Natural Law | Moral Philosophy Through the Ages

NATURAL LAW

From Moral Philosophy through the Ages (2nd edition), by James Fieser

CONTENTS

Introduction

Natural Law Defined

Aquinas's Natural Law Theory

Sexual Activities that are Contrary to Natural Law

The Relation between Eternal, Natural, Human, and Divine Law

The Synderesis Principle

Primary, Secondary, and Super-Added Principles

Secularized Natural Law Theories of Grotius, Hobbes and Pufendorf

Grotius: Natural Law Is Rooted Only in the Rational Instinct of Sociability

Hobbes: Natural Law is Rooted in the Instinct of Self-Preservation

Pufendorf: Natural Law is Rooted in the Instinct of Self-Preservation

Criticisms of Natural Law Theory

Hume's Criticism: Natural Law Theories Erroneously Derive Ought from Is

Bentham's Criticism: The Test for Conformity to Natural Law is actually Utility

Mill's Criticism: Natural Instincts provide no Guidance for Moral Conduct

Nielsen's Criticism: Can't Secularize Natural Law Theory since Nature is Purposeless

Lingering Issues with Natural Law Theory

Removing Biology from Natural Law Theory

References

Study Questions

INTRODUCTION

A long-running reality TV show called "Sister Wives" follows the polygamous family of Kody Brown and his four spouses. Throughout the episodes the characters openly discuss what motivated them to adopt their lifestyle, how this impacts their children, how the wives deal with jealousies, and what others think about them. It also shows them in their daily routines and how normal their situation feels to them. The show is probably the most intimate exposure of a polygamous family that has ever been available to the general public. When agreeing to do the series, Brown knew that he was risking prosecution under the anti-polygamy laws of his home state of Utah, but felt that it was worth the risk to present his side of this controversial issue. Sure enough, the day after the show first aired county police announced that they would investigate the family. It did not matter that Brown was only legally married to one of the women, since under Utah law the polygamy law is violated when a married person either marries another person or "cohabits with another person." While Brown was not prosecuted, the threat alone prompted him to file a suit against Utah challenging its anti-polygamy law. The case was ultimately thrown out after the county announced that it would only prosecute polygamy cases when abuse, violence or fraud were involved, which did not apply in Brown's situation.

The morality and legality of polygamous marriages has been a matter of debate for over two thousand years, and the most common argument against it is that it is unnatural. David Hume argued that we are by nature the lovers, friends and patrons of our spouses, and we should not willingly exchange this for the title of master and tyrant. Montesquieu argued that polygamy creates an unnatural passion that results in grotesquely unequal treatment of women. Henry Home argued that if undisguised nature reveals itself anywhere it is with children, and children clearly understand that monogamous marriages are natural. Polygamy is just one issue where philosophers have looked to nature to judge the moral rightness of some conduct, and other issues include abortion, euthanasia, war, and genetic engineering. In fact, an ethical approach called natural law theory uses "naturalness" as a litmus test for determining what is morally right or wrong on any issue.

Natural Law Defined

It is difficult to concisely define natural law theory. It is not a single theory per se, but a collection of different theories by different thinkers that do not all have the same features. The hunt for a good definition begins with two ancient sources, the first of which is Stoic philosophy which held that we should live in agreement with nature. Philosophers of this ancient Greek school believed that God permeates the entire world and strictly regulates all events. Everything in life happens according to a preordained rational plan, including natural disasters, the rise and fall of governments, and human conflicts. Our moral responsibility, then, is to conform our expectations to this preordained plan, and thus live in agreement with nature. Roman philosopher Cicero (106–43 BCE) describes this Stoic account of natural law here:

True law is right reason in agreement with nature; it is of universal application, unchanging and everlasting; it summons to duty by its commands, and averts from wrong doing by its prohibitions. We cannot be freed from its obligations by senate or people, and we need not look outside ourselves for an expounder or interpreter of it. And there will not be different laws at Rome and at Athens, or different laws now and in the future, but one eternal and unchanging law will be valid for all nations and all times and there will be one master and ruler, that is, God, over us all, for he is the author of this law, its promulgator, and its enforcing judge. (Republic, 3:22)

According to Cicero, God establishes within nature one eternal and unchanging moral law that applies to all countries. Whether we are from Rome or Athens, we are under the command of the same natural law. We discover this natural law by looking within ourselves, not by consulting any external political governing bodies, such as the Roman Senate. The commanding force of natural law is so strong that we are compelled to obey it.

The second ancient source of natural law theory is the texts of ancient Roman Law. Roman Law spans a thousand-years from around 450 BCE to 550 CE, and notions of natural law appear prominently in writings from its final few centuries. Within these texts there is a key distinction between natural laws that are the same throughout all nations, and civil laws that vary based on the unique preferences of those nations:

The laws of nature, which are observed by all nations alike, are established, as it were, by divine providence, and remain ever fixed and immutable. But the civil laws of each individual state are subject to frequent change, either by the tacit consent of the people, or by the subsequent enactment of another statute. [Institutes of Justinian, 1.2]

Some of the unchanging natural laws even apply to animals, such as procreation and the rearing of children. There is also the natural access that both humans and animals have to air, running water, and the sea. Other natural laws are more human-specific, and are designated as "laws of nations" indicating that these natural laws have been instituted in legal systems of countries throughout the world:

The rules established by a given state for its own members are peculiar to itself, and are called civil law. The rules constituted by natural reason for all are observed by all nations alike, and are called laws of nations. [Gaius Institutes, 1.2.8]

For example, from the earliest times, by natural law wild animals become the possessions of their captors, and precious stones immediately become the property of the finder. Roman law also discusses the source and authority behind natural law: the first quote above links natural law with a divine decree, and the second quote links it with natural reason.

From these early accounts in the Stoics and Roman Law, key elements of natural law theory emerge from which we can form this definition:

Natural law is (1) an unchanging and universal set of rules that are (2) established by God, (3) known through reason, and (4) differ from human-created laws that change.

Throughout our lives we encounter a confusing jumble of laws, some legal, some moral, some religious and others secular. The concept of natural law is a helpful tool for sorting through these, and establishing the authority behind some of those laws. For example, natural law principles might suggest that laws prohibiting murder are based on the high value that each of us places on our own lives, which gives them moral authority. By contrast, laws dictating which side of the road we drive on are more arbitrary social conventions, which gives them only legal authority. In this chapter we will look at some of the more influential moral discussions of natural law and important criticisms of them.

AQUINAS'S NATURAL LAW THEORY

Within the medieval Christian tradition, the most famous theory of natural law was offered by Italian philosopher and theologian Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274). However, his work was built upon a foundation laid by earlier Christian thinkers beginning with Augustine of Hippo (354 – 430 CE). While Augustine did not develop a full-fledged natural law theory, he did discuss the idea of an eternal law that governs the universe, which humans can partially grasp through reason. Natural law, Augustine argued, is a reflection of this eternal law that is imprinted on the human soul, and allows us to distinguish right from wrong through our conscience and rational faculties. We find all of these themes in Aquinas.

Aquinas has detailed accounts of natural law that appear in two distinct works, the first focuses specifically on the issue of sexual morality, and the other more generally on natural law theory.

Sexual Activities that are Contrary to Natural Law

Aquinas's first discussion of natural law theory appears in his work Summa Contra Gentiles (Summary Against the Gentiles), written between 1259 and 1265. The work was intended as a comprehensive defense of Christian doctrine against non-Christian views, particularly addressing Muslim and pagan philosophies. Aquinas's approach to natural law in this work is rooted in the concept of teleology: the idea that everything in nature has a proper end or purpose. He focuses specifically on sexual morality and argues that nature shows us that human sexual activity is aimed at procreation and should be conducted only in a monogamous marriage between a man and woman.

Aquinas's teleological approach was directly influenced by Aristotle's view that the good of each thing is determined by its ability to achieve its proper end. In sexual matters, according to Aquinas, human reason can discern what is right or wrong by observing the purpose of human faculties and behaviors. Actions, then, that deviate from these proper ends are considered unnatural and thereby immoral. In considering what our natural ends are, Aquinas relies on observations of both human physiology and human psychology. This takes into account both the biological realities of human reproduction and also the social and emotional aspects of human relationships. From a physiological standpoint, he argues that the natural purpose of semen is procreation, and any emission of semen outside the possibility of conception is contrary to nature and, therefore, wrong. This forms the basis of his arguments against various non-procreative sexual acts. Beyond mere biological function, he argues that psychological and social considerations say much about the need for the institution of marriage and the proper raising of children. For, the human psychological need for stable partnerships and the extended period of care needed for human offspring require long-term, monogamous relationships. Further, he argues against sexual relations outside of marriage on the grounds that it doesn't provide the stable environment necessary for raising children. He also condemns incest, arguing that it interferes with the natural expansion of social bonds through marriage to non-relatives.

Aquinas offers several natural law arguments specifically against polygamy. First, he argues that polygamy creates an imbalance in the marital relationship. He writes, "If then while the wife has one husband only, the husband has more than one wife, there will not be a friendship of equality on both sides, friendship consisting in a certain equality." This argument draws on the psychological need for equality in relationships and suggests that polygamy inherently creates an unfair power dynamic. Second, building on the equality argument, he contends that polygamy reduces the status of women to that of servants rather than equal partners. He writes, "There will not be the friendship of a free man with a free woman, but a sort of friendship of a slave with her master."

Third, he observes that in species where fathers invest in offspring care, monogamy is the norm. We even see this, he says, in the animal world: "In every species of animal in which the father takes any interest in the offspring, one male keeps company with one female only, as in all birds that rear their young in common." Further, human fathers have a special interest in knowing that their children are biologically theirs, which implies monogamy. Fourth, drawing on social and psychological factors, he argues that polygamy leads to household discord: "from one man having several wives there arises domestic discord, as experience shows." This practical argument suggests that polygamy is contrary to the natural human need for harmonious family life. Finally, he holds that polygamy interferes with our natural desire of "free enjoyment" of sexual union. This interference leads to jealousy and conflict, observing that "animals fight alike for food and for sexual jealousy."

The Relation between Eternal, Natural, Human, and Divine Law

Aquinas's second account of natural law comes from what is considered his masterpiece, Summa Theologica (Summary of Theology), which he composed near the end of his life between 1265 and 1274. His discussion of natural law here is a more lengthy and systematic analysis than what we've seen in his earlier Summa Contra Gentiles. He in fact subtitles that portion of Summa Theologica the "Treatise on Law".

In this work, Aquinas starts with the observation that there are four distinct kinds of law: eternal law, natural law, human law, and divine law. Eternal law is the most perfect and complete set of God's laws, which govern "the whole community of the universe." Similar to earlier Stoic notions of divine order, Aquinas also argues that God's rule permeates the universe. We might view eternal law as something like a master database of all of God's laws. From a moral standpoint, these laws include both general moral rules of conduct, such as "Murder is wrong," and more particular rules, such as "Angry employees should not kill their bosses." Only God has access to the complete list of rules, and we humans will at best have only partial knowledge of this list. Natural law, for Aquinas, is a subset of eternal law and includes only general rules of conduct, such as "Murder is wrong." In different ways, these rules are embedded in our human nature, and we access them through rational intuition.

Human law represents our attempt to deduce more specific rules from the general rules of natural law. For example, from the general rule that "murder is wrong," we might deduce the more specific rule that "angry employees should not kill their bosses." According to Aquinas, it is all too easy to make mistakes when deducing specific rules, and for that reason, we commonly assign this task to legislators and other legal experts. As long as governing bodies carefully and rationally deduce specific laws from natural law, then these specific laws will conform to eternal law. However, even the slightest error of reasoning may result in improper human laws, and these would clearly not be contained in eternal law. Finally, divine law is a special subset of eternal law that God reveals to us in divinely inspired texts, such as the Ten Commandments in the Hebrew Bible. The purpose behind divine law is to help eliminate human error when searching for moral rules. For example, we might not correctly grasp the general principle of natural law that "murder is wrong"; similarly, we might incorrectly deduce particular rules of human law. Divine law is a safeguard that helps us confirm our results.

In short, for Aquinas, all moral laws are ultimately grounded in God's unchanging eternal law, and we discover general rules of natural law through intuition. Legal experts then deduce more specific rules of human law from these, and in scriptural divine laws, we find examples of both general and specific rules. Since we do not have access to the complete list of eternal laws, morality begins, from our limited human perspectives, with a search for the general rules of natural law. But where do we begin looking for the general rules of natural law? Aquinas says that we must look to human nature as a guide:

[Each human being] has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end: and this participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. (Summa Theologica, 1a2ae, 90.2)

According to Aquinas, when God created us, he gave us natural instincts that reflect the general moral principles of natural law. There are two distinct levels of morally relevant instincts. First, God implanted in us an instinctive intuition that we should pursue our proper human end. Second, God implanted in us a series of instincts that define our proper end as living, reproducing, and rational creatures.

The Synderesis Principle

Concerning the first level of morally relevant instincts, the intuition to do good and avoid evil, Aquinas says that we get this through an intuitive faculty called synderesis. The word synderesis is a Greek term that means "innate moral consciousness." Christian theologians described it as a spark that ignites our conscience or the fuel that feeds our conscience. But Aquinas has a more precise psychological analysis of the synderesis faculty. First, he describes it as an instinctive habit. According to Aquinas, some human habits are very strong, such as the ability to acquire language, and others are much weaker, such as our inclination to be religious. For Aquinas, synderesis is a weak habit.

Second, Aquinas describes it as a component of our reason. According to Aquinas, sometimes we reason about things simply as a matter of speculation, such as whether 2 plus 3 equals 5. Other times, though, we reason about things for the practical purpose of performing an action, such as whether to get a drink from the refrigerator. For Aquinas, synderesis is an aspect of practical reasoning, and it involves reasoning about performing moral actions.

Third, as a habit of practical reasoning, synderesis involves reasoning from principles. Aquinas argues that reasoning always begins with general principles, and from these we deduce more specific things. For example, I may begin with the general principle that "all men are mortal" and deduce from that the more particular statement that "John is mortal." Practical reasoning similarly involves starting with the general principles and moving to specific things.

The synderesis faculty feeds us a single general principle of natural law, which commentators conveniently call the synderesis principle. Aquinas explicitly states the synderesis principle here:

Every agent acts on account of an end, and to be an end carries the meaning of to be good. Consequently the first principle for the practical reason is based on the meaning of good, namely that it is what all things seek after. And so this is the first command of law, "that good is to be sought and done, evil to be avoided." All other commands of natural law are based on this. Accordingly, then, the commands of natural law extend to all doing or avoiding of things recognized by the practical reason of itself as being human goods As converging on one common primary precept these various precepts of natural law all take on the nature of one natural law. (Summa Theologica, la2ae, 94.2)

In this passage, Aquinas states that the highest principle of natural law is that "good is to be sought and done, and evil to be avoided." At first, we might think that the synderesis principle is so general that it is almost useless. In fact, some critics of Aquinas say that his synderesis principle is an empty concept since it is true by definition; they claim that "doing good and avoiding evil" is simply built into the definition of "what is to be done and avoided."

However, the synderesis principle is not as meaningless as critics charge, particularly because Aquinas defines "good" and "evil" in a very specialized sense. Specifically, "good" is that which conforms to our proper human end, and "evil" is that which does not. Using somewhat technical jargon, Aquinas makes this point here:

The good or evil of an action, as of other things, depends on its fullness of being or its lack of that fullness. Now the first thing that belongs to the fullness of being seems to be that which gives a thing its species. (Summa Theologica, la2ae, 18.2)

The synderesis principle tells us that we should do those things that are conducive to our proper end and avoid those things that are not conducive to our proper end. More precisely, the synderesis principle contains two distinct parts:

1. If X is for our proper human end, then X ought to be done.

2. If X is not for a proper human end, then X ought not to be done.

From these two parts of the synderesis principle, we can deduce two separate lists of actions: (1) those that we should perform and (2) those that we should avoid. For simplicity, let's refer to these two parts of the synderesis principle as the "pursue good" and "avoid evil" clauses respectively.

The upshot of Aquinas's account of the synderesis principle is that it is a divinely implanted habit of practical reason that tells us to act according to our proper end. This is the highest principle of natural law, and from this we are to deduce more specific moral principles. There is clearly a religious element to Aquinas's theory insofar as God creates in us the instinctive synderesis faculty. However, according to Aquinas, we do not actually need to believe in God for the synderesis faculty to give us knowledge of natural law. We are all created with this instinct despite our individual religious views, and we all have the ability to grasp its meaning, just as we have the ability to grasp any other general rational principle. The genius of Aquinas's account of natural law in Summa Theologica is how he meticulously traces moral obligation from this highest and most general principle of natural law, to more specific rules of obligation, then right down to specific actions that we are obligated to perform. We turn to that next.

Primary, Secondary, and Super-Added Principles

We've seen that the first instinctive component of natural law is our innate knowledge of the synderesis principle, namely, that we should act according to our proper end. The second instinctive component of natural law involves a series of human inclinations that define our proper end as living, reproducing, and rational creatures. Aquinas argues that we must discover our proper human end by considering our most basic human natural inclinations. Following Aristotle's theory of human nature, Aquinas lists our basic inclinations according to three distinct faculties of the human psyche: the vegetative, appetitive, and rational faculties.

First, our vegetative faculty is responsible for keeping us alive through nutrition and growth. Arising from this faculty, then, we have an inclination for self-preservation. Second, our appetitive faculty provides us with an array of emotions and desires that prompt us to act out in different ways. From our appetitive faculty, we have an inclination to reproduce through heterosexual activities and to educate our offspring. Third, our rational faculty sets us apart from other animals, and from this we have inclinations to be rational, know God, and live in society. In total, then, Aquinas lists six human inclinations: (1) self-preservation, (2) heterosexual reproduction, (3) education of offspring, (4) rational thought, (5) knowledge of God, and (6) participation in society. Just as God implanted the synderesis principle within us, God also implanted these six inclinations within us. At this point, God's task is done, and it is up to us to discover the moral implications of the synderesis principle combined with our natural inclinations.

Aquinas argues that, from these six natural inclinations, we will discover six primary principles of natural law: (1) preserve human life, (2) have heterosexual intercourse, (3) educate children, (4) shun ignorance, (5) worship God, and, (6) avoid harming others. Aquinas notes specifically that divine law corroborates the last two of these: "You should love the Lord your God" and "You should love your neighbor." In any case, for Aquinas, we arrive at these six primary principles by logically deducing each of them from the synderesis principle. For example, with the sixth primary principle—avoid harming others—we can see the precise deduction process here:

1. All acts that are unsuitable for human ends are acts that we should not do.

2. All acts that harm others are acts that are unsuitable for human ends.

3. Therefore, all acts that harm others are acts that we should not do.

Premise 1 in this argument is the "avoid evil" clause of the synderesis principle. Premise 2 is based on the observation that humans instinctively live in society. Following the rules of syllogistic logic, from these two premises we deduce the primary principle of natural law: that we should avoid harming others. We deduce all six of the primary principles of natural law in a similar way. Aquinas believes that these deductions are so intuitive that any reasonable person can arrive at these six primary principles.

Aquinas argues that the deduction process does not stop here with the six primary principles of natural law. Rather, we must continue to draw out more precise secondary moral principles. At this stage, we leave the domain of natural law and enter the domain of human law. For example, from the primary principle "avoid harming others," we can deduce a secondary principle that we should not unjustifiably kill others:

(1) All acts that harm others are acts that we should not do.

(2) All acts of unjustified killing are acts that harm others.

(3) Therefore, all acts of unjustified killing are acts that we should not do.

Premise 1 in this argument is the primary principle that we should avoid harming others, which we previously deduced from the synderesis principle. Premise 2 is the observation that we harm others when we unjustifiably kill people. For Aquinas, this is a premise that is supplied through the "careful reflection of wise people." Following the rules of syllogistic logic once again, from these two premises we deduce the secondary principle of human law that we should not kill people unjustifiably. When deducing secondary principles of human law, any mistake of reasoning will pervert its connection with natural law. For this reason, unlike the primary principles that can be deduced by everyone, secondary principles of human law require "careful reflection of wise people." To guard against errors at this level, divine law has confirmed the most general precepts of human law in the Ten Commandments.

Aquinas argues that the deduction process continues further by drawing out even more specific principles, which he calls "super-added principles." We derive these directly from secondary moral principles. At this stage, we leave the domain of natural law and enter the domain of human law. For example, from the secondary principle "do not kill people unjustifiably," we can deduce a super-added principle that employees should not kill their bosses:

(1) All acts of unjustified killing are acts that we should not do.

(2) All acts of killing one's boss are acts of unjustified killing.

(3) Therefore, all acts of killing one's boss are acts that we should not do.

Premise 1 in this argument is the secondary principle that we should not kill others unjustifiably. Premise 2 is an observation by legal experts that we are not justified in killing our bosses at work. From this we deduce the super-added principle that we should not kill our bosses. The force of natural law diminishes as we move to increasingly specific principles. The reason, according to Aquinas, is that specific cultures have their own views as to what counts as harm or unjustified murder. For example, if I am an indentured servant in a developing country and my boss routinely tortures me, I may indeed be morally justified in killing that person. So, as we move further away from the self-evident primary principles of natural law, we must rely more and more on the judgments of wise people and legal experts.

Here, then, is a final illustration that links together all the deductive stages, beginning with the "avoid evil" clause of the synderesis principle, on through primary, secondary, and super-added principles:

(1) All acts that are unsuitable for human ends are acts that we should not do. ("avoid evil" clause of the synderesis principle)

(2) All acts that harm others are acts that are unsuitable for human ends. (based on the inclination of humans to live in society)

(3) Therefore, all acts that harm others are acts we should not do. (primary principle of natural law)

(4) All acts of stealing are harmful acts. (observation by wise people)

(5) Therefore, all acts of stealing are acts we should not do. (secondary principle of human law)

(6) All acts of fraud are acts of stealing, (observation by legal experts)

(7) Therefore, all acts of fraud are acts we should not do. (super-added principle)

To summarize, the key points of Aquinas's theory of natural law are these:

• Natural law consists of general principles of eternal law that God fixes in human nature.

• Our instinctive synderesis faculty informs us of the highest principle of natural law: We should act according to our proper end.

• Six specific natural inclinations define our proper end and give us six primary principles of natural law.

• From primary principles of natural law, we deduce secondary and superadded principles of human law.

SECULAR NATURAL LAW THEORIES OF GROTIUS, HOBBES AND PUFENDORF

Aquinas was canonized by the Catholic Church around fifty years after his death, and his writings became enormously influential, including his views on natural law. Even today, within Catholic circles, the term "natural law" refers specifically to Aquinas's views on the subject. However, a new approach to natural law theory was forged within seventeenth-century protestant Europe. This moved away from Aquinas's approach that ground natural law in Aristotelean teleology, where we discover what we should do by investigating our natural purpose or end. Rather, this new approach grounded it in human reason and the need for social harmony. As such, this new approach is often called "rational" or "secular" or "modernist" natural law. The three philosophers associated with this view are Dutch-born Hugo Grotius (1583–1645), English-born Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) and German-born Samuel von Pufendorf (1632–1694). The two names "Grotius and Pufendorf" specifically were almost always paired together in discussions of nature law over the following century.

Grotius: Natural Law Is Rooted Only in the Rational Instinct of Sociability

In the opening section of his landmark book The Law of War and Peace (1625), Grotius announces that he aims to systematize Roman law since "the welfare of mankind demands that this task be accomplished." By analyzing Roman law directly, Grotius was looking at a natural law tradition that predated Aquinas, and Grotius thereby avoided many of the assumptions that Aquinas made. Specifically, Grotius does not attempt to base natural law on a wide range of human inclinations, such as Aquinas's list of six. Taking his lead from Stoicism, Grotius considers only one human inclination, that of sociability:

Among the traits characteristic of man is an impelling desire for society, that is, for the social life—not of any and every sort, but peaceful, and organized according to the measure of his intelligence, with those who are of his own kind; this social trend the Stoics called "sociableness." [On the Law of War and Peace, Prolegomena, 6]

According to Grotius, we are naturally inclined to live in peaceful societies with other intelligent and like-minded humans. This basic fact of human sociability is the foundation of natural law:

This maintenance of the social order, which we have roughly sketched, and which is consonant with human intelligence, is the source of law properly so called. [Ibid., 8]

For Grotius, then, the highest principle of natural law is simply to be sociable. Like previous natural law theorists, Grotius also believed that we can deduce more specific rules of natural law from this highest principle. He lists five particular rules: (1) Do not take things that belong to others, (2) restore to other people anything that you might have of theirs, (3) fulfill promises, (4) compensate for any loss that results through your own fault, and (5) punish people as deserved. These more specific rules focus largely on issues of personal property and punishment, and it seems clear that the list is not complete. For example, we do not see rules about sexual behavior, family responsibilities, religious obligations, and similar moral issues that philosophers of the time commonly addressed. However, Grotius is not interested in offering a handbook of morality for use in our ordinary lives. Instead, he wants to explain the foundation of international laws that apply to warring nations around the world. What are the causes of war? When are wars justified? How can we maintain peace? Grotius's five specific rules of natural law help answer these questions, and through them he hoped to set the standard of proper conduct for all countries around the world.

Although Grotius did not draw out the implications of natural law for our day-to-day moral behavior, he did set the agenda for natural law philosophers after him. In Grotius's view, as we search for the rules of natural law that govern our personal lives, we should look toward our instinct of sociability, and not the broader list of six instincts that Aquinas suggested.

Hobbes and Pufendorf: Natural Law is Rooted in the Instinct of Self-Preservation

Like Grotius, Hobbes sees laws of nature as the basis for establishing peaceful societies and ending armed conflicts. However, unlike Grotius, Hobbes explains in great detail how laws of nature impact our daily moral behavior. As Hobbes begins his account of natural law, he immediately parts company with Grotius concerning the instinct of sociability: for Hobbes, humans simply have no such natural inclination. Not only do we lack instinctive sociability, but our human selfish nature continually hinders our ability to live sociably with one another. We have differing likes and dislikes in virtually everything—from our favorite foods to our political views. From these differences arise "disputes, controversies, and at last war." Hobbes also explains how we differ from other, more sociable animal species, such as ants, which naturally live peacefully in groups. Unlike ants, we humans continually compete with one another for honor, and we take great pleasure in acquiring more things than our neighbors. We also commonly think that we are smarter than our leaders, and we have rhetorical skills that enable us to make evil things appear to be good.

Having rejected the instinct of sociability, Hobbes finds another instinct upon which to base natural law: the instinct of self-preservation. Self-preservation is so central to Hobbes's account of natural law that he even defines "law of nature" as a rational principle that mandates self-preservation:

A Law of Nature (lex naturalis) is a precept or general rule, found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do that which is destructive of his life or taketh away the means of preserving the same, and to omit that by which he thinketh it may be best preserved. (Leviathan, 1.14)

Hobbes lists twelve specific laws of nature, each of which is rooted in our inherent need to survive. His first and most important law of nature is "to seek peace, and follow it . . . [and] by all means we can, to defend ourselves." Hobbes believes that the best way to preserve ourselves is to live in peace with other people, but if we cannot do this, then we should defend ourselves any way we can.

Pufendorf was directly influenced by both Grotius and Hobbes. Pufendorf relates a story that, when once imprisoned and having no access to his library, he wrote a book on natural law titled Elements of Universal Jurisprudence, drawing on what he could remember from what he had earlier read in works by Grotius and Hobbes. Pufendorf follows Grotius's view that the foundation of natural law is sociability. He writes, "it appears that this is a fundamental law of nature: to the extent that we can, every person ought to preserve and promote society, that is, the welfare of mankind." However, Pufendorf holds that humans have two paths for discovering this. First, similar to Grotius, we are led to this awareness through the "light of reason", without the need for any arguments or deductions. His second path, though, echoes Hobbes: self-preservation drives us more than all of our other natural inclinations, and we eventually realize that our best chance of survival is to be sociable. Pufendorf portrays a combative state of nature very similar to Hobbes:

So, then, man is an animal which is very desirous of his own preservation. He is liable to many wants, unable to support himself without the help of others of his kind, and yet wonderfully fit in society to promote a common good. But then his is malicious, insolent, and easily provoked, and not less prone to do harm to his fellow man than he is capable of executing it. From this it must be inferred that to attain our self-preservation, it is absolutely necessary that we be sociable. (The Duty of Man and Citizen, 1.3)

According to Pufendorf, we are too weak to survive on our own, and so we must rely on help from others. Thus, whether we learn this through the light of reason or through a bitter lesson from human survival, the fundamental principle of natural law is sociability, and all moral obligations follow from this.

Like Aquinas, Pufendorf also examines whether polygamy is or is not against natural law. He states that, among the learned, there is no clear answer. After presenting the arguments pro and contra, he thus leaves it to the reader to decide. According to Pufendorf the main arguments for the compatibility of polygamy and natural law are these. Polygamy can fulfill the regular ends of matrimony, such as certainty of offspring and mutual assistance, just as well as monogamy. Critics of polygamy have argued that conjugal fidelity needs to be reciprocal to be fair, but defenders held that mutual fidelity does not require equal performances from both sides, but only equal consideration. Finally, polygamy has been practiced by many nations historically, and is still practiced in some cultures, which suggests it is not inherently unnatural or unlawful. From the opposing side of the issue, the main arguments for the incompatibility of polygamy and natural law are these. Polygamy may be a violation of the marriage covenant, especially if the original contract between the parties did not allow for additional spouses. Also, Polygamy can lead to jealousy, domestic quarrels, and hatred among rival mothers, which can negatively impact the family and society. Finally, polygamy violates the natural equality of humankind, since it imposes unequal conditions on men and women.

While Pufendorf seems neutral on whether polygamy strictly speaking violates natural law, he gives a final pragmatic assessment in favor of monogamy: "the most decent, the most proper, and the most peaceable way of wedding is for one to live contented with one" (Law of Nature and of Nations, 6.1.17). Even in cultures where polygamy is allowed, he notes, men often single out a beloved wife, indicating a natural inclination towards monogamy. The practical benefits of monogamy, he continues, are better family management, fewer domestic quarrels, and the prevention of poverty and social disorder due to an excessive number of children.

Of the three secular theories of natural law presented by Grotius, Hobbes, and Pufendorf respectively, Pufendorf's is the one that synthesizes the intuitions of sociability and survival. His is also the natural law theory that became most influential in the following two centuries. Here are the main points of his theory:

• Our knowledge of natural law is founded upon some aspect of human psychology, such as sociability or self-preservation.

• There is a single fundamental natural law which is we should be sociable.

• All moral obligations are built upon this fundamental natural law to be sociable.

CRITICISMS OF NATURAL LAW THEORY

Natural law theories make bold claims about the universal nature of morality and our ability to discover what those moral truths are. We will look at four criticisms of natural law theory that question these claims.

Hume's Criticism: Natural Law Theories Erroneously Derive Ought from Is

The first is by Scottish philosopher David Hume (1771–1776). He argues that there is a big difference between statements of fact, such as "Stealing is harmful to society," and statements of obligation, such as "You should not steal." We establish statements of fact through observation and scientific investigation. For example, a sociologist could confirm the claim that "stealing is harmful to society." By contrast, Hume believes that we cannot establish statements of obligation through observation or scientific investigation. For example, no sociological study can establish the moral mandate that "you should not steal." According to Hume, moral theories commonly err by beginning with statements of fact, but then concluding with statements of obligation. His point is summed up with the motto "We cannot derive ought from is." Philosophers today describe this as the fact-value problem. That is, facts and values are so radically different from each other that moral philosophers create a problem when using facts to defend a moral value.

While Hume does not mention any natural law theorists by name in his critique, he is nevertheless frequently credited with targeting natural law philosophers. Aquinas, for example, begins with facts about our six human inclinations and concludes that we ought to follow the six primary principles of natural law. Grotius begins with the fact about our instinctive sociability and concludes that we ought to be sociable. Hobbes begins with the fact of self-preservation and concludes that we ought to seek peace to preserve ourselves. Finally, Pufendorf begins with the fact of self-preservation and concludes that we ought to be sociable to survive.

What should we think about Hume's is-ought critique of natural law theory? Hume is certainly correct that natural law philosophers derive ought from is, and they do so more blatantly than most other moral philosophers. However, we need to ask, what is so bad about deriving ought from is? One problem is that there is too much flexibility in how we deduce ought statements from is statements. For example, from the natural inclination toward self-preservation, Aquinas infers that we should always preserve our lives and never resort to suicide, even when terminally ill. However, there are more modest inferences that natural law theories could make. For instance, we might reasonably deduce that we should preserve our lives in cases of self-defense, but we are morally permitted to end our lives when terminally ill. For every instinct mentioned by natural law philosophers, there are both extreme and modest conclusions that we can draw, and the differences between the two can be dramatic. The problem here, though, is that it seems that something more than mere facts guides us when selecting the extreme versus the modest recommendation. We might be guided by our intuitions, our personal feelings, or our social customs, and, if so, the pure facts are far less important than natural law philosophers believe. So, although it may appear as if we are simply deducing obligations of moral law from facts about natural inclination, we are not really doing this. Rather, we are relying on some other means of moral assessment. We should then just drop the factual facade in our moral theories and instead highlight the true basis of moral assessment, whether that is intuition, personal feeling, social custom, or something else.

Bentham's Criticism: The Test for Conformity to Natural Law is actually Utility

A second criticism of natural law theory is by English philosopher Jeremy Bentham (1748–1832), who was one of the founders of the utilitarian moral theory, which says that we determine the rightness of an action based on whether it produces more pleasure than pain. No other moral test is needed, whether its virtues, moral duty, divine command, or natural law. According to Bentham phrases like the "Law of Nature" are just empty words without substantive meaning. The only way to prove that an act violates a so-called "natural law" is to show its harmful consequences. In that sense, natural law theory is just utilitarianism in disguise. Bentham's critique plays out when we look at the arguments by Aquinas and Pufendorf regarding polygamy and natural law. Both speak of the benefits of monogamy such as fulfilling the psychological need for equality, giving fathers assurance that their child is biologically theirs, promoting stable family structures, supporting domestic harmony, and reducing potential conflict within the household. By contrast, the harms of polygamy involve undermining mutual respect, reducing women's roles to that of subordinates, and creating jealousy. If the actual moral test that these philosophers use is the balance of benefit vs. harm, then the whole concept of natural law is empty, and they should just admit to being utilitarians.

The same problem extends to philosophers who to try prove that a state law contradicts natural law by demonstrating the law's harm. To make matters worse, Bentham argues, natural law doctrine tends to encourage people to rebel against any law they personally dislike, justifying their reaction by appeals to conscience rather than observable facts about benefit and harm. True utilitarianism, by contrast, can provide decisions that neither party in a dispute would theoretically reject, potentially reconciling opposing viewpoints.

Is Bentham correct that natural law theory brings nothing to the table and, at best is just utilitarianism in disguise? Here are two responses to Bentham that natural law defenders might make. First, natural law theory allows for the existence of moral absolutes, such as the inviolability of human life, which cannot be overridden by utilitarian calculations. A common objection to utilitarianism is that, in some circumstances, an otherwise immoral action might bring about more benefit than harm. Take, for example, assassinating a political rival in the interest of maintaining social stability. We often think that some actions such as murder are wrong without exception, and this is where natural law theory might help. It allows for the existence of moral absolutes, such as the inviolability of human life, which cannot be overridden by utilitarian calculations. It thus provides a safeguard against potential abuses that could arise from a pure cost-benefit analysis.

A second response to Bentham is this: the fact that natural law theorists discuss benefits and harms doesn't necessarily mean they are "utilitarians in disguise." Instead, it suggests that natural law and utilitarianism can be complementary approaches, with natural law providing the foundational principles and utilitarianism offering a method for applying those principles in specific contexts. Suppose we acknowledge that assassinating a political rival is forbidden by natural law based on a principle such as the inviolability of all human life. Nevertheless, a utilitarian cost-benefit analysis might suggest an alternative non-lethal option for subduing an especially destabilizing rival.

In fairness to utilitarianism, though, it has a long history of refining the utilitarian test for moral rightness in ways that stand up to challenges like these two. Utilitarians would say that they don't need help from natural law theorists to determine which moral rules are inviolable, and a carefully devised utilitarian principle will do just that. Thus, for the utilitarian, Bentham's initial criticism remains: natural law theory at its best is just utilitarianism in disguise.

Mill's Criticism: Natural Instincts provide no Guidance for Moral Conduct

We've seen that Aquinas, Grotius and Pufendorf all ground natural law upon one or more human instincts. English utilitarian philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) attacks just this point and argues that natural instincts are typically things that we should overcome and should not be looked upon as a foundation for what we ought to do morally. As he states it, "nearly every respectable attribute of humanity is the result not of instinct, but of a victory over instinct" ("Nature" in Three Essays on Religion, 1874). There are for key points to his argument. First, the idea that goodness is natural, Mill argues, only emerged after long periods of artificial education made good behaviors habitual. In earlier times, philosophers viewed humans in their natural state as more akin to wild animals, requiring "taming" to develop moral character. Even virtues that seem instinctive, like courage, are actually triumphs over our natural inclinations. Fear, he says, is one of the most natural human emotions, and courage is the result of conquering this instinct through cultivation. Second, contrary to the belief that humans are naturally altruistic, Mill argues that selfishness is our natural state. Even people with sympathetic characters, if left uncultivated, tend towards a kind of "sympathetic selfishness," caring only for those close to them while being indifferent or unjust to others.

Third, Mill argues, key moral qualities like truthfulness and justice are not natural to humans, but rather artificial constructs developed through social and legal conventions. For instance, the concept of justice as we understand it today evolved from the value that society found in adhering to consistent laws, not from an innate sense of fairness. What's worse, Mill argues, some instincts, such as destructiveness or cruelty, are so harmful and should be suppressed rather than indulged. So too with the human instinct of domination, which is "a delight in exercising despotism, in holding other beings in subjection to our will". Fourth, most bad actions are, in fact, perfectly natural in that they arise from natural feelings. Thus, rather than following nature, we have an obligation to amend it. All useful human action consists of improving upon the spontaneous course of nature, bringing it more in line with our conceptions of justice and goodness. "The duty of man," he writes, "is to co-operate with the beneficent powers, not by imitating but by perpetually striving to amend the course of nature—and bringing that part of it over which we can exercise control, more nearly into conformity with a high standard of justice and goodness." As a utilitarian, Mill held along with Bentham that the standards of justice and goodness we should follow are those which maximize general happiness.

What should we think about Mill's criticism that instincts provide no guidance for moral conduct? With at least some instincts that natural law philosophers appeal to, Mill is correct. A case in point is the instinct to procreate that Aquinas draws upon as the foundation for his conception of sexual morality. One problem is that Aquinas mischaracterizes that urge: it is not so much an inclination to procreate that we have, but rather a blind impulse towards sexual activity itself, which may or may not have the effect of procreation. Let us presume that that when animals copulate they don't do so with the conscious aim of creating offspring, but do so from sheer drive. Humans, with our superior intellect, may only be slightly different than animals. In most cases we copulate hoping that we do not create offspring, assuming we give it any thought at all when in the moment. If there is a moral mandate that comes from this raw impulse for sex it is simply "go for it!" This does not lead to any of moral constraints on sex that Aquinas lists. What does constrain us are the foreseeable consequences of unprotected sex in our specific circumstances, as a utilitarian would say. But even when the aim of the sexual impulse is to create offspring, that still does not lead to Aquinas's list of moral constraints on sex, as our discussion of polygamy suggests. Pufendorf, we've seen, held that it's not clear whether natural law prefers monogamy over polygamy. Now, it is true that society may gang up on polygamists, unwed mothers, divorcees, fornicators, and adulterers. But that is society, not natural instinct.

The case for connecting sexual instincts with natural laws of morality, then is weak. But what about the human instinct to live within society, which both Aquinas and Grotius hold: doesn't that more obviously lead to moral rules about sociability? The problem here is that a mere instinct to live within a community has no immediate bearing on the kind of society that will be. Recall Mill's point about the instinct to dominate others: this would naturally lead to a society abounding with bullying, abuse, manipulation, exploitation, and slavery. Couple that with our instinct towards violence, and society could be a hellscape for humans, except for those at the top of the food chain. A mere impulse to live within society won't do it, and it would have to be one coupled with an impulse towards fairness and non-violence before it would even approach a society worth living in. Again, for the utilitarian, we value a society that is fair and non-violent, not because of any natural instinct towards it, but because we see that it promotes happiness.

Nielsen's Criticism: Can't Secularize Natural Law Theory since Nature is Purposeless

Throughout this discussion I have presented natural law theory in a way that was not necessaryily dependent upon the existence of God. Aquinas did hold that God as our creator imprints natural law upon human nature. However, Aquinas's conception of human purpose draws on Aristotle who did not bring God into the picture in his ethics. For Aristotle, all living things in the natural world have a function that displays their purpose. We can take this as a brute fact, if we prefer, and just leave out Aquinas's theological component of natural law. In fact, a benefit of these natural law theories is that they allow for a secular interpretation.

However, American philosopher Kai Nielsen (1926–2021) does not think secularization of natural law theory is even possible. The cornerstone of Aquinas's natural law theory, he suggests, is that human nature has a purpose (teleology). If I ask you "what are chairs for?" you'd have a good answer since you know that chairs were designed by people for a particular purpose. Suppose next I asked you "what are people for?" While this question is linguistically similar to the first one about chairs, it will be impossible for you to answer it in an analogous way if there was no divine creator of human nature who designed us with a purpose. Nielsen writes that "From a scientific point of view it has been denied that we can speak meaningfully of 'the nature of human nature'" ("An Examination"). Even if anthropologists discovered some common core to the human animal, this would not establish natural law theory since that common core would not by itself define our purpose. Having a human nature is one thing, but having a purpose to our human nature is another. Nielsen emphasizes that morality can still be rational even if human nature lacks a purpose. Rejection of Aquinas's theory "need not entail nihilism, cynicism, subjectivism, or relativism. And it does not even entail that there are no 'natural moral goods'" (Ibid., p. 71). For, he says, there are alternative accounts of both morality and human nature, Utilitarianism being just one.

Is Nielsen correct that Aquinas's account of natural law fails if there is no divine creator? The short answer is that the more committed a natural law theory is to Aristotelean teleology, the more relevant Nielsen's criticism becomes. For, Aristotelian teleology assumes a unified, overarching purpose for human beings, which informs how we ought to behave. This unified purpose is more plausible if humans were divinely created with built-in goals. By contrast, within a naturalistic worldview, human traits are the result of evolutionary processes, which don't necessarily produce a single coherent purpose. Aquinas was fully committed to Aristotelean teleology, but at the same time he was equally committed against a naturalistic world view. Thus, the removal of a divine creator leaves no source for an over-arching human purpose upon which to ground natural law. There certainly are non-teleological approaches to natural law, such as those by Grotius and Pufendorf, which could withstand the removal of a creator God. The question, though, is how much can we remove teleology from Aquinas's natural law theory before it becomes too foreign for his name to be associated with. We will look at this next.

LINGERING ISSUES WITH NATURAL LAW THEORY

Aquinas's emphasis on physiology and Pufendorf's emphasis on human psychology were innovative for their time and brought moral philosophy out of the clouds and down to earth where we could seek out moral standards by looking at human nature. However, their views of human nature seem antiquated by today's standards. If we reject their biological and psychological assumptions, is there anything left to natural law theory that is worth salvaging?

Removing Biology from Natural Law Theory

Australian philosopher John Finnis (b. 1940) thinks there is. His main innovation lies in his focus on practical reasoning and basic goods, which he identifies as intrinsic aspects of human well-being. Finnis posits seven basic goods: life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience, sociability, practical reasonableness, and religion. These goods, he believes, are self-evident and objective aspects of human flourishing, known through reason rather than mere natural impulses or biological inclinations. We grasp these goods through rational reflection as things worth pursuing for their own sake, rather than deriving them from observations about human nature. This doesn't mean they are immediately obvious, but rather that once understood, they don't require further justification. Finnis states that "Some readers, of course, grumble about appeals to self-evidence. But self-evident propositions, though they cannot and need not be proved, can be defended sufficiently against objections" (Natural Law and Natural Rights, p. 444). In short, Finnis is swapping out Aquinas's list of natural instincts for his own list of rationally intuitive basic goods. If his list of basic goods is a decent one, then, yes, this may be a more acceptable way of approaching natural law.

However, a common criticism of Finnis's theory is that he does not adequately justify the specific basic goods he identifies. For example, it is not clear that aesthetic experience or religion are truly fundamental to human flourishing or whether they reflect a more contingent cultural value. Regarding play, while it may contribute to human enjoyment and development, it does not seem to have the same moral weight as goods like friendship or life. Regarding knowledge, it is unclear why knowledge should be valued for its own sake rather than for the benefits it brings, such as technological advancement or problem-solving. Bentham would argue that Finnis has fallen into the exact same trap that other natural law philosophers have: to defend his specific list of basic goods, he needs to show that they maximize happiness. This, then, makes utilitarianism the standard of rightness, not Finnis's basic goods.

There may be an alternative way of modernizing natural law theory in a way that doesn't fall back on rationally self-evident basic goods. Rather than rejecting biology as the basis for morality, maybe we should embrace it, particularly in the form of evolutionary theory. A scientifically-informed modern reader who looks at Aquinas's list of instincts can't help but see what he was foreshadowing. Darwin himself examines several of these inclinations, including human mating, human sociability, and even religion, explaining how the development of each aided in human survival. He also discusses the degree to which they are either truly instinctive or just pragmatic social creations. This is the subject of evolutionary ethics, now more commonly referred to as sociobiology, which we will address in a later chapter. It remains to be seen whether this evolutionary approach to modernizing natural law theory can succeed any better than Finnis's rationalistic approach. But evolutionary theory would at least be consistent with the "natural" aspect of natural law theory, which historically looked to biology to tell us what is natural.

REFERENCES

Aquinas, Thomas. "The Treatise on Law" (1a2ae, q. 90–144) Summa Theologica, translated by Laurence Shapcote, Fathers of the English Dominican Province (London, 1911–36).

Bentham, Jeremy. The quotation from Bentham is from Chrestomathia: being a collection of papers (1816), Appendix 4, Section 20, note, from The Works of Jeremy Bentham, edited by John Bowring (London, 1838–43).

Cicero. The Republic (De Re Publica), 3.22, translated by Clinton Walker Keyes (Harvard University Press, 1928).

Finnis, John. Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford University Press, 2011).

Grotius, Hugo. On the Law of War and Peace (De jure belli ac pads, 1625), Prolegomena, translated by Francis W. Kelsey (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1925).

Hobbes, Thomas. The quotation by Hobbes is from Leviathan (1651), 1.14. Various editions.

Home, Henry. Sketches of the History of Man (1774), 1.1.6.

Hume, David. "Of Polygamy" in Essays, Moral Political and Literary (1742). Various editions.

Hume, David. Hume's view about not deriving ought from is can be found in his Treatise of Human Nature (1739–40), 3.1.1. Various editions

Mill, John Stuart. Three Essays on Religion (1874), "Nature". Various editions.

Montesquieu. Spirit of the Laws (1748), 16.6. Various editions.

Nielsen, Kai. "An Examination of the Thomistic Theory of Natural Moral Law." The American Journal of Jurisprudence, Volume 4, Issue 1, 1 January 1959.

Pufendorf, Samuel von. Of the Law of Nature and Nations (Dejure Naturae et Gentium, 1762).

Pufendorf, Samuel von. The Whole Duty of Man according to the Law of Nature (London, 1691), a seventeenth-century English translation of his book De officio hominis et civis juxta legem naturalem (1673).

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. What is the concept of natural law in Stoicism?

2. What is the concept of natural law in Roman law?

3. What are the key features of natural law?

4. According to Aquinas, what types of sexual practices are acceptable or forbidden by natural law?

5. What is Aquinas's argument against polygamy?

6. Describe Aquinas's distinctions between eternal law, natural law, human law, and divine law.

7. What are the two parts of Aquinas's synderesis principle?

8. List the six human inclinations and their corresponding six primary precepts of morality.

9. Give an example of how we deduce secondary moral principles from primary principles.

10. What is a "super-added principle" of morality?

11. According to Grotius, what is the highest principle of natural law and the five rules he deduces from them?

12. According to Hobbes, what is a law of nature?

13. What was Pufendorf's highest principle of natural law, and what are the two ways we gain knowledge of it?

14. What are Pufendorf's arguments for and against polygamy?

15. What are the key points of Grotius's and Pufendorf's views of natural law?

16. What is Hume's criticism of natural law theory, and what is the response to this criticism given in the chapter?

17. What is Bentham's criticism of natural law theory, and what is the response to this criticism given in the chapter?

18. What is Mill's criticism of natural law theory, and what is the response to this criticism given in the chapter?

19. What is Nielsen's criticism of natural law theory, and what is the response to this criticism given in the chapter?

20. What is Finnis's version of natural law theory, and what is the response to this given in the chapter?

[Short Essay]

21. Short essay: pick any one of the following views in this chapter and criticize it in a minimum of 100 words. The Stoic view of natural law; Aquinas's method of deducting lower principles of natural law from higher ones; Grotius's five rules of natural law; Hobbes's conception of natural law; Pufendorf's view of natural law; one of the responses to Hume, Bentham, Mill, Nielsen, or Finnis.