STOICISM

From Ancient and Medieval Philosophy: Essential Selections, by James Fieser

© 2008, updated 1/1/2026, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

CONTENTS

Introduction

Lives of Stoics

Summaries

Logic

Natural Philosophy

God

The Soul

Fate and the Eternal Recurrence

Reconciling Free Will with Fate and Necessity

Ethics

Roman Stoicism: Reducing Passions, Attaining Tranquility, Cosmopolitanism

Study Questions

 

INTRODUCTION

The school of Stoicism emerged during the Hellenistic period in Athens shortly after the death of Aristotle, and over subsequent centuries it experienced an early, middle and late stage of activity. The early one is represented by the first three heads of the Stoic school in Athens during the third-century BCE, namely Zeno of Citium (335–263 BCE), Cleanthes (331–232 BCE), and Chrysippus (279–206 BCE). They developed elaborate theories of logic, physics and ethics, and the views of Chrysippus in particular are what we today commonly associate with classic Stoicism. During the second phase, in the second-century BCE, the heads of Stoicism took a more eclectic approach, combining Stoic teachings Platonism and Aristotelianism. In the first-century BCE, the center of philosophy shifted from Athens to Rome, which marks the start of Stoicism's third phase, which concentrated on the therapeutic benefits of the Stoic perspective of life. As Stoicism evolved throughout these periods, it became the most popular of the competing philosophical systems. The focus of this chapter is mainly on Stoicism's early period. Unfortunately, no complete works of its three first leaders survive, and, like Presocratic philosophy, all that remains are summaries and quotations by later writers who had access to their works before they disappeared.

          The early Stoics divided their philosophy into logic, physics and ethics, and illustrated the relation between the three with the metaphor of a walled garden of fruit-bearing trees: physics is the trees that nourish the fruit of ethics, and the wall of logic protects them both from attack. As to logic, there are two main parts: an analysis of sentences and an analysis of argument forms. As to sentences, or "assertible" statements as Stoics call them, there are four main types which have different logical connectives. Using modern terminology, they are,

• Conditional (if-then): "If it is day, then it is light."

• Conjunction (and): "It is day and it is light."

• Disjunction (or): "It is day or it is night"

• Negation (not): "It is not day"

As to arguments, there are several different argument forms, but two important ones are these, again using modern terminology:

• Modus ponens

If Plato is alive then Plato must be breathing.

Plato is alive

Therefore, Plato must be breathing

• Disjunctive syllogism

It is night or it is day

It is not night

Therefore, it is day

As to physics, or natural philosophy, the Stoics held that the whole cosmos is spherical and surrounded by an infinite vacuum. It is a single living thing, like an animal, and it possesses a rational principle that they variously called fate, mind, God, logos. The emphasis is pantheistic, where God and reason are not a separate thing from the world, but embedded in the material world itself. This pantheistic theme appears in Cleanthes' "Hymn to Zeus". Stoics held that the human soul is a material thing, like hot breath, which leaves the body at death, circulates with other things, and is ultimately destroyed in the fire of the world's destruction. Through the rational principle of the world, everything is controlled by fate, which involves an elaborate web of causal interconnections between all things. Also, everything has within in it a seed of reason, or seminal principle (logos spermatikos), which creates and takes back all things. According to their theory of the eternal return (ekpyrosis), the world came into existence through fire, will eventually be destroyed by fire, and from that same fire a new identical world will be born. This cycle of creation and destruction continues forever.

          Stoics accepted that fate is a determining force in our lives, but at the same time they attempted to reconcile fate with free will. A selection below by Cicero discusses Chrysippus's efforts to show how fate and free will are compatible. Chrysippus accepted three features of fate: (1) logical bivalence: all future events are already either true or false, (2) causal necessity: all things happen by prior causes within a vast interconnection of causes, (3) fatalism: all future events are fated. Is there any room left for free will? Chrysippus says yes and makes his case by distinguishing between (a) external causes where fate controls the major events outside of us, and (b) internal causes, where our minds can control only minor aspects of those major events. Chrysippus gives an analogy: a cylinder rolls down a hill and bounces as it goes. The main downward direction of the cylinder is controlled by external laws of nature (i.e., external causes by fate), but the bumpiness is a function of the cylinder's internal construction (i.e., internal causes by our minds). Thus, fate controls the big things in our lives, but not the small ones.

          Stoic ethics is multifaceted and includes discussions of natural inclination, virtues, mental and non-mental goods, things that are neither good nor bad, moral duties, and the passions. Natural inclinations involve a kind of natural law where all animals live according to instinctive predispositions, but humans as rational animals live according to natural reason. All the other components of ethics are linked in some way with natural inclinations. The Stoics also put forward a set of paradoxes that followed from their ethics (1) all moral offences are equal, (2) the wise are kings who live as they will, (3) the foolish are mad, (4) whoever has one virtue has them all, (5) there is no middle ground between virtue and vice.

          During its late period, Roman Stoics emphasized the therapeutic benefits of their philosophy, which involved reducing one's passions (apatheia) and achieving a tranquil state of mind (ataraxia). Selections below on this subject are from three influential Stoic authors whose works have survived. Seneca (4 BCE–65 CE), a Roman senator, argues that anger is not natural to us, and it is within our ability to subdue it. Epictetus (55–135 CE), a freed slave, argues that the only thing that is within our control is our attitudes, and we should work hard to resign ourselves to fate so that we are unaffected by the uncontrollable events that happen to us. Marcus Aurelius (121–180 CE), a Roman emperor, argues that we should avoid looking at the world from our limited and temporary perspective, and instead consider it from a larger and more cosmic view of space and time. All three of these Roman Stoics emphasized the theme of cosmopolitanism: each one of us is first and foremost a citizen of the cosmos.

LIVES OF STOICS

Zeno of Citium (335–263 BCE)

Zeno was the son of Innaseas, or Demeas, and a native of Citium, in Cyprus, which is a Grecian city, partly occupied by a Phoenician colony. He had his head naturally bent on one side. . . . He was thin, very tall, of a dark complexion, because of which someone once called him an Egyptian Clematis [i.e., a woody vine] . . . . He had fat, flabby, weak legs, on which account Perseus, in his Convivial Reminiscences, says that he would refuse many invitations to supper. It is said that he was very fond of figs both fresh and dried in the sun.

          He was a pupil, as has been already stated, of Crates [the Cynic]. After that, they say that he became a pupil of Stilpo and of Xenocrates [in Plato's Academy], for ten years. . . . He associated himself with Crates in the following manner. Having purchased a quantity of purple from Phoenicia, he was shipwrecked close to the Piraeus [i.e., the port near Athens]. When he had made his way from the coast as far as Athens, he sat down by a bookseller's stall, being now about thirty years of age. When he picked up the second book of Xenophon's Memorabilia and began to read it, he was enchanted by it, and asked where such men as were described in that book lived. As Crates happened very coincidentally to pass at the moment, the bookseller pointed him out, and said, "Follow that man." From that time forth Zeno became a pupil of Crates. Though Zeno was in other respects very energetic in his application to philosophy, still he was too modest for the brazenness of the Cynics. Because of this, Crates, wishing to cure him of this false modesty, gave him a jar of lentil porridge to carry through the Ceramicus [i.e., a district in Athens]. When Crates saw that Zeno was ashamed and that he tried to hide it, Crates struck the jar with his staff, and broke it. As Zeno fled away, and the lentil porridge ran down his legs, Crates shouted to him, "Why do you run away, my little Phoenician, you have done no harm." For some time after he continued as a pupil of Crates, and when he wrote his treatise entitled the Republic, some said, jokingly, that he had written it upon the tail of the dog. . . . Eventually he left Crates, and became the pupil of the philosophers whom I have mentioned before, and continued with them for twenty years. It is related that he said, "I now find that I made a prosperous voyage when I was wrecked."

          He would walk up and down in the beautiful colonnade [in Athens] which is called the Priscanactium, and which is also called poikile [i.e., stoa poikile, or painted porch], from the paintings of Polygnotus, and there he delivered his discourses, wishing to make that spot tranquil. For in the time of the thirty tyrants, nearly fourteen hundred of the citizens had been murdered there by them. Accordingly, from then on men came there to hear him, and from this his pupils were called Stoics. So also were his successors, who had been at first called Zenonians, as Epicurus tells us in his Epistles. Before this time, the poets who regularly visited this colonnade (stoa) had been called Stoics, as we are informed by Eratosthenes, in the eighth book of his treatise on the Old Comedy; but now Zeno's pupils made the name more notorious. The Athenians had a great respect for Zeno, and they accordingly gave him the keys of their walls, and honored him with a golden crown and a brass statue. This was also done by his own countrymen, who thought that the statue of such a man would be an honor to their city.

          It is also said that he avoided a crowd with great care, so that he would sit at the end of a bench, so always to avoid being restricted on one side. He never would walk with more than two or three companions. . . . They say that he was once whipping a slave whom he had detected stealing. When the slave said, " It was fated that I should steal; " Zeno rejoined, "Yes, and that you should also be beaten." . . . The comic poets, without intending it, praise him in their very attempts to turn him into ridicule. Philemon speaks thus of him in his play entitled the Philosophers: "This man adopts a new philosophy. He teaches to be hungry, nevertheless he gets disciples. Bread is his only food, his best dessert is dried figs, and water is his drink." He died in the following manner. When he was going out of his school, he tripped, and broke one of his toes. Striking the ground with his hand, he repeated the line out of the Niobe [by Aeschylus]: "I am coming: why do you call me in this way!" Immediately he strangled himself, and so he died. The Athenians buried him in the Ceramicus [district of Athens], and honored him with the decrees which I have mentioned before, bearing witness to his virtue. [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7]

Cleanthes of Assos (331–232 BCE)

Cleanthes was a native of Assos, and the son of Phanias. He was originally a boxer (as we learn from Antisthenes, in his Successions). He came to Athens, having only four drachmas [i.e., one half of a week's labor], as some people say. Associating himself with Zeno, he devoted himself to philosophy in the fullest way and adhered to the doctrines as his master. . . . Cleanthes was especially renowned for his industriousness, so that as he was a very poor man, he was forced to work as a laborer. He would carry water in the gardens at night, and at day he would engage in philosophical discussions. Because of this he was called "well-drawer". . . . While he was very industrious, he was not gifted by nature, and was intellectually slow. When he was ridiculed by his fellow pupils, he would patiently endure it. . . . . Cleanthes did not even object when he was nicknamed "donkey" but only said that he was the only animal able to carry the burdens that Zeno put upon him. . . . He once said to a man who was conversing with him by himself, "You are not talking to a bad man." When someone criticized him because of his old age, he replied, "I too wish to leave, but when I see that I am in good health in every way, and am able to recite and read, I am content to remain." They say too, that he would write down all that he heard from Zeno on oyster shells, and on the shoulder-blades of oxen, because of his lack of money with which to buy parchment. . . . Although he was of this character and in such circumstances, he became so distinguished, that, even though Zeno had many other disciples of high reputation, Cleanthes succeeded him as head of his School. . . . He died in the following manner. His gums greatly swelled and, at the command of his physicians, he abstained from food for two days. He recovered to the point that his physicians allowed him to return to all his former habits. But he refused, and, saying that he had now already gone part of the way, he continued abstaining from food for the future and thus died. Some report that he was eighty years old, and having been a pupil of Zeno nineteen years. [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7]

Chrysippus of Soli (279–206 BCE)

Chrysippus was the son of Apollonius, and a native of either Soli or Tarsus (as Alexander tells us in his Successions), and he was a pupil of Cleanthes. Previously he practiced running as a public runner, after which he became a pupil of Zeno or of Cleanthes (as Diocles and the generality of authors say). While he was still living Chrysippus left him, and became a very prominent philosopher. He was a man of great natural ability and acuteness in every way. In many points he dissented from both Zeno and Cleanthes, about whom he often would say that he only wanted to be instructed in the dogmas of the school, and that he would discover the demonstrations for himself. But whenever Chrysippus opposed him with any vehemence, he always apologized. . . . He was industrious beyond all other men as is plain from his writings, for he wrote more than seven hundred and five books. He often wrote several books on the same subject, wishing to put down everything that occurred to him. He continually corrected his previous assertions, and used a great number of quotations from others. . . . Apollodorus of Athens (in his Collection of Dogmas), stated that what Epicurus had written out of his own head, and without any quotations to support his arguments, was a great deal more than all the books of Chrysippus. He writes, and I give his exact words, "For if anyone were to take away from the books of Chrysippus all the passages which he quotes from other authors, his paper would be left empty." . . . One day, when Chrysippus was teaching in the Odeum [i.e., a lecture hall in Athens], he was invited to a sacrifice by his pupils. After drinking some sweet unmixed wine [i.e., not diluted with water], he was overtaken with giddiness, and departed this life five days afterwards, having lived seventy-three years. . . . But some people say that he died from a fit of extreme laughter when, after seeing his donkey eating figs, he told the old woman [tending to it] to give the donkey some pure wine [unmixed with water] to drink afterwards. He then laughed so violently that he died. [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7]

Epictetus of Hierapolis (55–135 CE)

Epictetus, who, when his master was twisting his leg, said, smiling and unmoved, "You will break my leg;" and when it was broken, he added, "Did I not tell you that you would break it?" [Origin, Contra Celsum 7.53]

          Epictetus once urged him, with a touch of criticism, to take a wife and raise a family, for it seemd fitting for a philosopher to leave someone to replace him after death. But he received the rebuttal: "Very well, Epictetus; give me one of your daughters." [Lucian, Demonax 55]

          Not only in those very crude times, and when they were unpolished in Greek literature, were philosophers banished from Rome, but when Domitian was emperor they were, by a decree of the senate, driven out of the city, and banished Italy, at which time the philosopher Epictetus went from Rome to Nicopolis because of that decree. [Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights 15.11]

          It is easy, indeed, to observe that Plato is found only in the hands of those who profess to be literary men; while Epictetus is admired by persons of ordinary capacity, who have a desire to be benefited, and who perceive the improvement which may be derived from his writings. [Origin, Contra Celsum 6.2]

SUMMARIES

Disagreement within the Stoic School (Numenius, History, 1)

In the School of the Stoics beginning from their very leaders, there has always been discord, which, indeed, has not yet ceased. It is with preference that they hold disputations, and [exercise] themselves over any argument that is difficult to refute. Some have held to their original teachings, others have already introduced changes. Even the first, who were similar to oligarchs, and were nevertheless disagreed with. It was really their fault that the later Stoics criticized the earlier ones so much, even to the extent that some claimed to be more stoical than others. This is especially so with those who disputed about externalities, and were petty. For it was the latter who especially exceeded the others, and faulted the others for being busybodies and quibblers.

Main Features (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7)

The Stoics themselves promoted growth in philosophy, particularly regarding the greater development of the art of syllogism, and included almost everything under definitions. Both Chrysippus and Zeno agreed on this point. They likewise supposed God to be the one originating principle of all things, and a being of the highest perfection whose providential care pervaded everything. These speculators were convinced about the existence of fate everywhere, using examples as the following. Suppose that a dog was attached to a wagon. If he is inclined to follow the wagon, he is both drawn by it and follows it voluntarily. He thus makes an exercise of free will in combination with necessity or fate. But if the dog is not inclined to follow the wagon, he will be completely coerced to do so. The same, of course, holds true in the case of people. For if they are not willing to follow, they will be completely compelled to do what has been decreed for them. The Stoics held that the soul lives after death, but that it is nevertheless a physical body, and one that is formed from the refrigeration of the surrounding atmosphere. For this reason, also, it was called psyche. They acknowledge likewise, that there is a transmigration of souls from one body to another, that is, for those souls for whom this migration has been destined. They accept the doctrine that there will be a conflagration, a purification of this world, some say the entirety of it, but others only a portion, and that the world itself is undergoing partial destruction. This corruption, and the generation from it of another world, they term purgation. They assume the existence of all bodies, and that body does not pass through body, but that a refraction takes place. They hold that all things involve plenitude, and that there is no vacuum. The foregoing are the opinions of the Stoics also. [Hippolitus, Refutation of All Heresies, 1]

Three Parts of Philosophy: Logic, Physics, Ethics (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7)

The Stoics divide philosophical knowledge into three parts: one part relates to physics, one to ethics, and one to logic. Zeno of Citium was the first who made this division (in his treatise On Reason). Chrysippus followed him (in the first book of his treatise On Reason, and in the first book of his treatise On Nature). . . . They compare philosophy to an animal, where logic is like the bones and sinews, physics like the fleshy parts, and ethical philosophy like the soul. They also compare it to an egg, calling logic the shell, and ethics the white, and physics the yolk. Similarly, they compare it to a garden in which logic is the fence which goes around it, physics are the soil or the fruit-trees, and ethics is the fruit. Again, they compare it to a city fortified by walls, and regulated by reason. However, some of them say that no one part is preferred to another, but they are all combined and united inseparably, and so they treat them all in combination. Others, though, class logic first, physics second, and ethics third, as Zeno does. . . . But Cleanthes says that there are six divisions of reason according to philosophy: dialectics, rhetoric, ethics, politics, physics, and theology; but others assert that these are not divisions of reason, but of philosophy itself. [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7.33]

          [Chrysippus stated] "First, then, it seems to me, according as it has been correctly said by the ancients, that there are three kinds of philosophical speculations, logical, ethical, and physical, and that of these, the logical should to be placed first, the ethical second, and the physical third; within the physical, the discourse concerning the gods should to be the last. For this reason, the traditions concerning this have been named the 'endings'." [Plutarch, Contradictions]

          The Stoics affirm that wisdom is the knowledge of things human and divine; that philosophy is the pursuit of that art which is convenient to this knowledge; that virtue is the sole and sovereign art which is thus convenient; and this distributes itself into three general parts—natural, moral, and logical. By which just reason (they say) philosophy is tripartite; of which one natural, the other moral, the third logical. The natural when our inquiries are concerning the world and all things contained in it; the ethical is the employment of our minds in those things which concern the manners of man's life; the logical (which they also call dialectical) regulates our conversation with others in speaking. [Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita]

          As there are three kinds of lives, namely, the theoretical, the practical, and the logical, they say that the last is the one which ought to be chosen. For, a logical animal, (that is, a rational one) was made by nature for the purpose of speculation and action. [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7.66]

LOGIC

Divisions and Value of Logic [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7]

34. Some say that the logical division is properly subdivided into two sciences, namely, rhetoric and dialectics. . . . Rhetoric itself they divide into three kinds: deliberative, forensic, and panegyric. Rhetoric is also divided into several parts, one relating to the discovery of arguments, one to style, one to the arrangement of arguments, and the other to the delivery of the speech. A rhetorical oration they divide into the introduction, the narration, the reply to the statements of the adverse party, and the peroration. . . .

          35. They say that the most useful of these parts is the consideration of syllogisms. For, they show us what are the things which are capable of demonstration, and that contributes much to the formation of our judgment, and their arrangement and memory give a scientific character to our knowledge. They define reasoning to be a system composed of assumptions and conclusions; and syllogism is a syllogistic argument proceeding on them. Demonstration they define to be a method by which one proceeds from that which is more known to that which is less. A perceptual presentation (phantasia) is an impression produced on the mind, its name being appropriately borrowed from impressions on wax made by a seal. Perceptual presentations are comprehensible and incomprehensible. Comprehensible, which they call the criterion of facts, is produced by a real object, and is, therefore, at the same time conformable to that object. The incomprehensible has no relation to any real object, or else, if it has any such relation, does not correspond to it, being but a vague and indistinct representation.

          Dialectics itself they pronounce to be a necessary science, and a virtue which includes several other virtues under its species. The disposition not to take up one side of an argument hastily, they consider to be a knowledge by which we are taught when we ought to agree to a statement, and when we ought to withhold our agreement. Discretion they consider to be a powerful reason, having reference to what is becoming, so as to prevent our yielding to an irrelevant argument. Irrefutability they define to be a power in an argument, which prevents one from being drawn from it to its opposite. Freedom from vanity, according to them, is a habit which refers the perceptions back to right reason.

          Again, they define knowledge itself as an assertion or safe comprehension, or habit, which, in the perception of what is seen, never deviates from the truth. They say further, that without dialectic speculation, the wise man cannot be free from all error in his reasoning. For that is what distinguishes what is true from what is false, and which easily detects those arguments which are only plausible, and those which depend upon an ambiguity of language. Without dialectics they say it is not possible to ask or answer questions correctly. They add that precipitation in denials extends to those things which are done, so that those who have not properly exercised their perceptions fall into irregularity and thoughtlessness. Again, without dialectics, the wise man cannot be acute, and ingenious, and wary, and completely dangerous as an arguer. For it belongs to the same man to speak correctly and to reason correctly, and to discuss properly those subjects which are proposed to him, and to answer readily whatever questions are put to him. All of these qualities belong to a man who is skillful in dialectics. This then is a brief summary of their opinions on logic.

Knowledge and Zeno's Fist Metaphor [Cicero, Academics, 2.4]

[Stoics] declare that no one but the wise man has knowledge of anything. Zeno illustrated this by the action of his hand. For showing his hand open to view with the fingers stretched out, perception, he said, is like this. Then, closing his fingers slightly, assent is like this. Next, entirely closed together his fingers and doubling his fist, he declared this position to resemble the mental act of comprehension; from that simile he also gave a new name to that mental act, calling it "grasping". Again when he had brought up his left hand and had tightly and powerfully closed it over the other fist, he said that knowledge was like that, and that no one was able to attain to knowledge but the wise person.

Sense Perception

36. The Stoics have chosen, first of all, to give an account of perception and sensation. For, the criterion by which the truth of facts is ascertained is a kind of perception, and because the judgment which expresses the belief, and the comprehension, and the understanding of a thing, a judgment which precedes all others, cannot exist without perception. For perception leads the way; and then thought, finding vent in expressions, explains in words the feelings which it derives from perception.

          [Zeno defined perceptual presentation (phantasia) as an impression (tuposis) on the soul; Cleanthes compared it to the impression made by a seal on wax with literal depressions and elevations; Chrysippus opposed this literal understanding and defined it as an alteration in the soul.]

          But there is a difference between perceptual presentation (phantasia) and illusory image (phantasma). For an illusory image is a conception of the intellect, such as takes place in sleep. Now, perceptual presentation is an impression (tuposis) produced on the mind, that is to say, an alteration (alloiosis), as Chrysippus states in the twelfth book of his treatise on the Soul. For we must not take this impression to resemble [an imprint in wax] that is made by a signet ring, since it is impossible to conceive that there would be many impressions made at the same time on the same thing. But perceptual presentation is understood to be that which is impressed, and formed, and imprinted by a real object, according to a real object, in such a way as it could not be by any other than a real object.

          According to their view of the perceptual representations, some are sensible, and some are not. The sensible ones are derived by us from one or more senses. Those not sensible come directly from the intellect, as for instance, those that relate to incorporeal objects, or any others which are grasped by reason. Again, those which are sensible, are produced by a real object, which imposes itself on the intelligence, and compels its acquiescence; and there are also some others, which are simply apparent, mere shadows, which resemble those which are produced by real objects.

Assertable Propositions: Simple and Compound [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7]

48. An assertable (axioma), is that thing which is true, or false, or perfect in itself, being asserted, or denied positively, as far as depends upon itself (as Chrysippus explains it in his Dialectic Definitions). For instance, "It is day," "Dion is walking." It has received the name of assertable, because it is either maintained or denied. For the man who says, "It is day," appears to maintain the fact of its being day. If then it is day, the assertable put before one is true. But if it is not day, the assertable is false. An assertable, a question, and an interrogation, differ from each other, and so does an imperative proposition from one which is related to oaths, or imprecatory, or hypothetical, or appellative, or false. For that is an assertable which we utter, when we affirm anything positively, which is either true or false. A question is a thing complete in itself, as also is an assertable, but which requires an answer, as for instance, " Is it day?" Now this is neither true nor false; but, as "It is day" is an assertable; so is, "Is it day?" a question. . . .

          Now of assertables, some are simple, and others are not simple. . . . Those are simple, which consist of an assertable or proposition, which is not ambiguous, (or of several assertables, or propositions of the same character,) as for instance the sentence, " It is day." Those are not simple, which consist of an assertable or proposition which is ambiguous, or of several assertables or propositions of that character. Of an assertable, or proposition, which is ambiguous, as " If it is day;" of several assertables, or propositions of that character, as, "If it is day, it is light."

          Simple propositions are divided into the affirmative, the negative, the privative, the categorical, the definite, and the indefinite; those which are not simple, are divided into the combined, and the adjunctive, the connected and the disjunctive, and the causal and the augmentative, and the diminutive. That is an affirmative proposition, "It is not day." And the species of this is doubly affirmative. That again is doubly affirmative, which is affirmative of an affirmative, as for instance, "It is not not day; " for this amounts to, "It is day." That is a negative proposition, which consists of a negative particle and a categorem, as for instance, " No one is walking." That is a privative proposition which consists of a privative particle and an assertable according to power, as "This man is inhuman." That is a categorical proposition, which consists of a nominative case and a categorem, as for instance, "Dion is walking." That is a definite proposition, which consists of a demonstrative nominative case and a categorem, as for instance, " This man is walking." That is an indefinite one which consists of an indefinite particle, or of indefinite particles, as for instance, " Somebody is walking," " He is moving."

          Of propositions which are not simple, the combined proposition is . . . that which is held together by the copulative conjunction "if." This conjunction professes that the second member of the sentence follows the first, as for instance, "If it is day, it is light." That which is adjunctive is . . . an assertable which is made to depend on the conjunction "since", beginning with an assertable and ending in an assertable, as for instance, "Since it is day, it is light." This conjunction professes both that the second portion of the proposition follows the first, and the first is true. A connected proposition is connected by some copulative conjunctions, as for instance, "It both is day, and it is light." A disjunctive proposition is disconnected by the disjunctive conjunction "or" as for instance, "It is either day or night." This proposition professes that one or other of these propositions is false. A causal proposition is connected by the word, "because;" as for instance, "Because it is day, it is light." For the first is, so to speak, the cause of the second. An augmentative proposition, which explains the greater, is construed with an augmentative particle, and which is placed between the two members of the proposition, as for instance, "It is rather day than night." The diminutive proposition is, in every respect, the exact contrary of the preceding one, as for instance, "It is less night than day." Again, at times, assertables or propositions are opposed to each other in respect of their truth and falsehood, when one is an express denial of the other; as for instance, "It is day" and, "It is not day."

Logical Arguments: Five Types [Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7]

49. An argument, as Criuis says, is that which is composed of a major premise, a minor premise, and a conclusion. For example, "If it is day, it is light;" "But it is day, therefore it is light." For the major premise, is, "If it is day, it is light." The minor premise is, "It is day." The conclusion follows, "Therefore it is light." The mode of a proposition is, so to speak, a figure of an argument, as for instance, such as this, "If it is the first, it is the second; but it is the first, therefore it is the second."

          A conditional syllogism is that which is composed of both the preceding arguments as for instance, "If Plato is alive, Plato breathes; but the first fact is so, therefore so is the second." This conditional syllogism has been introduced for the sake, in long and complex sentences, of not being forced to repeat the assumption, as it was a long one, and also the conclusion; but of being able., instead, to content one's self with summing it up briefly thus, "The first case put is true, therefore so is the second." . . .

          There are arguments which are not demonstrated from their not standing in need of demonstration, and these are laid down differently by different people. Chrysippus enumerates five kinds, which serve as the foundation for every kind of argument; and which are assumed in conclusive arguments properly so called, and in syllogisms, and in modes.

          The first kind that is not demonstrated, is that in which the whole argument consists of a conjunctive and an antecedent; and in which the first term repeats itself so as to form a sort of conjunctive proposition, and to bring forward as the conclusion the last term. As, for instance, "If the first be true, so is the second; but the first is true, therefore, so is the second." The second kind that is not demonstrated, is that which, by means of the conjunctive and the opposite of the conclusion, has a conclusion opposite to the first premise. As, for instance, "If it is day, it is light; but it is night, therefore it is not day." For here the assumption arises from the opposite of the conclusion, and the conclusion from the opposite of the first term. The third kind that is not demonstrative, is that which, by a negative combination, and by one of the terms in the proposition, produces the contradictory of the remainder; as, for instance, "Plato is not dead and alive at the same time but Plato is dead; therefore, Plato is not alive." The fourth kind that is not demonstrative, is that which, by means of a disjunctive, and one of those terms which are in the disjunctive, has a conclusion opposite to what remains; as, for instance, "It is either the first, or the second: but it is the first; therefore, it is not the second." The fifth kind that is not demonstrative, is that in which the whole argument consists of a disjunctive proposition, and the opposite of one of the terms, and then one makes the conclusion identical with the remainder; as, for instance, " It is either day or night; but it is not night; therefore it is day." . . .

          50. Such then are the doctrines which the Stoics maintain on the subject of logic, in order as far as possible to establish their point that the logician is the only wise man. For they assert that all affairs are looked at by means of that speculation which proceeds by argument, including under this assertion those that belong to both natural philosophy and moral philosophy. For, they say, how else could one determine the exact value of nouns, or how else could one explain which laws are imposed on which actions? Further, as there are two habits both incidental to virtue, the one considers what each existing thing is, and the other inquires what it is called. These then are the notions of the Stoics on the subject of logic.

NATURAL PHILOSOPHY

Divisions of Natural Philosophy (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7)

67. They divide natural philosophy into the topics of (1) bodies, (2) principles, (3) elements, (4) gods, and (5) boundaries, space, and vacuum. They make these divisions according to species. But according to genera, they divide them into three topics: the world, the elements, and that which reasons on causes. The topic about the world, they say, is subdivided into two parts. For in one point of view, the mathematicians also have a share in it; and according to it, it is that they investigate into the nature of the fixed stars and the planets; as, for instance, whether the sun is of such a size as he appears to be, and similarly, whether the moon is. In the same way they investigate the question of spherical motion, and others of the same character. The other point of view is that which is reserved exclusively for natural philosophers, according to which it is that the existence and substance of things are examined (for instance, whether the sun and the stars consist of matter and form), and whether the sun is born or not born, whether it is living or lifeless, corruptible or incorruptible, whether it is regulated by Providence, and other questions of this kind.

          The topic which examines into causes they say is also divisible into two parts. With reference to one of its considerations, the investigations of physicians study it. Accordingly, they investigate the dominant principle of the soul, the things which exist in the soul, seeds, and things of this kind. Its other division is claimed as belonging to both them and mathematicians, as, for instance, how we see, what is the cause of our appearance being reflected in a mirror, how clouds are collected, how thunder is produced, and so too the rainbow, the halo, comets, and things of that kind.

The World (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7)

68. They think that there are two general principles in the universe, the active and the passive, The passive is matter, an existence without any distinctive quality. The active is the reason which exists in the passive, that is to say, God. For that he, being eternal, and existing throughout all matter, makes everything. . . . But they say that principles and elements differ from each other. For that the one had no generation or beginning, and will have no end; but that the elements may be destroyed by the operation of fire. Also, that the elements are bodies, but principles have no bodies and no forms, and elements too have forms. . . .

          They also teach that God is unity, and that he is called Mind, Fate, and Jupiter, and by many other names. That, as he was in the beginning by himself, he turned into water the whole substance which pervaded the air. As the seed is contained in the produce, so too, he being the seed of reason (logos spermatikos) of the world, remained behind in moisture, making matter suitable to be employed by himself in the production of those things which were to come after; and then, first of all, he made the four elements, fire, water, air, and earth. . . .

          70. Again, the world is inhabited and regulated according to intellect and providence (as Chrysippus says, in his works on Providence, and Posidonius in the thirteenth book of his treatise on Gods). For, mind penetrates into every part of the world, just as the soul pervades us. But it is in a greater degree in some parts, and in a less degree in others. For instance, it penetrates as a habit, as, for instance, into the bones and sinews; and into some it penetrates as the mind does, for instance, into the dominant principle. Thus the whole world, being a living thing, endowed with a soul and with reason, has the aether (pneuma) as its dominant principle. . .

          They say too, that the world is one and also finite, having a spherical form. For such a shape is the most convenient for motion. . . . On the outside there is diffused around it a boundless vacuum, which is incorporeal. It is incorporeal inasmuch, as it is capable of being contained by bodies, but is not so. They say that there is no such thing as a vacuum in the world, but that it is all closely united and compact. For, that this condition is necessarily brought about by the concord and harmony which exist between the heavenly bodies and those of the earth. . . . They say that these things are all incorporeal, and all alike. Further, that time is incorporeal, since it is an interval of the motion of the world. That of time, the past and the future are both illimitable, but the present is limited. They assert that the world is perishable, inasmuch as it was produced by reason, and is one of the things which are perceptible by the senses; and whatever has its parts perishable, must also be perishable in the whole. The parts of the world are perishable, for they change into each other. Therefore, the whole world is perishable. Again, if anything admits of a change for the worse it is perishable; therefore, the world is perishable, for it can be dried up, and it can be covered with water.

          Now the world was created when its substance was changed from fire to moisture, by the action of the air. Then its denser parts coagulated, and so the earth was made, and the thinner portions were evaporated and became air. This being rarefied more and more, produced fire. Then, by the combination of all these elements, were produced plants and animals, and other kinds of things. . . .

          Again, they say that the world is an animal, and that has reason, and life, and intellect. . . . It is an animal in this sense, as being an essence with life, and with sensation. For that which is an animal, is better than that which is not an animal. But nothing is better than the world. Therefore the world is an animal. It is possessed with life, as is plain from the fact of our own soul is, so to speak, a fragment broken off from it. . . .

More on The World (Pseudo-Plutarch, Placita)

          The Stoics say that within the compass of the world there is no vacuum, but beyond it the vacuum is infinite.

          The Stoics make a difference between that which is called the universe, and that which is called the whole world; the universe is the infinite space considered with the vacuum, the vacuity being removed gives the right conception of the world. Thus, the universe and the world are not the same thing.

          The Stoics say that there is a vacuum into which infinite space by a conflagration will be dissolved.

          It is often said by Chrysippus, that there is without the world an infinite vacuum, and that this infinity has neither beginning, middle, nor end. By this the Stoics chiefly refute that spontaneous motion of the atoms downward, which is taught by Epicurus. For, with infinity,  there is no difference according to which one thing is thought to be above, another below.

          The Stoics say that the world is one thing, and this they say is the universe and is corporeal.

          The Stoics say that the figure of the world is spherical,

          The Stoics say that the stars are of a circular form, like as the sun, the moon, and the world.

          The Stoics say that the sun is an intelligent flame proceeding from the sea.

          The Stoics say that the sun is spherical, and it is of the same figure with the world and the stars.

          The Stoics say that the sun maintains its course only through that space in which its sustenance is seated, let it be the ocean or the earth; by the exhalations proceeding from these it is nourished.

          The Stoics say that the moon is mixed of fire and air.

          The Stoics declare, that in magnitude the moon exceeds the earth, just as the sun itself doth.

          The Stoics believe that the moon is of the same figure with the sun, spherical.

          The Stoics say that on account of the diversity of the moon's substance the composition of its body is subject to corruption.

          Socrates and Plato conjecture that these forms are beings separate from matter, subsisting in the understanding and imagination of the deity, that is, of mind. Aristotle accepted forms and ideas; but he does not believe them separated from matter, or patterns of the things God has made. Those Stoics, that are of the school of Zeno, profess that forms are nothing else but the conceptions of our own mind.

          Pythagoras and Aristotle judge that the first causes are incorporeal beings, but those that are causes by accident or participation become corporeal substances; by this means the world is corporeal. The Stoics grant that all causes are corporeal, inasmuch as they are physical.

          The Stoics think that of the four elements two are light, fire and air; two ponderous, earth and water; that which is naturally light by its own nature, not by any inclination, recedes from its own center; but that which is heavy by its own nature tends to its center; for the center is not a heavy thing in itself.

          Most of the Stoics say that motion is time.

GOD

God Pervades and is the Substance of Everything (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7.72)

They say that God is a living being, immortal, rational, perfect, and intellectual in his happiness. He is unsusceptible of any kind of evil, having a foreknowledge of the world and of all that is in the world. However, he does not have the shape of a human. He is the creator of the universe, and, so to speak, the Father of all things, both general and particular. A portion of God pervades everything, which is called by different names, according to its powers. For they call him Dia as being the person everything is; Zeus because he is the cause of life, or because he pervades life; Athena, with reference to the extension of his dominant power over the aether; Hera, because of his extension through the air; Hephaestus, because of his pervading fire, which is the chief instrument of art; Poseidon, as pervading moisture; Demeter, as pervading the earth. In the same way, regarding some other of his unique attributes, they have given him other names.

          Zeno asserted that the substance of God is the whole world and the heaven (as was also stated by Chrysippus in his first book Of the Gods, and by Posidonius in his first book with the same title). Antipater (in the seventh book of his treatise on the World) says that his substance is like air. Boethus (in his treatise on Nature), calls the substance of God the sphere of the fixed stars. Divine nature they define to be, that which keeps the world together, and sometimes that which produces the things upon the earth. Nature is a habit which derives its movements from itself, perfecting and holding together all that arises out of it. It does so according to the principles of production, in certain definite periods, and doing the same as the things from which it is separated. It has for its object, suitableness and pleasure, as is plain from its having created man. . . . [The say] that all things are produced by fate. Fate, is a connected cause of existing things, or the reason according to which the world is regulated.

Cleanthes' Hymn to Zeus (Stobaeus, Anthology, 1.1.12)

Hail to you, mighty Zeus, who are called by many names, nature's great unchanging king, the almighty who controls everything through universal law (nomos). Let mortals everywhere call on you, since we alone are your offspring among all created things that live and move on earth, and we carry your image. I will thus forever sing praises of your power.

          The sky obeys you, as it forever rolls around the earth at your command, and joyfully feels your guidance. The lightning clenched within your hand is a mighty weapon, an unconquered double-edged fiery thunderbolt. It never fails. All nature quakes under its dreadful blow, and through this you direct the Universal Reason (logos) throughout the universe, intermingled with the heavenly light of the large and small stars. How great you are, supreme eternal King.

          No work is done outside of you, great God, neither in the world, nor in the heaven above, nor on the ocean, but only what the impassioned do from their evil hearts. But in your wisdom you can make the rough smooth, bring order from disorder, and make beauty from the ugly. You have combined good with evil so that together one Universal Reason (logos) rules over them all, which evil people cannot see and for that reason become unhappy.

          They continually yearn to acquire good things but fail to see or hear the universal law (nomos) of God, which if they would obey, would give them a good life guided by reason. But now, they indecently and randomly rush this way and that, going their own ways without knowing the truth. Some selfishly chase after glory, others after unrestrained gain, others after bodily pleasure. Self-deceived, they bring on their own downfall.

          But most generous Zeus, you who are wrapped in the clouds hurling lightning bolts, please save your children from their destructive ignorance. Scatter the darkness far from their souls, and allow them to achieve true knowledge, for it is through knowledge that you justly guide all things. For, by honoring us, we may in turn repay you with honor by endlessly singing praises of your works. This is just as it should be, since there is no greater glory for a mortal or god than to appropriately praise the universal law (nomos) forever.

Chrysippus's Various Notions of God (Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods, 1.15)

We come next to Chrysippus, who is considered the most skillful exponent of the extravagant notions of the Stoics, and who gathers together a large group of deities so utterly removed from knowledge that, although our mind seems able to picture in imagination anything whatever, we cannot even form an idea of them by conjecture. For he tells us that divine power resides in reason and in the soul and mind of nature taken as a whole. He also declares that the world itself is God and the universal outpouring of its soul. Also, it is this same world's guiding principle, operating in mind and reason, together with the common nature of things and the totality which embraces all existence. Further, divinity is the foreordained might and necessity of the future. Also he deifies fire and the principle of æther that we have mentioned before. So too with those elements whose natural state is one of flux and transition, such as water, earth, and air. He also deifies the sun, the moon, the stars, the universal existence in which all things are contained. It is also those human beings who have attained immortality.

Knowledge of God through Beauty (Plutarch, Placita)

The Stoics hold that God is a thing more common and obvious, and is a mechanical fire which every way spreads itself to produce the world. It contains in itself all seminal virtues, and by this means all things by a fatal necessity were produced. This spirit, passing through the whole world, received different names from the mutations in the matter through which it ran in its journey. God therefore is the world, the stars, the earth, and (highest of all) the mind in the heavens.

          The Stoics define the essence of a god as follows. It is an intelligent and fiery spirit, which has no shape, but is continually changed into what it pleases, and assimilates itself into all things. The knowledge of this deity they first received from the beauty of those things which so visibly appeared to us. For they concluded that nothing beautiful could formed merely casually or by chance, but that such things were fashioned through the skill of a great understanding that produced the world.

          That the world is beautiful is made clear from the figure, the color, the size of it, and likewise from the wonderful variety of those stars which adorn this world. The world is spherical; the orbicular has the preeminence above all other figures, for being round itself it has its parts like itself. (For this reason, according to Plato, the understanding, which is the most sacred part of a person, is in the head.) The color of the world is most beautiful since it is painted with blue. Although it is a little darker than purple, yet has such a shining quality, that by reason of the vehement efficacy of its color it cuts through such a space of air. From this it is that at so great a distance the heavens are to be contemplated. In this very greatness of the world the beauty of it appears. Examine all things: that which contains the rest carries a beauty with it, such as an animal or a tree. Also things which are visible to us accomplish the beauty of the world. The oblique circle called the Zodiac in heaven is with different images painted and distinguished: "There's Cancer, Leo, Virgo, and the Claws; Scorpio, Arcitenens, and Capricorn; Amphora, Pisces, then the Ram, and Bull; The lovely pair of Brothers next succeed."

          There are a thousand other examples that give us the suitable reflections of the beauty of the world. Thus Euripides says, "The starry splendor of the skies, the beautiful and varied work of that wise Creator, Time." From this the knowledge of a god is conveyed to man; that the sun, the moon, and the rest of the stars, being carried under the earth, rise again in their proper color, magnitude, place, and times. Therefore, they who by tradition delivered to us the knowledge and veneration of the gods did it by these three manner of ways: first, from Nature; secondly, from fables; thirdly, from the testimony supplied by the laws of commonwealths. Philosophers taught the natural way; poets, the fabulous; and the political way is to be had from the constitutions of each commonwealth.

          Chrysippus and Cleanthes, having filled (as one may say) heaven, earth, air, and sea with gods, have not yet made any one of all these gods immortal or eternal, except Jupiter alone, in whom they consume all the rest. So, it is no more suitable for him to consume others than to be consumed himself. For it is alike an infirmity to perish by being resolved into another, and to be saved by being nourished by the resolution of others into himself. Now these are not like other of their absurdities, gathered by argument from their suppositions or drawn by consequence from their doctrines. Rather, they themselves proclaim it aloud in their writings concerning the gods, (On Providence, On Fate, and On Nature), expressly saying that all the other gods were born, and will die by the fire, melting away, in their opinion, as if they were of wax or tin.

THE SOUL (MIND)

Features of the Soul (Plutarch, Placita)

The Stoics say that the soul is a hot exhalation (pneuma).

          The Stoics say the soul is constituted of eight parts. Five of these are the senses, hearing, seeing, tasting, touching, smelling, the sixth is the faculty of speaking, the seventh of generating, the eighth of commanding; this is the principal of all, by which all the other are guided and ordered in their proper organs, as we see the eight arms of a polypus aptly disposed.

          The Stoics are generally of this opinion, that the seat of the soul is throughout the heart, or in the spirit about it.

          The Stoics say, when the souls leave the bodies, they are carried to different places. The souls of the unlearned and ignorant descend to the conglomerate of earthly things, but the learned and vigorous last till the general fire.

          The Stoics give this definition of sense: Sense is the apprehension or comprehension of an object by means of an organ of sensation. There are several ways of expressing what sense is. It is either a habit, a faculty, an operation, or an imagination which apprehends by means of an organ of sense—and also the eighth principal thing, from whence the senses originate. The instruments of sense are intelligent exhalations (pneuma), which from the said commanding part extend unto all the organs of the body.

          The Stoics say that what the senses represent is true; what the imagination represents, is partly false, partly true.

          The Stoics say that there are five senses properly so called, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, and touching.

          The Stoics affirm that every man, as soon as he is born, has a principal and commanding part of his soul, which is in him like a sheet of writing-paper, to which he commits all his notions. The first manner of his inscribing is by denoting those notions which flow from the senses. Suppose it is of a thing that is white. When the present sense of it is vanished, there is yet retained the remembrance. When many memorative notions of the same resemblance concur, then he is said to have an experience. For experience is nothing more than the abundance of notions that are of the same form that meet together. Some of these notions are naturally produced according to the aforesaid manner, without the assistance of special skill. The others are produced by discipline, learning, and industry, and only these only are properly called "notions", whereas the others are called "preconceptions". But "reason", which gives us the designation of rational, is completed by preconceptions in the first seven years. The conception of the mind is the vision that the intelligence of a rational animal has received. When that vision falls upon the rational soul, then it is called the "conception of the mind", for it has derived its name from the mind [i.e., ennoema from nous]. Therefore, these visions are not to be found in any other animals, and they only are appropriated to gods and to us men. If we consider these generally, they are "phantasms", but if we consider them specifically, they are "notions". [By analogy,] with coins, if you consider them according to their own value, they are simply coins; but if you consider them as a price for a naval voyage, they are called not merely coins, but your transportation.

          The Stoics say that the highest part of the soul is the commanding part of it. This is the cause of sense, imagination, consents, and desires. We call this the rational part. From this principal and commander there are produced seven parts of the soul, which are spread through the body, as the seven arms in a polypus. Of these seven parts, five are assigned to the senses, seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting, touching. Sight is a spirit which is extended from the commanding part of the eyes; hearing is that spirit which from the principle reaches to the ears; smelling a spirit drawn from the principal to the nostrils; tasting is a spirit extended from the principle to the tongue; touching is a spirit which from the principal is drawn to the extremity of those bodies which are obnoxious to a sensible touch. Of the rest, the one called the generative is a spirit which reaches from the principal to the generating vessels; the other, which is the vocal and termed the voice, is a spirit extended from the principal to the throat, tongue, and other proper organs of speaking. This principal part itself has that place in our spherical head which God has in the world.

          The Stoics say that all the passions are seated in those parts of the body which are affected, the senses have their residence in the commanding part of the soul. Epicurus, though, says that all the passions and all the senses are in those parts which are affected, but the commanding part is subject to no passion.

          Plato and the Stoics hold that sleep arises from the relaxation of the sensitive spirit. It does not obtain complete relaxation such as if it fell to the earth, but only so that the spirit is carried through the intestine and parts of the eyebrows, in which the principal part has its residence. But when there is a total relaxing of the sensitive spirit, death occurs.

Human Fetus and the Human Soul

          The Stoics say that an embryo is not an animal, but is to be considered part of the mother's abdomen. It is just as we believe that the fruit of trees is considered part of the trees, until it is full ripe, then it falls and ceases to belong to the tree. So it is with the embryo. [Plutarch, Placita]

          They say that the human seed having been duly deposited during intercourse in the womb, and having been by natural impulse quickened, it becomes condensed into the mere substance of the flesh, which is in due time born, warm from the furnace of the womb, and then released from its heat. (This flesh) resembles the case of hot iron, which is in that state plunged into cold water. For, being smitten by the cold air (into which it is born), it at once receives the power of animation, and utters vocal sound. [Tertullian, Treatise on the Soul]

Arguments for the Corporeal Nature of the Soul (Nemesius, The Nature of Man)

The arguments of Cleanthes the Stoic affirming the soul to be corporeal are here confuted logically and by demonstration. Chrysippus intending to maintained the same view is here likewise answered, and his Fallacies discovered. . . .

          Cleanthes composes a syllogism [for the corporeal nature of the soul] in this manner. There is (he says) a likeness between us and our parents, not only with respect to the body, but also with the soul, such as our passions, manners, and affections. Now it pertains to a body to have in it likeness and unlikeness. Likeness and unlikeness cannot belong to things void of Body; Therefore the soul is a bodily thing. . . .

          Cleanthes, thus frames another argument. No incorporeal thing (he says) can suffer together with a thing corporeal; neither can a bodily-thing, suffer with a thing that has no body; but only corporeal things may suffer one with another. Now it is evident, that if the body be diseased, and wounded, the soul suffers grief with it. The body also suffers with the soul, for, when the mind is afflicted by shame, the body blushes, and when the mind fears, the body looks pale. Therefore the soul is a corporeal thing. . . .

          Chrysippus argues as follows. Death is a separation of the soul from the body. Now, a thing that lacks body cannot be separated from a body, because an incorporeal thing cannot be touched (or laid even along) by a corporeal thing. But the soul touches, and is equally touched by the body, and is also separated from the same. Therefore, the soul is a corporeal-essence.

Bodies and Souls both Dissolve upon Death (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 4)

If souls continue to exist, how does the air contain them from eternity? But we may similarly ask how does the earth contain the bodies of those who have been buried from time so remote? For as here the mutation and their dissolution of these bodies after a certain time span, whatever it may be, makes room for other dead bodies. So too the souls that travel into the air after existing for some time are transmuted and diffused, and assume a fiery nature by being received into the seminal intelligence of the universe. In this way make room for the fresh souls that come to dwell there. This is the answer that a man might give on the hypothesis of souls continuing to exist. But we must not only think of the number of bodies which are thus buried, but also of the number of animals which are daily eaten by us and the other animals. For what a number is consumed, and thus in a manner buried in the bodies of those who feed on them! Nevertheless this earth receives them by reason of the changes of these bodies into blood, and the transformations into the aerial or the fiery element.

FATE AND THE ETERNAL RECURRENCE

Fate and Necessity

Fate is, as the Stoics define it, a certain interconnection of causes which may not be avoided. It is a fast knitting together of causes which may not be altered. It brings to everything, and conveys back and forth, only the effects that result from the motions and necessity of destiny itself, but not necessarily the effects that are most useful to us. [Nemesius, The Nature of Man]

          The Stoics, in this agreeing with Plato, say that necessity is a cause invincible and violent; that fate is the ordered complication of causes, in which there is a blending of those things which proceed from our own determination, so that certain things are to be attributed to fate, others not. [Plutarch, Placita]

          Chrysippus said that fate is a spiritual force, which in due order manages and rules the universe. Again, in his book "Definitions," he says that fate is the reason of the world, or that it is that law whereby Providence rules and administers everything that is in the world. It is that reason by which all things have been, all things are, and all things will be produced. The Stoics say that it is a chain of causes, that is, it is an order and inconnection of causes which cannot be resisted. [Plutarch, Placita]

          Anaxagoras and the Stoics say that fortune is that cause which human reason cannot comprehend. For there are some things which proceed from necessity, some things from Fate, some from choice and free-will, some from Fortune, some from chance. [Plutarch, Placita]

          Others [like the Stoic Chrysippus] define Fate differently: it is "the interconnection of causes" in "their connection towards the infinite," by which every posterior fact is the consequence of an anterior one. Thus the things that follow relate to the things that precede, and, as their effects, necessarily depend thereupon. Among these [Stoic] philosophers there are two conceptions of Fate: some consider that everything depends from a single principle, while others do not. [Plotinus, Enneads]

          There are some [i.e., Chrysippus, Philopater and other Stoics] who affirm that things may be in our power, and that there may be fate also. For, some features, they say, are given by destiny to everything that is made, as to the water to cool; to every plant to bear such fruit as is according to its kind; to a stone to sink downward; to fire to mount upwards; and to living-creatures to accept or to be desirous of things agreeable to them. If nothing [outside of us, or belonging to destiny] conflicts with what we attempt to do, then it becomes perfectly  in our power to proceed. Indeed, then, they say, we will certainly effect it. [Nemesius, The Nature of Man]

          Reason compels us to admit that by Fate all things take place. By Fate I mean that which the Greeks call heimarmene, that is, a certain order and series of causes, for cause linked to cause produces all things. In this connection of cause consists the constant truth which flows through all eternity. From this it follows that nothing happens which is not predestined to happen. In the same way nothing is predestined to happen, the nature of which does not contain the efficient causes of its happening. [Cicero, On Divination, 1.55]

          Chrysippus, the leader of the Stoics, defines fate (which the Greeks call heimarmene) in this manner: "fate," he says, "is a certain unchallengeable and eternal series and chain of things, moving and interweaving itself in a fixed and established order of events, with which it is fitted and connected." To the best of my memory, I have included the exact words of Chrysippus so that if anyone thinks that my interpretation of this is obscure, he may refer to the words themselves. In his fourth book On Providence he says, that fate is "a natural harmony of all things from eternity, each following the other with unalterable interdependence." [Aulus Gellius, Attic Nights, 7.2]

The Eternal Recurrence: Creation and Destruction though Fire (Philo, The Eternity of the World)

The Stoics hold [that the world] is a certain admirably-arranged essence, extending to the period of conflagration, either beautifully adorned or unadorned, the periods of the motion of which are called time. . . .

          The Stoics speak of one world only, and hold that God is the cause of its creation, but that the cause of its destruction is no longer God, but the power of invincible, unwearied fire, which pervades all existing things, in the long periods of time dissolving everything into itself, while from it again a regeneration of the world takes place through the providence of the Creator. According to these men there may be one world spoken of as eternal and another as destructible, destructible in reference to its present arrangement, and eternal as to the conflagration which takes place, since it is made immortal by regenerations and periodical revolutions which never cease. . . .

          The Stoic will say that time is admitted to be an interval of the motion of the world, but not of that world only which is arranged and adorned by itself, but also of that one which is conceived of in connection with the conflagration which has been spoken of. . . .

          [The Stoics said that] fire is the cause of all motion, and motion is the beginning of generation (for it is impossible that anything whatever should be generated without motion). For this reason, they said that before the new world began to be formed, when it was beginning to be fashioned, the whole fire would not be extinguished in that conflagration. They affirmed that some would still remain, but yet only a small portion. They were very cautious about this since, if it would be entirely extinguished, the consequence would be that everything would remain motionless and devoid of ornament, inasmuch as the cause of motion would no longer be in any existence. . . .

          [The Stoics] in their arguments, assumed that a vacuum of infinite extent will be left abandoned on the outside of the world. That so, since it is fated to be subjected to a certain diffusion of boundless extent, it may not be in want of a place which may be capable of receiving that diffusion. When therefore it has been extended and increased to such a degree, as to be very nearly equal to the infinite extent of the vacuum by the boundless and illimitable extension of its own diffusion, it then, according to them, is itself the seed of reason (logos spermatikos) to itself; but when, according to a perfect regeneration of the parts, its entire substance . . . [line lost] . . . being contracted in the extinction of the fire into dense air; but when the air again is contracted, and when it settles down into water, then again the water is still further condensed, so as to be changed into earth, which is the best of all the elements.

Each Recurrence the Same (Arius Didymus, Epitomae, in Eusebius, Preparation, 15)

But the oldest of this sect are of opinion that all things are changed into ether, when at certain very long periods all are resolved into an ethereal fire. . . . But from this it is clear that Chrysippus has not accepted this confusion in reference to substance (for that was impossible), but only that which was meant as equivalent to change. For the term destruction is not properly understood of the great destruction of the world which takes place in long periods by those who hold the doctrine of the dissolution of the universe into fire, which they call conflagration, but they use the term destruction as equivalent to change in the course of nature.

          For is held by the Stoic philosophers that the universal substance changes into fire, as into a seed, and coming back again, from this completes its organization, such as it was before. This is the doctrine which was accepted by the first and oldest leaders of the sect, Zeno [of Citium], Cleanthes, and Chrysippus. For Zeno [of Tarsus] (who was the disciple and successor of Chrysippus in the School) is said to have doubted about the conflagration of the universe.

          The common reason having advanced so far, and a common nature having become greater and fuller, and having at last dried up all things and absorbed them into itself, finds itself in the universal substance, having gone back to the condition first mentioned, and to that resurrection which makes the Great Year, in which takes place the restitution from itself alone to itself again.

          When it has returned, because of an arrangement such as that from which it began to make a similar organization, it according to reason follows the same course again, so that such periods go on from eternity and never cease. For it is not possible for all things to have a cause of their beginning, nor of that which administers them. For under things created there must lie a substance of a nature to receive all the changes, and the power that out of it created them. For as there is in our case a certain kind of creative nature, there must of necessity be something of the same kind in the world also, something uncreated, for there cannot be a beginning of creation in the case of this nature: and in the same way as it is uncreated, it is also impossible for it to be destroyed, either by itself, or by anything external that would destroy it.

RECONCILING FREE WILL WITH FATE AND NECESSITY (Cicero, On Fate)

Necessity and the Principle of Bivalence that Every Proposition is either True of False

9. There are no natural causes flowing from the necessity of things which determine the truth of the proposition that "Carneades came down into the Academy". This fact had its causes, but we must distinguish between those prior causes that depend on chance, and those efficient causes that contain a physical energy and influence. Thus this proposition was always true and certain, that "Epicurus will die at the age of seventy-two, in the Archonship of Pitharatus." Yet there were no fatal causes that determined this event. But since it took place we may be sure that it necessarily happened in the way it did. Those who affirm that future things are unchangeable, and that things true and certain cannot become false and uncertain, ought not to be regarded as the partisans of strict fatalism, since they are only explaining the meaning of words. However, those philosophers who introduce a chain of eternal causes of absolute necessity, rob the human soul of its free-will, and bind it hand and foot in the necessity of fate. . . .

          10. Here let me take the liberty for a moment to agree with Epicurus, and deny that every proposition is either true or false [i.e., bivalence]. I would rather expose myself to criticism for this, than grant that fate governs all things. For while this latter opinion [regarding fate] is entirely indefensible, the former [regarding bivalence] is merely doubtful. Therefore, Chrysippus strives to prove that every proposition must be true or false. Epicurus, though, fears that by conceding this point [of bivalence], he may be obliged to admit that everything happens through fate. For, the [bivalent] truth or falsehood of any given proposition existing from all eternity, must be certain in one sense or other. If certain, then it is necessary according to the necessity of fate, and thus Epicurus thinks that necessity and fate are established. But Chrysippus, on the other hand, fears that, if he cannot establish his [bivalence] principle that every proposition is either true or false, then it will be impossible to prove that everything is done in consequence of fate, and of the eternal causes of all future events.

Lazy Man Argument against Free Will: If Everything is Fated, then we Do Not have to do Anything

12. Nor need we be deterred from this line of reasoning [concerning bivalence and necessity] by the argument called the lazy man (or, by some philosophers the "master argument"), which, if we follow it, it would induce us to remain inactive all our lives. This argument may be thus stated. "If it be the will of fate that you should rid yourself from this disease, then whether you take medicine or not, you will rid yourself equally." Again, " If it is the will of fate that you should not escape from your malady, whether you take medicine or not, you will not escape." Fate, therefore, is the regulator of both alternatives, and any application to a physician will be useless.

          This argument is very appropriately called lazy, for if we adopt it, we must remain in absolute idleness, and abstain from all action whatever. We may change the statement of this argument and omit the word fate, but still it has the same effect. "If from all eternity this proposition is true, you will escape from this malady; then whether you consult a physician or not, you will escape from it." Again; "If from all eternity this proposition is false, you will not recover from this disease; then you will not escape from it whether you consult a physician or not."

Chrysippus' Response to the Lazy Man Argument: If the End is Fated, so too is the Means

12. Chrysippus rejects this [lazy Man] argument. For, he says, we must distinguish between two kinds of propositions, the simple and the compound. For instance, this is a simple proposition: "Socrates will die this day." Here, whether he does anything, or does not do so, the day of his death is definitively fixed. But if the fate spoken of is of this sort, "Laius will beget Oedipus," then it cannot be added, "whether Laius sleeps with a woman or not" for it is a compound fact, and "co-fated", to use Chrysippus's expression. For, it is fated both that Laius will sleep with his wife, and that he will beget Oedipus. In the same way, if it is asserted, "Milo will compete in the Olympic games", it would be absurd to reply that he must compete whether he meets any opponent or not. For the assertion "he will compete", is a compound one, because there is no competition without an opponent. All sophisms of this nature are demolished in the same way. "Whether you consult a physician, or whether you do not, you will recover," is fallacious. For it is just as much fated that you will consult a physician as that you will recover.

Carneades' Response: Not Everything is Fated since Some things are Within our Power

14. Carneades also fully rejects this [lazy man] method of arguing, and thinks that these conclusions are adopted too hastily. He therefore pushed his argument in a plainer manner, and avoided deception. His conclusions were formed in this way: "If everything happens by prior causes, all these causes must be closely and compactly bound to each other by a natural interconnection. Now if this is the case, then necessity governs all things; and if this too is the case, then nothing is in our own power. But some things are in our own power. Yet, if all things happen by fate, then then all things happen by prior causes. Therefore, all that happens does not happen by fate." This argument cannot be made more firm.

Divine Foreknowledge not Based on Bivalence, but only on Knowledge of Causes

14. Suppose someone were to try to reply to Carneades, and to argue as follows. "If all that happens is true from all eternity, so that it must happen in a specific manner [i.e., bivalence], then it follows necessarily that all things are closely and compactly bound together by a natural interconnection" [i.e., causal necessity].  He would be in effect saying nothing. For there is an essential difference between (1) whether a natural cause from eternity makes future things true [i.e., bivalence], or (2) whether even without a natural eternity those future things can be recognized as true [from their necessary causes]. Therefore, Carneades says that Apollo himself cannot predict with certainty what things will take place, except for those things whose causes are so contained in nature that they must eventually take place.

          For what can the deity himself have seen to make him say that "Marcellus (who was consul three times) would perish in the sea?" This event was indeed true from all eternity [i.e., bivalence], but it had no efficient cause. In Carneades opinion, Apollo himself could not know those past events which leave no signs or remnants. How then can he know events which are future? For it is only by an acquaintance with efficient causes that we can foreknow the particular events which result from them. Therefore, he says, Apollo could not predict in the case of Oedipus that he would certainly kill his father, because there existed no prior cause for such an event in nature.

          15. Thus, the Stoics, who hold that everything [causally] happens by fate, can consistently accept the truth of oracles of this kind, and of other things that are types of divination. However, those who only assert that all things which must happen are certain from all eternity [i.e., bivalence], may, if they please, reject such consequences [about oracles and divination]. Their position is more restricted than the Stoics.

Chrysippus: Fate controls External Causes, but not a thing's Internal Causes

18. But Chrysippus, rejecting necessity, yet believing that nothing can happen without prior causes, distinguishes causes into two kinds, in order to preserve the doctrine of fate, and yet avoid that of [causal] necessity. There are, he says, certain [internal] absolute principal causes, and certain [external] auxiliary proximate causes. When, therefore, we assert that all things happen by prior causes, we do not so much refer to these [internal] absolute or principal causes, but rather the [external] auxiliary and proximate ones. He therefore opposes the argument that I have just mentioned in this manner. Chrysippus says, if everything happens by fate, I grant that everything happens by prior causes; but these prior causes are not [internal] principal ones, but instead are [external] auxiliary ones. If these latter [external] causes are not in our power, it does not follow that that [internal] desire itself is outside of our power. However, if we [incorrectly] say that everything happens from [internal] principal causes, then, since these [prior necessitating] causes are beyond our control, desire is likewise beyond our control [since it would then be like an external cause].

          Those, therefore, who thus introduce fate, and join necessity with it, rush wildly into this absurd consequence, namely, the destruction of free-will. But those who admit prior causes without supposing them to be [internal] principal causes, have no such error to fear. In fact, nothing is more natural, according to these philosophers, than the manner in which assent is produced from prior causes. They grant that assent cannot arise without some corresponding action upon the senses, yet they say that this action upon the senses, being only an [external] proximate cause, not an [external] principal one, takes place as Chrysippus describes.

Rolling Cylinder Analogy: External Cause gives it a Push, Internal Cause makes it Roll

18. It is not that this assent can arise without some external cause, (for sense must be acted upon by seeing an object). Rather, it is like a rolling cylinder or spinning top, which cannot begin to move until it is pushed or impacted. But after they have received the impact, they continue their rolling or spinning motions according to their own natures or forms.

          19. For, Chrysippus states, "a man who pushes a cylinder gives it an [external] principle of motion, but not [internally and] immediately that of rolling. So when an object [externally] strikes our senses and conveys its image to our soul [like an imprint on wax], it nevertheless leaves us [internally] free to form our specific assent concerning it. Again, it is like the cylinder which was externally pushed, but then continues to move according to its own [internal] force and nature. In short, if some effect were produced without a prior cause, it would then be false that all things happen by fate. If, however, it is probable that everything which happens indeed has a prior cause, then why should we not admit that all things happen by fate, unless we understand this distinction between the two different causes [i.e., external and internal]?"

          This is Chrysippus's view of the situation. But it is a different view if someone denied that our assent is the effects of fate, yet also held that our assent must be produced without a prior impression made on our senses. But both parties will be in agreement if they grant that a prior impression is made on the senses, and yet that the assent is not the effect of fate, since the [external] proximate cause does not specifically trigger assent. For although Chrysippus grants that the [external] proximate cause of assent is in the impression of the object made on the senses, this does not imply that it was the [internal] necessary cause of assenting to it.

ETHICS (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 7.51-65)

Divisions of Ethics

51.The ethical part of philosophy they divide into (1) the topic of inclination, (2) the topic of good and bad, (3) the topic of the passions, (4) the topic of virtue, (5) the topic of the chief good, (6) the topic of the primary value of actions, (7) the topic of duties or what is appropriate, and (8) the topic of encouragements to and discouragements from acting. . . .

Natural Law: Natural Inclinations in Plants, Animals and Rational Animals

52. They say that the first inclination which an animal has is to protect itself, as nature brings herself to take an interest in it from the beginning, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on Ends. Accordinly, he says that the first and dearest object to every animal is its own existence, and its consciousness of that existence. For, it is not natural for any animal to be alienated from itself, or even to be brought into such a state as to be indifferent to itself, being neither alienated from nor interested in itself. It remains. therefore, that we must assert that nature has bound the animal to itself by the greatest unanimity and affection; for by that means it repels all that is injurious, and attracts all that is akin to it and desirable. But as for what some people say, that the first inclination of animals is to pleasure, they say what is false. For they say that pleasure, if there be any such thing at all, is an accessory only, which, nature, having sought it out by itself, as well as those things which are adapted to its constitution, receives incidentally in the same manner as animals are pleased, and plants made to flourish.

          Further, they say, nature makes no difference between animals and plants, when it regulates them so as to leave them without voluntary motion or sense. Some things also take place in humans in the same manner as in plants. But, as inclination in animals tends chiefly to the point of making them pursue what is appropriate to them, we may say that their inclinations are regulated by nature. As reason is given to rational animals according to a more perfect principle, it follows, that to live correctly according to reason, is properly predicated of those who live according to nature. For nature is, so to speak, the artist who produces the inclination.

          53. For this reason Zeno was the first writer who said (in his treatise on the Nature of Man) that the chief good was admittedly to live according to nature. This means living according to virtue, for nature leads us to this point. (Cleanthes speaks similarly in his treatise on Pleasure, and so do Posidonius and Hecaton in their essays on Ends as the Chief Good). Again, to live according to virtue is the same thing as living according to one's experience of those things which happen by nature (as Chrysippus explains it in the first book of his treatise on the Chief Good). For our individual natures are all parts of universal nature. For this reason, the chief good is to live in a manner corresponding to nature, and that means corresponding to one's own nature and to universal nature. It also means doing none of those things that the common law of mankind is in the habit of forbidding. This "common law" is identical with that right reason which pervades everything, being the same with Jupiter, who is the regulator and chief manager of all existing things.

          Again, this very thing is the virtue of the happy man and the perfect happiness of life when everything is done according to a harmony with the genius of each individual with reference to the will of the universal governor and manager of all things. . . .

Virtues: Intellectual and Nonintellectual, Primary and Secondary

54. Generally speaking, virtue is a perfection in everything, such as with a statue. Virtue may be non-intellectual, like good health, or intellectual, like good judgment. For Hecaton says (in the first book of his treatise on Virtues), that the scientific and speculative virtues are those that have a constitution theoretical principles, as, for instance, good judgment and justice. Those which are not non-intellectual are those which are generally viewed as parallel to and the practical result or effect of the former; such as health and strength. Accordingly, temperance is one of the intellectual virtues, and it happens that good health usually follows it, and is aligned, so to speak, beside it. This is just as strength follows the proper structure of an arch. The non-intellectual virtues derive their name from the fact that they do not proceed assent from intelligence. Rather, they are derived from others, are only accessories, and are found even in worthless people, as in the case of good health courage. Posidonius (in the first book of his treaties on Ethics) says that the great proof of the reality of virtue is that Socrates, Diogenes, and Antisthenes made great improvement; and the great proof of the reality of vice may be found in the fact of its being opposed to virtue. . . .

          Among the virtues some are primitive and some are derived. The primitive [primary] ones are good judgment, courage, justice, and temperance. Subordinate [secondary] to these, as a kind of species contained in them, are magnanimity, continence, endurance, presence of mind, wisdom in council. The Stoics define good judgment as a knowledge of what is good, and bad, and indifferent. Justice is a knowledge of what ought to be chosen, what ought to be avoided, and what is indifferent. Magnanimity is a knowledge of engendering a lofty habit, superior to all such accidents as happen to all men indifferently, whether they be good or bad. Continence they consider to be a disposition which never abandons right reason, or a habit which never submits to pleasure. Endurance they call a knowledge or habit by which we understand what we ought to endure, what we ought not, and what is indifferent. Presence of mind they define as a habit which is prompt at finding out what is suitable on a sudden emergency. Wisdom in counsel they think a knowledge which leads us to judge what we are to do, and how we are to do it, in order to act becomingly. Analogously, among the vices there are also some which are primary, and some which are subordinate. For instance, folly, and cowardice, and injustice, and intemperance, are among the primary vices. Incontinence, slowness, and folly in counsel among the subordinate ones. The vices are ignorance of those things of which the virtues are the knowledge.

Mental and Non-Mental Goods, Honor as the Highest Good

55. Most generally, Good is some advantage. More specifically, it is either what is beneficial or not distinct from what is beneficial. For this reason, virtue itself, and the good which partakes of virtue, are spoken of in a threefold view of the subject. The first is good as a source of benefits, secondly, as goods that follow from benefits, such as virtuous actions, and thirdly, the agent himself who benefits, such as the good person who partakes of virtue.

          In another way, they define the good in a unique manner, as being what is perfect according to the nature of a rational being as rational being. Accordingly, they say that such a nature is conformity to virtue insofar as virtuous actions and virtuous people partake of virtue. So too with the accompaniments of virtue, such as joy, gladness, and things of that kind.

          In the same manner they speak of vices, which they divide into folly, cowardice, injustice, and things of that kind. They consider that those things which partake of vices, and actions done according to vice, and bad men themselves, are in some sense the evil. Its accompaniments are hopelessness, sadness, and other things of that kind.

          56. Again, some are mental, others are external to the mind, and some are neither mental nor are external to it. The mental goods are virtues and virtuous actions. The goods external to the mind involve a virtuous country, a virtuous friend, and the happiness of one's country and friend. Those which are neither mental nor external to it are, for example, a man himself being good or happy. Similarly, with evils, some are mental, such as the vices and vicious actions. Some are external to the mind, such as having a foolish country, a foolish friend, or one's country or one's friend being unhappy. Those evils are neither mental nor external to it are, for example, a man himself being worthless and unhappy. . . .

          59. They call the honorable the perfect good, because it has naturally all the items that are required by nature and because it is perfectly harmonious. Now, there are four species of this perfect good: justice, courage, temperance, and knowledge. For, in these goods all honorable actions are accomplished. Analogously, there are also four species of the disgraceful: injustice, and cowardice, and intemperance, and folly. The honorable is predicated in one sense, as making those who are possessed of it worthy of all praise. In a second sense, it refers to what is well adapted by nature for its proper work. In yet another sense, it expresses that which adorns a man, such as when we say that the wise man alone is good and honorable.

          The Stoics also say, that the honorable is the only good (as Hecaton says, in the third book of his treatise on Goods, and Chrysippus asserts the same principle in his essays on the Honorable). They say that honor is virtue, and honor is also that which partakes of virtue. This assertion is the same as the other, namely, that everything good is honorable, and that the good is equivalent to the honorable, insofar as the one thing is exactly equal to the other. For since it is good, it is honorable; and it is honorable, therefore, it is good.

          60. They hold that all goods are equal, and that every good is to be desired in the highest degree, and that it admits of no relaxation or heightening of intensity.

Indifferent things as Neither Good nor Bad: Health, Wealth, Strength, Nobility

They also divide all existing things into good, bad, and indifferent. The good are the virtues, good judgment, justice, courage, temperance, and the rest of similar qualities. The bad are the contraries, folly, injustice, and the like. Those are indifferent which are neither beneficial nor injurious, such as life, health, pleasure, beauty, strength, riches, a good reputation, nobility of birth; and their contraries, death, disease, labor, disgrace, weakness, poverty, a bad reputation, baseness of birth, and the like (as Hecaton lays it down in the seventh book of his treatise on the Chief Good, and he is followed by Apollodorus, in his Ethics, and by Chrysippus). For they affirm that those things are not good but indifferent, though perhaps a little more near to one species than to the other.

          For, just as it is the property of the hot to warm and not to chill one, so it is the property of the good to benefit and not to injure one. Now, wealth and good health cannot be said to benefit any more than to injure anyone, and so wealth and health are not goods. Again, they say that something is not good which it is possible to use both well and badly. But it is possible to make either a good or a bad use of wealth or of health; therefore, wealth and good health are not goods. Posidonius, however, affirms that these things do come under the head of goods. But Hecaton, in the nineteenth book of his treatise on Goods, and Chrysippus, in his treatises on Pleasure, both deny that pleasure is a good. For they say that there are disgraceful pleasures, and that nothing disgraceful is good. That to benefit a person is to move him or to keep him according to virtue, but to injure him is to move him or to keep him according to vice.

          They also assert, that indifferent things are so spoken of in two ways. Firstly, those things are called indifferent which have no influence in producing either happiness or unhappiness, such as riches, glory, health, strength, and the like. For it is possible for a man to be happy without any of these things. Also, it is from the character of the use that is made of them that happiness or uuhappiness depends. In a second sense, those things are called indifferent that do not excite any inclination or aversion, as for instance, the fact of a man's having an odd or an even number of hairs on his head, or his putting out or drawing back his finger. For, it is not in this sense that the things previously mentioned are called indifferent, for they do excite inclination or aversion. For this reason, some of them are chosen, though there is equal reason for preferring or shunning all the others.

Some Indifferent things are Preferred for Assisting in Natural Life

          61. Again, among indifferent things, they call some preferred, and others rejected. Those are preferred that have some proper value, and those are rejected, which have no value at all. By the term proper value, they mean that quality of things that causes them to concur in producing a well-regulated life. In this sense, every good has a proper value. Again, they say that a thing has value, when in some point of view, it has a sort of intermediate power of aiding us to live conformably to nature. Under this class, we may include riches or good health, if they give any assistance to natural life. Again, value is predicated of the price which one gives for the attainment of an object, which someone who has experience of the object sought, fixes as its fair price; as if we were to say, for instance, that as some wheat was to be exchanged for barley, with a mule thrown in to make up the difference.

          Those goods then are preferred, which have a value. With the mental goods they are ability, skill, improvement, and the like. With corporeal goods, they are life, health, strength, a good constitution, soundness, beauty. With the external goods, they are riches, glory, noblity of birth, and the like. Rejected things are, in the case of qualities of the mind, stupidity, unskilfulness, and the 1ike. Circumstances affecting the body include death, disease, weakness, a bad constitution, mutilation, disgrace, and the like. External circumstances include poverty, lack of reputation, ignoble birth, and the like. But there are qualities and circumstances that are neither preferred nor rejected, and thus belong to neither class

          Again, with preferred things, some are preferred for their own sakes, some for the sake of other things, and some partly for their own sakes and partly for that of other things. Those which are preferred for their own sakes are ability, improvement, and the like. Those which are preferred for the sake of other things, are wealth, nobility of birth, and the like. Those which are preferred partly for their own sake, and partly for that of something else, are strength, vigor of the senses, universal soundness, and the like. Or, they are preferred for their own sakes, inasmuch as they are in accordance with nature, and preferred for the sake of something else, inasmuch as they are productive of no small number of advantages. The same is the case in the inverse ratio, with those things which are rejected.

Moral Duties as Actions in Agreement with Nature

62. They say that duty is that which is preferred and contains in itself reasonable arguments why we should prefer it, such as that it corresponds to the nature of life itself. This argument applies to plants and animals, since even their nature is subject to the obligation of certain duties. Duty (to kathekon) had this name given to it by Zeno, in the first place, because its name is derived from its extending to, or incumbent upon people. It is an action that is in agreement with nature. With actions that are done at the prompting of impulse, some are duties, and some are contrary to duty, and some are neither duties nor contrary to duty.

          Those actions are duties which reason selects for us to, such as to honor one's parents, one's brothers, one's country, to gratify one's friends. Those actions are contrary to duty which reason does not choose, as for instance, to neglect one's parents, to be indifferent to one's brothers, to avoid assisting one's friends, to be careless about the welfare of one's country, and so on. Those are neither duties, nor contrary to duty, which reason neither selects to do nor rejects, such as to pick up straw, to hold a pen or a comb, or acts of that sort.

          Again, there are some duties that do not depend on circumstances, and some that do. Those that do not depend on circumstances include taking care of one's health and sense organs, and the like. Those which do depend on circumstances include the mutilation of one's body, the sacrificing of one's property, and so on. The case of those actions which are contrary to duty, is similar. Again, some duties are always such, and some are not always. It is always a duty to live in accordance with virtue. But it is not always a duty to ask questions, give answers, talk, and the like. This also applies to acts that are contrary to duty.

          There is also a class of intermediate duties, such as the duty of boys to obey their masters.

Four Main Passions: Pain, Fear, Desire, Pleasure

63. The Stoics also say that the mind is divisible into eight parts. For, the five organs of sensation, and the vocal power, and the intellectual power (which is the mind itself), and the generative power, are all parts of the mind. But falsehood produces a corruption which operates on the intellect, from which many passions arise, and many causes of instability. All passion is itself, according to Zeno, an irrational and unnatural movement of the mind, or excessive inclination.

          Of the general class of passions there are four kinds, namely pain, fear, desire, and pleasure (as Hecaton says in the second book of his treatise on the Passions, and as Zeno also says in his work on the Passions). They hold that these passions are judgments (as Chrysippus contends in his work on the Passions), for covetousness is an opinion that money is a beautiful object, and in a similar way drunkenness and intemperance are similar judgments.

          Pain they define to be an irrational contraction of the mind, and it is divided into the following types: pity, envy, jealousy, resentment, heaviness, annoyance, sorrow, anguish, confusion. Pity is a grief over some one, on the ground of his being in undeserved distress. Envy is a grief, at the good fortune of another. Jealousy is a grief at that belonging to someone else, which one desires one's self. resentment is a grief at another also having what one has one's self. heaviness is a grief which weighs one down. Annoyance is grief which narrows one, and causes one to feel in a strait. Sorrow is a grief arising from deliberate thought, which endures for some time, and gradually increases. Anguish is a grief with acute pain. Confusion is an irrational grief, which frets one, and prevents one from clearly discerning present circumstances.

          But fear is the expectation of evil; and the following feelings are all classed under the head of aversion: dread, hesitation, shame, dismay, panic, and anxiety. Dread is a fear which produces alarm. Shame is a fear of disgrace. Hesitation is a fear of coming activity. Dismay is a fear from the imagination of some unusual thing. Panic is a fear accompanied with a racing of the voice. Anxiety is a fear of some uncertain event. . . .

Five Ethical Paradoxes

64. They lay down the position that all offences are equal (as Chrysippus argues in the fourth book of his Ethical Questions, and so say Persaeus and Zeno). For if one thing that is true is not more true than another thing that is true, neither is one thing that is false more false than another thing that is false. So too, one deceit is not greater than another, nor one sin than another. For the man who is a hundred furlongs from Canopus, and the man who is only one, are both equally not in Canopus. So too, he who commits a greater sin, and he who commits a less, are both equally not in the right path. . . .

          They say, that not only are the wise free, but that they are also kings, since kingly power is an irresponsible dominion, which can only exist in the case of the wise man (as Chrysippus says in his treatise on the Proper Application of his Terms made by Zeno). For he says that a ruler ought to give decisions on good and evil, and that none of the wicked understand these things. In the same way, they assert that they are the only people who are fit to be magistrates or judges, or orators, and that none of the bad are qualified for these tasks. Further, that they are free from all error, in consequence of their not being prone to any wrong actions. Also, that they are unconnected with injury, for that they never injure anyone else, nor themselves. Also, that they are not pitiful, and that they never make allowance for any one; for that they do not relax the punishments appointed by law, since yielding, and pity, and mercifulness itself, never exist in any of their souls, so as to induce an affectation of kindness in respect, of punishment; nor do they ever think any punishment too severe. . . .

          Again, they say that all the foolish are mad; for that they are not prudent, and madness is equivalent to folly in every one of its actions. But the wise man does everything properly, just as we say that Ismenias can play every piece of flute-music well. Also, they say that everything belongs to the wise man, for that the law has given them perfect and universal power; but some things also are said to belong to the wicked, just in the same manner as some things are said to belong to the unjust, or as a house is said to belong to a city in a different sense from that in which a thing belongs to the person who uses it.

          65. They say that virtues mutually follow each other, and he who has one has all. For the precepts of them all are common, as Chrysippus affirms in the first book of his treatise on Laws; and Apollodorus, in his Natural Philosophy, according to the ancient system; and Hecaton, in the third book of his treatise on Virtues. For they say that, the man who has virtue is able to consider and also to do what must be done. But what must be done must be chosen, and encountered, and distributed, and awaited; so that if the man does some things by deliberate choice, and some in a spirit of endurance, and some distributively, and some patiently; he is prudent, and courageous, and just, and temperate. Each of the virtues has a particular subject of its own, about which it is conversant; as, for instance, courage is conversant about the things which must be endured: good judgment is conversant about what must be done and what must not, and what is of a neutral or indifferent character. In a similar way, the other virtues are conversant about their own unique subjects; and wisdom in counsel and shrewdness follow good judgment; and good order and decorum follow temperance; and equality and goodness of judgment follow justice; and constancy and energy follow courage.

          Another doctrine of the Stoics is, that there is nothing intermediate between virtue and vice. The Peripatetics assert that there is a stage between virtue and vice, being an improvement on vice which has not yet arrived at virtue. However, the Stoics say that, just as a stick must be either straight or crooked, so a man must be either just or unjust, and cannot be more just than just, or more unjust than unjust; and that the same rule applies to all cases.

ROMAN STOICISM: REDUCING PASSIONS, ATTAINING TRANQUILITY, COSMOPOLITANISM

Seneca: Controlling Anger (Seneca, On Anger)

          1.5. Whether anger is natural will become evident if we consider human nature. What is more gentle than man while he is in the proper state of mind, yet what is more cruel than anger? What is more affectionate to others than man, yet what is more savage against them than anger? Mankind is born for mutual assistance, anger for mutual ruin. The former loves society, the latter alienation. The one loves to do good, the other to do harm. The one helps even strangers, the other attacks even its dearest friends. The one is even ready to sacrifice itself for the good of others, the other to plunge into peril provided it drags others with it. Who, then, can be more ignorant of nature than he who attributes this cruel and hurtful vice to nature's best and most perfect work? Anger, as we have said, is eager to punish, yet it is far from man's nature that it should desire should exist in man's peaceful breast. For human life is founded on benefits and harmony, and is bound together into an alliance for the common help of all. This is not through terror, but through love towards one another.

          1.7. It is easier to banish dangerous passions than to rule them, and it is easier not to admit them than to keep them in order when admitted. For when they have established themselves in possession of the mind they are more powerful than the lawful ruler, and will in no way permit themselves to be weakened or reduced. Further, reason herself, who holds the reins, is only strong while she remains apart from the passions. If she mixes and contaminates herself with them she becomes no longer able to restrain those whom she might once have cleared out of her path. Ror the mind, when once excited and shaken up, goes whither the passions drive it.

          2.10. What room is there for anger? Everything ought either to move us to tears or to laughter. The wise man will not be angry with the wicked. Why not? Because he knows that no one is born wise, but becomes so. He knows that very few wise men are produced in any age, because he thoroughly understands the circumstances of human life. Now, no sane man is angry with nature: for what should we say if a man chose to be surprised that fruit did not hang on the thickets of a forest, or to wonder at bushes and thorns not being covered with some useful berry? No one is angry when nature excuses a defect. The wise man, therefore, being tranquil, and dealing openly with mistakes, is not an enemy to the wicked but their improver, will go out every day in the following frame of mind. "Many men will meet me who are drunkards, lustful, ungrateful, greedy, and excited by the frenzy of ambition." He will view all these as nonthreateningly as a physician does his patients. When a captain's ship leaks freely through its opened seams, does he become angry with the sailors or the ship itself? No. Rather, he tries to fix it. He shuts out some water, bales out some other, closes all the holes that he can see, and by ceaseless labor counteracts those which are out of sight and which let water into the hold. Nor does he relax his efforts because as much water as he pumps out runs in again. We need a sustained struggle against permanent and prolific evils, not, indeed, to defeat them, but merely to prevent their overpowering us.

          3.34. Come now, let us list the other causes of anger: they are food, drink, and the showy apparatus connected with them, words, insults, disrespectful movements of the body, suspicions, obstinate cattle, lazy slaves, and spiteful construction put upon other men's words. Thus, even the gift of language to mankind becomes counted among the wrongs of nature. Believe me, the things which cause us such great passion are trivial, the sort of things that children fight and squabble over. There is nothing serious, nothing important in all that we do with such gloomy faces. It is, I repeat, the setting a great value on trivialities that is the cause of your anger and madness. This man wanted to rob me of my inheritance, that one has accused me in front of persons whom I had long courted with great expectations, that one has desired my lover. A wish for the same things, which ought to have been a bond of friendship, becomes a source of arguments and hatred. A narrow path causes quarrels among those who pass up and down it. A wide and broadly spread road may be used by whole tribes without bumping. Those objects of desire of yours cause strife and disputes among those who want the same things, because they are petty, and cannot be given to one man without being taken away from another.

Epictetus: Resigning Oneself to Fate (Epictetus, Manual)

1. Some things are in our control and others are not. Things in our control are opinion, aim, desire, aversion, and, in a word, whatever are our own doing. Things not in our control are body, property, reputation, political position, and, in a word, whatever are not our own doing.

          The things in our control are by nature free, unrestrained, and unhindered. But those not in our control are weak, dependent, restricted, and dependent on others. Remember then that if you imagine that what is naturally slavish is free, and what is naturally another's is your own, you will be hindered, you will grieve, you will be confused, you will find fault both with gods and humans. But if you suppose that only to be your own which is your own, and what belongs to others such as it really is, then no one will ever compel you or restrain you. Further, you will find fault with no one or accuse no one, and you will do nothing against your will. No one will hurt you, you will have no enemies, and you will not be harmed.

          Aiming then at these high matters, you must remember that to attain them requires more than ordinary effort. You must entirely abandon some things and for the present postpone the rest. But if you also desire power and wealth, it may be that you will fail to get them, just because your desire is set on power, and you will certainly fail to attain those things which alone bring freedom and happiness.

          Therefore, strive to be able to say to every harsh appearance, "You are only an appearance, and not absolutely the thing you appear to be." Then examine it by those rules which you have, the first and main one being this: whether it concerns the things which are in our own control, or those which are not. If it concerns anything not in our control, be prepared to say that it is nothing to you.

          3. With regard to whatever objects give you delight, are useful, or are deeply loved, remember to tell yourself of what general nature they are, beginning from the most insignificant things. If, for example, you are fond of a specific cup, remind yourself that it is only cups in general of which you are fond. Then, if it breaks, you will not be disturbed. If you kiss your child, or your wife, say that you only kiss things which are mortal, and thus you will not be disturbed if either of them dies.

          4. When you are about to take something in hand, remind yourself of what type of thing it is. If you are going to a public bath, remind yourself the things which usually happen in the bath: some people splash the water, some push, some use abusive language, and others steal. Thus you will more securely go about this action if you say to yourself "I will now go bathe, and keep my own mind in a state conformable to nature." Do the same with regard to every other action. For thus, if any interference arises in bathing, you will have it ready to say, "It was not only to bathe that I desired, but to keep my mind in a state of conformity with nature. if I am bothered at things that happen, then I will not have that conformity.

          7. Consider when, on a voyage, your ship is anchored. If you go on shore to get water you may along the way amuse yourself by picking up a shellfish, or an onion. However, your thoughts and continual attention ought to be directed towards the ship, waiting for the captain to call you on board. You must then immediately leave all these things, otherwise you will be thrown into the ship, with your legs tied like a sheep. So it is with life. If, instead of an onion or a shellfish, you are given a wife or child, that is fine. But if the captain calls, you must run to the ship, leaving them, and regarding none of them. But if you are old, never go far from the ship, otherwise, when you are called, you will be unable to come in time.

          10. When anything happens to you, always remember to turn to yourself and ask what ability you have to deal with it. If you see an attractive person, self-restraint is the ability you have to exercise against your desire. If you are in pain, you will find fortitude. If you hear unpleasant language, you will find patience. So, if you train yourself in these habits appearances will not carry you away.

          11. Never say of anything, "I have lost it"; but say instead, "I have returned it." Is your child dead? It is returned. Is your wife dead? She is returned. Is your estate taken away? Well, is not this similarly returned? But you say "he who took it away is an evil person." What difference is it to you who the giver assigns to take it back? While he gives it to you to possess, take care of it. But do not view it as your own, just as travelers view an inn.

          12. If you want to improve, reject the following type of reasoning. "If I neglect my affairs, I will have no income, and if I do not punish my son, he will be bad." For, it is better to die with hunger, and be free from grief and fear, than to live in affluence with uneasiness. It is better that your son should be bad, than you unhappy.

          So, start from small things. Did a little oil spill? Was a little wine stolen? Say to yourself, "This is the price paid for being without passion (apatheia), for tranquility (ataraxia), and nothing can be gained without a price." When you call your servant, it is possible that he may not come, or, if he does, he may not do what you want. But he is in no way of such importance that it should be in his power to give you any disturbance.t

          15. Remember that you must behave in life as at a dinner party. Is anything brought around to you? Put out your hand and take your portion with moderation. Does it pass by you? Do not stop it. Has it not yet arrived? Do not stretch your desire towards it, but wait until it reaches you. Do this with regard to children, to a wife, to vocations, to riches, and you will eventually be a worthy partner of the feasts of the gods. If you do not even take the things that are set before you, but are able even to reject them, then you will not only be a partner at the feasts of the gods, but also of their empire. For, by doing this, Diogenes, Heraclitus and others like them, deservedly became, and were called, divine.

          16. When you see anyone crying in grief, either because his son has moved away or died, or the man has lost his property, be careful that you are not carried away by the impression that it is outward ills that make him miserable. But instead make a distinction in your mind and be ready to say, "What hurts this man is not this occurrence itself, since someone else might not be hurt by it, but the view he chooses to take of it." As far as conversation goes, however, be willing to show him sympathy, and, if necessary, cry with him. However, be careful not to cry inwardly, too.

          17. Remember that you are an actor in a drama that depends upon the judgment of the author. If he wants it short then it is short, if long then it is long. If he wants you to act the part of a poor man, a cripple, a governor, or a private person, see that you act it naturally. For it is your job to act well the role that is assigned to you, while it is another's job to choose your role.

Marcus Aurelius: The Cosmic Perspective (Marcus Aurelius, Meditations)

          2.17. Of human life, its time is a mere point, its substance is in a flux, its perception is dull, the composition of its whole body is subject to decay, its mind is in a whirl, fortune hard to find, and fame is something that lacks judgment. In short, everything which belongs to the body is a stream, what belongs to the soul is a dream and vapor, life is a warfare and a stranger's journey, and after acquiring fame there is only oblivion. What then is capable of directing us? One thing, and only one:  philosophy. But this consists in keeping your mind free and unharmed from violence. You must rise above pains and pleasures, always act with purpose, and not falsely or hypocritically. You must not feel the need of another person to do or not do something. You must accept all that happens, all that is fated, as coming from wherever it is that you yourself came. Finally, you must wait for death with a cheerful mind, as being nothing other than a dissolution of the elements of which every living being is composed. If there is no harm to the elements themselves as each continually changes into another, why should you have any concern about the change and dissolution of all the elements? For dissolution is according to nature, and nothing is evil which is according to nature.

          5.23. Why do unskilled and ignorant people disturb those who have skill and knowledge? What people have skill and knowledge? Those who know the beginning and end of things, and know the reason that pervades all substance, and directs the universe through all time by fixed revolutions.

          7.47. Look around at the courses of the stars, as if you were going along with them, and constantly consider the changes of the elements into one another. These thoughts remove the filth of the earthly life.

          9.32. You cannot remove from your path many useless things that disturb you, for they lie entirely in your opinion. You will then gain abundant space for yourself by contemplating the whole universe in your mind, by reflecting on the eternity of time, and observing the rapid change of every several thing, how short is the time from birth to death, and the illimitable time before birth as well as the equally boundless time after death.

          12.32. Consider what a small a part of boundless and unfathomable time is assigned to every person, for it is quickly swallowed up in the eternal. Consider how small a part it is of the whole substance, and how small a part it is of the universal soul. Consider what a small piece of the whole earth you crawl upon. Reflecting on all this, consider nothing to be great, except to act as your nature leads you, and to endure that which the common nature brings.

Stoic Cosmopolitanism: We are Citizens of the World

Let us grasp the fact that there are two communities. One, which is vast and truly contains both gods and humans, where we do not take account of this or that piece of land, but make the boundaries of our citizenship reach as far as the rays of the sun. The other is that which we have been assigned by the accident of birth. This may be that of the Athenians or Carthaginians, or of any other city which does not belong to all people but to some especial ones. Some people serve both of these communities, the greater and the lesser, at the same time. Some serve only the lesser, some only the greater. We can serve the greater commonwealth even when we are at leisure, and, indeed, I think we can serve it better when we are at leisure. [Seneca, On Leisure, 4]

          If these statements of the philosophers are true, that God and men are related, there is only one path open to humans, which is to do as Socrates did: if someone asks what country you are from, never to reply, "I am an Athenian", or "I am a Corinthian", but instead "I am a citizen of the universe." For why do you say that you are an Athenian, instead of merely a native of the little spot on which your tiny body was cast forth at birth? Plainly you call yourself Athenian or Corinthian because of the greater region which includes not only the very spot where you were born, and all your household, but also generally that region from which the race of your ancestors has come down to you. Consider when someone has learned to understand the government of the universe and has realized that there is nothing so great or powerful or all-inclusive as this frame of things wherein humans and God are united, and that from it come the seeds from which are sprung not only my own father or grandfather, but all things that are born and that grow upon earth, and rational creatures in particular; for these alone are by nature designed to share in the community of God, being connected with Him by the bond of reason. Why should such a person not call himself a citizen of the universe and a son of God? Why should he fear anything that can happen to him among men? When kinship with Caesar or any other of those who are powerful in Rome is sufficient to make men live in security, above all scorn and free from every fear, shall not the fact that we have God as maker and father and kinsman relieve us from pains and fears? [Epictetus, Discourses, 1.9]

          If we have intelligence in common, then so too is our reason in common, in respect of which we are rational beings. If this is so, then we also share in common the reason which commands us what to do, and what not to do. If this is so, there is also a common law. If this is so, we are fellow-citizens. If this is so, we are members of some political community. If this is so, the world is in some way a state. For of what other world community will anyone say that the whole human race are members? From this world community comes also our intelligence, our reasoning faculty and our sense of law. Where else would they come from? The earthly part of me comes from earth, the watery part from another element, and that which is hot and fiery from some further source (for nothing comes out of that which is nothing, as nothing also returns to non-existence). Thus, the intellectual part of me also comes from some related source. [Marcus Aurelius, Meditations, 4.4]

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. In the section on Stoic logic, what are some features of the Stoic view of sense perception?

2. What is an assertable proposition, and what are some examples?

3. In the section on Stoic natural philosophy, what are some key features of the Stoic view of the world?

4. What are some key features of the Stoic view of God?

5. In the section on the Stoic view of the soul, what are some key features of the soul?

6. Give one of the arguments for the corporeal nature of the soul.

7. What are some key features of the Stoic view of necessity and fate?

8. What are some key features of the Stoic view of the eternal recurrence?

9. In the section on reconciling free will with fate and necessity, what is the principle of bivalence, and what potential implications does it have regarding fate and necessity?

10. What is the lazy man argument against fate?

11. Why does Carneades believe that divine foreknowledge is not based on bivalence?

12. What is Chrysippus's rolling cylinder argument in defense of free will?

13. In the section on Stoic ethics, what are some features of the Stoic view of natural inclinations and the virtues?

14. What are some features of the Stoic view of goods and the highest good?

15. What are some features of the Stoic view of indifferent things and the passions?

16. What are the five ethical paradoxes?

17. What are some features of Seneca's view of controlling one's anger?

18. What are some features of Epictetus' view of resigning oneself to fate?

19. What are some features of Marcus Aurelius's cosmic perspective?

20. What are some features of Stoic cosmopolitanism?

21. Short essay: please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

          a. Chrysippus attempts to reconcile fate with free will by distinguishing between external causes imposed by fate that control the big things, and the internal causes imposed by our minds that control the little things. Using his analogy of the rolling cylinder, discuss whether he succeeds (for help, do an internet search for "Chrysippus cylinder").

          b. In the section "Divine Foreknowledge not Based on Bivalence," Carneades argues that the gods do not foreknow the truth everything (i.e. they do not have foreknowledge of all bivalent facts). Rather, the gods only have limited foreknowledge based on those events that result from physical necessity. Since free choices do not result from physical necessity, then there are many such events that the gods cannot know. Carneades thus preserves free will by rejecting total divine foreknowledge. In a previous section, he also preserves free will by rejecting fate. Discuss Carneades' argument and whether he succeeds.

          c.  Stoicism scholar Keith Seddon believes that Chrysippus's critique of the lazy man argument fails: "Though seeing this doesn't to any degree undermine the fatalist's position, for just as your recovering was fated (if only you had known it), so was your calling the doctor! This might be how it happened, all right, but if the event of your calling the doctor was caused by prior circumstances (as all events are, according to the theory of causal determinism) then in what sense could you be considered to exercise your free will?" ("Do the Stoics Succeed" 2004). Discuss Seddon's point and how Chrysippus might respond.

          d. Adam Smith criticizes the Stoic view that since everything is divinely fated, then even human vice is a necessary part of the plan of the universe: "The ancient stoics were of opinion, that as the world was governed by the all-ruling providence of a wise, powerful, and good God, every single event ought to be regarded, as making a necessary part of the plan of the universe, and as tending to promote the general order and happiness of the whole: that the vices and follies of mankind, therefore, made as necessary a part of this plan as their wisdom or their virtue; and by that eternal art which educes good from ill, were made to tend equally to the prosperity and perfection of the great system of nature. No speculation of this kind, however, how deeply soever it might be rooted in the mind, could diminish our natural abhorrence for vice, whose immediate effects are so destructive, and whose remote ones are too distant to be traced by the imagination." (Theory of Moral Sentiments, 1759, 1.2.3.) Explain Smith's point and how the Stoics might respond.

          e. Hume criticizes Epictetus on the grounds that self-restraint can be just another form of self-indulgence. "It is certain that, while we aspire to the magnanimous firmness of the philosophic sage, and endeavour to confine our pleasures altogether within our own minds, we may, at last, render our philosophy like that of Epictetus, and other Stoics, only a more refined system of selfishness, and reason ourselves out of all virtue as well as social enjoyment." (Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748, 5). Discuss Hume's point and how Epictetus might respond.

          f. Henry Sidgwick criticizes that the Stoic view of "living according to nature" is circular: "The most characteristic formula of Stoicism seems to have been that declaring 'Life according to Nature' to be the ultimate end of action. The spring of the motion that sustained this life was in the vegetable creation a mere unfelt impulse: in animals it was impulse accompanied with sensation: in man it was the direction of Reason, which in him was naturally supreme over all merely blind irrational impulses. What then does Reason direct? 'To live according to Nature' is one answer: and thus we get the circular exposition of ethical doctrine in its simplest form." (Methods of Ethics, 1874, 13). Discuss Sidgwick's point and how the Stoics might respond?

          g. Augustine argues that some Stoics condemn compassion towards others, while others hold that it is a virtue: "The Stoics, indeed, are accustomed to condemn compassion. . . . But the eminent Stoic, Epictetus, quoting the opinions of Zeno and Chrysippus, the founders of the school, has taught us, they admit that passions of this kind occupy the soul of the wise man, whom they would have to be free from all vice. It then follows that these very passions are not judged by them to be vices, since they assail the wise man without forcing him to act against reason and virtue" (City of God, 9.5). Drawing from the above sections on Stoic ethics and Epictetus, discuss whether the Stoics are for or against compassion.

          h. In the following, Arthur Schopenhauer comments on the Stoic ethical view the dispensibleness of everything: "The Stoics held that the actual dispensing with everything that can be done without is not demanded, but that it is sufficient that we should regard possessions and pleasures constantly as dispensable, and as held in the hand of chance; for then the actual deprivation of them, if it should chance to occur, would neither be unexpected nor fall heavily. One might always have and enjoy everything; only one must ever keep present the conviction of the worthless ness and dispensableness of these good things on the one hand, and of their uncertainty and perishableness on the other, and therefore prize them all very little, and be always ready to give them up. Even more, he who must actually dispense with these things in order not to be moved by them, thereby shows that in his heart he holds them to be truly good things, which one must put quite out of sight if one is not to long after them." (The World as Will, 1859, 16). Explain Schopenhauer's distinction between actually dispensing with something and being prepared to dispense with something, and discuss which of these two best represents Epictetus.

          i. Karl Jaspers criticizes that Stoics like Epictetus do not adequately deal with existential crises: "The ultimate situations – death, chance, guilt, and the uncertainty of the world – confront me with the reality of failure. What do I do in the face of this absolute failure, which if I am honest I cannot fail to recognize? The advice of the Stoic, to withdraw to our own freedom in the independence of the mind, is not adequate. The Stoic's perception of man's weakness was not radical enough. He failed to see that the mind in itself is empty, dependent on what is put into it, and he failed to consider the possibility of madness. The Stoic leaves us without consolation; the independent mind is barren, lacking all content. He leaves us without hope, because his doctrine affords us no opportunity of inner transformation, no fulfilment through self-conquest in love, no hopeful expectation of the possible." (1951, Way to Wisdom, 2.) Discuss Jasper's point and how Epictetus or other Stoics might respond.

          j. Epicureans and Stoics both make several references to food. Compare and contrast the type of dietary advice that each of these schools might give to someone who is trying to lose weight, and discuss which might be the best.

SKEPTICISM: ACADEMIC AND PYRRHONIAN

From Ancient and Medieval Philosophy: Essential Selections, by James Fieser

© 2008, updated 1/1/2026, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

CONTENTS

Introduction

Lives of Skeptics

Summaries

Academic Skepticism

Sextus Empiricus: Outlines of Pyrrhonean Skepticism

Six Criticisms of Skepticism

Study Questions

 

INTRODUCTION

To be a skeptic means to doubt, and in Hellenistic times two competing schools of skepticism emerged, both teaching that we should doubt everything. The first of these is Academic skepticism, so named because it arose within Plato's Academy a few generations after Plato's death. The second is Pyrrhonian skepticism, named after its founder, Pyrrho, who was from the region of Ellis on the Greek Peloponnesian peninsula. There are two main differences between the two schools. First, while both advocated a skeptical way of life through suspension of judgment, Pyrrhonians saw this as a path to tranquility, and Academics did not. Second, the two schools offered different types of skeptical arguments.

Concerning Academic skepticism, the movement originated within what is traditionally called the "New Academy" in contrast with the "Old Academy" established by Plato and his six successors. Active from 266-90 BCE, there were seven leaders of the skeptical New Academy, the most important ones being its founder Arcesilaus and its fifth leader Carneades. Like Socrates, both of these philosophers wrote nothing and took on the Socratic role of critically examining others' beliefs. They actively engaged in debates with other philosophical schools, particularly with Stoics about the possibility of knowledge. Stoics claimed that we can know basic truths through "comprehension" (katalepsis), which is the mental capacity to grasp or intuit things. Academic skeptics argued to the contrary that all things are incomprehensible (akatalepsis), and the best we have is mere probability (pithanon). Much of what we know about Academic skepticism comes from the Roman statesman and philosopher Cicero, who himself was a follower of the Academics. The selections below from Cicero's work "Academic Questions" present a dialogue about the success of the main skeptical arguments used by Academics. The character Lucullus takes the Stoic side and argues that the skeptical arguments fail; and Cicero, who makes himself a character in the dialogue, takes the Academic side and argues that they succeed. Their conversation focuses on six specific skeptical arguments. The broken oar and dove's neck arguments aim to show that things are often not as they appear, thus we can't trust our perceptions: an oar appears broken in water, and a dove's neck appears to be multi-colored, but in reality they are not. The twin argument maintains that it is impossible in many cases to distinguish one twin from another, making it seem as though they are the same person although in reality they are different. The dreaming argument is that we cannot distinguish dreaming from being awake. The divine vision argument is that since a god can make divine visions appear to be sort of like reality, then that god can also make divine visions indistinguishable from reality, and thus we could not know what is real. The sorites "heap of wheat" argument is based on the problem of where to draw a line of demarcation: it is unclear exactly how many grains of wheat are necessary to constitute a heap. In response to Lucullus, Cicero describes situations in which each of these six skeptical arguments create genuine problems with knowledge. Cicero concludes with a discussion of the liar's paradox, which creates a contradiction by declaring that one is a liar if one tells the truth. According to Cicero, the liar's paradox cannot be rejected without rejecting the validity of all arguments of the same form.

Turning to Pyrrhonian skepticism, little is known about Pyrrho's life or what he taught, other than the fact that he was the inspiration for later philosophers of the Pyrrhonian school. Like the Academic skeptics, the Pyrrhonians also targeted Stoic claims of comprehensible knowledge, and held to incomprehensibility, which, for the Pyrrhonians involve a reduction of everything to competing appearances (phantasiai). What we know of the Pyrrhonian school comes mainly from the writings of Sextus Empiricus (fl. 200 CE), a Pyrrhonian skeptic in Roman times. The most famous part of his writings is Book 1 of Outlines of Pyrrhonism, excerpted below, which discusses the main views and arguments of the Pyrrhonians. He begins with a definition of the Pyrrhonian approach to skepticism: "Skepticism is an ability to place appearances in opposition to judgments in any way whatever. By balancing reasons that are opposed to each other, we first reach the state of suspension of judgment, and afterwards that of tranquility." He explains each component of this definition and says that the central doubting technique involves countering every argument with an opposing one so that we remain neutral on whatever it is that the argument is about.

Sextus next presents ten Methods for setting arguments in opposition to each other, which he describes in detail. The first involves perceptual differences among animal species. Different animals see, taste, smell, hear or feel the same thing in different ways. For example, the leaves of a tree appear tan to a dog, but gray to a cat; we cannot prefer the dog's perception to the cat's; therefore, we must suspend judgement about whether the leaves are tan or gray. The other methods follow this pattern. The second method involves perceptual differences from one human to another, and the third involves perceptual differences from one of our sense organs to another, such as how an apple is red to sight and sweet to taste. The fourth is based on how our perceptions change under different physiological conditions, such as how colors which appear faded to the old may appear bright and vivid to the young. The fifth notes how our perceptions change based on perspective, such as our distance from an object. The sixth involves how our perceptions change based on the media through which we sense things, for example, we hear a sound differently in expanded air than we do in condensed air. The seventh is based on how the perceived properties of objects change depending on how much of it is present, for example, tiny slivers of silver look black while the entire silver thing looks white. The eighth notes how some perceptions are relative to others, such as how a rock appears small next to a boulder, but the same rock appears large next to a pebble. The ninth notes how the rarity of things or events impacts our judgments of them, such as with gold.

The first nine Methods deal mainly with our sensory perceptions of things and our judgments about them. The tenth Method, though, deals with customary beliefs about religion and ethics, but these also are subject to doubt since there are always competing perspectives of them. For example, people in different countries disagree about whether the creator God of humans is Jupiter or Oceanus, or whether it is morally shameful for men to wear women's clothing. Continuing with the topics of religion and ethics in Book 3, Sextus argues that the believer's notion of God is counterbalanced by philosophical considerations that the notion of God is inconceivable and indemonstrable. On ethical issues he argues that nothing is naturally good or bad since, for every ethical issue, people have opposing laws, behaviors and belief systems.

Skeptical philosophers were criticized by other philosophical schools, and the concluding section here gives six such criticisms with the skeptic's response to each of them.

LIVES OF SKEPTICS

Pyrrho (360-270 BCE) (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 9)

Pyrrho was a citizen of Elis. . . . He was originally a painter. . . . He associated with Anaxarchus, and attended him everywhere; so that he even went as far as the Gymnosophists, in India, and the Magi. . . . His life corresponded to his principles, for he never shunned anything and never guarded himself against anything. He confronted everything, such as wagons, precipices, dogs, and similar things, committing nothing whatever to his senses. He would then be rescued (as Antigonus the Carystian tells us), by his friends who accompanied him. Aenesidemus says that he studied philosophy on the principle of suspending his judgment on all matters, without however, on any occasion acting in an irresponsible manner, or doing anything without proper consideration. He lived to nearly ninety years of age. . . . He always maintained the same demeanor, so that if anyone left him in the middle of his lecture, he remained and continued with what he was saying. When a young man, though, he was of a very volatile temperament. Often too, Antigonus says, he would go away for a time, without telling anyone beforehand, and taking any random persons whom he chose for his companions. Once, when Anaxarchus had fallen into a pond, he passed by without assisting him. When someone blamed him for this, Anaxarchus himself praised Pyrrho's indifference and absence of all emotion. . . . He was so greatly honored by his country that he was appointed a priest, and on his account all the philosophers were exempted from taxation. . . . On another occasion, when he was driven back by a dog that was attacking him, someone criticized him for lack of composure. Pyrrho replied saying, "It is a difficult thing entirely to set aside human nature, but a person should still strive with all his power to counteract circumstances with his actions if possible, and at least with his reason." There is also a story that once, when some medicines of a burning tendency, along with some cutting and cauterizing substance were applied to him for a wound, he never even furrowed his brow.

Arcesilaus (316-241 BCE) (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 4)

Arcesilaus was . . . a native of Pitane in Aeolia. He was the original founder of the Middle Academy [of Plato], and the first man who professed to suspend the declaration of his judgment, because of the contrarieties of the reasons alleged on either side. . . . He spent all his time in the Academy, and avoided meddling with public affairs, but at times he would spend some days in the Piraeus [i.e., the seaport area] of Athens, discoursing on philosophical subjects. . . . Being a man of very expensive habits, for he was in this respect a sort of second Aristippus, he often went to dine with his friends. He also lived openly with Theodote and Philaete, two courtesans of Elis. . . When someone asked him once why people left other schools to go to the Epicureans, but no one left the Epicureans to join other sects, he replied, "People sometimes make eunuchs of men, but no one can ever make a man out of an eunuch." . . . . Finally, when he was near his end, he left all his property to his brother Pylades . . . as he brought him to Athens. He never married or had any children.

Carneades (214-129 BCE) (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 4)

Carneades was the son of Epicomus, or Philocomus, as Alexander states in his Successions, and a native of Cyrene. He carefully read all the books of the Stoics, especially those of Chrysippus. He wrote replies to them, but did so with such modesty that he would say, "If Chrysippus had not lived, I would never have existed." Carneades was a man of as great industry as ever existed, but he was not very devoted to the study natural philosophy, but preferred instead discussion of ethical topics. He was so intent at his study that he would let his hair and nails grow. He was so distinguished as a philosopher that the orators would leave their own schools and come and listen to his lectures. He also had a very powerful voice, so much so that the keeper of the Gymnasium sent to him once to ask him to not shout so loudly. Carneades replied, "Give me then, some reference to set the bounds for my voice." The keeper wittily responded, "Your reference is your audience of students."

Cicero (106-43 BCE) (Plutarch, Lives)

When Cicero came to Athens, he was a student of Antiochus of Ascalon, with whose fluency and elegance of diction he was very taken. However, he did not approve of Antiochus' innovations in doctrine, as Antiochus had now moved away from the New Academy . . . to embrace the doctrine of the Stoics. Instead, Cicero adopted and adhered to the [skeptical] doctrines of the New Academy. He vowed to himself that if he should become dissatisfied with any employment in the commonwealth, he would retire from legal and political affairs, and pass his life with tranquility in the study of philosophy. . . . He often asked his friends not to call him orator, but philosopher, because he had made philosophy his business, and had only used rhetoric as an instrument for attaining his objects in public life. . . . When the Roman Republic changed into a monarchy, Cicero withdrew himself from public affairs, and devoted his time to instructing interested young men in philosophy. By the close contact he thus had with some of the noblest and highest in rank, he again began to have great influence in the city. The work and object to which he set himself was to compose and translate philosophical dialogues and to convert logical and physical terms into the Roman idiom.

Sextus Empiricus (fl. 200 CE) (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 9)

Herodotus was the teacher of Sextus Empiricus, who left ten books of Skeptical Maxims, and other excellent works. Sextus was the teacher of Saturninus, who was also an empiric [i.e., physician].

SUMMARIES

The Academics (Augustine, Against the Academics, 2.5.11)

The School of the Academy established that, (1) man lacks the knowledge to touch upon things relating to philosophy (Carneades said that he did not even care about the rest), and that, (2) man was still able to be a wise, and the whole role of the wise man was to the search for the truth. . . . Accordingly, the wise man will not assent to anything at all. For he will necessarily err, and the wise consider it a crime to assent in matters of uncertainty. All this uncertainty they not only maintained, but expressed further with abundant arguments. . . . In defense of their position [that truth cannot be found] they made their case by pointing out the opposition between philosophers, the illusions of the senses, dreams and hallucinations, and sophisms and sorites.

The Pyrrhonians (Diogenes Laertius, Lives, 9)

All these men were called Pyrrhoneans from their master, and also doubters, skeptics, ephectics [i.e., suspenders of judgment], and even zetetics [i.e., seekers]. Their philosophy was called zetetic, from their investigating or seeking the truth on all sides. It was called skeptical because they were always doubting and never finding. It was called ephectic from the disposition which they encouraged after investigation, that is, the suspending of their judgment. It was called aporetic [i.e., perplexed] because they asserted that both they and the dogmatic philosophers were perplexed. They were called Pyrrhonians from Pyrrho himself. . . . The Pyrrhonian system, then, is a simple explanation of appearances, or of notions of every kind, by means of which, comparing one thing with another, one arrives at the conclusion, that there is nothing in all these notions, but contradiction and confusion (as Aenesidemus says in his Introduction to Pyrrhonism). As to the contradictions which are found in those speculations, when they have pointed out in what way each fact is convincing, they then, by the same means, take away all belief from it. For they say that we regard as certain those things which always produce similar impressions on the senses, those which are the offspring of habit, or which are established by the laws, and those too which give pleasure or excite wonder. They prove that the reasons opposite to those on which our assent is founded are entitled to equal belief.

ACADEMIC SKEPTICISM (Cicero, Academic Questions, 1.12; 2.7-32)

Arcesilaus and the Creation of the New Skeptical Academy

Cicero: You have explained the principles both of the Old Academy and of the Stoics with brevity, but also with great clearness. But I think it is true (as Antiochus, a great friend of mine, would assert) that it is to be considered as a corrected version of the Old Academy, rather than as any new sect.

Varro: It is your part now, who revolt from the principles of the ancients, and who approve of the innovations which have been made by Arcesilaus, to explain what that division of the two schools which he made was, and why he made it; so that we may see whether that revolt of his was justifiable.

Cicero: Arcesilaus, as we understand, directed all his attacks against Zeno [of Citium, the Stoic], not out of obstinacy or any desire of gaining the victory, as it appears to me, but by reason of the obscurity of those things which had brought Socrates to the confession of ignorance, and even before Socrates, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and nearly all the ancients; who asserted that nothing could be ascertained, or perceived, or known: that the senses of man were narrow, his mind feeble, the course of his life short, and that truth, as Democritus said, was sunk in the deep; that everything depended on opinions and established customs; that nothing was left to truth. They said in short, that everything was enveloped in darkness; therefore Arcesilaus asserted that there was nothing which could be known, not even that very piece of knowledge which Socrates had left himself. Thus he thought that everything lay hid in secret, and that there was nothing which could be discerned or understood. For these reasons it was not right for anyone to profess or affirm anything, or sanction anything by his assent, but men ought always to restrain their rashness and to keep it in check so as to guard it against every fall. For rashness would be very remarkable when anything unknown or false was approved of; and nothing could be more discreditable than for a man's assent and approval to precede his knowledge and perception of a fact. And he would act consistently with these principles, so as to pass most of his days in arguing against every one's opinion, in order that when equally important reasons were found for both sides of the same question, the judgment might more naturally be suspended, and prevented from giving assent to either. This they call the New Academy, which however appears to me to be the old one, if, at least, we consider Plato as one of that Old Academy. For in his books nothing is affirmed positively, and many arguments are accepted on both sides of a question; everything is investigated, and nothing positive affirmed. Still let the school whose principles I have explained be called the Old Academy, and this other the New. This continued to the time of Carneades, who was the fourth in succession after Arcesilaus, and continued in the same principles and system as Arcesilaus.

Stoic view that Comprehension is Self-Evident and Requires no Defensei that Comprehension

Lucullus: The business that we now propose to ourselves is to argue against the Academics. But appears to some [Stoic] philosophers (and also of people of great ability) to be something that ought not to be done at all. They think that there is no sense at all in, and no method of disputing with people who believe nothing. They criticize the Stoic Antipater, who enjoyed such disputes, and say that there is no need to lay down exact definitions of what knowledge is, or perception, or, if we want to render word for word, comprehension, which they call katalepsis (comprehension). They say that those who wish to persuade others that there is anything which can be comprehended and perceived, are acting ignorantly. For, there is nothing clearer than enargeia (vividness), as the Greeks call it, and which we may call perspicuity, or evidentness if you like. . . . Still they thought that no discourse could be found which should be more intelligible than evidentness itself. They thought that there was no need of defining things which were so clear. However, others declared that . . . a reply ought to be made to those arguments which were advanced against comprehension, to prevent anyone being deceived by the Academics.

Criticisms of the Broken Oar and the Dove's Neck Arguments for Skepticism

Lucullus: Let us begin then with the senses. The judgments of the senses are so clear and certain, that if an option were given to our nature, and if some god were to ask of it whether it is content with its own unimpaired and uncorrupted senses, or whether it desires something better, I do not see what more it could ask for. Nor while speaking on this topic need you wait while I reply to the illustration drawn from a bent oar, or the neck of a dove. For, I am not a man to say that everything which seems is exactly of that character of which it seems to be. Epicurus may deal with this idea, and with many others. But in my opinion there is the very greatest truth in the senses, if they are in sound and healthy order, and if everything is removed which could impede or hinder them. Therefore we often wish the light to be changed, or the situation of those things which we are looking at; and we either narrow or enlarge distances; and we do many things until our sight causes us to feel confidence in our judgment. The same thing takes place with respect to sounds, smell, and taste, so that there is not one of us who, in each one of his senses, requires a more acute judgment as to each sort of thing. But when practice and skill are added, so that one's eyes are charmed by a picture, and one's ears by songs, who is there who can fail to see what great power there is in the senses? . . .

Presentation of the Divine Visions, Dreaming, and Twins Arguments for Skepticism

Lucullus: It is right, therefore, for us to have those answers ready which may be given in defense of the evidentness of a thing (and we have already spoken of them). We should be armed to be able to encounter the questions of those people [i.e., the Academic Skeptics], and to scatter their nit-picking objections to the winds. This is what I propose to do next. I will, therefore, explain their arguments one by one, since even they themselves are in the habit of speaking in a sufficiently lucid manner.

In the first place, they attempt to show that many things can appear to exist, which in reality have no existence, such as when minds are moved to no purpose by things which do not exist, in the same manner as by things that do. For, you claim (the Academics say) that some visions are sent by a god, such as those that are seen during sleep, and also those that are revealed by oracles, auspices, and the entrails of victims, (for they say that the Stoics, against whom they are arguing, admit all these things). They then ask if a god can make a false vision appear probable, then why can he not also make that same vision very closely resemble others that are true [i.e., so that the vision feels true, rather than merely probable]? If he can do this, then why can he not also make this [false] vision almost indistinguishable from the true? Finally, if he can do this can he not make this [false] vision completely indistinguishable from the true?

Next, the mind is affected by its own motion, such as with as is made plain by the things we picture to ourselves in imagination and the visions which appear either to sleepers or to mad men. If this is so, say they, is it not probable that the mind is also affected in such a manner, that not only it does not distinguish between the perceptions, as to whether they are true or false, but that there really is no difference between them? For instance, if any persons trembled and grew pale, either because of some spontaneous agitation of mind, or because some terrible object intruded upon them from without, there would be no possibility of distinguishing one trembling and paleness in the two cases, nor indeed would there be any difference between the external and internal alarm which caused them.

Lastly, if no deceptive appearances are attended with probability, then another method [of doubt] applies. But deceptive appearances are probable, then why may not one say the same of such as are not easily distinguished from each other? Why not also of such as have actually no difference at all between them [such as with twins or the impressions from signet rings]? This is especially so when you yourselves say that the wise man when enraged withholds himself from all assent, because the appearances presented to him show no distinctive mark. . . .

Criticism of the Sorites and Divine Vision Arguments

Lucullus: [The Skeptics] are blamable insofar as they use a most sophistical kind of argument. It is the system of adding or taking away, step by step, minute items from a proposition, is a kind of argument that meets with little approval in philosophy. They call it "sorites" [i.e., heap] because they make up a heap by adding grain after grain. It is a very faulty and sophistical style of arguing! [The sorites are a class of paradoxical arguments such as the "heap of wheat" argument: one grain of wheat is not a heap, neither is two, etc., thus then neither is 1,000]. This is the way you take your successive steps: If a vision is brought by a god before a man asleep of such a nature as to be probable, why may not a vision also be brought of such a nature as to be very like truth? If so, then why may not one be brought which can hardly be distinguished from truth? If so, then why may there not be one which cannot be distinguished at all from truth? If so, then why may there not be such that there is actually no difference between them? If you come to this point because I have granted you all the previous propositions, it will be my fault. But if you advance forward of your own accord, it will be yours. For who will grant to you either that a god can do everything, or that even if he could he would act in that manner? How do you assume that if one thing may be like another, it follows that it may also be difficult to distinguish between them? Then, that one cannot distinguish between them at all? Lastly, that they are identical? Thus, if wolves are like dogs, you will eventually come to assert that they are the same animals. Similarly, there are some dishonorable things that are honorable things; some bad things like good things; some unartistic things like artistic things. Why then do we hesitate to affirm that there is no difference between all these things? Do we not even see that they are inconsistent? But if the result were demonstrated, that there is no difference between appearances of various classes, we should find some which belonged both to their own proper class and to a class not their own. How can that happen?

Criticism of the Dreaming Argument

Lucullus: There is then one method of getting rid of all false appearances, whether they are formed in the imagination, which we grant to be usually the case, or whether they result from sleep, or the influence of wine, or madness. For we say that clearness, which we ought to hold with the greatest persistence, is absent from all visions of that kind. For who is there who, when he imagines something and pictures it to himself in his thoughts, does not, as soon as he has stirred up himself, and recovered himself, feel how much difference there is between what is evident and what is unreal? The case of dreams is the same. . . . But while these visions last, they assume the same appearance as those things which we see while awake. There is a good deal of real difference between them, but we may pass over that. Now what we assert is that there is not the same power or soundness in people when asleep that there is in them while waking, either in intellect or in sensation. Nor do drunken men carry out their actions with the same decision as sober men. They doubt, they hesitate, they correct themselves at times, and give only a weak assent to what they see or agree too. Then, when they have slept off their drunkenness, they understand how unreal their perceptions were. The same thing is the case with madmen. When their madness is beginning, they both feel and say that something appears to them to exist that has no real existence. Then when their frenzy subsides, they feel and speak like Alcmaeon: "But now my heart does not agree with that which with my eyes I see." . . .

But from the whole character of this discussion we may see the worthless nature of the argument of those men who wish to throw everything into confusion. We ask for judgment, marked with gravity, consistency, firmness, and wisdom. But we use the examples of men dreaming, mad, or drunk. Are we aware how inconsistent is our talk concerning this entire class of arguments? If we were, we would not bring forward men overpowered by wine or sleep, or deprived of their intellect, in such an absurd manner. We would note say, at one moment, there there is a difference between the perceptions of men awake and sober and sensible, and those of men in a different condition, and, at other occasions, say that there was no difference at all.

They do not even perceive that by this kind of argument they are making out everything to be uncertain, which they do not wish to do. I call that uncertain which the Greeks call "hidden" (adelon). For if the fact is that there is no difference between the appearance that a thing presents to a madman and to a person in his senses, then who can feel sure of his own sanity? To wish to produce such an effect as that is a proof of no ordinary madness.

Criticism of the Twins Argument

Lucullus: But they follow up in a childish manner with the resemblance of twins, or of impressions made by signet rings. For who of us denies that there are resemblances between things when they are visible in numbers of things? But if the fact of many things being like many other things is sufficient to take away knowledge, why are you not content with that, especially as we admit it? Why instead do you insist upon an assertion which the nature of things will not admit, namely, that everything is not in its own kind of that character of which it really is, and also that there is a conformity without any difference whatever in two or more things? Suppose, for example that we grant that eggs are entirely like eggs, and bees like bees. Why then do you carry on the fight? What do you seek to gain by talking about twins? For we admit that they are alike, and you should be content with that. But you try to make them out to be actually the same, and not merely alike, and that is quite impossible. . . . Let's grant that those ancient Servilius brothers [Geminus and Quintus] who were twins were as much alike as they are said to have been. Do you think that that would have made them the same? They were not distinguished from each other out of doors, but they were at home. They were not distinguished from each other by strangers, but they were by their own family. Do we not see that this is frequently the case, that those people whom we should never have expected to be able to know from each other, we do by practice distinguish so easily that they do not appear to be even in the least alike? . . .

As a mother distinguishes between twins by the constant practice of her eyesight, so you too will distinguish when you have become accustomed to it. Do you not see that it has become a perfect proverb that one egg is like another? Yet we are told that at Delos (when it was a flourishing island) there were many people who would keep large numbers of hens for the sake of profit. When they glanced upon an egg, they usually could tell which hen had laid it. Nor is this fact [of the resemblance of eggs] detrimental to us, since we are content to be unable to tell one from another. Yet it is impossible for one to assent to the statement that one egg is identical with another, implying that there is absolutely no difference between the two. I have laid it down as a rule, to consider all appearances as true which are of such a character as those which are false cannot be. From this I may not depart one finger's breadth, as they say, otherwise I would throw everything into confusion. For not only the knowledge of what is true and false, but their whole nature too, will be destroyed if there is no difference between one and the other.

Defense of the Broken Oar and Dove's Neck Arguments

Cicero: But you say that you are not at all disturbed by "the broken oar" or "the dove's neck." In the first place, I must ask why? For, in the case of the oar, I feel that that which appears to be the case is not really so. In the case of the dove's neck, there appear to be many colors, but are not in reality more than one. In the next place did our statement contain nothing more than this? Let all our arguments stand: that man is tearing his cause to pieces, for he says that his senses are voracious. . . . Do you see that ship? It appears to us to be standing still, but to those who are in that ship, this house appears to be moving. Search out the reason why it seems so. Yet however completely you may have discovered it (and very likely you may not succeed), nevertheless you will not have shown that you have a true witness on your side, but merely that your witness gives false evidence for a good reason.

Why talk about the ship? Because I saw that you thought nothing of the oar. Perhaps you want things on a larger scale. What can there be larger than the sun? Mathematicians maintain it to be more than eighteen times larger than the earth. But how tiny it seems to us! In my eyes it is about a foot in diameter. Epicurus thinks that it may be even less than it seems to be, but not much. Nor does he think that it is much greater, but that it is very nearly the size it seems to be. Thus, our eyes are either quite correct, or, in any event, not very incorrect. What then becomes of the exception, "If once...?" However, let us leave this gullible man, who does not believe that the senses are ever wrong not even now, when that sun, which is whirled along with such rapidity that it is impossible even to conceive how great its velocity is, nevertheless seems to us to be standing still.

Defense of the Twins Argument

Cicero: But, to bring the dispute into small compass, consider within what narrow bounds the issue lies. There are four main propositions which prove that there is nothing which can be known, perceived, and apprehended, and this is the doctrine with which our whole investigation is occupied. Of these propositions the first is that there is a kind of deceptive appearance. The second is that such an appearance cannot be perceived. The third is that when no difference is traceable between a number of appearances, it cannot happen that some of them are be capable of being perceived, while others are not so capable. The fourth is that there is no truthful appearance resulting from an act of sensation, which has not side by side with it another indistinguishable from it, yet which cannot be perceived. Of these four propositions, all accept the second and third. The first Epicurus does not grant, but you (with whom we are now dealing) also accept this. The whole battle is over the fourth.

[Concerning the Servilius twins], suppose that a man who was looking at Publius Servilius Geminus thought that he was looking at Quintus instead. He thus came across an appearance of such a nature that it could not be perceived, because there was no sign marking off the true appearance from the false. Once this test was removed, what infallible sign did he have to help him recognize [any other person such as] Caius Cotta who was twice consul with Geminus? You say that in the whole realm of nature no resemblance so great as this exists. You carry on the fight, it is true, but fortunately I am a compliant opponent. Suppose that no such perfect resemblance exists. Nevertheless, it may still seem to exist. Therefore, it will deceive the senses, and if one likeness deceives them, it will have made everything doubtful. For when once that criterion is destroyed then, even if the person whom you see, is really the person whom he appears to you to be, you will still not judge by that characteristic which you say you should, being of such a character that one of the same kind cannot be false. Now, if it is possible that Publius Geminus may appear to you to be Quintus, what certainty do you have that he may not appear to you to be Cotta, though he is not, since some things do appear to you to be what they are not?

You say that all things belong to their own particular class, and that no one thing has the same characteristics as another. It is a Stoic notion and not very easy to believe, that there is not a single hair or a single grain in every respect like another hair or grain. These statements can be refuted, but I do not care to enter into that battle. Indeed, it does not matter with regard to the present question whether an impression of a thing is in every respect identical with another, or cannot be in practice distinguished from that other, even though the two are not identical. But, granting that there cannot be such a perfect resemblance between people, can there not be such a resemblance between statues? Tell me, could not [the sculptor] Lysippus produce a hundred Alexanders of the same pattern, using the same brass, the same tempering, the same graving tool and other implements that are the same? How, then could you distinguish between them? Again, if with this ring I make a hundred impressions on the same piece of wax, is it possible that there would be any difference to enable you to distinguish one from the other? Or, will you have to find some ring maker, since you have succeeded in finding your Delian chicken-breeder who could recognize his own eggs? . . .

Defense of the Divine Visions and Dreaming Arguments

Cicero: You said that the perceptions of people who are asleep, drunk, or mad, were less vigorous than those of people who are awake, sober, and sane. How did you prove this? Because, you said, when [the Roman poet] Ennius had awakened, he would not say that he had seen Homer, but only that Homer had seemed to be present. Thus, Alcmaeon says, "My heart distrusts the witness of my eyes." You also said this about men who are drunk. [Similarly, you say, no one] could reasonably deny that a man on awaking believes his visions were just dreams, or that a man or that a man whose madness has calmed down now supposes the appearances which came before him during his madness not to have been true. But that is not the question: the question is how those things appear to us at the time when they do appear. . . .

But why speak about madmen? Does anyone, however sound in mind, feel as sure about what he sees as that man did about his visions? What about the Ajax who called out "I see you now, I see you now, so live, Ulysses, while you still can." Did he not actually twice say loudly that he saw, even though he certainly did not see? . . . Now all these examples are quoted to prove what is as sure as anything can be, that so far as the assent of the mind is concerned, there is no difference between true appearances and false. You prove nothing when you merely refute those false perceptions of men who are mad or dreaming by their own recollection. For the question is not what sort of recollection those people usually have who have awakened, or those who have recovered from madness. Rather, it is a question of what sort of perception madmen or dreamers had at the moment when they were under the influence of their madness or their dream.

Defense of the Heap of Wheat Sorites Argument

Cicero: I now leave the subject of the senses. What is there that can be perceived by reason? You say logic has been discovered and is a sort of arbiter and judge of truth and falsehood. What truth and what falsehood? With which subjects is it concerned? Will the logician decide what is true or false in mathematics, literature or music? The logician knows nothing of those things. Perhaps in philosophy then. But what does the logician care about the size of the sun? What means does he have to determine the nature of the supreme good? What then will he judge? Perhaps he will make judgments about what combination or disjunction of ideas is accurate, what is an ambiguous expression, what follows from each fact, or what is inconsistent with it. If he decides these only these and similar questions, then he decides about his own affairs. But he promised more. Indeed, if we look to the other numerous and important matters which philosophy embraces, it is not enough merely to judge these questions.

But, since you place so much importance in the art of logic, I would ask you to consider whether it was not invented for the precise purpose of being used against you. For, at first it gives an ingenious account of the elements of speaking, of the manner in which one may come to an understanding of ambiguous expressions, and of the principles of reasoning. Then, after a few more things, it comes to the sorites. The sorites is a very slippery and hazardous topic, and a class of argument which you yourself declare to be a vicious one. What then, you will say; are we to be blamed for that viciousness? The nature of things has not given us any knowledge of ends, so as to enable us, in any subject whatever, to say how far we can go. Nor is this the case only in respect of the heap of wheat, from which the name ["sorites"] is derived. But in no matter whatever where the argument is conducted by minute questions: for instance, if the question be whether a man is rich or poor, illustrious or obscure whether things be many or few, great or small, long or short, broad or narrow we have no certain answer to give, how much must be added or taken away to make the thing in question either one or the other. . . . In your answers, you cannot fix the last number which can be classed as "few," nor the first, which amounts to "many." This kind of uncertainty extends so widely, that I do not see any bounds to its progress.

Defense of the Liar's Paradox Argument

Cicero: What then do you think of this conclusion: "(1) If you say it is now daylight and you tell the truth, then it is daylight; (2) you do say that it is now daylight and you do tell the truth; (3) therefore, it is daylight." You and your school undoubtedly think the form is valid and accept that the argument has been properly constructed. So in your teaching you convey this to your pupils as the simplest method of composing an argument. You will therefore either accept the validity of any argument constructed in the same way, or else your art of logic is nothing. Consider now whether you will accept the validity of this proof: "(1) If you say you are a liar and tell the truth, then you are a liar; (2) you do say that you are a liar and you do tell the truth; (3) therefore, you are a liar [and thus do not tell the truth]." How can you resist accepting this, when you have accepted the former proof that belongs to the same class? These are knots tied by Chrysippus which even he never untied. What indeed was he to do in face of an inference like this "(1) If it is daylight, then it is daylight; (2) it is daylight; (3) therefore, it is daylight". Of course he would accept it. In what respect then is it different from this other inference: "(1) If you are a liar, then you are a liar; (2) you are a liar; (3) therefore you are a liar." This you say you can neither accept nor reject. How, then, can you any more accept or reject the former? If art, reasoning, method, and the cogency of the argument are worth anything, there is as much of these in the one as in the other. But this is what these men ultimately come to: they require us to make exceptions of these insoluble fallacies. I advise them to go before some tribune, for they will never get me to allow them their exception.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS: OUTLINES OF PYRRHONEAN SKEPTICISM (Outlines of Pyrrhonism)

The Principal Differences between Philosophers (1.1)

It is probable that those who seek after anything whatever, will either find it as they continue the search, or will deny that it can be found and admit it to be out of reach, or will go on seeking it. Accordingly, some have said regarding the things sought in philosophy that they have found the truth, while others have declared it impossible to find, and still others continue to seek it. Those who think that they have found it are those who are especially called Dogmatists, as for example, the Schools of Aristotle and Epicurus, the Stoics and some others. Those who have declared it impossible to find are Clitomachus, Carneades, with their respective followers, and other Academics. Those who still seek it are the Skeptics. Therefore, it appears reasonable to conclude that the three principal kinds of philosophy are the Dogmatic, the Academic, and the Skeptic. Other writers may suitably examine the first two Schools, but I will here give an outline of the Skeptical School. I must comment in advance, though, that I will not declare absolutely with anything I say that it is exactly as I describe it. Rather, I will state things empirically as they appear to me now.

Ways of Examining Skepticism (1.2)

One way of examining the Skeptical philosophy is called general, and the other particular. The general method is that by which we set forth the character of Skepticism, declaring what its idea is, what its principles are, its method of reasoning, its criterion, and its aim. It also presents the method of doubt, and the way in which we should understand the Skeptical formula, and the distinction between Skepticism and the related Schools of philosophy. The particular method, on the contrary, is that by which we speak against each part of so-called philosophy. Let us then treat Skepticism at first in the general way, beginning our delineation with the terminology of the Skeptical School.

The Names of the Skeptical School (1.3)

The Skeptical School is also called the "Seeking School" (zetetic) from its spirit of research and examination; the "Suspending School" (ephectic) from the condition of mind in which one is left after the search, in regard to the things that one has examined; and the "Doubting School" (aporetic) either because, as some say, the Skeptics doubt and are seeking in regard to everything, or because they never know whether to deny or affirm. It is also called the Pyrrhonean School, because Pyrrho appears to us the best representative of Skepticism, and is more prominent than all who before him occupied themselves with it.

What is Skepticism? (1.4)

Skepticism is an ability to place appearances in opposition to judgments in any way whatever. By balancing reasons that are opposed to each other, we first reach the state of suspension of judgment, and afterwards that of tranquility.

To clarify, I do not use the word "ability" in any unusual sense, but simply mean that we are able to do something. By "appearances" I mean the things that we sense, as opposed to our judgments about them. The phrase "in any way whatever" may refer either to the word "ability" in its simple sense as I have said, or it may refer to the "placing of appearances in opposition to judgments." For we place appearances in opposition to each other in a variety of ways: appearances to appearances, and judgments to judgments, or appearances to judgments. Also, the phrase "in any way whatever" may refer to "appearances and judgments," so that we need not ask how appearances appear, or how thoughts are judged; rather, we should understand these things in a simple sense. By "reasons opposed to each other," I do not in any way mean that they deny or affirm anything, but simply that they offset each other. By "balancing" I mean equally likely and equally unlikely, so that the opposing reasons do not surpass each other in likelihood. "Suspension of judgment" means holding back opinion so that we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Tranquility" is composure and calmness of mind. I will later explain how tranquility accompanies suspension of judgment when I speak about the aim of skepticism.

The Skeptic (1.5)

The notion of a "Pyrrhonean philosopher" follows from the above definition of the Skeptical School. He is the one who possesses the ability that I have described.

The Primary Principle of Skepticism (1.6)

Skepticism arose in the beginning from the hope of attaining tranquility. People of the greatest intelligence were perplexed by the contradiction of various things, and being at a loss what to believe, they began to question what things are true, and what false. They then hoped to attain tranquility through some solution. The primary principle of Skepticism, then, is to oppose every argument by one of equal weight, and in this way we finally reach the position where we have no dogmas.

Does the Skeptic Dogmatize? (1.7)

I say that the Skeptic does not dogmatize. I do not say this with regard to the popular meaning of the word "dogma", namely, that it is a dogma to assert to anything rather than another. For even the Skeptic assents to feelings that are a necessary result of sensation. For example, when he is warm or cold, he cannot say that he thinks he is not warm or cold. Rather, when I say that the Skeptic does not dogmatize, I take the word "dogma" to mean the acceptance of any opinion in regard to the undetectable things investigated by science. For the Pyrrhonean assents to nothing that is undetectable.

Furthermore, the Skeptic does not dogmatize even when he utters the skeptical formula in regard to things that are undetectable, such as "Nothing is truer than another thing," or "I decide nothing," or any of the others which I will speak about later. For the dogmatist maintains that the things about which he dogmatizes actually exist in themselves. The Skeptic, however, does not regard these Skeptical formulas in any absolute sense, for he assumes that the saying "All is false" includes its own falsehood. Similarly, the saying "Nothing is true" and "Nothing is truer than another thing" implies that they are no truer than other things, and thus they cancel themselves out. We say the same also in regard to the other Skeptical expressions. In short, if he who dogmatizes assumes the truth about that which he dogmatizes, the Skeptic, on the contrary, expresses his sayings in a way that applies to the utterances themselves. Thus, we cannot say that the Skeptic dogmatizes in saying these things. The principal thing in uttering these formulas is that he says what appears to him, and communicates his own feelings in an unprejudiced way, without asserting anything in regard to external objects.

Is Skepticism a System? (1.8)

I respond in a similar way if I am asked whether Skepticism has a system or not. If the word "system" is defined as meaning a body of persons who hold dogmas which are in conformity with each other, and also with appearances, and dogma means an assent to anything that is undetectable, then I reply that we have no system. If, however, one means by "system", a method which follows a certain line of reasoning based on appearances, and that reasoning shows how it is possible to apparently live rightly (not understanding "rightly" as referring to virtue only, but in a broader sense); if, also, it leads one to be able to suspend judgment, then I reply that we have a system. For we follow a certain kind of reasoning which is based upon appearances, and which shows us how to live according to the habits, laws, and teachings of our country, and our own feelings.

Does the Skeptic deal with Natural Science? (1.9)

I reply similarly to the question whether the Skeptic should deal with natural science. For we do not deal with natural science in order to express ourselves with confidence regarding any of the dogmas that it teaches, but we take it up in order to be able to meet every argument by one of equal weight, and also for the sake of tranquility. In the same way we deal with the logical and ethical part of so-called philosophy.

Do the Skeptics deny Appearances? (1.10)

Those who say that the Skeptics deny appearances are ignorant of our teachings. For as I said before, we do not deny the sensations which we think we have, and which lead us to assent involuntarily to them; we accept that we have appearances. When we are ask whether the object is such as it appears to be, we concede that it appears so and so. However, while we do not question the phenomenon, we do question what is asserted about the phenomenon, and that is different from doubting the phenomenon itself. For example, it appears to us that honey is sweet. This we concede, for we experience sweetness through sensation. We doubt, however, whether it is sweet by reason of its essence, which is not a question of the phenomenon, but of that which is asserted of the phenomenon. Should we, however, argue directly against appearances, it is not with the intention of denying their existence, but only to show the rashness of the Dogmatists. For if reasoning is such a deceiver that it snatches away genuine appearances from before our eyes, we should distrust it all the more in regard to things that are undetectable, and thus avoid rashly following it.

The Criterion of Skepticism (1.11)

From what I say about the criterion of the Skeptical School, it is evident that we pay careful attention to appearances. The word criterion is used in two ways. First, it is understood as a proof of existence or non-existence, in regard to which I will criticize later. Second, when it refers to action, it means the criterion that we follow in life by doing some things and refraining from doing others. It is about this that I will now speak. I say that the criterion of the Skeptical School is appearance, and in calling it so, I mean the image of what appears. This cannot be doubted, since it arises from feeling and involuntary reception. Hence virtually no one doubts that an object appears to be such and such; but we do question whether it is as it appears.

So, we cannot be entirely inactive with the observances of daily life since we live by following appearances, and in an unprejudiced way. Observance of daily life is of four different kinds. Sometimes it is directed by the guidance of nature, sometimes by the necessity of feelings, sometimes by the tradition of laws and of customs, and sometimes by the teaching of skills. It is directed by the guidance of nature, for by nature we are capable of sensation and thought. It is directed by the necessity of feelings, since hunger leads us to food, and thirst to drink. It is directed by the traditions of laws and customs, since according to them we consider piety a good in daily life, and impiety an evil. It is directed by the teaching of skills, for we are not inactive in the skills we undertake. I say all these things, however, without expressing a decided opinion.

What is the aim of Skepticism? (1.12)

It is natural to examine next the aim of Skepticism. An aim is the end for which we do anything or think anything. It depends on nothing, or in other words, it is the ultimate objective of things to be desired. We say, then, that the aim of the Skeptic is tranquility in those things which pertain to opinion, and moderation in the things that life requires of us. In order to attain tranquility, the Skeptic begins to philosophize about the ideas and to understand which are true and which are false. He then faces contradictions of equal weight, and, being unable to judge, he withholds his opinion. As if by fate, while his judgment is in suspension he attains tranquility in regard to matters of opinion. For a person will always be troubled if he holds the opinion that anything is either good or bad by nature. For when he does not possess those things that seem good to him, he feels tortured by the things which are by nature bad, and pursues those that he thinks to be good. But once he acquires them, he becomes even unhappier through his irrational and excessive excitement, which makes him fear losing them and inclines him to do everything in his power to retain the things that seem good to him. On the other hand, if a person is undecided about things that are good and bad by nature, he will neither seek nor avoid anything eagerly, and is therefore in a state of tranquility.

A story is told about Apelles the painter that applies to the Skeptic. It is said that Apelles was once painting a horse and wished to depict foam in the horse's mouth. When he failed to do so, he gave up and threw a sponge at the picture with which he had wiped the colors from the painting. However, as soon as the sponge touched the picture, it produced an excellent representation of foam. Similarly, Skeptics initially hope to gain tranquility by making judgments about the irregularity between appearances and their thoughts about them. When they are unable to do this, they suspend their judgment. As if by fate, while their judgment is in suspension, tranquility follows, just as a shadow follows a body.

Nevertheless, I do not maintain that the Skeptic is completely undisturbed, since he is disturbed by some things that are inevitable. I admit that sometimes he is cold and thirsty, and that he suffers in these ways. However, in similar circumstances, the ignorant suffer in two ways: first from the feelings themselves, and, second, from the fact that they think these conditions are bad by nature. The Skeptic, by contrast, escapes more easily since he rejects the opinion that anything is in itself bad by nature. Therefore we say that the aim of the Skeptic is tranquility in matters of opinion, and moderation of feeling in those things that are inevitable. Some notable Skeptics have added also suspension of judgment in investigation.

The General Methods of Suspending Judgment (1.13)

Since, as I have said, tranquility follows the suspension of judgment in regard to everything, it is important for me to explain how this suspension of judgment takes place. Generally speaking, it occurs by placing things in opposition to each other. We either place appearances in opposition to appearances, or thoughts in opposition to thoughts, or some combination of these. For example, we place appearances in opposition to appearances when we say that this tower appears round from a distance but square when nearby. Thoughts are in opposition to thoughts when, for example, someone tries to prove that that providence exists because of the order in the heavens, and we oppose this with the fact that there is no providence since good people often suffer while evil people prosper. Thought is placed in opposition to appearances, when, for example, Anaxagoras opposed the fact that snow is white, by saying that snow is frozen water, and, as water is black, snow must also be black.

Likewise we sometimes place the present in opposition to the present, with reasoning similar to the above-mentioned cases. We sometimes also place the present in opposition to the past or the future. For example, when someone proposes an argument to us that we cannot refute, we say to him, "Before the founder of the School to which you belong was born, the argument which you propose had not appeared as a valid argument, but was dormant in nature; so in the same way it is possible that its refutation also exists in nature, but has not yet appeared to us, so that it is not at all necessary for us to agree with an argument that currently seems to be strong." In order to make it clearer to us what we mean by these oppositions, I will proceed to give the Methods through which suspension of judgment is produced. I will not say anything about their validity or their number, because they may be unsound and there may be more than I will list.

The Ten Methods (1.14)

Certain Methods were commonly handed down by the older Skeptics, by means of which suspension of judgment seems to take place. They are ten in number, and are synonymously called "arguments" and "points." They are these: the first is based upon the differences in animals; the second upon the differences in men; the third upon the difference in the constitution of the organs of sense; the fourth upon circumstances; the fifth upon position, distance, and place; the sixth upon mixtures; the seventh upon the quantity and constitution of objects; the eighth upon relation; the ninth upon frequency or rarity of occurrences; the tenth upon systems, customs, laws, mythical beliefs, and dogmatic opinions. I have made this order myself.

These Methods come under three general heads: the standpoint of the judge, the standpoint of the thing judged, and the standpoint of both together. Under the standpoint of the judge come the first four, for the judge is either an animal, or a man, or a sense, and exists under certain circumstances. Under the standpoint of that which is judged, come the seventh and the tenth. Under the one composed of both together, come the fifth and the sixth, the eighth and the ninth. Again, these three divisions are included under the Method of Relation, because that is the most general one. It includes the three special divisions, and these in turn include the ten. We say these things in regard to their probable number, and we proceed in the following chapter to speak of their meaning.

The First Method: Perceptual Differences among Animal Species Limit our Judgments (1.14)

The first Method, I said, is the one based upon the differences in animals, and according to this Method, different animals do not get the same ideas of the same objects through the senses. This we conclude from the different origin of the animals, and also from the difference in the constitutions of their bodies.

In regard to the difference in origin, some animals originate without sexual contact, while others originate through sexual intercourse. Of those which originate without sexual intercourse, some come from fire, as the little animals which appear in chimneys, others from stagnant water, as misquotes, others from fermented wine, as the stinging ants, others from the earth, others from the mud, like frogs, others from slime, as worms, others from donkeys, as beetles, others from cabbage, as caterpillars, others from fruit, as the gall insect from the wild figs, others from putrefied animals, as bees from bulls, and wasps from horses. Again, of those originating from sexual intercourse, some come from animals of the same kind, as in most cases, and others from those of different kinds, as mules. Again, of animals in general, some are born alive, as humans, others from eggs, as birds, and others are born a lump of flesh, as bears. It is probable therefore, that the inequalities and differences in origin cause great opposition in the animals, and the result is incompatibility, discord, and conflict between the sensations of the different animals.

Again, the differences in the principal parts of the body, especially in those fixed by nature to judge and to perceive, may cause the greatest differences in their ideas of objects, according to the differences in the animals themselves. For example, those who are jaundice call that yellow which appears to us white, and those who have bloodshot eyes call it blood-red. Accordingly, as some animals have yellow eyes, and others bloodshot ones, and still others whitish ones, and others eyes of other colors, it is probable that they have a different perception of colors. Furthermore, when we look steadily at the sun for a long time, and then look down at a book, the letters seem to us gold colored, and dance around. Now, some animals have by nature a luster in their eyes, and these emit a fine and sparkling light so that they see at night, and we may reasonably suppose that external things do not appear the same to them as to us.

Jugglers by lightly rubbing the wick of the lamp with metal rust, or with the dark yellow fluid of the sepia, make those who are present appear at one moment copper-colored and another moment black, according to the amount of the mixture used. If this is so, it is reasonable to suppose that because of the mixture of different fluids in the eyes of animals, their ideas of objects would be different. Furthermore, when we press the eye on the side, the figures, forms and sizes of things seen appear elongated and narrow. It is therefore probable that animals which have the pupil oblique and long, as goats, cats, and similar animals, have ideas different from those of the animals which have a round pupil. Mirrors, according to their different construction, sometimes show the external object smaller than reality, as concave ones, and sometimes long and narrow, as the convex ones do; others show the head of the one looking into it down, and the feet up. As some of the vessels around the eye fall entirely outside the eye, on account of their protuberance, while others are more sunken, and still others are placed in an even surface, it is probable that for this reason also the ideas vary. Accordingly, dogs, fishes, lions, men, and grasshoppers do not see the same things, either of the same size, or of similar form, but according to the impression on the organ of sight of each animal respectively.

The same thing is true in regard to the other senses. For how can it be said that shellfish, birds of prey, animals covered with spines, those with feathers and those with scales would be affected in the same way by the sense of touch? Further, how can the sense of hearing perceive alike in animals which have the narrowest auditory passages, and in those that are furnished with the widest, or in those with hairy ears and those with smooth ones? For even humans hear differently when we partially stop up the ears, from what we do when we use them naturally. The sense of smell also varies according to differences in animals, since even our sense of smell is affected when we catch a cold and the phlegm is too abundant, and also when parts around our head are flooded with too much blood, for we then avoid odors that seem agreeable to others, and feel as if we were injured by them. Since also some of the animals are moist by nature and full of secretions, and others are very full of blood, and still others have either yellow or black bile prevalent and abundant, it is reasonable to think that odorous things appear different to each one of them.

It is the same with regard to things of taste, since some animals have the tongue rough and dry and others very moist. We too, when we have a dry tongue in fever, think that whatever we take is gritty, bad tasting, or bitter; and this we experience because of the varying degrees of the humors that are said to be in us. Since, then, different animals have different organs for taste, and a greater or less amount of the various humors, it may well be that they form different ideas of the same objects as regards their taste.

It is natural to suppose that external objects are regarded differently according to the different constitution of the animals which perceive them. This is similar to how the same food on being absorbed becomes in some places veins, in other places arteries, and in other places bones, nerves, or other tissues, showing different power according to the difference of the parts receiving it. This is just as the same water absorbed by the trees becomes in some places bark, in other places branches, and in still other places fruit, perhaps a fig, a pomegranate, or something else. This is also just as the breath of the musician when blown into the flute becomes sometimes a high tone and sometimes a low one, or the same pressure of the hand upon the lyre sometimes causes a deep tone and sometimes a high tone.

We may see this more clearly in the things that are sought for and avoided by animals. For example, myrrh appears very agreeable to people and intolerable to beetles and bees. Oil also, which is useful to people, destroys wasps and bees if sprinkled on them; and sea-water, while it is unpleasant and poisonous to men if they drink it, is most agreeable and sweet to fish. Swine also prefer to wash in vile filth rather than in pure clean water. Furthermore, some animals eat grass and some eat herbs; some live in the woods, others eat seeds; some are carnivorous, and others lactivorous; some enjoy putrefied food, and others fresh food; some raw food, and others that which is prepared by cooking; and in general that which is agreeable to some is disagreeable and fatal to others, and should be avoided by them. Thus hemlock makes the quail fat, and henbane the hogs, and these, as it is known, enjoy eating lizards; deer also eat poisonous animals, and swallows the cantharid. Further, ants and flying ants, when swallowed by men, cause discomfort and colic, but the bear, on the contrary, whatever sickness he may have, becomes stronger by devouring them. The viper is benumbed if one twig of the oak touches it, as is also the bat by a leaf of the plane-tree. The elephant flees before the ram, and the lion before the cock, and seals from the rattling of beans that are being pounded, and the tiger from the sound of the drum. Many other examples could be given, but that we may not seem to dwell longer than is necessary on this subject, we conclude by saying that since the same things are pleasant to some and unpleasant to others, and the pleasure and displeasure depend on the sense impressions (phantasia), it must be that different animals have different impressions of objects.

Since the same things appear differently according to the difference in the animals, it will be possible for us to say how the external object appears to us, but as to how it is in reality we will suspend our judgment. For we cannot ourselves judge between our own impressions and those of other animals, being ourselves involved in the difference, and therefore much more in need of being judged than being ourselves able to judge. Furthermore, we cannot give preference to our own mental impressions over those of other animals, either without evidence or with evidence, for besides the fact that perhaps there is no evidence, as I will show, the evidence so called will be either apparent to us or not. If it is not apparent to us, then we cannot accept it with conviction. If it is apparent to us (since the question is in regard to what is apparent to animals, and we use as evidence that which is manifest to us who are animals), then it is to be questioned if it is true as it is apparent to us. It is absurd, however, to try to base the questionable on the questionable, because the same thing is to be believed and not to be believed, which is certainly impossible. The evidence is to be believed insofar as it will furnish a proof, and disbelieved insofar as it is itself to be proved. We therefore have no evidence according to which we can give preference to our own ideas over those of so-called irrational animals. Since ideas differ according to the difference in animals, and it is impossible to judge them, it is then necessary to suspend the judgment in regard to external objects. . . .

The Second Method: Perceptual Differences from Person to Person Limit our Judgments (1.14)

Such is the first Method of suspension of judgment. The second, we said above, is based upon the differences between men. For even if one assents to the hypothesis that men are more trustworthy than the irrational animals, we will find that doubt arises as soon as we consider our own differences. For, since man is said to be composed of two things, soul and body, we differ from each other in respect to both of these things. For example, as regards the body, we differ both in form and personal peculiarities. For the body of a Scythian differs in form from the body of an Indian, the difference resulting, it is said, from the different control of the humors. According to different control of the humors, differences in ideas also arise, as we described under the first Method. For this reason, there is certainly a great difference among men in the choice and avoidance of external things.

The Indians delight in different things than do our own people, and the enjoyment of different things is a sign that different ideas are received by the external objects. We differ in personal peculiarities, as some digest beef better than the small fish from rocky places, and some are get diarrhea from the weak wine of Lesbos. There was, they say, an old woman in Attica who could drink thirty drachmas of hemlock without danger, and Lysis took four drachmas of opium unhurt, and Demophon (Alexander's table waiter) shivered when he was in the sun or in a hot bath, but felt warm in the shade. Athenagoras also, from Argos, was not harmed if stung by scorpions and venomous spiders. The so-called Psylli were not injured when bitten by snakes or by the aspis, and the Tentyrites among the Egyptians are not harmed by the crocodiles around them. The Ethiopians who live on the Hydaspes river, opposite Meroe, eat scorpions and serpents, and similar things without danger. Rufinus in Chalcis could drink hellebore without vomiting or diarrhea, and he enjoyed and digested it as something to which he was accustomed. Chrysermos, the Herophilian, ran the risk of stomachache if he ever ate pepper, and Soterichus, the surgeon, was seized by diarrhea if he smelled the odor of roasting shad. Andron, the Argive, was so free from thirst that he could travel even through the waterless Libya without looking for a drink. Tiberius, the emperor, saw in the dark, and Aristotle tells the story of a certain Thracian, who thought that he saw the figure of a man always going before him as a guide.

While therefore such a difference exists in men in regard to the body (and we must be satisfied with referring to a few only of the many examples given by the Dogmatics), it is probable that men also differ from each other with respect to the soul itself, for the body is a kind of image of the soul, as the physiognomy also shows. The best example of the numerous and infinite differences of opinion among men is the contradiction in the sayings of the Dogmatics, not only about other things, but about what it is well to seek and to avoid. The poets have also fittingly spoken about this, for Pindar said, "One delights in getting honors and crowns through storm-footed horses, Another in passing life in rooms rich in gold, Another still, safe travelling enjoys, in a swift ship, on a wave of the sea." The poet [Homer] says "One man enjoys this, another enjoys that." The tragedies also abound in such expressions, for instance, it is said, "If to all, the same were good and wise, Quarrels and disputes among men would not have been." And again, "It is awful indeed, that the same thing should please some mortals, And by others be hated."

Thus, the choice and the avoidance of things depends on the pleasure and displeasure which they give, and the pleasure and displeasure consist in sense and sense impressions, when some choose the things that others avoid. From this it is logical for us to conclude that they are not affected similarly by the same things, for otherwise they would have chosen or avoided in the same way. Now, the same things affect different men differently, because of the difference in the men. For this reason, then, suspension of judgment may reasonably be introduced. Further, we may perhaps say how each object appears to us, and what its individual differences are, but we will not be able to declare what it is as to the nature of its essence. For we must either believe all men or some men; but to believe all is to undertake an impossibility, and to accept things that are in opposition to each other. If we believe some men only, let someone tell us with whom to agree, for the Platonist would say with Plato, the Epicurean with Epicurus, and others would advise in a corresponding manner. So as they disagree, with no one to decide, they bring us back to the suspension of judgment. Furthermore, he who tells us to agree with the majority proposes something childish, since no one could go to all men and find out what pleases the majority. For, it is possible that, in some nations which we do not know, the things that are rare to us are common to the majority of them, and those things which happen commonly to us are rare to them. For example, it might happen that the majority would not be harmed when bitten by venomous spiders, or that they will seldom feel pain, or have other personal peculiarities similar to those spoken of above. It is necessary therefore to suspend judgment on account of the differences in men.

The Third Method: Differences between One's Sense Organs Limit our Judgments (1.14)

While, however, the Dogmatics are arrogant enough to think that they should be preferred to other men in the judgement of things, we know that their claim is absurd, for they themselves form a part of the disagreement. If they give themselves preference in this way in the judgment of phenomena, they beg the question before they begin the judgment, since they trust the judgment to themselves. Nevertheless, in order that we should reach the result of the suspension of judgment by limiting the argument to one man, one who for example they deem to be wise, let us take up the third Method. This is the one that is based upon differences in perception [as perceived by one person].

That the perceptions differ from each other is evident. For example, paintings seem to have recesses and projections to the sense of sight, but not to the sense of touch. Honey tastes pleasant to the tongue of some people, but is unpleasant to the eyes; thus, it is impossible to say whether it is really pleasant or unpleasant. It is the same in regard to myrrh, since it delights the sense of smell, but disgusts the sense of taste. Similarly, euphorbium is harmful to the eyes but harmless to all the rest of the body, and so we are not able to say whether it is really harmless to bodies or not, as far as its own nature is concerned. Rainwater, too, is useful to the eyes, but it makes the trachea and the lungs rough, just as oil does, although it soothes the skin. The sea-torpedo placed on one's limbs makes them numb, but is harmless when placed on the rest of the body. For this reason we cannot say what each of these things is by nature. It is possible only to say how it appears each time.

We could cite more examples than these, but in order not to spend too long in laying out the plan of this book we will simply say the following: Each of the phenomena perceived by us seems to present itself in many forms, such as the apple, which is smooth, fragrant, sweet, yellow. Now it is not known whether it has in reality only those qualities which appear to us, or if it has only one quality, but appears different because of the different constitution of the sense organs, or if it has more qualities than appear to us, but some of them do not affect us. That it has only one quality might be concluded from what we have said about the food distributed in bodies, and the water distributed in trees, and the breath in the flute and syrinx, and in similar instruments. For it is possible that the apple also has only one quality, but appears different because of the difference in the sense organs by which it is perceived. On the other hand, that the apple has more qualities than those that appear to us, can be argued in this way. Let us imagine someone born with the sense of touch, of smell, and of taste, but neither hearing nor seeing. He will then assume that neither anything visible nor anything audible exists at all, but only the three kinds of qualities which he can perceive. It is possible then that, since we have only the five senses, we only recognize those qualities of the apple which we are able to perceive. But it may be supposed that other qualities exist which would affect other sense organs if we possessed them, although, as it is, we do not feel the sensations which would be felt through them.

But nature, one will say, has brought the senses into harmony with the objects to be perceived. What kind of nature? Among the Dogmatics there is a great difference of opinion about the real existence of nature anyway. For he who decides whether there is a nature or not, if he is an uneducated man, would be according to them untrustworthy; if he is a philosopher, he is a part of the disagreement, and is himself to be judged, but is not a judge. In short, if it is possible that only those qualities exist in the apple which we seem to perceive, or that there are more than these, or that not even those which we perceive exist, it will be unknown to us what kind of a thing the apple is. The same argument holds for other objects of perception. If, however, the senses do not apprehend the external world, the intellect cannot apprehend it either. For this reason also it will appear that the suspension of judgment follows in regard to external objects.

The Fourth Method: Differing Physiological Conditions Limit our Judgment (1.14)

In order to attain to suspension of judgment by fixing the argument on each separate sense, or even by putting aside the senses altogether, we take up the fourth Method of suspension. This is the one based upon circumstances, and by circumstances we mean conditions. This Method comes under consideration, we may say, with regard to conditions of being naturally healthy or unhealthy, being wake or asleep, the age of life, moving or keeping still, hating or loving, hunger or fullness, drunkenness or sobriety, predispositions, being courageous or afraid, sorrowing or rejoicing.

Things, then, appear different as they are according to natural health, or contrary to it; for example, the insane and those inspired by a god, think that they hear gods, while we do not. Similarly, they often say that they perceive the odor of storax or frankincense, or the like, and many other things which we do not perceive. Water, also, that seems lukewarm to us, if poured over places that are inflamed, will feel hot, and a garment that appears orange-colored to those that have blood-shot eyes, would not look so to me. Also, the same honey appears sweet to me, but bitter to those who have jaundice. One might say that those who are not in a natural state have unusual ideas of objects, because of the intermingling of certain humors. But then one must also say that perhaps objects which are really what they seem to be to those who are in an unnatural condition, appear different to those who are in health. For even those who are in health have humors that are mixed with each other. For to give to one kind of fluid a power to change objects, and not to another kind, is a fiction of the mind. For, just as healthy people are in a condition that is natural to those who are in health (and contrary to the nature of those who are not in health), so also unhealthy people are in a condition contrary to the nature of those in health (but natural to those not in health). We must therefore believe that they also are in some respect in a natural condition.

Furthermore, in sleep or in waking, the ideas are different, because we do not see things in the same way when we are awake as we do in sleep; neither do we see them in the same way in sleep as we do when awake. Accordingly, the existence or non-existence of these things is not absolute, but relative, that is in relation to a sleeping or waking condition. It is therefore probable that we see those things in sleep which in a waking condition do not exist, but they are not altogether non-existent. For, they exist in sleep, just as those things which exist when we are awake, exist, although they do not exist in sleep.

Furthermore, things present themselves differently according to the age of life. For, the same air seems cold to the aged, but temperate to those in their prime, and the same color appears dim to those who are old, and bright to those in their prime, and likewise the same tone seems faint to the former, and audible to the latter. People in different ages are also differently disposed towards things to be chosen or avoided. Children, for example, are very fond of balls and hoops, while those in their prime prefer other things, and the old still others. It follows from this that the ideas in regard to the same objects differ in different periods of life.

Furthermore, things appear different in a condition of motion and rest, since that which we see at rest when we are still, seems to move when we are sailing by it. There are also differences which depend on liking or disliking, as some greatly detest swine meat, but others eat it with pleasure. As Menander said, "O how his face appears Since he became such a man! What a creature! Doing no injustice would make us also beautiful." Also, many people who love ugly women consider them to be very beautiful.

Furthermore, there are differences which depend on hunger or fullness, since the same food seems agreeable to those who are hungry, and disagreeable to those who are satisfied. There are also differences depending on drunkenness and sobriety, such as that which we consider ugly when we are sober does not appear ugly to us when we are drunk. Again, there are differences depending on predispositions, such as that the same wine appears sour to those who have previously eaten dates or dried figs, but agreeable to those who have taken nuts or chickpeas. The vestibule of the bath warms those who enter from without, but cools those who leave it once they rest in it. Furthermore, there are differences depending on being afraid or courageous, since the same thing seems fearful and terrible to the coward, but in no way to the brave. There are differences, also, depending on being sad or joyful, since the same things are unpleasant to the sad, but pleasant to the joyful.

Since therefore the irregularities depending on conditions are so great, and since men are in different conditions at different times, it is perhaps easy to say how each object appears to each man, but not so of what kind it is, because the irregularity is not of a kind to be judged. For he who would pass judgment upon this is either in some one of the conditions mentioned above, or is in absolutely no condition whatever. But to say that he is in no condition at all is wholly absurd, as, for example, that he is neither in health nor in illness, that he is neither moving nor quiet, that he is not of any age, and also that he is free from the other conditions. But if he judges the ideas while he is in any condition whatever, he is a part of the contradiction. Besides, he is no genuine critic of external objects, because he is confused by the condition in which he finds himself. Therefore, neither can the one who is awake compare the ideas of those who are asleep with those who are awake, nor can he who is in health compare the ideas of the sick with those of the well. For we believe more in the things that are present, and affecting us at present, than in the things not present.

In another way, the irregularity in such ideas is impossible to be judged, for whoever prefers one idea to another, and one condition to another, does this either without a criterion and a proof, or with a criterion and a proof. But he can do this neither without them, for he would then be untrustworthy, nor with them. For if he judges ideas, he judges them entirely by a criterion, and he will say that this criterion is either true or false. But if it is false, he will be untrustworthy; if, on the contrary, he says that it is true, he will say that the criterion is true either without proof or with proof. If without proof, he will be untrustworthy; if he says that it is true with proof, it is certainly necessary that the proof be true, or he will be untrustworthy. Perhaps he will he say that the proof which he has accepted for the accrediting of the criterion is true, having judged it, or without having judged it. If he says so without judging it, he will be untrustworthy. But if he has judged it, it is evident that he will say that he has judged according to some criterion, and we must seek a proof for this criterion, and for that proof a criterion. For the proof always needs a criterion to establish it, and the criterion needs a proof that it may be shown to be true. But a proof can neither be sound without a pre-existing criterion that is true, nor a criterion true without a proof that is shown beforehand to be trustworthy. Consequently, both the criterion and the proof are thrown into circular reasoning, by which it is found that they are both of them untrustworthy: for as each looks for proof from the other, each is as untrustworthy as the other. Since then one cannot prefer one idea to another, either without a proof and a criterion or with them, the ideas that differ according to different conditions cannot be judged. Thus, the suspension of judgment in regard to the nature of external objects follows from this Method also.

The Fifth Method: Differing Perceptual Perspectives Limit our Judgments (1.14)

The fifth Method is that based upon position, distance, and place, for, according to each of these, the same things appear different. For example, the same porch seen from either end appears shortened, but from the middle it looks symmetrical on every side. The same ship appears small and motionless from afar, and large and in motion nearby. The same tower appears round from a distance, but square nearby. So much for distance. Now in reference to place, we say that the light of the lamp appears dim in the sun, but bright in the dark. The same rudder appears broken in the sea, but straight out of it; the egg in the bird is soft, but in the air hard; amber is a fluid in the lynx, but is hard in the air; coral is soft in the sea, but hard in the air; a tone of voice appears different produced by panpipes, and by a flute, and different simply in the air. Also in reference to position, the same picture leaned back appears smooth, and leaned forward a little seems to have recesses and projections, and the necks of doves appear different in color according to the difference in inclination. Since then all phenomena are seen in relation to place, distance, and position, each of which relation makes a great difference with the idea, as we have mentioned, we are obliged by this Method also to come to the suspension of judgment. He who wishes to give preference to certain ones of these ideas will attempt the impossible. If he simply makes the decision without proof, he will be untrustworthy. Suppose, though, that he wishes to make use of a proof. If he says that the proof is false, he contradicts himself; but if he declares the proof to be true, then proof of its proof will be demanded of him, and another proof for that, which proof also must be true, and so on in an infinite regress. It is impossible, however, to present proofs to infinity, so that one will not be able to prove that one idea is to be preferred to another. Since, then, one cannot either with or without proof judge the ideas in question, the suspension of judgment results. We may be able to say how each thing appears according to this or that position, or this or that distance, or this or that place, but, for the reasons which we have mentioned, it is impossible to declare what it really is.

The Sixth Method: Differing Media of Perceptions Limit our Judgments (1.14)

The sixth Method is the one based upon mixtures. According to this, no object presents itself alone, but always together with something else. While it is possible to say of what nature the mixture is, of the thing itself, and of that with which it is seen, we must conclude that we cannot say what sort the external object really is. Now it is evident, I think, that nothing from without is known to us by itself, but always with something else, and that because of this fact it appears different. The color of our skin, for example, is different seen in warm air from what it is in cold, and we could not say what our color really is, only what it is when viewed under each of these conditions. The same sound appears different in expanded air from what it is in condensed. Aromas are more overpowering in the warm bath and in the sun than they are in the cold air, and a body surrounded by water is light, but by air heavy. Leaving aside, however, outer mixtures, our eyes have inside of them coatings and humors. Since then visible things are not seen without these, they will not be accurately apprehended, since it is the mixture that we perceive. For this reason, those who have jaundice see everything yellow, and those with bloodshot eyes red. Since the same sound appears different in broad open places from what it does in narrow and winding ones, and different in pure air and in impure, it is probable that we do not perceive the tones unmixed. For the ears have narrow winding passages filled with vaporous secretions, which it is said gather from places around the head. Since also there are substances present in the nostrils and in the seat of the sense of taste, we perceive the things smelled and the things tasted in connection with them, and not unmixed. Thus, because of mixture the senses do not perceive accurately what the external objects are. The intellect even does not do this, mainly because the senses, which are the guides of the intellect, make mistakes, and perhaps the intellect itself adds a certain special mixture to those messages communicated by the senses. For in each place where the Dogmatics think that the ruling faculty is situated, we see that certain humors are present, whether we locate it in the region of the brain, in the region of the heart, or somewhere else. Since therefore according to this Method also, we see that we cannot say anything regarding the nature of external objects, we must suspend our judgment.

The Seventh Method: The Quantity of a Thing's Components Limits our Judgments (1.14)

The seventh Method is the one which, as we said, is based upon the quantity and constitution of objects, constitution commonly meaning composition. It is evident that we must suspend our judgment according to this Method also in regard to the nature of things. For example, filings from the horn of the goat appear white when they are seen separately and without being put together; but put together in the form of a horn, they look black. The filings of silver by themselves appear black, but as a whole appear white. Parts of the Taenarus stone look white when ground, but in the whole stone appear yellow. Grains of sand scattered apart from each other appear to be rough, but put together in a heap, they produce a soft feeling. The hellebore plant causes choking when applied fine and powdery, but no longer does so when applied coarse. Wine also taken moderately strengthens us, but when taken in excess relaxes the body. Food similarly, has a different effect according to the quantity, at least; it often disturbs the body when too much is taken, causing indigestion and vomiting.

We will also be able to say here what kind the cutting from the horn is and what many cuttings put together are, of what kind a filing of silver is and what many of them put together are, of what kind the tiny Taenarus stone and what one composed of many small ones is. With the grains of sand, the hellebore, the wine, and the food, we can say what they are in relation to each other. But no longer can we say what the nature is of the thing by itself, because of the irregularity in the ideas which we have of things, according to the way in which they are put together. In general, it appears that useful things become harmful when an intemperate use is made of them, and things that seem harmful when taken in excess, are not injurious in a small quantity. What we see in the effect of medicines especially attests to this fact. For, an exact mixture of simple remedies makes a compound which is helpful, but sometimes when a very small inclination of the balance is overlooked, the medicine is not only unhelpful, but very harmful, and often poisonous. So the argument based upon the quantity and constitution of objects, puts in confusion the existence of external objects. Therefore, this Method naturally leads us to suspend our judgment, since we are not able to declare exactly the nature of external objects.

The Eighth Method: The Relativity of Everything Limits our Judgments (1.14)

The eighth Method is the one based upon relativity. From this we conclude to suspend our judgment as to what things are absolutely, in their nature, since everything is in relation to something else.

We must bear in mind that we use the word "is" incorrectly, in place of "appears", meaning to say, everything "appears" to be in relation. However, this is said with two meanings. First, everything is in relation to the one who judges, for the external object (that is, the thing judged) appears to be in relation to the judge. The second way is that everything is in relation to the things considered together with it, as the relation of the right hand to the left. But [in the previous Methods] we came to the conclusion above, that everything is in relation to something, as for example, to the one judging; each thing appears in relation to this or that animal, and this or that man, and this or that sense, and in certain circumstances. As regards things considered together, also, each thing appears in relation to this or that mixture, and this or that method, and this or that composition, quantity and place.

In another way it is possible to conclude that everything is in relation to something, as follows. Does the being in difference differ from the being in relation, or not? If it does not differ, then it is the same as relation; if it does differ, then those things which are in a difference are in a relation to something (since everything which differs is in some relation, for it is said to be in relation to that from which it differs). Now according to the Dogmatics, some beings belong to the highest genera, others to the lowest species, and others to both genera and species at the same time. All of these are in relation to something, therefore everything is in relation to something. Furthermore, among things, some things are manifest, and others are hidden, as the Dogmatics themselves say. The things that are manifest are the phenomena, and the things that are made known to us by the phenomena are the hidden things. For according to the Dogmatics, the phenomena are the outward appearance of the unknown. Thus, that which makes known [i.e., the manifest phenomena], and that which is made known [i.e., the hidden], are in relation to something. Everything, therefore, is in relation to something.

In addition to this, some things are similar to each other, and others are dissimilar, some are equal, and others are unequal. Now these things are in relation to something, therefore everything is in relation to something. Whoever says that everything is not in relation to something, himself establishes the fact that everything is in relation to something, for even in saying that everything is not in relation to something, he proves it in reference to us, and not in general, by his objections to us. In short, as we have shown that everything is in relation to something, it is then evident that we cannot say exactly what each object is by nature, but what it appears to be like in relation to something else. It follows from this, that we must suspend our judgment regarding the nature of things.

The Ninth Method: The Rarity of Some Things Limits our Judgments (1.14)

In regard to the Method based on the frequency and rarity of events, which we call the ninth of the series, we give the following explanation. The sun is certainly a much more astonishing thing than a comet. But because we see the sun continually and the comet rarely, we are so much more astonished at the comet that it even seems an omen, while we are not at all astonished at the sun. Imagine that the sun appeared at rare intervals, and at rare intervals setting, first suddenly lighting up all things, and second casting everything into shade: we would be greatly astonished at that sight. An earthquake, too, trouble those who experience it for the first time in a different way than those who have become accustomed to it. Consider how great the astonishment is of a man who sees the sea for the first time. The beauty of the human body, seen suddenly for the first time, moves us more than if we are accustomed to seeing it. That which is rare seems valuable, while things that are familiar and easily obtained seem by no means so. If, for example, we should imagine water as rare, of how much greater value would it seem than all other valuable things. Or, if we imagine gold as simply thrown about on the ground in large quantities like stones, to whom do we think it would be valuable, or by whom would it be hoarded, as it is now? Since then the same things seem to valuable sometimes but not other times according to the frequency or rarity that they are met with, we will be able to say what kind of a thing each of them appears to be according to the frequency or rarity with which it occurs, but we are not able to say what each external object is absolutely. Therefore, according to this Method also, we suspend our judgment regarding these things.

The Tenth Method: Irregularity of Custom, Laws and Conduct Limits our Judgments (1.14)

The tenth Method is one principally connected with morals, relating specifically to (1) codes of conduct, (2) customs, (3) laws, (4) mythical beliefs, and (5) dogmatic opinions. A code of conduct is a choice of a manner of life, or of something held by one or many, as for example that of Diogenes or the Spartans. A law is a written contract among citizens, the violator of which is punished. A custom or habit (for there is no difference) is a common acceptance of a certain thing by many, the violator of which is not necessarily punished. For example, it is a law not to commit adultery, and it is a custom with us to forbid having sex with a woman in public. A mythical belief is a tradition regarding things which never took place, but were invented, such as the tales about Cronus which many people believe. A dogmatic opinion is the acceptance of something that seems to be established by a course of reasoning, or by some proof. Examples are, that atoms are elements of things, and that they are either homogeneous, or infinitively small, or something else.

We sometimes place each of these things in opposition to itself, and other times in opposition to each one of the others. For example, we place a custom in opposition to another custom as follows. Some of the Ethiopians tattoo new-born children, but we do not. The Persians think it is appropriate to have a garment of many colors reaching to the feet, but we think it is inappropriate. People from India have sex with their women in public, but most of the other nations find that shameful. We place a law in opposition to another law in this way. Among the Romans a man who renounces his paternal inheritance does not pay his father's debts, but among the Rhodians he must pay them anyway. Among the Tauri in Scythia, it was a law to sacrifice strangers to Artemis, but with us it is forbidden to kill a man near a temple. We place a code of conduct in opposition to another code of conduct when, for example, we oppose the school of Diogenes to that of Aristippus, or that of the Spartans to that of the Italians. We place a mythical belief in opposition to another mythical belief, as when, according to some traditions, Jupiter is said to be the father of men and gods, and according to other traditions Oceanus is: "Oceanus, father of the gods, and Tethys the mother." We place dogmatic opinions in opposition to each other, as when we say that some declare that there is only one element, but others that elements are infinite in number. Some say that the soul is immortal, and others that it is mortal. Some say that our affairs are directed by the providence of the gods, but others hold that there is no divine providence.

We place custom in opposition to other things, such as a law, when we say that among the Persians it is the custom to practice homosexuality, but among the Romans it is forbidden by law to do that. For us adultery is forbidden, but among the Massegetae adultery is customarily accepted with indifference (as Eudoxos of Cnidus relates in the first part of his book of travels). Among us it is forbidden to have sex with our mothers, but among the Persians it is the custom to have such marriages. The Egyptians marry their sisters, which is also forbidden by law among us. Further, we place a custom in opposition to a code of conduct when we say, for example, that most men have sex with their wives in private, but the [Cynic] philosopher Crates did it with his wife publicly. Diogenes [the Cynic] went around with one shoulder bare, but we go around with our customary clothes.

We place a custom in opposition to a mythical belief, as when the myths say that Cronus ate his own children, while with us it is the custom to take care of our children. Among us it is the custom to honor the gods as good an incapable of evil, but the poets describe them as suffering from injuries and being jealous of each other. We place a custom in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that it is a custom with us to request favors from the gods, but that Epicurus says that the divine pays no attention to us. Aristippus also held it to be a matter of indifference to wear women's clothes, but we consider it shameful.

We place a code of conduct in opposition to a law, as when, according to the law it is not allowed to beat a free and noble born man, but the wrestlers and boxers hit each other according to the teaching of their manner of life. Although murder is forbidden, the gladiators kill each other for the same reason. We place a mythical belief in opposition to a code of conduct when we say that, although the myths maintain that Hercules spun wool and did slaves' tasks in Omphale's house and did things that not even an ordinary good man would have done, yet Hercules code of conduct was noble. We place mythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that, for example, it is good for athletes to seek after glory and enter for its sake upon a laborious profession, yet, on the other hand, many philosophers teach that glory is worthless. We place a law in opposition to a mythical belief when we say that the poets represent the gods as committing adultery and sin, but among us the law forbids those things. We place law in opposition to dogmatic opinion when we say that the followers of Chrysippus hold that it is a matter of indifference to marry one's mother or sister, but the law forbids these things. We place a mythical belief in opposition to a dogmatic opinion when we say that the poets represent Jupiter as descending and having sex with mortal women, but the Dogmatists think that this was impossible. Also, the poet says that Jupiter, because of his sorrow for Sarpedon, rained drops of blood upon the earth, but it is a dogma of the philosophers that the divine is exempt from suffering. They also deny the myth of the horse-centaurs, yet they give us the horse-centaur as an example of unreality.

We could give many other examples of each of the direct opposites mentioned above, but for a brief account, these are sufficient. Since irregularity of things is shown by this Method also, we will not be able to say what objects are by nature, but only what each thing appears to be like, according to this or that code of conduct, or this or that law, or this or that custom, or according to each of the other conditions. Therefore, by this Method also, we must suspend our judgment in regard to the nature of external objects. Thus we arrive at suspension of judgment through the ten Methods.

The Notion of God is Inconceivable (3.3)

Now considering that most of the Dogmatists hold God to be the most efficient cause, let us first inquire concerning God. However, we recognize that, in the course of life, we say (without engaging our judgment) that there are Gods, that we worship the Gods, and that they have providence. But we say the following to oppose the rashness of the dogmatists.

Of the things which we understand, we ought to consider their substances, such as whether they are bodies or are incorporeal. So too with their forms. For no one can understand a horse if he has not first learned what the form of a horse is. Likewise, that which is understood, must be understood as being somewhere. Now insofar as some of the dogmatists say that God is a body, others say he is incorporeal. Some, that he has a human form, others not. Some say that he exists in space, others that he does not exist in space. Of those who say that he exists in space, some say that he is in the world, others that he is beyond it. How, then, can we have a conception of God without having undisputed knowledge of his substance, or of his form, or of the place wherein he exists? Let them first agree among themselves concerning what God is, and then they may represent him to us, and require that we accept such a conception of God. For, while they disagree irreconcilably among themselves, we cannot accept anything from them as undoubtedly true.

But, they say, conceive within yourself of something that is incorruptible and blessed: that thing, then, is God. But this is ridiculous. For, as he who does not know Dion cannot know the properties that belong to him, as Dion. So, not knowing the substance of God, we similarly cannot know his accidents. Further, let them tell us what is blessed: whether it is that which is active according to virtue, and has a providence over the things subordinate to it; or that which is passive, and neither has any activity itself, or provides activity to another. For, differing irreconcilably even about this, they show that what they call blessed is inconceivable, and consequently God himself is also inconceivable.

God's Existence is not Self-Evident and cannot be Demonstrated from the Self-Evident or Non-Self-Evident (3.3)

But even though we might grant some notion of God, yet it is necessary for us to suspend judgment about whether he is or he is not, at least with respect to what the dogmatists say. For, it is not self-evident that there is a God. For, if that were self-evident, the Dogmatists would have agreed about who, what, and where he is. Yet, on the contrary, there is an unending controversy among them, whereby we see that his being is not self-evident to us, and requires demonstration. Now he who says that there is a God, must either demonstrate it by either a something that is self-evident, or not self-evident. He cannot do so by something self-evident, for if that were self-evident which demonstrates there is a God (forasmuch as that which demonstrates is relative to that which is demonstrated, and consequently is grasping together with it, as we have formerly proved), then that there is a God will be also be self-evident, as being grasped together with the self-evident thing that demonstrates it. But this [i.e., God's existence] is not self-evident, therefore neither can it be demonstrated by something that is self-evident.

But neither can God be demonstrated by what is not self-evident, for the non-self-evident will require a demonstration. If demonstrated by something self-evident, then it will no longer be non-self-evident, but instead evident that there is a God. Therefore, the non-self-evident demonstrative cannot be demonstrated by what is self-evident. But neither can it be demonstrated by something non-self-evident. For he who says so will be driven into an infinite regress, as we continually require a demonstration of the non-self-evident, that is alleged for demonstrating the thing proposed. Therefore, it cannot be demonstrated from any other thing that there is a God. So, if it is neither self-evident in itself, nor demonstrable from something else, it will be incomprehensible whether there is a God.

God's Providence cannot be Demonstrated because of Evil (3.3)

Further, he who says there is a God, holds either that he is provident over the things in the world, or he is not provident. If God is provident, he is so either over all, or only over some. If over all, there would be no badness or evil in the world. But all things (as they admit) are full of evil; therefore, God cannot be said to be provident over all. If he is provident only over some things, why is he provident over these and not over those? For either (1) he both wills to be provident and is capable of being provident over all; or (2) he wills, but is incapable; or (3) he is capable, but does not will; or (4) he neither wills nor is capable. If he both wills and is capable [i.e., option 1], then he indeed would be provident over all. But he is not provident, as is clear from what we just said [regarding evil]. Therefore, it is not the case that he both wills to provide over all and is capable of providing over all. If he wills, but is incapable [i.e., option 2], then his power is exceeded by some cause that hinders him from being provident over the things that are outside of his providence. But it is absurd to image God to be weaker than some other thing. If he is capable of being provident over all, but does not will this [i.e., option 3], then he may be evil. If he neither wills nor is capable [i.e., option 4], then he is both evil and weak. But to say this of God is impious. Therefore, God is not provident over the things of the world. Further, if he is not provident over them, and neither performs any work or effect, then no one can say by what means he comprehends that there is a God, seeing that it neither is self-evident in itself, nor comprehended by any effects. For these reasons therefore it is incomprehensible whether there is or is not a God.

Hence we may also argue, that they who say there is a God, cannot be excused from impiety. For, by affirming that he is provident over all things, they say that God is the author of evil. In saying that he is provident over only some and not over all, they will be forced to admit that God is either evil or weak, which cannot be said without clear impiety.

Nothing is Naturally Good (3.23)

Fire, which heats by nature, appears to everyone to be heating. Snow, being cool by nature, appears to everyone to be cooling. In the same way, all things that by nature have affects, will affect other things according to their nature. But none of those things that are called "good" affect all men as good, as we will show. Therefore, there is nothing good by nature. It is clear that none of those things that are called "good" affect everyone in the same way. We will ignore ordinary people, some of whom think that physical fitness is good, others sexual pleasures, others eating, others drinking, others gambling, others wealth, others something worse than these. Now, some philosophers, such as the Peripatetics, say that there are three kinds of goods, some in the soul such as virtues, some in the body such as health and the like, and some are external such as friendship wealth and the like. The Stoics also hold that there are three kinds of goods, some in the soul such as virtues, some external such as a virtuous man and a friend, and some neither inside or outside of the soul such as a virtuous man as man. But those that are in the body or external, which the Peripatetics designate as goods, they deny to be goods. There are some philosophers who hold pleasure to be a good, others on the contrary say that it is an evil. Accordingly, one of these philosophers proclaimed "I would rather be mad than pleased." Now, if all things that by nature have affects, will affect everyone the same way, then nothing is good by nature. . . .

Nothing is Naturally Evil or Shameful (3.24)

As I have proved, there is nothing naturally good. For the same reasons, neither is there anything naturally evil. For, those things that seem evil to some men are pursued by others as goods, such as lust, injustice, greed, overindulgence, and the like. Thus, if natural things affect everyone in the same way, and those that are said to be evil do not affect everyone in the same way, then nothing is naturally evil. . . .

In addition to what has been said, it may be proper to briefly consider the notions concerning things that are shameful and not shameful, unlawful and unlawful, laws and customs, piety towards the gods, reverence for the departed, and the like. By doing so we will discover a great diversity of belief concerning what ought or ought not to be done.

With us, homosexuality is considered shameful and unlawful. With the Germani, it is not shameful but permitted by custom. Neither did the ancient Thebans consider it shameful, and they say that Merione the Cretan received his name as an indication of this custom. Some also attribute this to Achilles' burning friendship with Patroclus. It is no surprise, then, that both the Cynics and [the Stoics] Zeno of Citium, Cleanthese and Chrysippus say that it is indifferent.

Again, if a man lies with his wife in public, we consider it shameful, yet some of the people of India do not, for they do so publicly with indifference. Crates the [Cynic] philosopher is also said to have done this. For us, it is shameful and disgraceful for women to prostitute themselves, but with many of the Egyptians it is praiseworthy, for they say that those who have slept with many men would wear ankle bracelets as a mark of their honor. Further, among them, girls before marriage gained a dowry by prostituting themselves. The Stoics say that it is no shame to cohabitate with a prostitute or to live off the profits of what she makes.

For us tattoos are shameful and dishonorable, but many of the Egyptians and Samaritans tattoo their children. With us it is shameful for men to wear earrings, but for some barbarians and Syrians it is a sign of nobility. Further, some, as a sign of nobility, put holes in the nostrils of their children in which they hang rings of silver or gold, which none of us do. Neither to we wear robes colored with flowers, but, while we think this is indecent, the Persians consider it respectable. When during a feast Dionysius the Tyrant of Sicily offered a robe of this kind to Plato and Aristippus the philosophers, Plato refused saying "I will not disgrace myself with a female robe since I am a man. But Aristippus [the Cynic] accepted it saying even during a feast of Bacchus, a pure woman does not become corrupt. Thus, even with these wise men, to one it seemed decent, to the other indecent.

With us it is unlawful to marry our mother or sister, but the Persians (and among them the Magi, who are famous for their wisdom), marry their mothers, and the Egyptians marry their sisters. . . . Among us it is illegal to eat human flesh, but there are whole nations of barbarians who consider this as something indifferent. But why cite the barbarians when Tydeus himself is said to have eaten the brains of his enemy? The stoics say that it is not improper to eat just the flesh of other men, but also our own. . . .

The same kind of argument we might deduce from many other things, which, for brevity, we will omit. If we cannot immediately give a contrariety to something, we may still say that it is possible that in some unknown nations there may be a different opinion. For example, if we did not know that the custom of the Egyptians is to marry their sisters, we might wrongly affirm everyone believes that we should not marry our sisters. Similarly, with those things about which we do not know of a difference, we should not affirm that there is no controversy concerning them. For, as I said, it is possible that some other unknown nations may hold the contrary. Thus, seeing so great a diversity of practices, the skeptic suspends judgment about whether anything is good or bad by nature, or generally to be done or not done.

SIX CRITICISMS OF SKEPTICISM

Skeptics give Weak Arguments (Sextus, Outlines, 3.32)

Because of his great compassion, to the best of his ability the skeptic attempts through discourse to remedy the arrogance and rash insolence of the dogmatists. Physicians who treat bodily diseases have remedies of different sorts, applying extreme ones to those who are extremely sick, but milder ones to those whose disease is milder. Similarly, the arguments proposed by the skeptic are not all of equal force. The stronger ones, which are best able to overthrow the disease of the dogmatists, he uses against those who are most severely affected by it. The milder ones he uses against those who have it more mildly and superficially, so that they may be cured by milder methods. Because of this the skeptic sometimes uses stronger methods and arguments, and other times, for a given purpose, uses weaker ones, since he deems them sufficient to accomplish his purpose.

Skeptics Themselves use Reason (Diogenes, Lives, 9)

[According to the Skeptics] to any assertion there is a contrary assertion opposing it, which, after having destroyed all others, turns itself against itself, and destroys itself. This resembles, so to speak, those cathartic medicines which, after they have cleansed the stomach, then discharge themselves, and are gotten rid of. But the dogmatic philosophers criticize that all these reasonings are so far from overturning the authority of reason that they confirm it. To this the Skeptics reply, that they only use reason as an instrument, because it is impossible to overturn the authority of reason without using reason. Similarly, if we assert that "there is no such thing as space," we must use the word "space," but demonstratively, not dogmatically. Again, if we assert that "nothing exists according to necessity," it is unavoidable that we use the word "necessity." . . .

Skeptics Themselves give Positive Definitions and Dogmas (Diogenes, Lives, 9)

The dogmatic philosophers, arguing against the Skeptics, say that they assert positive and deceptive dogmas. When the Skeptics think that they are refuting others, they are convicting themselves: in the very act of refutation, they assert positively and dogmatize. For when they say that they define nothing, and that every argument has an opposite argument, they at the same time give a positive definition, and assert a positive dogma. But Skeptics reply to these objectors. As to the things which happen to us as men, we admit what you say. For we recognize that it is day, that we are alive, and many other phenomena of life. But with respect to those things as to which the dogmatic philosophers make positive assertions, saying that they are comprehended, we suspend our judgment on the ground of their being uncertain, and that we know nothing but the passions. We admit that we see, and we are aware that we comprehend that such a thing is the fact, but we do not know how we see, or how we comprehend. Also, we state in the course of discussion that this appears white, without asserting positively that it really is so. With respect to the assertion, "We define nothing," and other sentences of that sort, we do not pronounce them as dogmas. For to say that is a different kind of statement from saying that the world is spherical; for the one fact is not evident, while the other statements are mere admissions. While, therefore, we say that we define nothing, we do not even say that as a definition.

Skeptical Denial Overthrows All Life (Diogenes, Lives, 9)

The dogmatic philosophers say that the Skeptics overthrow all life when they deny everything of which life consists. But the Skeptics say that they are mistaken, for they do not deny that they see, but that they do not know how it is that they see. For, they say, we assert what is actually the fact, but we do not describe its character. We feel that fire burns, but we suspend our judgment as to whether it has a burning nature. We see whether a person moves and that a man dies, but how these things happen we do not know. Thus, we only oppose the uncertain substances that are behind the evident facts. When we say that an image has projections, we only state plainly what is evident; but when we say that it does not have projections, we no longer say what appears evident, but something else. For this reason, Timon [the Skeptic] says in his Python that Pyrrho does not destroy the authority of custom, and in his Images he says the following: "What is evidently seen prevails, wherever it may be". In his Treatise on the Senses, he says, "I do not establish the reason why a thing is sweet, but I admit that the fact of sweetness is evident."

The Skeptic's position on Appearances is Paradoxical (Diogenes, Lives, 9)

Democritus says that there is no test whatever of appearances, and also that they are not criteria of truth. Further, the dogmatic philosophers attack the criterion derived from appearances, and say that the same objects present different appearances at times, so that at one time a town appears to be a square, and at another it appears to be round. Consequently, if the Skeptic does not distinguish between different appearances, he does nothing at all. If, on the contrary, he determines in favor of some appearances, then he no longer attaches equal value to all appearances. In response to this, the Skeptics say that in the presence of different appearances, they restrict themselves with to saying that there are many appearances, and that it is precisely because things present themselves under different characters, that they affirm the existence of appearances.

The Skeptic's Suspension will make them Comply with Immorality (Diogenes, Lives, 9)

The Skeptics say that the chief good is the suspension of the judgment which tranquility of mind follows, like its shadow, as [the Skeptics] Timon and Aenesidemus say. For we need not choose these things, or avoid those which all depend on ourselves. But we cannot avoid those things which do not depend upon us, but upon necessity, such as hunger, thirst, and pain, since it is not possible to put an end to them by reason. But the dogmatic philosophers object that the Skeptic, on his principles, will not refuse to kill and eat his own father if he is ordered to do so. The Skeptics reply that, without bothering themselves with the speculations of the dogmatic philosophers, they can live very well by suspending their judgment in all matters that do not refer to living and the preservation of life. Accordingly, say they, we avoid some things, and we seek others, following custom in that, and we obey the laws.

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. What are the broken oar and dove's neck arguments for skepticism and what is Cicero's defense of them?

2. What is the twins argument for skepticism and what is Cicero's defense of it?

3. What are the divine visions and dreaming arguments for skepticism and what is Cicero's defense of them?

4. What is a sorites argument and the liar's paradox, and what does Cicero conclude about them?

5. What are the main features of skepticism that Sextus describes in 1.1-1.6?

6. What are the main features of skepticism that Sextus describes in 1.7-1.10?

7. According to Sextus in 1.11-1.13, what is the criterion and aim of skepticism, and the method of suspending judgment?

8. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the first method of skepticism.

9. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the second method of skepticism.

10. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the third method of skepticism.

11. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the fourth method of skepticism.

12. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the fifth method of skepticism.

13. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the sixth method of skepticism.

14. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the seventh method of skepticism.

15. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the eighth method of skepticism.

16. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the ninth method of skepticism.

17. Describe and give one of Sextus's examples of the tenth method of skepticism.

18. What are Sextus's arguments in 3.3 against the conception of God?

19. What are Sextus's arguments in 3.23 and 3.24 for the skeptical view that nothing is naturally good, evil or shameful?

20. In the final section of this chapter, what are the six criticisms of skepticism, and what is the skeptic's response?

21. Short essay: please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

a. In Cicero's dialogue Academic Questions, Lucullus criticizes several standard arguments for skepticism, including that of the broken oar, dove's neck, twins, divine visions and dreaming. Cicero then defends each of these against Lucullus's attack. Pick one of these arguments, present both Lucullus's and Cicero's side of the dispute, and discuss which of the two is right.

b. Sextus argues that the Pyrrhonian school of skepticism differs substantially from the Academic school. Discuss Sextus's reasons for this view and whether the two schools are as distinct as he believes.

c. Pick one of the ten methods of skepticism, explain it, and discuss whether it succeeds.

d. Pick one of the Sextus's arguments against the concept of God, explain it, and discuss whether it succeeds.

e. Discuss Sextus's argument that nothing is naturally good, evil or shameful, and discuss whether the argument succeeds.

f. Pick one of the four criticisms of skepticism in the final section of this chapter, and discuss the skeptic's response and whether it succeeds.

g. In the following, Descartes argues that it is absurd to take skepticism seriously in matters of ordinary life, yet at the same time skepticism must viewed as legitimate when inquiring into the certainty of human knowledge: "When it is a case of regulating our life, it would assuredly be stupid not to trust the senses, and those skeptics were quite ridiculous who so neglected human affairs that they had to be preserved by their friends from tumbling down precipices. It was for this reason that somewhere I announced that no one in his sound mind seriously doubted about such matters. But when we raise an enquiry into what is the surest knowledge which the human mind can obtain, it is clearly unreasonable to refuse to treat them as doubtful, nay even to reject them as false, so as to allow us to become aware that certain other things, which cannot be thus rejected, are for this very reason more certain, and in actual truth better known by us" (Reply to Objections V). Would Sextus agree with Descartes? Explain.

h. In the following, Hume criticizes that Pyrrhonian skepticism can have no lasting impact on himself or society: "A Pyrrhonian cannot expect, that his philosophy will have any constant influence on the mind: or if it had, that its influence would be beneficial to society. On the contrary, he must acknowledge, if he will acknowledge anything, that all human life must perish, were his principles universally and steadily to prevail. All discourse, all action would immediately cease; and men remain in a total lethargy, till the necessities of nature, unsatisfied, put an end to their miserable existence. . . . And though a Pyrrhonian may throw himself or others into a momentary amazement and confusion by his profound reasonings; the first and most trivial event in life will put to flight all his doubts and scruples. . . . When he awakes from his dream, he will be the first to join in the laugh against himself, and to confess, that all his objections are mere amusement." (Enquiry concerning Human Understanding, 1748, 12.2). Discuss Hume's point and how Sextus might respond.

i. In the following, Kant argues that skepticism has an important benefit by establishing the limits of human reason: "To the uncritical dogmatist, who has not surveyed the sphere of his understanding, nor determined, in accordance with principles, the limits of possible cognition, who, consequently, is ignorant of his own powers, and believes he will discover them by the attempts he makes in the field of cognition, these attacks of skepticism are not only dangerous, but destructive. For if there is one proposition in his chain of reasoning which be he cannot prove, or the fallacy in which he cannot evolve in accordance with a principle, suspicion falls on all his statements, however plausible they may appear. And thus skepticism, the plague of dogmatic philosophy, conducts us to a sound investigation into the understanding and the reason. When we are thus far advanced, we need fear no further attacks; for the limits of our domain are clearly marked out, and we can make no claims nor become involved in any disputes regarding the region that lies beyond these limits." (Critique of Pure Reason, 1781, 2.1.2) Discuss Kant's point and whether Sextus would agree.

j. Bertrand Russell makes the following comment about Pyrrhonian Skepticism's rejection of dogmatism: "It should be observed that Skepticism as a philosophy is not merely doubt, but what may be called dogmatic doubt. The man of science says 'I think it is so-and-so, but I am not sure.' The man of intellectual curiosity says 'I don't know how it is, but I hope to find out.' The philosophical Skeptic says 'nobody knows, and nobody ever can know' It is this element of dogmatism that makes the system vulnerable. Skeptics, of course, deny that they assert the impossibility of knowledge dogmatically, but their denials are not very convincing." (History of Western Philosophy, 1945, 1.26) Discuss Russell's point and how Sextus might respond.