MUSLIM AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHY

From Ancient and Medieval Philosophy: Essential Selections, by James Fieser

© 2008, updated 1/1/2026, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

CONTENTS

Introduction

Lives of Medieval Muslim and Jewish Philosophers

Al Ghazali: Criticisms of Traditional Philosophy

Averroes: The Relation Between Religion and Philosophy

Maimonides: Religious Language and Creation

Maimonides: Virtue

Study Questions

 

INTRODUCTION

Just as Greek philosophy was assimilated into Christian theology during the middle ages, so too was it introduced into medieval Muslim and Jewish religious thought. In the Eastern Roman Empire, Emperor Justinian closed the Neoplatonic academy in Athens in 529, and the center of Greek philosophy shifted to Alexandria in Egypt and Baghdad in Persia. In Western Europe, after the collapse of the Western Roman Empire, the original Greek documents of Plato and Aristotle became scarce, and knowledge of the classical Greek language itself was all but lost. Christian theologians only had access to a few Latin translations of Aristotle, and almost none of Plato or Plotinus. The situation was different in the East with the emergence of the Islamic State. Within Bagdad, Islam's cultural center of the time, various rulers and intellectuals sponsored systematic translations of Greek scientific and philosophical works into the Syriac and Arabic languages. By the tenth-century, all of Aristotle's works and some by Plato and Plotinus had been translated into these languages, and the Muslim philosophical tradition that emerged from this was a hybrid of Aristotelianism and Neoplatonism.

          The first major Muslim philosophers were Al-Kindi (d. 873) and Al-Farabi (870- 943), both of whom taught in Baghdad and brought Aristotle's philosophy to light. The Aristotelean trend continued with Avicenna (Ibn-Sina in Arabic, 980-1037), a physician and philosopher from the city of Bukhara, now in Uzbekistan. He was a central figure in classical Islamic theology (or "kalam") and authored over 100 philosophical texts, the most important of which is his multi-volume "Book of Healing" (Kitab al Shifa). As a metaphysician, he brought together the Muslim view of creationism with Aristotelianism. On the one hand, he defended the traditional Muslim view that the world was created by God and thus contingent, yet, on the other, he followed Aristotle that the world arises from an eternal and logical necessity.

          The selections below are from three important writers who succeeded Avicenna, namely, Al-Ghazali, Averroes, and Maimonides. Al-Ghazali (1056-1111) was born in the Persian district of Khorasan, now in Iran, and began his career teaching at a religious school in Baghdad. His acquaintance with logic and the writings of Avicenna set him on a quest for certainty, compelling him to leave his job and family and travel for ten years to various Islamic centers of learning. In the course of his search he embraced Sufism, Islam's mystical tradition. Returning to teaching, he authored numerous works of philosophy, theology, Sufism and law. In his book "The Incoherence of the Philosophers" he criticizes 20 theses held by his philosophical predecessors, particularly Avicenna. Among these, he argues that the Aristotelean conception of the world's eternality conflicts with the Muslim doctrine of creation, and that Aristotelian causal necessity conflicts with divine miracles. Thus, according to Al-Ghazali, the world does not arise from an eternal and logical necessity, but rather from the sheer will of God. The selections below by Al-Ghazali are from his intellectual autobiography "Deliverance from Error" in which he discusses his quest for certainty. His search began with the troubling relativist observation that the children of Christians become Christians, and the children of Muslims embrace Islam. Why are children's beliefs so susceptible to the instruction of their parents? Upon investigation, he concluded that there is no certainty to be found, even with sensation and necessary principles, and accordingly, he became a thorough-going skeptic. Ultimately, he says, he was delivered from his doubts, not through argumentation, but a religious experience whereby divine light illuminates knowledge. During his quest, he discovered that there are three seekers after truth: theologians, philosophers, and Sufis. He was not impressed with theology since it rested on assumptions, rather than self-evident truths. Neither was he impressed with the various schools of philosophy, since they all had some element of religious infidelity. Even the very subdisciplines of philosophy contained dangers. With metaphysics in particular, he argues that there are three heretical doctrines held by Al-Farabi and Avicenna: (1) there is no bodily resurrection, (2) God knows only universals, not particulars, and (3) the universe exists from all eternity and will never end. Al-Ghazali concluded that Sufism is the surest path to truth.

          Averroes (Ibn Rushd in Arabic, 1126-1198) was born in Cordova Spain, Islam's cultural center in Western Europe. His grandfather and father were judges, and he followed in this family tradition. He is considered the last of the great medieval Muslim philosophers, and the one that had the most influence upon Christian philosophers in subsequent centuries. In addition to philosophy and theology, he wrote on the subjects of medicine, astronomy and physics. In philosophy he composed commentaries on virtually all of Aristotle's works, and attempted to free Aristotelianism from the Neoplatonist influences of his Muslim predecessors. In response to Al-Ghazali's book "The Incoherence of the Philosophers," Averroes composed a criticism of it titled "The Incoherence of the Incoherence" in which he defends the Aristotelian notion of the world's eternality. The selections below by Averroes are from his "Decisive Treatise" in which he attempts to show the proper relationship between philosophy and theology. He argues that there are three methods of religious belief, all of which are endorsed by Islam. First is "philosophy", which is restricted to experts skilled in metaphysics and logic, and is especially good at determining when a scriptural passage should be interpreted metaphorically rather than literally. Next is "dogmatic discourse", which is the type used by religious legal scholars when they formulate religious laws by drawing conclusions from scripture. Last is "exhortation", which is what religious leaders do when teaching the uneducated masses. The question that Averroes seeks to answer is what should we do when a scriptural passage conflicts with reason? An example he gives is a verse from the Koran that implies that God exists in a three-dimensional heavenly location. His answer is that we must interpret this verse metaphorically and not literally. The reason is that there are two types of scriptural passages. First are the "apparent" (exoteric) ones that are plain and should be taken at face value. Second are the "hidden" (esoteric), which are more complex and require interpretation. The passage about God existing in a three-dimensional location is a hidden one and needs to be interpreted metaphorically. However, he warns, the task of interpreting allegorical passages is a potentially dangerous one that should only be undertaken by skilled philosophers, since it may result an incorrect and heretical interpretation. The example he gives is whether divine reward and punishment in the afterlife is literally true or just a metaphor aimed at motivating people to be moral. He argues that it is an apparent (exoteric) doctrine that should be understood literally, not metaphorically. Because of the risks, the uneducated should never attempt to interpret passages. He thus maintains that there are three groups of readers of scripture: that masses who constitute the majority are are guided only by exhortation (preaching), and should not be permitted to interpret; dogmatic theologians who attempt to interpret but without proper skill; and philosophers who correctly understand hidden (esoteric) scriptural meaning through logic.

          For nine centuries much of Spain and Portugal were under Muslim rule, and during this time the region was largely a safe haven for European Jews who were systematically persecuted in other parts of Europe. Jewish culture flourished, and Cordoba became the center of Jewish scholarship. Born there was Moses Maimonides (1138–1204), the most important Jewish theologian of the middle ages, who is often referred to as the "second Moses". The selections below are from two of his main philosophical works. The first is "Guide for the Perplexed", which is an effort to clarify confusing religious expressions in scripture and prevent people from misinterpreting them. He explains that there are seven causes of such misinterpretation, one of which is that many problematic scriptural verses should be understood figuratively, not literally. Throughout the work he painstakingly picks through one challenging passage after another in the Hebrew Bible and shows how to properly understand them. His first example is the verse in Genesis 1.26 where God says "Let us make man in our own image". Since humans have physical bodies, some people have taken this verse to imply that God too must have a physical body. Maimonides responds that the term "image" as used here is based on the Hebrew word, "zelem", which principally means "essence" rather than physical form. By contrast, the Hebrew word "toar" does mean physical shape, but the Genesis passage does not use this term. Ordinary people are the ones who typically make such misinterpretations, and for that reason, he argues, they should not be taught metaphysics which may mislead them into making even more mistakes. Rather, they should be firmly taught as children that God does not have a body, since this is critical for understanding other aspects of God, such as God's unity. Other scriptural misinterpretations arise from the erroneous assumption that God has attributes, whether psychological, physical, emotional, or quantitative. When passages describe God as having emotions, we must see that they merely describe a situation from our own human emotional perspective. Thus,        . While divine emotions must be interpreted metaphorically, Maimonides argues that divine creation of the world is different and must be interpreted literally. There are three theories about whether the world is eternal:  by Moses, Plato and Aristotle respectively, and those by Plato and Aristotle have problems, and thus we should accept Moses's account. We do not know the reason why God created the world and performed any other miracle, and we must just accept these facts. Maimonides' second philosophical work titled "Eight Chapters" is part of a larger commentary of his on the Talmud, and is a discussion of moral virtues. Influenced by Aristotle, he argues that vices arise from the sensitive and appetitive faculties of the soul, that virtue rests at a mean between two extreme vices, and that intellectual and moral vices are barriers between people and God. Further, he argues, our virtues and vices are not predetermined, but rather the result of our own free choices.

LIVES OF MEDIEVAL MUSLIM AND JEWISH PHILOSOPHERS (Stockl, Handbook)

Averroes (Ibn Rushd) (1126-1198)

Averroes was born in 1126 at Cordova, in which town his father was Chief Magistrate and Chief Priest. He first studied Theology and Jurisprudence, later he gave himself to Medicine, Mathematics and Philosophy. After his father's death he succeeded to his various offices, and whilst thus employed in important public duties, he composed (at Seville) the greater portion of those remarkable treatises which made his name famous in after ages. It is said that in his old age he was appointed regent of Spain by the Khalif Jussuf el Mansur, but that, soon after, having been accused of atheism and contempt of religion, he was excluded from the Mosque and sent into exile. He was, however, rein stated in his dignities after a brief interval, and d sent into exile. He was, however, rein stated in his dignities after a brief interval, and was then summoned to Morocco to act as physician to the Court. He died there in 1198.

          Averroes is remarkable for his commentaries on the writings of Aristotle, which have secured him the title of "the Commentator." On some of the Aristotelian treatises he has written as many as three commentaries—the first in the form of a brief paraphrase, the second in somewhat greater minuteness, and the third in all fulness of detail. We have a three-fold commentary of this kind on the Posterior Analytics, the Physics, the treatise De Cozlo, the De Anima, and the Metaphysics. In the case of other works only the short paraphrase and commentary remain to us. "Averroes did not possess the Greek original of the works of Aristotle; he understood neither Greek nor Syriac; wherever the Arabian translation was obscure or incorrect he was obliged to conjecture the true sense from the general context of the Aristotelian teaching."

          Besides his commentaries Averroes composed many other treatises. Of these the most important are: a) "Tehafot al Tehafot" (Destruction of destructions) a reply to Algazel's Refutation of the Philosophers which we shall notice later ; 6) "Qusesita in libros logicso Aristotelis"; c) "Treatises on Physics" (on the Problems of Aristotle's Physics); d) "Epistola de connexione intellectus abstract cum nomine"; e) "De animae beatitudine"; g) "De Intellectu possibili vel materiali" (preserved to us only in a Hebrew translation); g) on "the harmony of Religion and Philosophy" (a Hebrew text) ; h) "on the true meaning of Religious Dogmas, or the way of proving the same," etc.

Al-Ghazali (1056-1111)

Al-Ghazali was born at Gazzalah, in Khorosan. In his youth he acquired great renown for learning, and while yet a young man, was invited to Bagdad to teach philosophy, Soon became to lose hope of reaching truth on the lines followed by the philosophers. He turned from them, resigned his office of teacher, and retired into Syria, in order to give himself to mystical contemplation as a Sufite (solitary). He spent eleven years in the practices of Sufite life, and during this period, it is alleged, received revelations of the highest importance. He conceived himself bound to impart to others the knowledge he had thus received, and felt called to work for the spread of truth and the extirpation of error. Accordingly he left his solitude, and began to teach again. He changed the sphere of his teaching activity from time to time. Towards the end of his life he retired again into solitude, and died at Tus, in 1111.

          During the period of his life as a Sufi, he wrote his three best known works. The first of these is his treatise Makacid al faldsifa (The Efforts of the Philosophers). In this work he expounded the whole system of the Arabian Aristotelians, taking Avicenna as their typical reprosentive. Next followed the treatise : Tehdfot ai faldsifa (Dettructio Philosophorum), in which the whole system expounded in the Makacid is subjected to a destructive criticism. Lastly came the work, "Rehabilitation of Religious Knowledge," in which the author lays down his own system. This work has not yet been edited. But its fame in ancient times may be judged from the saying then current, that if the whole system of Islam perished, it could be restored from the pages of this work. We may mention here the title of a treatise in which Algazel deals with certain points of Mystical Doctrine. The title is "0 Child." It has been translated by Hammer-Purgstall.

Moses Maimonides (1135-1204)

Maimonides was born at Cordova in Spain in 1135. He gave himself to the study of Aristotle under the guidance of Averroes or one of his disciples. Persecuted as a heretic by his fellow Jews, he withdrew to Fez, and subsequently to Cairo, where he was appointed physician to the Sultan Saladin. He founded a school in Alexandria, but was driven from this city also by the persecutions of his co-religionists. He died in 1204. He is the author of several works treating of Jewish Theology and Ethics. His chief work is The Guide for the Perplexed. In this work he has a two-fold aim: to furnish a philosophic basis for the dogmas of the Jewish faith, and to set forth the true meaning which the holy scriptures conceal under images, similes, and parables. He adopts the axiom of the Arabian Aristotelians that the teaching of the prophets was expressed mainly in images because in this way only could it be conveyed to the people, but that it is the duty of the scholar to strip it of this veil with the aid of philosophy and to lay bare the hidden truth. For Maimonides, however, philosophy in the true sense is the philosophy of Aristotle.

AL GHAZALI: CRITICISMS OF TRADITIONAL PHILOSOPHY (Deliverance from Error)

Relativism and the Quest for Certainty

Know then, my brothers (may God direct you in the right way), that the diversity in beliefs and religions, and the variety of doctrines and sects which divide men, are like a deep ocean strewn with shipwrecks, from which very few escape safe and sound. Each sect, it is true, believes itself in possession of the truth and of salvation, "each party," as the Koran says, "rejoices in its own creed"; but as the chief of the apostles, whose word is always truthful, has told us, "My people will be divided into more than seventy sects, of whom only one will be saved." This prediction, like all others of the Prophet, must be fulfilled.

          From the period of adolescence (that is to say, previous to reaching my twentieth year) to the present time when I have passed my fiftieth, I have ventured into this vast ocean [of opposing views]. I have fearlessly sounded its depths, and like a resolute diver, I have penetrated its darkness and dared its dangers and abysses. I have interrogated the beliefs of each sect and scrutinized the mysteries of each doctrine, in order to disentangle truth from error and orthodoxy from heresy. I have never met one who maintained the hidden meaning of the Koran without investigating the nature of his belief, nor a partisan of its exterior sense without inquiring into the results of his doctrine. There is no philosopher whose system I have not fathomed, nor theologian the intricacies of whose doctrine I have not followed out.

          Sufism has no secrets into which I have not penetrated; the devout adorer of Deity has revealed to me the aim of his austerities; the atheist has not been able to conceal from me the real reason of his unbelief. The thirst for knowledge was innate in me from an early age; it was like a second nature implanted by God, without any will on my part. No sooner had I emerged from boyhood than I had already broken the fetters of tradition and freed myself from hereditary beliefs.

          I noticed how easily the children of Christians become Christians, and the children of Muslims embrace Islam. I also remembered the traditional saying ascribed to the Prophet, "Every child has in him the germ of Islam, then his parents make him Jew, Christian, or Zoroastrian." Accordingly, I was moved by a keen desire to learn what was this innate disposition in the child, the nature of the accidental beliefs imposed on him by the authority of his parents and his masters, and finally the unreasoned convictions which he derives from their instructions.

          Struck with the contradictions which I encountered in attempt to disentangle the truth and falsehood of these opinions, I was led to make the following reflection: The search after truth being the aim which I propose to myself, I ought in the first place to ascertain what are the bases of certainty. In the next place I recognized that certainty is the clear and complete knowledge of things, such knowledge as leaves no room for doubt nor possibility of error and conjecture, so that there remains no room in the mind for error to find an entrance. In such a case it is necessary that the mind, fortified against all possibility of going astray, should embrace such a strong conviction that, if, for example, any one possessing the power of changing a stone into gold, or a stick into a serpent, should seek to shake the bases of this certitude, it would remain firm and immovable. Suppose, for instance, a man should come and say to me, who am firmly convinced that ten is more than three, "No; on the contrary, three is more than ten, and, to prove it, I change this rod into a serpent," and supposing that he actually did so, I should remain none the less convinced of the falsity of his assertion, and although his miracle might arouse my astonishment, it would not instill any doubt into my belief.

          I then understood that all forms of knowledge which do not unite these conditions (imperviousness to doubt, etc.) do not deserve any confidence, because they are not beyond the reach of doubt, and what is not impregnable to doubt cannot constitute certainty.

Collapse into Skepticism

I then examined what knowledge I possessed, and discovered that in none of it, with the exception of sense-perceptions and necessary principles, did I enjoy that degree of certainty which I have just described. I then sadly reflected as follows: "We cannot hope to find truth except in matters which carry their evidence in themselves that is to say, in sense-perceptions and necessary principles. We must therefore establish these on a firm basis. Is my absolute confidence in sense-perceptions and on the infallibility of necessary principles analogous to the confidence which I formerly possessed in matters believed on the authority of others? Is it only analogous to the reliance most people place on their organs of vision, or is it rigorously true without admixture of illusion or doubt? "

          I then set myself earnestly to examine the notions we derive from the evidence of the senses and from sight to see if they could be called in question. The result of a careful examination was that my confidence in them was shaken. Our sight, for instance, perhaps the best practiced of all our senses, observes a shadow, and finding it apparently stationary pronounces it devoid of movement. Observation and experience, however, show subsequently that a shadow moves not suddenly, it is true, but gradually and imperceptibly, so that it is never really motionless.

          Again, the eye sees a star and believes it as large as a piece of gold, but mathematical calculations prove, on the contrary, that it is larger than the earth. These notions, and all others which the senses declare true, are subsequently contradicted and convicted of falsity in an irrefragable manner by the verdict of reason.

          Then I thought to myself: Since I cannot trust the evidence of my senses, I must rely only on intellectual notions based on fundamental principles, such as the following axioms: Ten is more than three. Affirmation and negation cannot coexist together. A thing cannot both be created and also existent from eternity, living and annihilated simultaneously, at once necessary and impossible. To this the notions I derived from my senses made the following objections: Who can guarantee you that you can trust to the evidence of reason more than to that of the senses? You believed in our testimony till it was contradicted by the verdict of reason, otherwise you would have continued to believe it to this day. Well, perhaps, there is above reason another judge who, if he appeared, would convict reason of falsehood, just as reason has refuted us. If such a third arbiter is not yet apparent, it does not follow that he does not exist.

          To this argument I remained some time without reply, and a reflection drawn from the phenomena of sleep deepened my doubt. Do you not see, I reflected, that while asleep you assume your dreams to be indisputably real? Once awake, you recognize them for what they are, namely, baseless illusions. Who can assure you, then, of the reliability of notions which, when awake, you derive from the senses and from reason? In relation to your present state they may be real. But it is possible also that you may enter upon another state of being which will bear the same relation to your present state as this does to your condition when asleep. In that new sphere you will recognize that the conclusions of reason are only illusions.

          This possible condition is, perhaps, that which the Sufis call "ecstasy" (hal), that is to say, according to them, a state in which, absorbed in themselves and in the suspension of sense-perceptions, they have visions beyond the reach of intellect. Perhaps also Death is that state, according to that saying of the prince of prophets: "People are asleep; when they die, they wake." Our present life in relation to the future is perhaps only a dream, and man, once dead, will see things in direct opposition to those now before his eyes; he will then understand that word of the Koran, "Today we have removed the veil from your eyes and your sight is keen."

          Such thoughts as these threatened to shake my reason, and I sought to find an escape from them. But how? To disentangle the knot of this difficulty, a proof was necessary. Now a proof must be based on primary assumptions, and it was precisely these of which I was in doubt. This unhappy state lasted about two months, during which I was, not, it is true, explicitly or by profession, but morally and essentially, a thorough-going skeptic.

Deliverance through Divine Light

God at last saw fit to heal me of this [skeptical] mental malady. My mind recovered sanity and equilibrium, the primary assumptions of reason recovered with me all their stringency and force. I owed my deliverance, not to a chain of proofs and arguments, but to the light which God caused to penetrate into my heart, the light which illuminates the threshold of all knowledge. To suppose that certitude can be only based upon formal arguments is to limit the boundless mercy of God.

          Someone asked the Prophet the explanation of this passage in the Divine Book: "God opens to Islam the heart of him whom he chooses to direct." "That is spoken," replied the Prophet, "of the light which God sheds in the heart." "And how can man recognize that light?" he was asked. "By his detachment from this world of illusion and by a secret drawing toward the eternal world," the Prophet replied. On another occasion he said: "God has created his creatures in darkness, and then has shed upon them his light." It is by the help of this light that the search for truth must be carried on. As by his mercy this light descends from time to time among men, we must ceaselessly be on the watch for it. This is also corroborated by another saying of the Apostle: "God sends upon you, at certain times, breathings of his grace; be prepared for them."

          My object in this account is to make others understand with what earnestness we should search for truth, since it leads to results we never dreamed of. Primary assumptions do not need to be sought for, since they are always present to our minds. If we engage in such a search, we only find them persistently escape our grasp. But those who push their investigation beyond ordinary limits are safe from the suspicion of negligence in pursuing what is within their reach.

Three types of Seekers after Truth: Theologians, Philosophers, Sufis

When God in the abundance of his mercy had healed me of this [skeptical] malady, I concluded that those who are engaged in the search for truth may be divided into three groups: (1) Scholastic theologians, who profess to follow theory and speculation; (2) The philosophers, who profess to rely upon formal logic; (3) The Sufis, who call themselves the elect of God and possessors of intuition and knowledge of the truth by means of ecstasy.

          The truth, I said to myself, must be found among these three classes of men who devote themselves to the search for it. If it escapes them, one must give up all hope of attaining it. Having once surrendered blind belief, it is impossible to return to it, for the essence of such belief is to be unconscious of itself. As soon as this unconsciousness ceases it is shattered like a glass whose fragments cannot be again reunited except by being throw again into the furnace and refashioned. Determined to follow these paths and to search out these systems to the bottom, I proceeded with my investigations in the following order: Scholastic theology; philosophical systems; and, finally Sufism.

The Aim of Scholastic Theology and Its Problem of Assumed Premises

Beginning with theological science, I carefully studied and reflected upon it. I read the writings of the authorities in this area and I myself composed several treatises. I recognized that this science, while sufficient in its own requirements, could not assist me in arriving at the desired goal. In short, its object is to preserve the purity of orthodox beliefs from all heretical innovation. God, by means of his apostle, has revealed to his creatures a belief which is true as regards their temporal and eternal interests. The chief articles of it are laid down in the Koran and in the traditions. Subsequently, Satan suggested to innovators principles contrary to those of orthodoxy; they listened greedily to his suggestions, and the purity of the faith was threatened. God then raised up a school of theologians and inspired them with the desire to defend orthodoxy by means of a system of proofs adapted to unveil the devices of the heretics and to foil the attacks which they made on the doctrines established by tradition.

          Such is the origin of scholastic theology. Many of its experts, worthy of their high calling, valiantly defended the orthodox faith by proving the reality of prophecy and the falsity of heretical innovations. But, to do so, they had to rely upon a certain number of [assumed] premises, which they accepted in common with their adversaries, and which authority and universal consent or simply the Koran and the traditions obliged them to accept. Their principal effort was to expose the self-contradictions of their opponents and to refute them by means of the premises which they had professed to accept. Now a method of argumentation like this has little value for one who only admits self-evident truths. Scholastic theology could not consequently satisfy me nor heal the malady from which I suffered.

          It is true that in its later development theology was not content to defend dogma; it betook itself to the study of first principles, of substances, accidents and the laws which govern them; but through lack of a thoroughly scientific basis, it could not advance far in its researches, nor succeed in dispelling entirely the overhanging obscurity which springs from diversities of belief.

          I do not, however, deny that it has had a more satisfactory result for others. On the contrary, I admit that it has, but it is by introducing the principle of authority in matters which are not self-evident. Moreover, my object is to explain my own mental attitude and not to dispute with those who have found healing for themselves. Remedies vary according to the nature of the disease; those which benefit some may injure others.

The Challenge of Studying of Philosophy

I proceeded from the study of scholastic theology to that of philosophy. It was plain to me that, to discover where the professors of any branch of knowledge have erred, one must make a profound study of that science. One must equal, indeed surpass, those who know most of it, so as to penetrate into secrets of it unknown to them. Only by this method can they be completely answered, and of this method I can find no trace in the theologians of Islam. In theological writings devoted to the refutation of philosophy I have only found a tangled mass of phrases full of contradictions and mistakes, and incapable of deceiving, I will not say a critical mind, but even the common crowd. Convinced that to dream of refuting a doctrine before having thoroughly comprehended it was like shooting at an object in the dark, I devoted myself zealously to the study of philosophy; but in books only and without the aid of a teacher. I gave up to this work all the leisure remaining from teaching and from composing works on law. There were then attending my lectures three hundred of the students of Bagdad. With the help of God, these studies, carried on in secret, so to speak, put me in a condition to thoroughly comprehend philosophical systems within a space of two years. I then spent about a year reflecting on these systems after having thoroughly understood them. I turned them over and over in my mind till they were thoroughly clear of all obscurity. In this manner I acquired a complete knowledge of all their subterfuges and subtleties, of what was truth and what was illusion in them.

          I now proceed to give a summary of these doctrines. I determined that they were divided into different varieties, and that their adherents might be ranged under diverse headings. All, despite their diversity, are marked with the stamp of infidelity and irreligion, although there is a considerable difference between the ancient and modern, between the first and last of these philosophers, according as they have missed or approximated to the truth in a greater or less degree.

The Philosophical Sects and the Stigma of Infidelity Associated with Them All

The philosophical systems, in spite of their number and variety, may be reduced to three: (1) the materialists; (2) the naturalists; (3) the theistic philosophers.

          (1) The Materialists. They reject an intelligent and omnipotent Creator and disposer of the universe. In their view the world exists from all eternity and had no author. The animal comes from semen and semen from the animal; so it had always been and will always be; those who maintain this doctrine are atheists.

          (2) The Naturalists. These devote themselves to the study of nature and of the marvelous phenomena of the animal and vegetable world. Having carefully analyzed animal organs with the help of anatomy, struck with the wonders of God's work and with the wisdom therein revealed, they are forced to admit the existence of a wise Creator who knows the end and purpose of everything. Certainly no one can study anatomy and the wonderful mechanism of living things without being obliged to confess the profound wisdom of him who has framed the bodies of animals and especially of man. But carried away by their natural researches they believed that the existence of a being absolutely depended upon the proper equilibrium of its organism. According to them, as the body perishes and is destroyed, so is the thinking faculty which is bound up with it; and as they assert that the restoration of a thing once destroyed to existence is unthinkable, they deny the immortality of the soul. Consequently they deny heaven, hell, resurrection, and judgment. Acknowledging neither a recompense for good deeds nor a punishment for evil ones, they fling off all authority and plunge into sensual pleasures with the avidity of brutes. These also ought to be called atheists, for the true faith depends not only on the acknowledgment of God, but of his Apostle and of the day of judgment. Although they acknowledge God and his attributes, they deny a judgment to come.

          (3) Next come the theistic philosophers. Among them should be considered Socrates, who was the teacher of Plato as Plato was of Aristotle. This latter drew up for his disciples the rules of logic, organized the sciences, elucidated what was formerly obscure, and expounded what had not been understood. This school refuted the systems of the two others (that is, the Materialists and Naturalists); but in exposing their mistaken and perverse beliefs, they made use of arguments which they should not. "God suffices to protect the faithful in war" (Koran, 33.25).

          Aristotle also contended with success against the theories of Plato, Socrates, and the theists who had preceded him, and separated himself entirely from them; but he could not eliminate from his doctrine the stains of infidelity and heresy which disfigure the teaching of his predecessors. We should therefore consider them all as unbelievers, as well as the so-called Muslim philosophers, such as Avicenna and Al-Farabi, who have adopted their systems.

          Let us, however, acknowledge that among Muslim philosophers none has better interpreted the doctrine of Aristotle than the latter. What others have handed down as his teaching is full of error, confusion, and obscurity adapted to disconcert the reader. The unintelligible can neither be accepted nor rejected. All serious knowledge Aristotle's philosophy owes to the translation of it by these two learned men.  Such philosophy may be divided into three portions: the first contains matter justly chargeable with impiety, the second is tainted with heresy, and the third we are obliged to reject absolutely. We proceed to details.

Divisions of the Philosophical Sciences

These sciences, in relation to the aim we have set before us, may be divided into six sections: (1) Mathematics; (2) Logic; (3) Physics; (4) Metaphysics; (5) Politics; (6) Moral Philosophy.

(1) Mathematics: The Danger of following the Unbelief of Mathematicians

Mathematics comprises the knowledge of calculation, geometry, and cosmography: it has no connection with the religious sciences, and proves nothing for or against religion. It rests on a foundation of proofs which, once known and understood, cannot be refuted. Mathematics tend, however, to produce two bad results.

          The first is this: Whoever studies this science admires the subtlety and clearness of its proofs. His confidence in philosophy increases, and he thinks that all its departments are capable of the same clearness and solidity of proof as mathematics. But then he hears people speak of the unbelief and impiety of mathematicians, of their professed disregard for the Divine Law, which is notorious, it is true that, out of regard for authority. He then echoes these accusations, but he says to himself at the same time that, if there was truth in religion, it would not have escaped those who have displayed so much keenness of intellect in the study of mathematics.

          Next, when he becomes aware of the unbelief and rejection of religion on the part of these learned men, he concludes that to reject religion is reasonable. How many of such men gone astray I have met whose sole argument was that just mentioned. Supposing one puts to them the following objection: It does not follow that a man who excels in one branch of knowledge excels in all others, nor that he should be equally versed in jurisprudence, theology, and medicine. It is possible to be entirely ignorant of metaphysics, and yet to be an excellent grammarian. There are past masters in every science who are entirely ignorant of other branches of knowledge. The arguments of the ancient philosophers are rigidly demonstrative in mathematics and only conjectural in religious questions. In order to ascertain this one must proceed to a thorough examination of the matter. Supposing, I say, one makes the above objection to these "apes of unbelief," they find it distasteful. Falling a prey to their passions, to a besotted vanity, and the wish to pass for learned men, they persist in maintaining the preeminence of mathematicians in all branches of knowledge. This is a serious evil, and for this reason those who study mathematics should be checked from going too far in their researches. For though far removed as it may be from the things of religion, this study, serving as it does as an introduction to the philosophic systems, casts over religion its malign influence. It is rarely that a man devotes himself to it without robbing himself of his faith and casting off the restraints of religion.

          The second evil comes from the sincere but ignorant Muslim who thinks the best way to defend religion is by rejecting all the exact sciences. Accusing their professors of being astray, he rejects their theories of the eclipses of the sun and moon, and condemns them in the name of religion. These accusations are carried far and wide, they reach the ears of the philosopher who knows that these theories rest on infallible proofs; far from losing confidence in them, he believes, on the contrary, that Islam has ignorance and the denial of scientific proofs for its basis, and his devotion to philosophy increases with his hatred to religion.

          It is therefore a great injury to religion to suppose that the defense of Islam involves the condemnation of the exact sciences. The religious law contains nothing which approves them or condemns them, and in their turn they make no attack on religion. The words of the Prophet, "The sun and the moon are two signs of the power of God; they are not eclipsed for the birth or the death of anyone; when you see these signs take refuge in prayer and invoke the name of God." These words, I say, do not in any way condemn the astronomical calculations which define the orbits of these two bodies, their conjunction and opposition according to particular laws. But as for the so-called tradition, "When God reveals himself in anything, he abases himself thereto," it is unauthentic, and not found in any trustworthy collection of the traditions.

          Such is the bearing and the possible danger of mathematics.

(2) Logic: The Danger of following the Unbelief of Logicians

This science, in the same manner, contains nothing for or against religion. Its object is the study of different kinds of proofs and syllogisms, the conditions which should hold between the premises of a proposition, the way to combine them, the rules of a good definition, and the art of formulating it. For knowledge consists of conceptions which spring from a definition or of convictions which arise from proofs. There is therefore nothing censurable in this science, and it is laid under contribution by theologians as well as by philosophers. The only difference is that the latter use a particular set of technical formulae and that they push their divisions and subdivisions further.

          It may be asked, What, then, this has to do with the grave questions of religion, and on what ground opposition should be offered to the methods of logic? The objector, it will be said, can only inspire the logician with an unfavorable opinion of the intelligence and faith of his adversary, since the latter's faith seems to be based upon such objections. But, it must be admitted, logic is liable to abuse. Logicians demand in reasoning certain conditions which lead to absolute certainty, but when they touch on religious questions they can no longer postulate these conditions, and ought therefore to relax their habitual rigor. It happens, accordingly, that a student who is captivated by the evidential methods of logic, hearing his teachers accused of irreligion, believes that this irreligion rests on proofs as strong as those of logic, and immediately, without attempting the study of metaphysics, shares their mistake. This is a serious disadvantage arising from the study of logic.

(3) Physics: The Natural World as an Instrument of God

The object of this science is the study of the bodies which compose the universe: the sky and the stars, and, here below, simple elements such as air, earth, water, fire, and compound bodies animals, plants, and minerals; the reasons of their changes, developments, and intermixture. By the nature of its researches it is closely connected with the study of medicine, the object of which is the human body, its principal and secondary organs, and the law which governs their changes. Religion having no fault to find with medical science, cannot justly do so with physical, except on some special matters which we have mentioned in the work entitled, "The Incoherence of the Philosophers." Besides these primary questions, there are some subordinate ones depending on them, on which physical science is open to objection. But all physical science rests, as we believe, on the following principle: Nature is entirely subject to God; incapable of acting by itself, it is an instrument in the hand of the Creator; sun, moon, stars, and elements are subject to God and can produce nothing of themselves. In a word, nothing in nature can act spontaneously and apart from God.

(4) Metaphysics: Three Heretical Doctrines by Al-Farabi and Avicenna

This is the fruitful breeding-ground of the errors of philosophers. Here they can no longer satisfy the laws of rigorous argumentation that logic demands, and this is what explains the disputes which arise between them in the study of metaphysics. The system most closely akin to the system of the Muslim doctors is that of Aristotle as expounded to us by Al-Farabi and Avicenna. The sum total of their errors can be reduced to twenty propositions: three of them are irreligious, and the other seventeen heretical. It was in order to combat their system that we wrote the work, "The Incoherence of the Philosophers." The three propositions in which they are opposed to all the doctrines of Islam are the following:

          (a) Bodies do not rise again; spirits alone will be rewarded or punished; future punishments will be therefore spiritual and not physical. They are right in admitting spiritual punishments, for there will be such; but they are wrong in rejecting physical punishments, and contradicting in this manner the assertions of the Divine Law.

          (b) God knows universals, but not particulars. This is clearly irreligious. The Koran asserts truly, "Not an atom's weight in heaven or earth can escape his knowledge" (10.62).

          (c) They maintain that the universe exists from all eternity and will never end. None of these propositions has ever been admitted by Muslims. Besides this, they deny that God has attributes, and maintain that he knows by his essence only and not by means of any attribute accessory to his essence. In this point they approach the doctrine of the Mutazilites, doctrines which we are not obliged to condemn as irreligious. On the contrary, in our work entitled, "Criteria of the Differences Which Divide Islam from Atheism," we have proved the wrongness of those who accuse of irreligion everything which is opposed to their way of looking at things.

(5) Political Science.

The professors of this confine themselves to drawing up the rules which regulate temporal matters and the royal power. They have borrowed their theories on this point from the books which God has revealed to his prophets and from the sentences of ancient sages, gathered by tradition.

(6) Moral Philosophy: The Dangers of Rejecting the Good theories and Accepting Bad Theories.

The professors of this occupy themselves with defining the attributes and qualities of the soul, grouping them according to genus and species, and pointing out the way to moderate and control them. They have borrowed this system from the Sufis. These devout men, who are always engaged in invoking the name of God, in combating desires and following the way of God by renouncing the pleasures of this world, have received, while in a state of ecstasy, revelations regarding the qualities of the soul, its defects and its evil inclinations. These revelations they have published, and the philosophers making use of them have introduced them into their own systems to embellish and give currency to their falsehoods. In the times of the philosophers, as at every other period, there existed some of these fervent mystics. Got does not deprive this world of them, for they are its sustainers, and they draw down to it the blessings of heaven according to the tradition: "It is by them that you obtain rain; it is by them that you receive your subsistence." Such were "the Companions of the Cave," who lived in ancient times, as related by the Koran (18). Now this mixture of moral and philosophic doctrine with the words of the Prophet and those of the Sufis gives rise to two dangers, one for the upholder of those doctrines, the other for their opponent.

          [First,] the danger for their opponent is serious. A narrow-minded man, finding in their writings moral philosophy mixed with unsupported theories, believes that he ought to entirely reject them and to condemn those who profess them. Having only heard them from their mouth, he does not hesitate in his ignorance to declare them false because those who teach them are in error. . . . Such is, however, the whimsical way of looking at things found in nearly all men. Every word proceeding from an authority which they approve is accepted by them, even if it is false; every word proceeding from one whom they suspect is rejected, even if it is true. In every case they judge of the truth according to its professors and not of men according to the truth which they profess, a ne plus ultra of error. Such is the peril in which philosophy involves its opponents.

          The second danger threatens those who accept the opinions of the philosophers. When, for instance, we read the "Treatise of the Brothers of Purity," and other works of the same kind, we find in them sentences spoken by the Prophet and quotations from the Sufis. We approve these works; we give them our confidence; and we finish by accepting the errors which they contain, because of the good opinion of them with which they have inspired us at the outset. Thus, by insensible degrees, we are led astray. In view of this danger the reading of philosophic writings so full of vain and delusive Utopias should be forbidden, just as the slippery banks of a river are forbidden to one who knows not how to swim. . . .

          This much, then, we have to say regarding the inconveniences and dangers which spring from the study of philosophy.

Sufism: Renounce the Passions and Meditation on God

When I had finished my examination of these doctrines I applied myself to the study of Sufism. I saw that, to understand it thoroughly, one must combine theory with practice. The aim which the Sufis set before them is as follows: To free the soul from the tyrannical yoke of the passions, to deliver it from its wrong inclinations and evil instincts, in order that in the purified heart there should only remain room for God and for the invocation of his holy name.

          As it was easier to learn their doctrine than to practice it, I studied first of all those of their books which contain it: "The Nourishment of Hearts," by Abu Talib of Mecca, the works of Hareth el Muhasibi, and the fragments which still remain of Junaid, Shibli, Abu Yezid Bustami, and other leaders (whose souls may God sanctify). I acquired a thorough knowledge of their researches, and I learned all that was possible to learn of their methods by study and oral teaching. It became clear to me that the last stage could not be reached by mere instruction, but only by transport, ecstasy, and the transformation of the moral being.

          To define health and satiety, to penetrate their causes and conditions, is quite another thing from being well and satisfied. To define drunkenness, to know that it is caused by vapors which rise from the stomach and cloud the seat of intelligence, is quite a different thing to being drunk. The drunken man has no idea of the nature of drunkenness, just because he is drunk and not in a condition to understand anything, while the doctor, not being under the influence of drunkenness, knows its character and laws. Or if the doctor fall ill, he has a theoretical knowledge of the health of which he is deprived.

          In the same way there is a considerable difference between knowing renouncement, comprehending its conditions and causes, and practicing renouncement and detachment from the things of this world. I saw that Sufism consists in experiences rather than in definitions, and that what I was lacking belonged to the domain, not of instruction, but of ecstasy and initiation.

          The researches to which I had devoted myself, the path which I had traveled in studying religious and speculative branches of knowledge, had given me a firm faith in three things: God, Inspiration, and the Last Judgment. These three fundamental articles of belief were confirmed in me, not merely by definite arguments, but by a chain of causes, circumstances, and proofs which it is impossible to recount. I saw that one can only hope for salvation by devotion and the conquest of one's passions, a procedure which presupposes renouncement and detachment from this world of falsehood to turn toward eternity and meditation on God. Finally, I saw that the only condition of success was to sacrifice honors and riches and to sever the ties and attachments of worldly life.

AVERROES: THE RELATION BETWEEN RELIGION AND PHILOSOPHY (Decisive Discourse)

Philosophical Reasoning Needed for Knowledge of Creation

We maintain that the business of philosophy is nothing other than to look into creation and to ponder over it in order to be guided to the Creator. In other words, it is to look into the meaning of existence. For the knowledge of creation leads to the cognizance of the Creator, through the knowledge of the created. The more perfect becomes the knowledge of creation, the more perfect becomes the knowledge of the Creator. Scripture encourages and exhorts us to observe creation. Thus, it is clear that this is to be taken either as a religious injunction or as something approved by scripture. But scripture urges us to observe creation by means of reason and demands the knowledge thereof through reason. . . .

          Now, it being established that the Law makes the observation and consideration of creation by reason obligatory (and consideration is nothing but to make explicit the implicit) this can only be done through reason. Thus we must look into creation with reason. Moreover, it is obvious that the observation which scripture approves and encourage must be of the most perfect type, performed with the most perfect kind of reasoning.

          As the Law emphasizes the knowledge of God and His creation by inference, it is necessary for any who wish to know God and His whole creation by inference, to learn the kinds of inference, their conditions and that which distinguishes philosophy from dialectic and exhortation from syllogism. This is impossible unless one possesses knowledge beforehand of the various kinds of reasoning and learns to distinguish between reasoning and what is not reasoning. This cannot be done except one knows its different parts, that is, the different kinds of premises.

          Hence, for a believer in the Law and a follower of it, it is necessary to know these things before he begins to look into creation, for they are like instruments for observation. For, just as a student discovers by the study of scripture, the necessity of knowledge of legal reasoning with all its kinds and distinctions, a student will find out by observing the creation the necessity of metaphysical reasoning. Indeed, he has a greater claim on it than the jurist. For if a jurist argues the necessity of legal reasoning from the saying of God: "Thus, take example from them, those of you who have eyes" (Koran, 49.2), a student of divinity has a better right to establish the same from it on behalf of metaphysical reasoning.

Philosophical Reasoning about Scripture Similar to Legal Reasoning about Scripture

One cannot maintain that this kind of reasoning is an innovation in religion because it did not exist in the early days of Islam. For legal reasoning and its kinds are things which were invented also in later ages, and no one thinks they are innovations. Such should also be our attitude towards philosophical reasoning. There is another reason why it should be so, but this is not the proper place to mention it. Many of the followers of this religion confirm philosophical reasoning, all except a small worthless minority, who argue from religious ordinances.

          Now, as it is established that scripture makes the consideration of philosophical reasoning and its kinds as necessary as legal reasoning, if none of our predecessors has made an effort to inquire into it, we should begin to do it, and so help them, until the knowledge is complete. For if it is difficult or rather impossible for one person to acquaint himself single-handed with all things which it is necessary to know in legal matters, it is still more difficult in the case of philosophical reasoning.

          But, if before us, somebody has inquired into it, we should derive help from what he has said. It is quite immaterial whether that man is our co-religionist or not; for the instrument by which purification is perfected is not made uncertain in its usefulness, by its being in the hands of one of our own party, or of a foreigner, if it possesses the attributes of truth. By these latter we mean those Ancients who investigated these things before the advent of Islam. Now, such is the case. All that is wanted in an inquiry into philosophical reasoning has already been perfectly examined by the ancients. All that is required of us is that we should go back to their books and see what they have said in this connection. If all that they say is true, we should accept it and if there is something wrong, we should be warned by it.

Need to Draw from Ancient Philosophers

Thus, when we have finished this kind of research we will have acquired instruments by which we can observe the universe, and consider its general character. For so long as one does not know its general character, one cannot know the created, and so long as he does not know the created, he can have no knowledge of the Creator. Thus, we must begin an inquiry into the universe systematically, such as we have learned from the trend of rational inference.

          It is also evident that this aim is to be attained by the investigation of one part of the universe after another, and that help must be derived from predecessors, as is the case in other sciences. Imagine that the science of geometry and astronomy had become extinct in our day, and a single individual desired to find out by himself the magnitude of the heavenly bodies, their forms, and their distances from one another. Even though he were the most wise of men, it would be as impossible for him as to ascertain the proportion of the sun and the earth and the magnitude of the other stars. It would only be attainable by aid of divine revelation, or something like it. If it be said to him that the sun is a hundred and fifty or sixty times as big as the earth, he would take it to be sheer madness on the part of the speaker, though it is an established fact in the science of astronomy, so that no one learned in that science will have any doubt about it. . . .

Three Methods for Belief: Philosophy, Dogmatic Discourse, Exhortation

So far, then, the position is established. Now, we Muslims firmly believe that our Law is divine and true. This very Law urges us and brings us to that blessing which is known as the knowledge of God, and His creation. This is a fact to which every Muslim will bear testimony by his very nature and temperament. We say this because temperaments differ in believing. One will believe through philosophy [i.e., metaphysics and logic]; while another will believe through dogmatic discourse [i.e., inference and legal reasoning], just as firmly as the former, as no other method appeals to his nature. There are others who believe by exhortation alone [i.e., preaching], just as others believe through inferences.

          For this reason our divine Law invites people by all the three methods, which every man has to satisfy, except those who stubbornly refuse to believe, or those, according to whom these divine methods have not been established on account of the waywardness of their hearts. This is why the mission of the Prophet has been declared common to the whole world, for his Law comprises all the three methods leading men towards God. What we say is quite clear from the following saying of God: "Invite men to the way of the Lord, by wisdom and mild exhortation, and dispute with them in the most condescending manner" (Koran, 16.126)

Reinterpreting Scripture as Metaphors to Fit Reason

As this scripture is true and leads to the consideration of the knowledge of God, we Muslims should believe that rational investigation is not contrary to scripture, for truth cannot contradict truth, but verifies it and bears testimony to it.

          If that is so, and rational observation is directed to the knowledge of any existent objects, then scripture may be silent about it, or it may mention it. If it is silent, then no dispute arises. It would be equivalent to the absence of its mention in scripture as obligatory, and hence the jurist derives it from legal conjecture. But if scripture mentions it, either it will agree with that which has been proved by inference, or else it will disagree with it. If it is in agreement it needs no comment, but if it is opposed to scripture, an interpretation is to be sought. Interpretation means to carry the meaning of a word from its original sense to a metaphorical one. But this should be done in such a manner as will not conflict with the custom of the Arabic language. It is to avoid the naming of an object, by simply mentioning its like, its cause, its attribute, or associate, etc. which are commonly quoted in the definition of the different kinds of metaphorical utterances. If the jurist does so in many of the legal injunctions, how very appropriate would it be for a learned man to do the same with his arguments. For the jurist has only his imaginary conjectures to depend upon, while a learned man possesses positive ones.

          We hold it to be an established truth that if scripture is apparently opposed to a truth proved by philosophy, then it admits of an interpretation according to the canons of the Arabic language. This is a proposition which a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer cannot mistrust. One who is accustomed to these divine things can experience for himself what we have said. The aim of this discourse is to bring together intellectual and traditional science. Indeed, we would even say that no logical conclusion will be found to be opposed to scripture, which when sifted and investigated in its different parts will be found in accordance, or almost so, with it.

          That is why all Muslims are agreed that all the words of scripture are not to be taken literally, nor all of them given an interpretation. But they vary in verses, which are or are not to be interpreted. For example, the Asharites put an interpretation upon the verse self-direction and on the "Tradition of Descent", while the Hanbalites take them literally. The Law has made two sides of these--apparent (exoteric) and hidden (esoteric)--because of the differences of human nature and minds in verifying a thing. The purpose of an opposed hidden (esoteric) meaning is to call the attention of the learned to find out a comprehensive interpretation. . . .

          Here it may be objected that in scripture there are things which all Muslims have agreed to take as hidden (esoterically), while there are others on which they have agreed to put an allegorical interpretation, while there are some about which they disagree. Is it justifiable to use logic in the interpretation of those which have been taken literally, or otherwise? We would say that if the agreement is positive there is no need to apply logic; but if it be conjectural there is. . . .

Two types of Scriptural Passages: Apparent (exoteric) and Hidden (esoteric)

But there are things which, because of their obscurity, cannot be understood by inference. So, God has favored such of his creatures as cannot understand logic, either because of their nature, habit, or lack of mental training, by quoting examples and parables of such things and has urged them to testify as to their truth through them. For everyone has mental capacity enough to understand them by the help of dogmatic and exhortatory argument which are common to all men. This is why scripture has been divided into two kinds: apparent (exoteric) and hidden (esoteric, inner). The apparent (exoteric) part consists of those examples which have been coined to express certain meanings; while the hidden (esoteric) is the meanings themselves, which are not manifested except to the learned in philosophy.

Fundamental Principles in Scripture should be Understood Literally, not Interpreted Allegorically

If it so happens as we have said that we can know of a thing by any of the above mentioned three methods, then we do not stand in need of any examples for understanding them. Such things should be taken literally and interpretation should find no place with regard to them. If these things form a part of the fundamentals principles of scripture, one who puts an interpretation upon them is an unbeliever. For instance, if a man believes [concerning the Day of Judgment] that there is no happiness or misery in the afterlife, and that the teaching is only an artifice to safeguard the life and property of the people from one another and that there is no goal for men other than this life, then he is certainly an unbeliever.

          When this has once been established it will become clear to you that allegorical interpretation is unlawful with some apparent (exoteric) texts of scripture. If such allegorical interpretation is used in the fundamental principles of the scripture, it is infidelity, and if used in general things it is heresy. But there are also a certain apparent (exoteric) texts which require allegorical interpretation by learned men. It is unbelief for them to take these in their mere apparent (exoteric) meaning, but at the same time it is religious heresy if ignorant people try to interpret or explain them.

Example: Whether God Exists in Space

Among these is the verse of divine self-direction and the "Tradition of Descent". For the Prophet said of an African slave girl who told him that God was in the sky [i.e., located in three-dimensional space]: "Emancipate her, for she is a believer." For there are persons who cannot believe a thing except through their imagination, that is, it is difficult for them to believe a thing which they cannot imagine. Among these may be classed people who cannot understand a thing except with a reference to space, and hence believe in God as though physical, notwithstanding that these are the very persons who have dealt very harshly with those mentioned above. They ought to be told that things of this character are ambiguous, and that we should pause and consider the saying of God: "Yet none knows the interpretation of this except God". Although learned men agree that these are to be interpreted, they differ in the interpretation according to their knowledge of principles of philosophy.

          There is a third part of scripture which occupies an intermediate position, because of some doubt about it. Some say that it should be taken as apparent (exoteric), and that no allegorical interpretation should be allowed in it. Others, though, say that they have some hidden (esoteric) meaning, and should not be taken as apparent (exoteric). This is because of the obscurity of their meaning. A learned man may be excused if he makes a mistake about them.

          If scripture is divided into these three parts [that is, apparent (exoteric), hidden (esoteric), and in between], it may be asked: to which of these does the description of the state of the Day of Judgment belong? We would reply that it is quite clear, on the very face of the question, that it belongs to that part in which there is some difference of opinion [i.e., in between apparent (exoteric) and hidden (esoteric)]. For one group of men, who class themselves among philosophers, say that these things should be taken literally. For, according to them, there is not a single argument which makes their literal sense absurd and unreasonable. This is the method of the Asharites. But another group of philosophers interpret them; but they differ very widely in the interpretation itself. Amongst these may be mentioned Al Ghazali and many Sufis. There are some who would amalgamate the two interpretations, as Al Ghazali has done in some of his books.

          These questions are among those in which, if the learned men err they are to be excused; otherwise, they are to be thanked and rewarded. For, if one acknowledges the reality of the Day of Judgment, and then begins to apply the principles of interpretation to the description, and not its reality, he does not in any way deny it. A denial of its reality is infidelity, for it is one of the fundamentals of scripture, and it can be easily verified by any of the three methods of argument common to all men. But one who is not learned should take it apparent (exoterically), an interpretation in his case is unbelief, for it leads to infidelity.

The Uneducated should not attempt Interpreting Scripture

We are thus of the opinion that such people should accept the literal sense [of apparent (exoteric) allegorical passages], for interpretation will certainly lead them to infidelity. A learned man who discloses the discussions of these things to the common people helps them towards unbelief and one who assists another in that direction is himself no better than an unbeliever. It is therefore unsuitable that these interpretations should be published in any other than learned books, for in this way they will reach none but the learned. But it is a mistake both in religion and philosophy if they are put in other books, with dogmatic and exhortative arguments, as Abu Hamid has done. Although the author's intention was good, the idea thus to increase the number of learned men, he caused a good deal of mischief through it. For, on account of this method some people began to find fault with philosophy, and others to blame religion, and still others began to think of reconciling the two. It seems that this was the very aim which Abu Hamid had in view in writing these books. He has tried to awaken the nature of men, for he never attached himself to any particular way of thinking in his books. He was an Asharite with the Asharites, a Sufi with the Sufis and a philosopher with the philosophers, so much so that he was, as has been said: "I am a Yeminite when I meet a Yeminite; if I meet a Ma'adi I am one of Banu Adnan."

          Hence, it is necessary for a doctor of Islam to prevent people, except the learned, from reading his books. It is just as necessary to prevent them from reading controversial writings which should not be studied except by those fit to do so. As a rule, the reading of these controversial books is less harmful than those of the former. For most people cannot understand philosophical books; only those endowed with superior natures can. People are on the whole destitute of learning and are aimless in their reading which they do without a teacher. Nevertheless they succeed in leading others away from religion. It is an injustice to the best kind of men and the best kind of creation; for in their case justice consists in the knowledge of the best things by the best people, fit to know it. It should be remembered that the greater the thing is the higher will be the injustice done to it because of ignorance. Hence God says: "Polytheism is a great injustice."

          In short, all that should be interpreted can be grasped by philosophy alone. So the duty of the learned person is to interpret, and of the common people to take it literally, both in conception and in verification. The reason for the latter is that they cannot understand more. A student of law sometimes finds interpretations which have a preference over others, in a general way by verification: that is, the argument is more convincing with the interpretations than with the literal meanings. These interpretations are common and it is possible for them to be admitted by any whose speculative faculties have been developed in controversy. Some of the interpretations of the Asharites and the Mutazilites are of this type, though the arguments of the Mutazilites are generally the weightier. But it is the duty of the common people who are not capable of understanding more than exhortation to take them as apparent (exoteric). Indeed, it is not proper for them to know the interpretations at all.

Three Types of Readers: Common People, Dogmatists, Philosophers

Thus, there are three groups into which people have been divided: Those who are excluded from the group who should know the interpretations. These are common people who are guided by exhortation alone. They form a vast majority: for every rational being who can accept a result by this method. The second are dogmatic interpreters. These are so, either by their nature only, or both by nature and habit. The third are those who can be definitely called interpreters. These are the philosophers, both by nature and by philosophical training. This kind of interpretation should not be discussed with the dogmatists, and certainly the common people. If any of these interpretations are disclosed to those not fit to receive them (especially philosophical interpretations which are far higher than common knowledge) they may be led to infidelity.

          Hence, it is necessary that the common people should be told that those things which are apparent (exoteric), and yet cannot be understood easily (the interpretations of which it is impossible for them to understand) are allegorical, and that no one knows the interpretation of them except God. We should stop at the following words of God "No one knows the interpretation thereof except God". This is also the answer to the question about some of those obscure problems which the common people cannot understand: "They will ask you concerning the spirit: answer: The spirit was created at the command of my Lord, but you have no knowledge given to you, except a little." Again, one who interprets these to persons not fit to receive them is an infidel, because he leads others to infidelity, which is quite in opposition to the purpose of scripture. This is especially the case when corrupt interpretations are put on the principles of scripture, as some men of our own times do. We have known many people who think they are philosophers and hence claim to find out strange things through philosophy, which are in every way contrary to religion, and they do not admit of any other interpretation. They think they must disclose these things to the common people. But by the disclosure of wrong notions they lead them to eternal destruction.

Analogy of the Discredited Physician: Do Not Teach Scriptural Interpretation to Common People

The difference between their aim and that of the jurists can be made clear by the following example. Since it is not possible to make everyone an expert physician, a certain physician laid down some principles for the preservation of health and the prevention of diseases, and he allowed the use of some things but prohibited others. Now a man comes and tells the people that the principles laid down by that physician are not correct and declares them to be false, and they become discredited in the eyes of the people; or says that they are capable of interpretations which they cannot understand and cannot verify by practice. Do you think that people in these circumstances will ever act upon those things which are useful for their health and for the prevention of diseases or that the man himself will ever be capable of acting on them? No, he will be quite incapable of doing so and thus will lead them all to destruction.

          This is the case when those interpretations which they cannot understand are correct, to say nothing of those that are wrong. For they will not believe in health to be preserved, nor disease to be prevented, to say nothing of the things which preserve health or prevent disease. This is the condition of that man who discloses interpretations of scripture to the common people and those not fit to receive them. Hence he is an unbeliever.

          The simile which we have described above is a real parallel, and not merely imaginary (as some may think) as it is correct in every respect. For the relation of the medicine to the body is the same as that of scripture to the soul. A physician is one who seeks to preserve the health when he finds it good and tries to restore it when it is missed. In the same way a religious law-giver is one who takes care of the health of souls, which is called piety. The Quran also makes clear its purpose, through religious action, by many verses. . . . Thus, we see, a religious law-giver seeks to establish this kind of health by religious knowledge and practice. This is the health upon which depends happiness and in the case of its absence the misery of the next world.

          This should have made it clear to you not merely that one should not speak of the wrong interpretation, but also that it is not proper to put even true ones in the books of the common people. These correct interpretations are of the faith which man has and of which the whole creation was afraid to bear the burden. By this we refer to the following verse of the Quran: "We proposed the faith unto the heavens, and the earth, and the mountains, and they refused to undertake the same, and were afraid thereof, but man undertook it: verily he is unjust to himself and foolish." These interpretations and the idea that their discussion is necessary in scripture have given rise to many sects in Islam, so much so that they have denounced one another with infidelity and innovations. This is especially the effect of wrong interpretations. . . .

          It is upon this point that the difference of opinion arises. Some say that the first principle is of reason, while others allege that it is of faith. That is to say, they have thought that faith, even before knowing the methods common to all and to which scripture has made a call on all, is the only method of arriving at truth. Thus they have mistaken the real purpose of law-giver, and being themselves in the wrong they have led others astray.

MAIMONIDES: RELIGIOUS LANGUAGE AND CREATION (Guide for the Perplexed)

Purpose of the Work: Clarify Confusing Religious Expressions (Introduction)

My primary object in this work is to explain certain words occurring in the prophetic books. Of these some are homonyms, and of their several meanings the ignorant choose the wrong ones; other terms which are employed in a figurative sense are erroneously taken by such persons in their primary [literal] signification. There are also hybrid terms, denoting things which are of the same class from one point of view and of a different class from another. It is not here intended to explain all these expressions to the uneducated (or to mere tyros), for a previous knowledge of Logic and Natural Philosophy is indispensable. [Neither is it for] those who confine their attention to the study of our holy Law, I mean the study of the canonical law alone; for the true knowledge of the Torah is the special aim of this and similar works.

          The object of this treatise is to enlighten a religious man who has been trained to believe in the truth of our holy Law, who conscientiously fulfils his moral and religious duties, and at the same time has been successful in his philosophical studies. Human reason has attracted him to abide within its sphere; and he finds it difficult to accept as correct the teaching based on the literal interpretation of the Law, and especially that which he himself or others derived from those homonymous, metaphorical, or hybrid expressions. Hence he is lost in perplexity and anxiety. If he is guided solely by reason, and renounce his previous views which are based on those expressions, he would consider that he had rejected the fundamental principles of the Law; and even if he retains the opinions which were derived from those expressions, and if, instead of following his reason, he abandon its guidance altogether, it would still appear that his religious convictions had suffered loss and injury. For he would then be left with those errors which give rise to fear and anxiety, constant grief and great perplexity.

Seven Causes of Inconsistency when Interpreting Scripture (Introduction)

There are seven causes of inconsistencies and contradictions to be met with in a literary work. The first cause arises from the fact that the author collects the opinions of various men, each differing from the other, but neglects to mention the name of the author of any particular opinion. In such a work contradictions or inconsistencies must occur, since any two statements may belong to two different authors. Second cause: The author holds at first one opinion which he subsequently rejects; in his work, however, both his original and altered views are retained. Third cause: The passages in question are not all to be taken literally; some only are to be understood in their literal sense, while in others figurative language is employed, which includes another meaning besides the literal one: or, in the apparently inconsistent passages, figurative language is employed which, if taken literally, would seem to be contradictories or contraries.

          Fourth cause: The premises are not identical in both statements, but for certain reasons they are not fully stated in these passages; or two propositions with different subjects which are expressed by the same term without having the difference in meaning pointed out, occur in two passages. The contradiction is therefore only apparent, but there is no contradiction in reality. The fifth cause is traceable to the use of a certain method adopted in teaching and expounding profound problems. Namely, a difficult and obscure theorem must sometimes be mentioned and assumed as known, for the illustration of some elementary and intelligible subject which must be taught beforehand, the commencement being always made with the easier thing. The teacher must therefore facilitate, in any manner which he can devise, the explanation of those theorems, which have to be assumed as known, and he must content himself with giving a general though somewhat inaccurate notion on the subject. It is, for the present, explained according to the capacity of the students, that they may comprehend it as far as they are required to understand the subject. Later on, the same subject is thoroughly treated and fully developed in its right place.

          Sixth cause: The contradiction is not apparent, and only becomes evident through a series of premises. The larger the number of premises necessary to prove the contradiction between the two conclusions, the greater is the chance that it will escape detection, and that the author will not perceive his own inconsistency. Only when from each conclusion, by means of suitable premises, an inference is made, and from the enunciation thus inferred, by means of proper arguments, other conclusions are formed, and after that process has been repeated many times, then it becomes clear that the original conclusions are contradictories or contraries. Even able writers are liable to overlook such inconsistencies. If, however, the contradiction between the original statements can at once be discovered, and the author, while writing the second, does not think of the first, he displays a greater deficiency, and his words deserve no notice whatever. Seventh cause: It is sometimes necessary to introduce such metaphysical matter as may partly be disclosed, but must partly be concealed; while, therefore, on one occasion the object which the author has in view may demand that the metaphysical problem be treated as solved in one way, it may be convenient on another occasion to treat it as solved in the opposite way. The author must try, by concealing the fact as much as possible, to prevent the uneducated reader from perceiving the contradiction.

God has no Physical Body: Confusing Essential Form (zelem) with Physical Form (toar) (Guide, 1.1)

Some have held the opinion that by the Hebrew word zelem [i.e., essential form] means the shape and figure of a thing, and this explanation has led some to believe in the corporeality of God [i.e., that God has a physical body]. For they thought that the words "Let us make man in our zelem [essential form]" implied that God had the form of a human being, that is, that He had figure and shape, and that, consequently, He was corporeal. They adhered faithfully to this view, and thought that if they were to reject it they would by doing so reject the truth of the Bible. Further, if they did not conceive God as having a body possessed of face and limbs, similar to their own in appearance, they would have to deny even the existence of God. The sole difference which they admitted, was that He excelled in greatness and splendor, and that His substance was not flesh and blood. Thus far went their conception of the greatness and glory of God. The incorporeality of the Divine Being, and His unity, in the true sense of the word (for there is no real unity without incorporeality) will be fully proved in the course of the present treatise.

          In this chapter it is our sole intention to explain the meaning of the words zelem [form] and demut. I hold that the Hebrew equivalent of [physical] "form" in the ordinary use of the word, that is, the figure and shape of a thing, is toar. Thus we find "[Joseph was] beautiful in toar [physical form], and beautiful in appearance" (Gen. 39:6): "What toar [physical form] is he of?" (1 Sam. 28.14): "As the toar [physical form] of the children of a king" (Judges 8.18). It is also applied to form produced by human labour, as "He marketh its toar [physical form] with a line," "and he marks its toar [physical form] with the compass" (Isa. 44.13). This term is not at all applicable to God. The term zelem, on the other hand, signifies the specific form, that is, that which constitutes the essence of a thing, whereby the thing is what it is; the reality of a thing in so far as it is that particular being. . .

          The uniqueness of humanity consists in a property which no other creature on earth possesses, namely, intellectual perception, and in the exercise of it he does not employ his senses, nor move his hand or his foot. This perception has been compared (though only apparently, not in truth) to the Divine perception, which requires no corporeal organ. On this account (that is, on account of the Divine intellect with which humans have been endowed), humans have been said to be made in the form and likeness of the Almighty, but far from it be the notion that the Supreme Being is corporeal, having a material form.

Ordinary People should not be Taught Metaphysics (Guide, 1.34)

There are five reasons why instruction should not begin with Metaphysics, but should at first be restricted to pointing out what is fitted for notice and what may be made manifest to the multitude.

          First Reason. The subject itself is difficult, subtle and profound, "Far off and exceeding deep, who can find it out?" (Eccles. 7.24). The following words of Job may be applied to it: "Whence then cometh wisdom? and where is the place of understanding?" (Job 28.20). Instruction should not begin with abstruse and difficult subjects. In one of the similes contained in the Bible, wisdom is compared to water, and amongst other interpretations given by our Sages of this simile, occurs the following: He who can swim may bring up pearls from the depth of the sea, he who is unable to swim will be drowned, therefore only such persons as have had proper instruction should expose themselves to the risk.

          Second Reason. Human intelligence is at first insufficient; for he is not endowed with perfection at the beginning, but at first possesses perfection only potentially, not in fact. Thus it is said, "And man is born a wild ass" (Job 11.12). If a man possesses a certain faculty potentially, it does not follow that it must become in him a reality. He may possibly remain deficient either on account of some obstacle, or from want of training in practices which would turn the possibility into a reality. Thus it is distinctly stated in the Bible, "Not many are wise" (Job 32.9); also our Sages say, "I noticed how few were those who attained to a higher degree of perfection" (B.T. Succah 45a). There are many things which obstruct the path to perfection, and which keep man away from it. Where can he find sufficient preparation and leisure to learn all that is necessary to develop that perfection which he has potentially?

          Third Reason. The preparatory studies are of long duration, and man, in his natural desire to reach the goal, finds them frequently too wearisome, and does not wish to be troubled by them. Be convinced that, if man were able to reach the end without preparatory studies, such studies would not be preparatory but tiresome and utterly superfluous. Suppose you awaken any person, even the most simple, as if from sleep, and you say to him, Do you not desire to know what the heavens are, what is their number and their form; what beings are contained in them; what the angels are; how the creation of the whole world took place; what is its purpose, and what is the relation of its various parts to each other; what is the nature of the soul; how it enters the body; whether it has an independent existence, and if so, how it can exist independently of the body; by what means and to what purpose, and similar problems. He would undoubtedly say "Yes," and show a natural desire for the true knowledge of these things; but he will wish to satisfy that desire and to achieve that knowledge by listening to a few words from you. Ask him to interrupt his usual pursuits for a week, till he learn all this, he would not do it, and would be satisfied and contented with imaginary and misleading notions; he would refuse to believe that there is anything which requires preparatory studies and persevering research. . . .

          The Fourth Reason is taken from the physical constitution of man. It has been proved that moral conduct is a preparation for intellectual progress, and that only someone whose character is pure, calm and steadfast, can achieve intellectual perfection; that is, acquire correct conceptions. Many men are naturally so constituted that all perfection is impossible; e.g., he whose heart is very warm and is himself very powerful, is sure to be passionate, though he tries to counteract that disposition by training; he whose testicles are warm, humid, and vigorous, and the organs connected therewith are surcharged, will not easily refrain from sin, even if he makes great efforts to restrain himself. You also find persons of great levity and rashness, whose excited manners and wild gestures prove that their constitution is in disorder, and their temperament so bad that it cannot be cured. Such persons can never achieve perfection; it is utterly useless to occupy oneself with them on such a subject [as Metaphysics]. . . . Now, consider how, in the writings of the Rabbis, the admission of a person into discourses on metaphysics is made dependent on distinction in social qualities, and study of philosophy, as well as on the possession of clear-sightedness, intelligence, eloquence, and ability to communicate things by slight allusions. . . . How, then, could any person speak on these metaphysical themes in the presence of ordinary people, of children, and of women!

          Fifth Reason. Man is disturbed in his intellectual occupation by the necessity of looking after the material needs of the body, especially if the necessity of providing for wife and children is added to it. This is much more so if he seeks superfluities in addition to his ordinary needs, for by custom and bad habits these become a powerful motive. Even the perfect man to whom we have referred, if too busy with these necessary things, much more so if busy with unnecessary things, and filled with a great desire for them—must weaken or altogether lose his desire for study, to which he will apply himself with interruption, lassitude, and want of attention. He will not achieve that for which he is fitted by his abilities, or he will acquire imperfect knowledge, a confused mass of true and false ideas. For these reasons it was proper that the study of Metaphysics should have been exclusively cultivated by privileged persons, and not entrusted to the common people. It is not for the beginner, and he should abstain from it, as the little child has to abstain from taking solid food and from carrying heavy weights.

Ordinary People should be Taught that God does not have a Physical Body (Guide, 1.35)

Do not think that what we have laid down in the preceding chapters on the importance, obscurity, and difficulty of the subject, and its unsuitableness for communication to ordinary persons, includes the doctrine of God's incorporeality and His exemption from all affections. This is not the case. For, all people must be informed, and even children must be trained in the belief that God is One, and that none besides Him is to be worshipped. In the same way, all must be taught by simple authority that God is incorporeal. So too that there is no similarity in any way whatsoever between Him and His creatures; that His existence is not like the existence of His creatures, His life not like that of any living being, His wisdom not like the wisdom of the wisest of men; and that the difference between Him and His creatures is not merely quantitative, but absolute [as between two individuals of two different classes]. . . .

          That God is incorporeal, that He cannot be compared with His creatures, that He is not subject to external influence; these are things which must be explained to every one according to his capacity, and they must be taught by way of tradition to children and women, to the stupid and ignorant, as they are taught that God is One, that He is eternal, and that He alone is to be worshipped. Without incorporeality there is no unity, for a corporeal thing is in the first case not simple, but composed of matter and form which are two separate things by definition, and secondly, as it has extension it is also divisible. When persons have received this doctrine, and have been trained in this belief, and are in consequence at a loss to reconcile it with the writings of the Prophets, the meaning of the latter must be made clear and explained to them by pointing out the homonymity and the figurative application of certain terms discussed in this part of the work. Their belief in the unity of God and in the words of the Prophets will then be a true and perfect belief.

God has no Attributes (Guide, 1.52)

There are, as you know, four kinds of quality; I will give you instances of attributes of each kind, to show you that this class of attributes cannot possibly be applied to God. (1) A man is described by any of his intellectual or moral qualities, or by any of the dispositions pertaining to him as an animate being, when, e.g., we speak of a person who is a carpenter, or who shrinks from sin, or who is ill. It makes no difference whether we say, a carpenter, or a sage, or a physician; by all these we represent certain mental dispositions; nor does it make any difference whether we say "sin-fearing" or "merciful." Every trade, every profession, and every settled human habit are certain mental dispositions. All this is clear to those who have occupied themselves with the study of Logic. (2) A thing is described by some physical quality it possesses, or by the absence of the same, e.g., as being soft or hard. It makes no difference whether we say "soft or hard," or "strong or weak"; in both cases we speak of physical conditions. (3) A man is described by his passive qualities, or by his emotions; we speak, e.g., of a person who is passionate, irritable, timid, merciful, without implying that these conditions have become permanent. The description of a thing by its color, taste, heat, cold, dryness, and moisture, belongs also to this class of attributes. (4) A thing is described by any of its qualities resulting from quantity as such; we speak, e.g., of a thing which is long, short, curved, straight, etc.

          Consider all these and similar attributes, and you will find that they cannot be used in reference to God. [Regarding 4], he is not a magnitude that any quality resulting from quantity as such could be possessed by Him. [Regarding 3], he is not affected by external influences, and therefore does not possess any quality resulting from emotion. [Regarding 2], he is not subject to physical conditions, and therefore does not possess strength or similar qualities; [Regarding 1], he is not an animate being, that He should have a certain disposition of the soul, or acquire certain properties, as meekness, modesty, etc., or be in a state to which animate beings as such are subject, as, e.g., in that of health or of illness. Hence it follows that no attribute coming under the head of quality in its widest sense, can be predicated of God. Consequently, these three classes of attributes, describing the essence of a thing, or part of the essence, or a quality of it, are clearly inadmissible in reference to God, for they imply composition, which, as we will prove, is out of question as regards the Creator. We say, regarding this latter point, that He is absolutely One.

God has no Emotional Attributes (Guide, 1.54)

Whenever any one of His actions is perceived by us, we ascribe to God that emotion which is the source of the act when performed by ourselves, and call Him by a label which is formed from the verb expressing that emotion. We see, for example, how well He provides for the life of the embryo of living beings; how He gives certain faculties both to the embryo itself and those who have to rear it after its birth, so that it may be protected from death and destruction, guarded against all harm, and assisted in the performance of all that is required [for its development]. Similar acts, when performed by us, are due to a certain emotion and tenderness called mercy and pity. God is, therefore, said to be merciful; e.g., "Like as a father is merciful to his children, so the Lord is merciful to them that fear Him" (Psalms 103.13). . . .

          God creates and guides beings who have no claim upon Him to be created and guided by Him; He is therefore called gracious. His actions towards mankind also include great calamities, which overtake individuals and bring death to them, or affect whole families and even entire regions, spread death, destroy generation after generation, and spare nothing whatsoever. Hence there occur inundations, earthquakes, destructive storms, expeditions of one nation against the other for the sake of destroying it with the sword and blotting out its memory, and many other evils of the same kind. Whenever such evils are caused by us to any person, they originate in great anger, violent jealousy, or a desire for revenge. God is therefore called, because of these acts, "jealous," "revengeful," "wrathful," and "keeping anger" (Nahum 1.2); that is to say, He performs acts similar to those which, when performed by us, originate in certain psychological dispositions, in jealousy, desire for retaliation, revenge, or anger; they are in accordance with the guilt of those who are to be punished, and not the result of any emotion; for He is above all defect.

          The same is the case with all divine acts; though resembling those acts which originate from our passions and psychological dispositions, they are not due to anything added further to His essence. [By analogy] the governor of a country, if he is a prophet, should conform to these attributes. Acts [of punishment] must be performed by him moderately and in accordance with justice, not merely as an outlet of his passion. He must not let loose his anger, nor allow his passion to overcome him. For all passions are bad, and they must be guarded against as far as it lies in human power. At times and towards some persons he must be merciful and gracious, not only from motives of mercy and compassion, but according to their merits; at other times and towards other persons he must evince anger, revenge, and wrath in proportion to their guilt, but not from motives of passion. He must be able to condemn a person to death by fire without anger, passion, or loathing against him, and must exclusively be guided by what he perceives of the guilt of the person, and by a sense of the great benefit which a large number will derive from such a sentence. You have, no doubt, noticed in the Torah how the commandment to annihilate the seven nations, and "to save alive nothing that breathes" (Deut. 20.16) is followed immediately by the words, "That they teach you not to do after all their abominations, which they have done unto their gods; so should you sin against the Lord your God" (ib. 18); that is to say, you shall not think that this commandment implies an act of cruelty or of retaliation; it is an act demanded by the tendency of man to remove everything that might turn him away from the right path, and to clear away all obstacles in the road to perfection, that is, to the knowledge of God.

Three Theories Concerning the Eternality of the World: Moses, Plato, Aristotle (Guide, 2.13)

Among those who believe in the existence of God, there are found three different theories as regards the question whether the Universe is eternal or not.

Moses: The Whole Universe was Created from Nothing

First Theory. Those who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, hold that the whole Universe (that is, everything except God) has been brought by Him into existence out of non-existence. In the beginning God alone existed, and nothing else; neither angels, nor spheres, nor the things that are contained within the spheres existed. He then produced from nothing all existing things such as they are, by His will and desire. Even time itself is among the things created; for time depends on motion, i.e., on an accident in things which move, and the things upon whose motion time depends are themselves created beings, which have passed from non-existence into existence. We say that God existed before the creation of the Universe, although the verb existed appears to imply the notion of time. We also believe that He existed an infinite space of time before the Universe was created; but in these cases we do not mean time in its true sense. We only use the term to signify something analogous or similar to time. For time is undoubtedly an accident, and, according to our opinion, one of the created accidents, like blackness and whiteness; it is not a quality, but an accident connected with motion. This must be clear to all who understand what Aristotle has said on time and its real existence. . . .

Plato: The Heavens are Transient, but their Substance is Eternal

Second Theory [held by Plato]. The theory of all philosophers whose opinions and works are known to us is this [that the heavens are transient but their substance is eternal]. It is impossible to assume that God produced anything from nothing, or that He reduces anything to nothing. That is to say, it is impossible that an object consisting of matter and form should be produced when that matter is absolutely absent, or that it should be destroyed in such a manner that that matter be absolutely no longer in existence. To say of God that He can produce a thing from nothing or reduce a thing to nothing is, according to the opinion of these philosophers, the same as if we were to say that He could cause one substance to have at the same time two opposite properties, or produce another being like Himself, or change Himself into a body, or produce a square the diagonal of which be equal to its side, or similar impossibilities. The philosophers thus believe that it is no defect in the Supreme Being that He does not produce impossibilities, for the nature of that which is impossible is constant, and it does not depend on the action of an agent, and for this reason it cannot be changed. Similarly there is, according to them, no defect in the greatness of God, when He is unable to produce a thing from nothing, because they consider this as one of the impossibilities.

          They therefore assume that a certain substance has co-existed with God from eternity in such a manner that neither God existed without that substance nor the latter without God. But they do not hold that the existence of that substance equals in rank that of God; for God is the cause of that existence, and the substance is in the same relation to God as the clay is to the potter, or the iron to the smith; God can do with it what He pleases; at one time He forms of it heaven and earth, at another time He forms some other thing. Those who hold this view also assume that the heavens are transient, that they came into existence, though not from nothing, and may cease to exist, although they cannot be reduced to nothing. They are transient in the same manner as the individuals among living beings which are produced from some existing substance, and are again reduced to some substance that remains in existence. The process of genesis and destruction is, in the case of the heavens, the same as in that of earthly beings. . . .

Aristotle: The Heavens are Eternal

The Third Theory, namely that of Aristotle, his followers, and commentators [is that the heavens are eternal]. Aristotle maintains, like the adherents of the second theory, that a corporeal object cannot be produced without a corporeal substance. He goes, however, farther, and contends that the heavens are indestructible. For he holds that the Universe in its totality has never been different, nor will it ever change: the heavens, which form the permanent element in the Universe, and are not subject to genesis and destruction, have always been so; time and motion are eternal, permanent, and have neither beginning nor end; the sublunary world, which includes the transient elements, has always been the same, because the prime matter is itself eternal, and merely combines successively with different forms; when one form is removed, another is assumed. This whole arrangement, therefore, both above and here below, is never disturbed or interrupted, and nothing is produced contrary to the laws or the ordinary course of Nature. He further says (though not in the same terms) that he considers it impossible for God to change His will or conceive a new desire; that God produced this Universe in its totality by His will, but not from nothing. Aristotle finds it as impossible to assume that God changes His will or conceives a new desire, as to believe that He is non-existing, or that His essence is changeable. Hence it follows that this Universe has always been the same in the past, and will be the same eternally.

          This is a full account of the opinions of those who consider that the existence of God, the First Cause of the Universe, has been established by proof. But it would be quite useless to mention the opinions of those who do not recognize the existence of God, but believe that the existing state of things is the result of accidental combination and separation of the elements, and that the Universe has no Ruler or Governor. Such is the theory of Epicurus and his school, and similar philosophers, as stated by Alexander of Aphrodisias. It would be superfluous to repeat their views, since the existence of God has been demonstrated while their theory is built upon a basis proved to be untenable. It is likewise useless to prove the correctness of the followers of the second theory in asserting that the heavens are transient, because they at the same time believe in the eternity of the universe, and so long as this theory is adopted, it makes no difference to us whether it is believed that the heavens are transient, and that only their substance is eternal, or the heavens are held to be indestructible, in accordance with the view of Aristotle. All who follow the Law of Moses, our Teacher, and Abraham, our Father, and all who adopt similar theories, assume that nothing is eternal except God, and that the theory of Creatio ex nihilo includes nothing that is impossible, while some thinkers even regard it as an established truth.

Criticism of Aristotle's and Plato's Views (Guide, 2.25)

We do not reject the eternity of the universe merely because certain passages in scripture confirm the creation; for such passages are not more numerous than those in which God is [allegorically] represented as a corporeal being; nor is it impossible or difficult to find for them a suitable interpretation [of the eternity of the universe]. We might have explained them in the same manner as we did in respect to the incorporeality of God. We should perhaps have had an easier task in showing that the scriptural passages [about creation] referred to are in harmony with the theory of the eternity of the universe if we accepted the latter, than we had in explaining the anthropomorphisms in the Bible when we rejected the idea that God is corporeal. For two reasons, however, we have not done so, and have not accepted the eternity of the universe. First, the Incorporeality of God has been demonstrated by proof; those passages in the Bible, which in their literal sense contain statements that can be refuted by proof, must and can be interpreted otherwise. But the eternity of the universe has not been proved; a mere argument in favor of a certain theory is not sufficient reason for rejecting the literal meaning of a Biblical text, and explaining it figuratively, when the opposite theory can be supported by an equally good argument.

Against Aristotle's View

Secondly, our belief in the Incorporeality of God is not contrary to any of the fundamental principles of our religion; it is not contrary to the words of any prophet. Only ignorant people believe that it is contrary to the teaching of scripture; but we have shown that this is not the case; on the contrary, scripture teaches the Incorporeality of God. If we were to accept the eternity of the universe as taught by Aristotle, that everything in the Universe is the result of fixed laws, that Nature does not change, and that there is nothing supernatural, we should necessarily be in opposition to the foundation of our religion, we should disbelieve all miracles and signs, and certainly reject all hopes and fears derived from scripture, unless the miracles are also explained figuratively. The allegorists among the Muslims [such as Averroes] have done this, and have thereby arrived at absurd conclusions.

Against Plato's View

If, however, we accepted the eternity of the universe in accordance with the second of the theories which we have expounded above (ch. 23), and assumed, with Plato, that the heavens are likewise transient [i.e., created], we should not be in opposition to the fundamental principles of our religion. This theory would not imply the rejection of miracles, but, on the contrary, would admit them as possible. The scriptural text might have been explained accordingly, and many expressions might have been found in the Bible and in other writings that would confirm and support this theory. But there is no necessity for this approach, so long as the theory [of the world's eternity] has not been proved. Since there is no proof sufficient to convince us, this theory [of Plato's] need not be taken into consideration, nor the other one [by Aristotle]. We take the text of the Bible literally [regarding creation], and say that it teaches us a truth which we cannot prove, and the miracles are evidence for the correctness of our view.

God's Reasons for Creation and Miracles are Unknowable

Accepting the creation, we find that miracles are possible, that Revelation is possible, and that every difficulty in this question is removed. We might be asked, Why has God [miraculously] inspired a certain person and not another? Why has He revealed the Law to one particular nation, and at one particular time? Why has He commanded this, and forbidden that? Why has He shown through a prophet certain particular miracles? What is the object of these laws? Why has He not made the commandments and the prohibitions part of our nature, if it was His object that we should live in accordance with them? We answer to all these questions: He willed it so, or, His wisdom decided so. He created the world according to His will, at a certain time, in a certain form, and as we do not understand why His will or His wisdom decided upon that peculiar form, and upon that peculiar time. Similarly, we do not know why His will or wisdom determined any of the things mentioned in the preceding questions. But if we assume that the Universe has the present form as the result of fixed laws, there is occasion for the above questions; and these could only be answered in an objectionable way, implying denial and rejection of the Biblical texts, the correctness of which no intelligent person doubts. Owing to the absence of all proof, we reject the theory of the eternity of the universe; and it is for this very reason that the noblest minds spent and will spend their days in research. For if the creation had been demonstrated by proof, even if only according to the Platonic hypothesis, all arguments of the philosophers against us would be of no avail. If, on the other hand, Aristotle had a proof for his theory, the whole teaching of scripture would be rejected, and we should be forced to other opinions. I have thus shown that all depends on this question. Note it.

MAIMONIDES: VIRTUE (Eight Chapters)

Moral Health of the Soul Compared with Physical Health of the Body (1)

Know that the human soul is one, but that it has many diversified activities. Some of these activities have, indeed, been called souls, which has given rise to the opinion that man has many souls, as was the belief of the physicians, with the result that the most distinguished of them states in the introduction of his book that there are three souls, the physical, the vital, and the psychological. These activities are called faculties and parts, so that the phrase "parts of the soul," frequently employed by philosophers, is commonly used. By the word "parts", however, they do not intend to imply that the soul is divided into parts as are bodies, but they merely enumerate the different activities of the soul as being parts of a whole, the union of which makes up the soul.

          Understand that the improvement of the moral qualities is brought about by the healing of the soul and its activities. The physician, who tries to cure the human body, must have a perfect knowledge of it in its entirety and its individual parts, just as he must know what causes sickness so that it may be avoided, and must also be acquainted with the means by which a patient may be cured. Similarly, he who tries to cure the soul, wishing to improve the moral qualities, must have a knowledge of the soul in its totality and its parts, must know how to prevent it from becoming diseased, and how to maintain its health.

          So, I say that the soul has five faculties; the nutritive [or "growing" faculty], the sensitive, the imaginative, the appetitive, and the rational. . . .

Vice results from the Sensitive and Appetitive Faculties, not the Nutritive, Imaginative or Rational (2)

Transgressions and observances of the Law have their origin only in two of the faculties of the soul, namely, the sensitive and the appetitive, and that to these two faculties alone are to be ascribed all transgressions and observances. The faculties of nutrition and imagination do not give rise to observance or transgression, for in connection with neither is there any conscious or voluntary act. That is, man cannot consciously suspend their functions, nor can he curtail any one of their activities. The proof of this is that the functions of both these faculties, the nutritive and the imaginative, continue to be operative when one is asleep, which is not true of any other of the soul's faculties.

          As regards the rational faculty, uncertainty prevails [among philosophers], but I maintain that observance and transgression may also originate in this faculty, in so far as one believes a true or a false doctrine, though no action which may be designated as an observance or a transgression results therefrom. Consequently, as I said above, these two faculties (the sensitive and the appetitive) alone really produce transgressions and observances.

          Now, as for the virtues, they are of two kinds, moral and intellectual, with the corresponding two classes of vices. The intellectual virtues belong to the rational faculty. They are (1) wisdom, which is the knowledge of the direct and indirect causes of things based on a previous realization of the existence of those things, the causes of which have been investigated; (2) reason, consisting of (a) inborn, theoretical reason, that is, axioms, (b) the acquired intellect, which we need not discuss here, and (c) sagacity and intellectual cleverness, which is the ability to perceive quickly, and to grasp an idea without delay, or in a very short time. The vices of this faculty are the antitheses or the opposites of these virtues.

          Moral virtues belong only to the appetitive faculty to which that of sensation in this connection is merely subservient. The virtues of this faculty are very numerous, being moderation, liberality, honesty, meekness, humility, contentedness, courage, and other virtues akin to these. The vices of this faculty consist of a deficiency or of an exaggeration of these qualities.

          As regards the faculties of nutrition and imagination, it cannot be said that they have vices or virtues, but that the nutritive functions work properly or improperly; as, for instance, when one says that a man's digestion is good or bad, or that one's imagination is confused or clear. This does not mean, however, that they have virtues or vices.

Virtues are at a Mean between Extremes (4)

Good deeds are such as are equibalanced, maintaining the mean between two equally bad extremes, the too much and the too little. Virtues are psychological conditions and dispositions which are mid-way between two reprehensible extremes, one of which is characterized by an exaggeration, the other by a deficiency. Good deeds are the product of these dispositions. To illustrate, temperance is a disposition which adopts a mid-course between inordinate passion and total insensibility to pleasure. Temperance, then, is a proper rule of conduct, and the psychological disposition which gives rise to it is an ethical quality; but inordinate passion, the extreme of excess, and total insensibility to enjoyment, the extreme of deficiency, are both absolutely harmful. The psychological dispositions, from which these two extremes, inordinate passion and insensibility, result—the one being an exaggeration, the other a deficiency—are alike classed among moral imperfections. . . .

          If a man will always carefully discriminate as regards his actions, directing them to the medium course, he will reach the highest degree of perfection possible to a human being, thereby approaching God, and sharing in His happiness. This is the most acceptable way of serving God which the sages, too, had in mind when they wrote the words, "He who properly orders his course is worthy of seeing the salvation of God, as it is said, 'to him that properly orders his course I will the salvation of God.'

Attaining Knowledge of God is the Single Goal (5)

As we have explained in the preceding chapter, it is the duty of man to subordinate all the faculties of his soul to his reason. He must keep his mind's eye fixed constantly upon one goal, namely, the attainment of the knowledge of God (may He be blessed!), as far as it is possible for mortal man to know Him. Consequently, one must so adjust all his actions, his whole conduct, and even his very words, that they lead to this goal, in order that none of his deeds be aimless, and thus slow the attainment of that end. So, his only design in eating, drinking, cohabiting, sleeping, waking, moving about, and resting should be the preservation of bodily health, while, in turn, the reason for the latter is that the soul and its agencies may be in sound and perfect condition, so that he may readily acquire wisdom, and gain moral and intellectual virtues, all to the end that man may reach the highest goal of his endeavors. . . .

          If a person has this as his ideal, he will dispense with many of his customary deeds, and refrain from a great deal of ordinary conversation. He who follows this line of conduct will not trouble himself with adorning his walls with golden ornaments, nor with decorating his garments with golden fringe, unless it be for the purpose of enlivening his soul, and thus restoring it to health, or of banishing sickness from it, so that it shall become clear and pure, and thus be in the proper condition to acquire wisdom. Therefore, our Rabbis of blessed memory say, "It is becoming that a sage should have a pleasant dwelling, a beautiful wife, and domestic comfort"; for one becomes weary, and one's mind dulled by continued mental concentration upon difficult problems. Thus, just as the body becomes exhausted from hard labor, and then by rest and refreshment recovers, so is it necessary for the mind to have relaxation by gazing upon pictures and other beautiful objects, that its weariness may be dispelled. Accordingly, it is related that when the Rabbis became exhausted from study, they were accustomed to engage in entertaining conversation (in order to refresh themselves). From this point of view, therefore, the use of pictures and embroideries for beautifying the house, the furniture, and the clothes is not to be considered immoral nor unnecessary.

Whether a Person is more ethical by Acting from Innate Goodness or by Resisting Temptation (6)

Philosophers maintain that though the man of self-restraint performs moral and praiseworthy deeds, yet he does them desiring and craving all the while for immoral deeds, but, subduing his passions and actively fighting against a longing to do those things to which his faculties, his desires, and his psychological disposition excite him, succeeds, though with constant vexation and irritation, in acting morally. The saintly man, however, is guided in his actions by that to which his inclination and disposition prompt him, in consequence of which he acts morally from innate longing and desire. Philosophers unanimously agree that the latter [i.e., the innately saintly person] is superior to, and more perfect than, the one who has to curb his passions, although they add that it is possible for such a one to equal the saintly man in many regards. In general, however, he must necessarily be ranked lower in the scale of virtue, because there lurks within him the desire to do evil, and, though he does not do it, yet because his inclinations are all in that direction, it denotes the presence of an immoral psychological disposition. . . .

          When, however, we consult the Rabbis on this subject, it would seem that they consider him who desires wickedness, and craves for it (but does not do it), more praiseworthy and perfect than the one who feels no torment at refraining from evil. They even go so far as to maintain that the more praiseworthy and perfect a man is, the greater is his desire to commit iniquity, and the more irritation does he feel at having to desist from it. This they express by saying, "Whosoever is greater than his neighbor has likewise greater evil inclinations". . . .

          At first appearance, by a superficial comparison of the sayings of the philosophers and the Rabbis, one might be inclined to say that they contradict one another. Such, however, is not the case. Both are correct and, moreover, are not in disagreement in the least. For, the evils which the philosophers term such (and of which they say that he who has no longing for them is more to be praised than he who desires them but conquers his passion) are things which all people commonly agree are evils, such as the shedding of blood, theft, robbery, fraud, injury to one who has done no harm, ingratitude, contempt for parents, and the like. . . . When, however, the Rabbis maintain that he who overcomes his desire has more merit and a greater reward (than he who has no temptation), they say so only in reference to laws that are ceremonial prohibitions. . . . The instances they cite are all from the ceremonial law, such as partaking of meat and milk together, wearing clothes made of wool and linen, and entering into incestuous marriages.

Intellectual and Moral Defects are Barriers between People and God (7)

Many passages are found in the Midrash, the Haggadah, and also the Talmud, which state that some of the prophets saw God from behind many barriers, and some from behind only a few, according to the proximity of the prophet to Him, and the degree of his prophetic power. Consequently, the Rabbis said that Moses, our teacher, saw God from behind a single, clear, that is transparent, partition. As they express it, (Yevamot, 49b) "He (Moses) looked through a translucent specularia". Specularia is the name of a mirror made of some transparent body like crystal or glass, as is explained at the end of Tractate Keilim.

          Let me now explain the above statement. In accordance with what we have made clear in Chapter 2, virtues are either intellectual or moral. Similarly, vices are intellectual, as ignorance, stupidity, and lack of understanding; or they are moral as inordinate lust, pride, irascibility, anger, impudence, avarice, and many other similar defects, a list of which we have given and explained in Chapter 4. Each of these defects is as a partition separating man from God, the Most High. This is what the prophet meant when he said, (Isaiah 59:2) "But your iniquities have ever made a separation between you and your God"; which means that our sins which, as we have said, are the evil qualities are the partitions which separate us from God.

Virtue and Vice not Predetermined by Astrology (8)

It is impossible for people to be born endowed by nature from his very birth with either virtue or vice, just as it is impossible that he should be born skilled by nature in any particular art. It is possible, however, that through natural causes he may from birth be so constituted as to have a predilection for a particular virtue or vice, so that he will more readily practice it than any other. For instance, a man whose natural constitution inclines towards dryness, whose brain matter is clear and not overloaded with fluids, finds it much easier to learn, remember, and understand things than the phlegmatic man whose brain is encumbered with a great deal of humility. But, if one who inclines constitutionally towards a certain excellence is left entirely without instruction, and if his faculties are not stimulated, he will undoubtedly remain ignorant. On the other hand, if one by nature dull and phlegmatic, possessing an abundance of humidity, is instructed and enlightened, he will, though with difficulty, it is true, gradually succeed in acquiring knowledge and understanding. In exactly the same way, he whose blood is somewhat warmer than is necessary has the required quality to make of him a brave man. Another, however, the temperament of whose heart is colder than it should be, is naturally inclined towards cowardice and fear, so that if he should be taught and trained to be a coward, he would easily become one. If, however, it is desired to make a brave man of him, he can without doubt become one, providing he receive the proper training which would require, of course, great exertion.

          I have entered into this subject so you may not believe the absurd ideas of astrologers, who falsely assert that the constellation at the time of one's birth determines whether one is to be virtuous or vicious, the individual being thus necessarily compelled to follow out a certain line of conduct.

          We, on the contrary, are convinced that our Law agrees with Greek philosophy, which substantiates with convincing proofs the contention that man's conduct is entirely in his own hands, that no compulsion is exerted, and that no external influence is brought to bear upon him that constrains him to be either virtuous or vicious, except inasmuch as, according to what we have said above, he may be by nature so constituted as to find it easy or hard, as the case may be, to do a certain thing. But it is absolutely untrue that he must necessarily do, or refrain from doing, a certain thing.

          Were a man compelled to act according to the dictates of predestination, then the commands and prohibitions of the Law would become null and void, and the Law would be completely false, since man would have no freedom of choice in what he does. Moreover, it would be useless, in fact absolutely in vain, for man to study, to instruct, or attempt to learn an art, as it would be entirely impossible for him, on account of the external force compelling him, according to the opinion of those who hold this view, to keep from doing a certain act, from gaining certain knowledge, or from acquiring a certain characteristic. Reward and punishment, too, would be pure injustice, both as regards man towards man, and as between God and man. Suppose, under such conditions, that Simeon should kill Reuben. Why should the former be punished, seeing that he was constrained to do the killing, and Reuben was predestined to be slain? How could the Almighty, who is just and righteous, punish Simeon for a deed which it was impossible for him to leave undone, and which, though he strove with all his might, he would be unable to avoid? If such were the true state of affairs, all precautionary measures, such as building houses, providing means of subsistence, fleeing when one fears danger, and so forth, would be absolutely useless, for that which is decreed beforehand must necessarily happen. This theory is, therefore, positively unsound, contrary to reason and common sense, subversive of the fundamental principles of religion, and attributes injustice to God (far be it from Him!).

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. What are the main features of Al-Ghazali's discussion of relativism and his quest for certainty?

2. What are the main reasons for Al-Ghazali's collapse into Skepticism?

3. According to Al-Ghazali, what is the aim of scholastic theology and its problem?

4. According to Al-Ghazali, what is the challenge of studying philosophy?

5. According to Al-Ghazali's discussion of the philosophical sects, what is the stigma if infidelity associated with materialism, naturalism and theism?

6. According to Al-Ghazali's discussion of the divisions of the philosophical sciences, what is the danger with mathematics, and what are the three heretical metaphysical doctrines of Al-Farabi and Avicenna?

7. According to Al-Ghazali in the final section on Sufism, what is the aim that Sufi's set before themselves?

8. According to Averroes, what are the two types of scriptural passages, and what does he say about interpreters who maintain that there is no happiness or misery in the afterlife?

9. What are the main features of Averroes' discussion of reinterpreting scripture as metaphors to fit philosophy?

10. What are the main features of Averroes' discussion of whether God exists in space?

11. According to Averroes, what are the main reasons why the uneducated should not attempt interpreting apparent (exoteric) allegorical passages?

12. According to Averroes, what are the main features of the three types of readers of scripture?

13. Explain Averroes' analogy of the discredited physician.

14. What are the main features of Maimonides' discussion of God having no physical body and the Hebrew words zelem and toar?

15. According to Maimonides, what are the five reasons why ordinary people should not be taught metaphysics?

16. According to Maimonides, why should ordinary people be taught that god does not have a physical body?

17. According to Maimonides, what are the four types of attributes that do not apply to God, and what is his explanation of the emotional attributes that we give to God?

18. According to Maimonides, what are the three theories by Moses, Plato and Aristotle concerning the eternality of the world, and what are his criticisms of Plato's and Aristotle's views?

19. What are the main features of Maimonides' discussion of virtues and vices in chapters 2, 6 and 7 of "Eight Chapters"?

20. According to Maimonides, what are the problems associated with the view that virtues and vices are predetermined?

21. Short essay: please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

          a. Al Ghazali describes his collapse into skepticism and how he was rescued from it through a mystical experience. Think of mystical experience as a type of divine illumination. Duns Scotus argued that if our natural capacity for knowledge is limited, then divine illumination cannot help, since it too will be subject to uncertainty. How might Al Ghazali respond to Scotus?

          b. Al Ghazali criticizes three heretical doctrines held by Al-Farabi and Avicenna. What are they, and what is so bad about them?

          c. Averroes argues that, when scripture conflicts with philosophical truth, we should re-interpret scripture to fit philosophy. What are the risks in doing this, and are the risks greater now than they were in the middle ages?

          d. Discuss Averroes' distinction between apparent (exoteric) and hidden (esoteric) scriptural passages, and how we might determine whether a scriptural verse or story should be interpreted metaphorically or literally.

          e. Averroes and Maimonides both discuss the challenges of interpreting scripture. Discuss what views they have in common and where, if at all, they differ.

          f. In "Guide for the Perplexed" 1.34, Maimonides argues that ordinary people should not be taught metaphysics. Discuss his reasoning and whether it applies in today's cultural environment.

          g. In "Guide for the Perplexed" 1.54, Maimonides argues that God has no emotions. Discuss his reasoning and whether you agree.

          h. In "Guide for the Perplexed" 2.13 and 2.5, Maimonides discusses three views regarding the eternality of the world by Moses, Plato and Aristotle. Discuss his criticisms of Plato's and Aristotle's views and whether you agree.

          i. In chapter six of his "Eight Chapters", Maimonides discusses whether a person is more ethical by acting from innate goodness or by resisting temptation. Explain the dilemma, discuss his solution, and give your own opinion about the dilemma.

          j. In chapter eight of his "Eight Chapters", Maimonides argues that virtues and vices are not predetermined by astrology. Discuss his answer and whether you agree.