320: Traces of God

PREFACE

From Classics in the Philosophy of Religion, by James Fieser

© 2026, updated 6/1/2026, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

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Most philosophy of religion anthologies are arranged topically, and for good reason. If we are looking into, say, the cosmological argument for God's existence, it helps to group together famous discussions by Aquinas, Leibniz, Hume and Kant all in one place. What we lose from this topical approach, though, is important lessons about the general trajectory of how philosophers dealt with the concepts of God and religion from era to era. The present anthology, Classics in the Philosophy of Religion, aims to address this with a historically organized presentation of texts.

          Of the various lessons we can learn by examining the historical sweep of the philosophy of religion, four stand out. The first and foundational one is that the history of the philosophy has been an on going contest between faith and reason. Philosophers in every era have had something to say about God and religion, and likely will continue to do so. This is especially evident in the Eastern philosophies of Hinduism and Buddhism, where, from their outset, philosophy was built upon their theologies. Their philosophies just explained their religious truths more analytically, with no overt battle between faith and reason. However, the case is different with Western philosophy of religion, which is our subject here. Western philosophy as a whole began as a non-mythological explanation of the world. It stood as an alternative to, initially, the polytheistic religions of Greece and Rome, and, later, to the monotheistic religions of Judaism and Christianity. Some of these secular philosophies were outright hostile to religion. Others, though, sought compromise, but even here the message was clear: theology was the one to do the compromising, not philosophy. We thus have the birth of the tension between faith and reason, between religion and science. The narrative shifted with the dominance of Christianity in the Middle Ages, where theologians were the gatekeepers of philosophy. Here, if any side was to compromise, it would certainly be philosophy. But the narrative shifted again in the Renaissance with a revived interest in classical Greek and Roman philosophy for its own sake, independently of Christianity. Philosophy's dominance was further strengthened during the scientific revolution, which offered a sophisticated naturalistic explanation of the world that put religion back on the defensive. It is thus not an exaggeration to say that western philosophy of religion has been and continues to be a contest between faith and reason.

          Building upon this, the second lesson we learn is that the contest between faith and reason was never a cordial game where the disputants would agree to disagree, respecting each other's positions. Rather, the stakes were high, particularly for the secularists and the most innovative theists. In Greek times, Protagoras was forced into exile and had his books burned for a single sentence condoning agnosticism. Socrates was executed on the charge of atheism and corrupting the youth. In early Christian times, Ancient Greek philosophical schools were shut down, and the Christian philosophy of Gnosticism was branded heretical. During the Renaissance, Bruno and Vanini were executed; Galileo was sentenced to house arrest; Spinoza and Diderot were excommunicated; Descartes and Rousseau were forced from one country to another; Hobbes, Herbert and Tindal faced censorship and the threat of prosecution; Hume, Wolf, Feuerbach, Strauss, and Russell were denied or fired from university teaching positions. These are just the famous cases. The point here is not that organized religion unjustly pushed back against philosophical threats. For all we know, in their own day, religious groups may have had some justification for their actions (I am excluding the most horrific acts of torture and execution which could never be morally justified in any age). Rather, the point is that secularists who publicly engage in the philosophy of religion were potentially putting their lives and livelihood at risk.

          Building on this, the third lesson is that secularists and innovative theists intentionally hid their most extreme views. If this is what philosophers got punished for in their actual publications, imagine what they would have written if there were no coercive political forces. In all the above famous cases, the writers believed they were being cautious, but in hindsight discovered they miscalculated. Other writers learned from their miscalculations and trained themselves to be even more cautious. We have a statement by Cicero 2,000 years ago on this very point: he observes that it is the opinion of some that "Epicurus does not actually believe the gods exist at all, and that what he said about the immortal gods was only to avoid public backlash" (On the Nature of the Gods, 1.44). It was not until the mid-twentieth-century that academic philosophers could speak openly on religious matters without professional risk. But this was due to hard-won legal protections like tenure and academic freedom, rather than a cultural acceptance of skepticism. What this means for the present text is that even the most radical philosophers of religion contained here are filtering their true views. It is then up to readers to decipher the subtext when possible. It sometimes helps to look at contemporaneous critics who attempt to unveil the hidden positions of these philosophers, which is precisely what Cicero was reporting. It also helps to spot patterns. A radical religious skeptic might claim to defend a heterodox religious view like deism, rather than outright atheism; Voltaire likely did this. They might also defend the idea that religious belief is based solely on faith, rather than reason; Bayle did this, and Hume used both of these tactics. They might overtly condemn atheism, even if they personally sympathized with this view; Vanini and Locke did this. When we examine the philosophy of religion from the other side, that of conservative theology, the situation is the opposite. We can presume full sincerity, and, in almost all cases, see a rigorous effort to defend their faith.

          The fourth and final lesson is that there is a specific set of issues the philosophers on both sides addressed, which are now staples in the philosophy of religion curriculum. These include proofs for God, attributes of God, evidence of divine intervention, reconciling God's existence with widespread suffering, and the incompatibility of world faiths. All these issues were first addressed by ancient Greek and Roman philosophers. They resurface again and again, though, within the context of new philosophical and scientific theories. For example, medieval Christians first viewed these issues through the lens of Plato, then Aristotle. During the scientific revolution the lenses were Copernicanism, Epicurianism and Newtonianism. Later it was Darwinism, then relativity theory. With each shift, the defenders of theism aimed to keep in step with the times, scientifically and philosophically. But the fundamental philosophical issues remained the same, and, in many cases, the repackaging was only surface-level. This repackaging is not necessarily a weakness, but rather an indication of what is philosophically central to theism. We expect world religions to hold true to their original canon of teachings over the course of thousands of years. But at least within Western religions, there is a secondary and more philosophical canon within them that similarly transfers down through time. That canon is reflected in the theistic defenses in this collection. These philosophical arguments survive because they represent the enduring logical skeleton of theistic thought, not merely because they are institutionally enforced.

          This work aims to present the foundational texts in western philosophy of religion in the most accessible manner, covering around 80 writers. All selections are grouped in chapters based on historical movements. While not necessarily perfect, the groupings aim to show major steps in the historical trajectory. Also, each selection is prefaced with a summary of its contents, and the readings themselves have sectional headings and subheadings that indicate their content. Half of the material in this work is taken from three similarly arranged anthologies that I have edited: (1) Ancient and Medieval Philosophy: Essential Selections, (2) Modern Philosophy: Essential Selections, and (3) Nineteenth and Twentieth Century Philosophy: Essential Selections. These include the most canonical Western philosophers, such as Plato, Aquinas, Leibniz, Hume, Kant, and Russell. The remaining half of the material focuses on writers whose impact was more narrowly on the philosophy of religion, such as Cicero, Gassendi, Tindal, Feuerbach, Whitehead, Stanton, and Bultmann. Though typically excluded in topical philosophy of religion anthologies, it is this latter group that shows the breadth of creativity within the subject.