HELLENISTIC GREEKS AND ROMANS

From Classics in the Philosophy of Religion, by James Fieser

© 2026, updated 6/1/2026, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

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CONTENTS

• Epicurus: Mortal Soul and Unconcerned Gods (from Letters)

• Lucretius: Against the Immortality of the Soul (from On the Nature of Things)

• Sextus Empiricus: Withholding Belief in God (from Outlines of Pyrrhonism)

• Cicero: Questionable Gods within Conflicting Schools (from On the Nature of the Gods)

• Plotinus: God as the Cosmic Triad (from Enneads)

• Porphyry: Against the Christians (from Against the Christians)

After the death of Aristotle in 322 BCE, Greek philosophers continued the innovative trend begun by the Pre-Socratic philosophers generations earlier, often building upon or modifying their views. This is the period of Hellenistic philosophy which lasted until around 200 CE. Hellenistic philosophy encompasses writings of both Greeks and Romans. The name derives from "Hellenes", which is the word that the Greeks used to refer to themselves. The term "Hellenistic" refers to the spread of Greek intellectual culture across the Mediterranean region. The Hellenistic philosophers all wrote within schools of thought, around ten of them. Three, though, were especially influential: Epicureanism, Stoicism and Skepticism. By this time, Plato's and Aristotle's schools lost prominence and these three Hellenistic schools became the cutting-edge philosophies. As they competed for followers, all three devised their own unique recommendations for achieving happiness in life. Epicureans advised pursuing pleasure, Stoics resigning oneself to fate, and Skeptics doubting everything. Just as the Pre-Socratic philosophers leaned towards secularism, so too did these three schools with their cosmological and metaphysical theories. The Epicureans held that the cosmos is eternal and has nothing to do with the gods. Officially, the Epicureans did not deny the existence of the gods, since to do so would have been a death sentence. But they marginalized the gods' powers and in influence in a way that made them completely insignificant in human affairs. For all practical purposes, their message was that we live in a godless realm. The Stoics took a different approach. They believed the cosmos was a giant organism governed by rigid laws of nature. We can call it "God" if we like, but it is not a conscious entity with free will. It is essentially physics. The skeptics took an even more radical approach by debunking every claim to knowledge, including all theories of cosmology and religion. If your true goal is to be happy, then the best way to achieve it is to not believe anything, including religious claims. At the tail end of the Hellenistic period, another school arose, "Neoplatonism", founded by Plotinus, who took Plato's theory of the cosmos in a new direction. For Plotinus, the cosmos itself is a multi-layered divine being, where we as individuals are part of that. Unlike the three main Hellenistic schools, Neoplatonism was thoroughly religious, and had a direct impact on Jewish and Christian concepts of God.

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EPICURUS:

MORTAL SOUL AND UNCONCERNED GODS

Epicurus (341–270 BC) was born on the Aegean island of Samos to Athenian parents. He reportedly began studying philosophy as a teenager after being dissatisfied with a teacher's presentation of Hesiod's view of the world originating from chaos. After several years of travel and teaching in the eastern Aegean, he settled in Athens around 306 BCE and bought a house with a garden, where he founded his school. It became known simply as "the Garden". Unusual for the time, he admitted women and at least one enslaved person among his students. He taught that the goal of life is pleasure, but understood this primarily as the absence of pain and disturbance rather than indulgence, and he lived modestly, subsisting largely on bread, water, and occasional cheese. He suffered for years from kidney stones and died of the condition at seventy-two, reportedly easing his final pain with a hot bath and wine while composing a last, contented letter to a friend. Epicurus wrote prolifically, reportedly some 300 papyrus scrolls, of which almost nothing survives except a handful of letters, including the two excerpted here. His views on religious issues are tied directly to his theory of physics.

          In the first selection he argues that the soul is a corporeal substance, made of extremely small particles spread throughout the body, similar to warm breath. Further, he says that sensation belongs jointly to soul and body together, so when the body's structure disperses at death, the soul's particles scatter too. He next debunks supernatural claims, such as omens from Gods. Celestial motions, such as eclipses, result from natural necessity established at the world's formation, not from any deity. As to the gods themselves, he argues that they live in tranquil isolation and take no interest in human affairs. Finally, is Epicurus's most famous argument. We should not fear death since all good and evil depend on sensation, and death is simply its absence.

THE MATERIAL SOUL AND ASTRONOMICAL EVENTS (Letter to Herodotus)

The Soul made of Physical Particles Spread Throughout a Person's Body

Let us now return to the study of the affections, and of the sensations. For this will be the best method of proving that the soul is a bodily substance composed of slight particles. It is diffused over all the members of the body, and presents a great analogy to a sort of spirit, having a mixture of heat, resembling at one time one, and at another time the other of those two principles. There exists in it a special part, that has an extreme mobility that results from the extremely small size of the elements which compose it, and also in reference to its more immediate sympathy with the rest of the body. This is sufficiently proven by the faculties of the soul, the passions, the mobility of its nature, thoughts, and, in a word, everything, the absence of which is death.

The Soul Perceives through the Medium of the Body and Dies with the Body

We must admit that it is in the soul most especially that the principle of sensation resides. At the same time, the soul would not possess this power of sensation if it were not enveloped by the rest of the body which communicates it to it, and in its turn receives it from it, but only in a certain degree; for there are certain affections of the soul of which it is not capable. It is on that account that, when the soul departs, the body is no longer possessed of sensation; for it has not this power, (that of sensation namely) in itself; but, on the other hand, this power can only manifest itself in the soul through the medium of the body. The soul, reflecting the manifestations which are accomplished in the substance which environs it, realizes in itself, in a virtue or power which belongs to it, the sensible affections, and immediately communicates them to the body in virtue of the reciprocal bonds of sympathy which unite it to the body. That is the reason why the destruction of a part of the body does not draw after it a cessation of all feeling in the soul while it resides in the body, provided that the senses still preserve some energy. Nevertheless, the dissolution of the corporeal covering, or even of any one of its portions, may sometimes bring on with it the destruction of the soul.

          The rest of the body, on the other hand even when it remains, either as a whole, or in any part, loses all feeling by the dispersion of that aggregate of atoms, whatever it may be, that forms the soul. When the entire combination of the body is dissolved, then the soul too is dissolved, and ceases to retain those faculties which were previously inherent in it, and especially the power of motion. So, that sensation perishes equally as far as the soul is concerned. For it is impossible to imagine that it still feels, from the moment when it is no longer in the same conditions of existence, and no longer possesses the same movements of existence in reference to the same organic system; from the moment, in short, when the things which cover and surround it are no longer such, that it retains in them the same movements as before.

Astronomical events are not Omens from Gods, but Result from Nature and Necessity

As to the heavenly phenomena, such as the motion and course of the stars, the eclipses, their rising and setting, and all other appearances of the same kind, we must beware of thinking that they are produced by any particular being which has regulated, or whose business it is to regulate, for the future, the order of the world, that is, by a being immortal and perfectly happy. For         , far from being compatible with happiness, are, on the contrary, the consequence of weakness, of fear, and of the need which a thing has of something else. We must not imagine either that these globes of fire, which roll on in space, enjoy a perfect happiness, and give themselves, with reflection and wisdom, the motions which they possess. But we must respect the established notions on this subject, provided, nevertheless, that they do not all contradict the respect due to truth. For nothing is more calculated to trouble the soul than this strife of contradictory notions and principles We must therefore admit that from the first movement impressed on the heavenly bodies since the organization of the world there is derived a sort of necessity which regulates their course to this day.

THE GODS AND DEATH (Letter to Menoecius)

Believe only that the Gods are Eternal and Blissful, but Reject Common Views about the Gods

Perform and practice these things that I have constantly recommended to you, and consider them to be the elements of the good life. First of all, believe that god is a being that is eternal and blissful, as the common opinion of the world says about god. But do not attach to your idea of him anything which is inconsistent with eternality or with bliss. Understand that god possesses everything that is able to preserve his own bliss for eternality. We know there are gods, since we have a distinct vision of them. But they are not of the nature that people in general attribute to them, and people do not believe in them in a way that is consistent with the ideas that they entertain of them. A person is not irreverent for rejecting the gods believed in by the masses, but, rather, is irreverent for applying to the gods the opinions that the masses entertain of them. The views of the masses about the gods are not grounded in sensation, but rather in false opinions, particularly the false view that the gods are responsible for the greatest evils that happen to wicked people, and the benefits which are given to the good. They say that the gods have their own ideas of virtue, and approve of people like themselves, but regard everything that is different as incompatible with the divine nature.

Do not fear Death since it does Not exist for the Living, and the Deceased do not Exist to Experience it

Accustom yourself to think that death is a matter that does not concern us. For all good and all evil depend on sensation, and death is only the removal of sensation. Accordingly, the correct view of the fact that death is no concern of ours makes the mortality of life pleasant to us, not because it gives us limitless time, but because it relieves us of the longing for immortality. Life has no terrors for a person who properly understands that there is nothing terrible in ceasing to live. Only a foolish person says that he fears death, not because it will cause him pain when it occurs, but because it pains him while he anticipates it. It is absurd for something that is not distressful when present, to then distress a person when it is only expected. Therefore, death, the most dreadful of all evils, is nothing to us, since, when we exist, death is not present to us, and when death is present we have no existence. It is no concern then either of the living or of the dead, since, to the living, death has no existence, and the dead have no existence themselves. Sometimes people flee from death as the greatest of evils, yet other times they wish for it as a rest from the evils in life. But the wise person neither desires to end life nor fears the end of life. Just as he chooses food, not preferring the greatest amount, but the most enjoyable, so too he enjoys his time, not measuring it as to whether it is of the greatest length, but as to whether it is most enjoyable.

          He is foolish who instructs a young person to live well, and an old person to die well, not only because of the constantly delightful nature of life itself, but also because the care to live well is identical with the care to die well. Still worse is the person who says "It is best not to be born, but if we are born, we should pass quickly through the gates of hades." For if this really is his opinion, why did he not just end his life since it was easily in his power to do so? But if he was joking, then he was making a fool of himself in front of those who disagree.

          We must remember that the future is not our own, nor, on the other hand, is it entirely not our own. That is, we can never altogether await the future with a feeling of certainty that it will be, nor altogether despair of it as what will never be.

Source: Epicurus, "Letter to Herodotus", "Letter to Menoecius" in Diogenes Laertius, Lives of Eminent Philosophers, translated by Charles Duke Yonge, adapted.

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LUCRETIUS:

AGAINST THE IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL

Titus Lucretius Carus (c. 99–55 BC) is known almost entirely through a single surviving work of his, the poem On the Nature of Things (De Rerum Natura), which lays out Epicurean philosophy in Latin verse. Virtually nothing certain is known about his life. The only ancient biographical account, written centuries later by St. Jerome, claims Lucretius was driven insane by a love potion and wrote his poem during intervals of sanity. Scholars treat account with suspicion, believing it was invented to discredit an atheistic poet from a later Christian perspective. The first discussion below addresses mortality of the soul, Like Epicurus, he argues that the soul is made of fine atoms that disperse like smoke once the body dies and can no longer contain them. As proof of the soul's mortality, he argues that the mind grows weak with infancy, matures with the body, and can be altered by illness or medicine. All of this indicates that the soul is of a changeable nature rather than an indestructible one. Further, even if our exact atoms were later reassembled, the break in memory means that the reassembled person would not be us either.

          In the section on the world created by chance, Lucretius argues that the world was not created by divine design, but by chance collisions of physical particles over vast spans of time. Moving by their own weight, these particles collided and combined in countless ways until, by accident, they formed the earth, sky, ocean, and living creatures. In the section on sources of belief in the gods, Lucretius argues that human belief in the gods stems from two main sources: vivid dreams and ignorance of nature. In early times, people saw majestic figures in their dreams and assumed they were living, immortal deities unaffected by death. Additionally, because people could not explain natural phenomena like the movement of the stars, seasonal changes, or violent storms, they attributed these occurrences to divine will. He continues arguing that fear resulted from this ignorance. People imagined angry gods causing terrifying events like lightning, earthquakes, and shipwrecks. To appease these powers, humans instituted rituals, sacrifices, and vows, creating unnecessary suffering for themselves. Lucretius concludes that true piety does not consist of falling before altars or offering sacrifices, but in understanding natural causes so that one can look at the world with a peaceful mind.

MORTALITY AND DEATH

Proofs of the Mortality of the Soul: Made of Atoms, Grows with the Body, Cured by Medicine (Nature, 3b)

Come now, that you may be able to learn that the minds and the light souls of living things have birth and death, I will hurry to present verses long sought out and found with willing effort, worthy to guide your life. It is your choice to link in a single name both of these [i.e., minds and souls]. When, to choose a case, I continue to speak of the soul, proving that it is mortal, suppose that I speak of mind as well, inasmuch as they are at one each with the other and compose a single thing.

          First of all, I have shown that the soul is finely made of tiny bodies and of first-beginnings [i.e., atoms], far smaller than the liquid moisture of water, clouds or smoke. For, it far surpasses them in speed of motion, and is more prone to move when struck by some slight cause. For indeed the soul is moved by images of smoke and cloud. Even when dreaming in sleep, we see altars breathing steam on high, and sending up their smoke. Undoubtedly, these are image particles (eidola) that are carried to us. Now, when containers are shattered, you see the water flowing away on every side, and the liquid parting this way and that, and cloud and smoke disperse into air. Thus, you must believe that the soul too is scattered and passes away far more swiftly, and is dissolved more quickly into its first-bodies, after it has withdrawn from a person's limbs, and has departed. For indeed, the body, which was the container of the soul, so to speak, cannot hold it together, when by some chance it is shattered and made thinner, since the blood is withdrawn from the veins. How, then, could you believe that the soul could be held together by any air, which is thinner than our body and can contain it less?

          Further, we feel that the understanding is created along with the body, grows together with it, and ages along with it. For, as children totter with feeble and tender bodies, they also have weak judgement of mind. Then, as they grow and their strength hardens, their sense is greater and their force of mind is increased. Later, when the body becomes shattered by the stern force of time, and its frame has sunk with its strength dulled, its reason is also diminished, its tongue raves, its mind stumbles, and everything gives way and fails at once. We see, then, that the mind is born with the body, grows with it, and, as I have shown, at the same time becomes weary and worn with age. Thus, it is natural that the entire nature of the mind should also be dissolved, just as smoke is dispersed into the high breezes of the air. . . .

          Since we perceive that the mind is cured, just like the sick body, and we see that it can be changed by medicine, this too forewarns us that the mind has a mortal life. For whoever attempts to alter the mind, or seeks to change any other nature, must indeed add parts to it or transfer them from their order, or take away some small piece at least from the whole. But what is immortal does not permit its parts to be transposed, nor that any part should be added or depart from it. For whenever a thing changes and passes out of its own limits, immediately this is the death of that which was before. So whether the mind is sick, it gives signs of its mortality, as I have proved, or whether it is changed by medicine.

Death is Nothing to Us since even in a Reconfigured Body we would have no Memories (Nature, 4b)

Death, then, is nothing to us, nor does it concern us one bit, insofar as the nature of the mind is only a mortal possession. Even as in the time gone by we felt no ill, when the Poeni [i.e., Phoenicians] came from every side to the conflict of battle, when all the world, shaken by the hurrying turmoil of war, shuddered and reeled beneath the high coasts of heaven, in doubt to which people's sway must fall all human power by land and sea. So, when we will be no more, when there will have come the parting of body and soul, by whose union we are made one, you may know that nothing at all will be able to happen to us, who then will be no more, or stir our feeling. No, not if earth will be mingled with sea, and sea with sky. Even if the nature of mind and the power of soul has feeling after it has been torn apart from our body, yet it is nothing to us, who are made one by the mating and marriage of body and soul. Suppose that time could gather together our substance after our death and bring it back again as it is now placed, and once more the light of life should be given to us. Even if this were done, it would not concern us at all, when once the memory of our former selves were snapped in two. Even now we do not care at all for the selves that we once were, not at all are we touched by any torturing pain for them. For when you look back over all the lapse of immeasurable time that now is gone, and think how many are the motions of matter, you could easily believe this too, that these same seeds, from which we now are made, have often been placed in the same order as they are now. Yet we cannot recall this in our mind's memory. For in between lies a break in life, and all the motions have wandered everywhere, far astray from sense. Grief and pain necessitate a perceiver, but death prevents our feeling. For, if by chance there is to be grief and pain for a man, he must himself too exist at that time, that harm may occur to him. Since death forestalls this, and prevents the being of him, on whom these misfortunes might gather, we may know that we have nothing to fear in death, and that he who is no more cannot be miserable. This is not any different than if he had never at any time been born, when once immortal death has stolen away mortal life.

AGAINST BELIEF IN THE GODS

World Created by Chance, not Design (Nature, 5.a)

But by what means that gathering together of matter established earth and sky and the depths of ocean, and the courses of sun and moon, I will set out in order. For, in truth, it is not by design that the first-beginnings of things place themselves each in their order with foreseeing mind, nor indeed did they make an agreement about what movements each would start. Rather, many first-beginnings of things in many ways have been driven on by collisions from time everlasting until now. Moved by their own weight, they have been inclined to be carried on, and to unite in every way and compose everything that they might create, meeting one with another. Therefore, it happens that, scattered abroad through a great age as they try meetings and motions of every kind, eventually those come together, which, suddenly thrown together, often become the beginnings of great things, of earth, sea and sky, and the race of living things.

Dreams, Ignorance of Natural Causes and Fear as the Source of Belief in the Gods (Nature, 5.e)

What cause has spread the notion of the existence and power of the gods across the wide nations of the earth? This notion has filled cities with altars and led solemn sacred rites to be instituted (which rites now flourish and are performed on all important occasions and in all distinguished places). This terror pervades mortals, a terror which raises new temples of the deities throughout the whole globe of the earth, and drives men to celebrate their worship on feast days. It is not so difficult, as it may seem, to explain.

          In those early times of which we speak, the tribes of mortals saw in their minds, even when awake, glorious images as of gods, and saw them even more distinctly in their sleep, and of an extraordinary size. To these, therefore, they attributed life, because they seemed to move their limbs, and to utter majestic words, suitable to their distinguished appearance and mighty strength. They also assigned to them an immortal existence, because their appearances came in constant succession, and their form remained the same. But they might certainly have believed them immortal for another reason. They might have considered that beliefs, possessing such apparent strength, could not easily be overpowered by any destructive force. They thought of the gods as perfectly happy, because the fear of death could not trouble any of them. Also, in their dreams they saw them do many and extraordinary actions, and it seemed that they experienced no difficulty when performing them.

          Further, they observed the revolutions of the heavens, and the various seasons of the year, go around in a certain order. Yet they could not understand by what causes these effects were produced. Thus, they would seek a refuge by handing over all things to the gods and supposing all things to be guided by their will.

          They placed the homes and realms of the gods in the sky, because night and moon are seen to roll through heaven. That is, moon, day, night, the grand constellations of night, the nightly luminaries of the heavens, the flying meteors, the clouds, the sun, the rain, the snow, the winds, lightning, hail, and the violent noise and loud threatening murmurs of the thunder.

          But observe how the race of men are unhappy when, in addition to attributing such acts to the gods, they also ascribe bitter wrath to them. What sorrow did they then create for themselves, and what sufferings for us! What fears have they passed down to later generations!

          Further, there is nothing pious for a man to be seen with his head veiled, turning towards a stone, and drawing near to every altar; or to fall face down on the ground, and to stretch out his hands before the shrines of the gods; or to sprinkle the altars with the profuse blood of four-footed animals, and to add vows upon vows. Rather, it is piety to be able to look at all things with a mind at peace.

          We may look up to the celestial regions of the vast world above, and contemplate the night sky studded with glittering stars, and reflect upon the revolutions of the sun and moon. When we do this, an anxiety might awaken within our hearts about the possibility that an almighty power of the gods is above us, which guides the stars in their various motions (an anxiety that might have otherwise remained buried under the weight of other worries).

          Lack of reasoning, and ignorance of natural causes, upsets our minds with doubts about whether there was any birth or beginning to the world, or whether there is any limit of time until which the walls of the world, and the silent movements of the heavenly bodies, can endure its continuous activity; or whether the heavens, divinely endowed with an imperishable nature, can, as they roll along time's eternal course, defy the mighty power of endless age.

          Besides, whose heart does not shrink at the terrors of the gods? Whose limbs do not shudder with dread, when the scorched earth shakes with the terrible flash of lightning, and when the roars of thunder fill the vast sky? Do not people and nations tremble? Do not proud rulers, filled with fear of the deities, quiver in every nerve, in the event that the dreaded time may come to pay the penalty for some foul action, or arrogant word?

          Consider likewise when the mighty force of a furious wind, raging over the sea, sweeps the commander of a fleet over the waters, along with his powerful legions and elephants. Does he not seek with vows the peace of the gods, and fearfully implore them with prayers for a lull in the winds and a favorable breeze? Unfortunately, he implores them to no purpose. Frequently, seized by a violent hurricane, he is nevertheless swept away to the shoals of death. Thus some unseen power, apparently, bears upon human things, and seems to trample down proud symbols of authority, and make them merely a sport for itself.

          Further, when the whole earth totters under our feet, and cities, shaken to their foundation, fall or threaten to fall, what wonder is it, that the nations of the world despise and humble themselves, and admit the vast influence of the gods over the world, and their stupendous power to govern all things?

Source: Lucretius, On the Nature of Things, translated by John Selby Watson, adapted.

SEXTUS EMPIRICUS:

WITHHOLDING BELIEF IN GOD

Sextus Empiricus (c. 160–210 CE) left behind almost no independent record of his life, and thus we know him only through his own writings. Even his birthplace is uncertain, with ancient sources indicating Greece or North Africa. His name tells us he practiced medicine in the "Empiric" school, which held that we should build medical knowledge from observed experience alone, without theorizing about hidden causes inside the body. That same distrust of unprovable theory runs straight through his philosophy. He was the last major voice of ancient Pyrrhonism, a school of radical skepticism founded centuries earlier by Pyrrho of Elis. Sextus's Outlines of Pyrrhonism is our only complete firsthand account of how that school actually argued. Without it, we would know Pyrrhonism today only through short quotations and secondhand summaries. His skeptical method was simple to state, but not always easy to follow.

          In the selections below from his Outlines, Sextus begins stating his skeptical methodology: we should lay out the strongest arguments on both sides of any question, let them cancel each other out, and refuse to conclude anything at all. Suspending judgment through this method, he believed, is the best path to tranquility. He next argues that the notion of God is inconceivable. For, dogmatists disagree over whether God is a body or incorporeal, has human form or not, and exists within the world or beyond it. Without agreement on his substance or location, appealing to "something incorruptible and blessed" tells us nothing, since we cannot know an unknown thing's properties. He next argues that God's existence is neither self-evident nor demonstrable, thus we must suspend judgment on whether God exists at all. His existence isn't self-evident, since dogmatists would then agree about him, which they do not. Further, it cannot be demonstrated either since a demonstration from something non-self-evident needs its own demonstration, and that chain runs on forever. Finally, he argues that the suffering in the world is inconsistent with divine providence. For, if God cared for everything, evil would not exist, yet evil clearly does. If he cared only for some things, he must either lack the power or the will to help the rest, and either option makes him weak, evil, or both.

THE SKEPTICAL METHOD (Outlines of Pyrrhonism, 1.4)

Skepticism is an ability to place appearances in opposition to judgments in any way whatever. By balancing reasons that are opposed to each other, we first reach the state of suspension of judgment, and afterwards that of tranquility.

          To clarify, I do not use the word "ability" in any unusual sense, but simply mean that we are able to do something. By "appearances" I mean the things that we sense, as opposed to our judgments about them. The phrase "in any way whatever" may refer either to the word "ability" in its simple sense as I have said, or it may refer to the "placing of appearances in opposition to judgments." For we place appearances in opposition to each other in a variety of ways: appearances to appearances, and judgments to judgments, or appearances to judgments. Also, the phrase "in any way whatever" may refer to "appearances and judgments," so that we need not ask how appearances appear, or how thoughts are judged; rather, we should understand these things in a simple sense. By "reasons opposed to each other," I do not in any way mean that they deny or affirm anything, but simply that they offset each other. By "balancing" I mean equally likely and equally unlikely, so that the opposing reasons do not surpass each other in likelihood. "Suspension of judgment" means holding back opinion so that we neither deny nor affirm anything. "Tranquility" is composure and calmness of mind. I will later explain how tranquility accompanies suspension of judgment when I speak about the aim of skepticism.

THE NOTION OF GOD IS INCONCEIVABLE (3.3)

Now considering that most of the Dogmatists hold God to be the most efficient cause, let us first inquire concerning God. However, we recognize that, in the course of life, we say (without engaging our judgment) that there are Gods, that we worship the Gods, and that they have providence. But we say the following to oppose the rashness of the dogmatists.

          Of the things which we understand, we ought to consider their substances, such as whether they are bodies or are incorporeal. So too with their forms. For no one can understand a horse if he has not first learned what the form of a horse is. Likewise, that which is understood, must be understood as being somewhere. Now insofar as some of the dogmatists say that God is a body, others say he is incorporeal. Some, that he has a human form, others not. Some say that he exists in space, others that he does not exist in space. Of those who say that he exists in space, some say that he is in the world, others that he is beyond it. How, then, can we have a conception of God without having undisputed knowledge of his substance, or of his form, or of the place wherein he exists? Let them first agree among themselves concerning what God is, and then they may represent him to us, and require that we accept such a conception of God. For, while they disagree irreconcilably among themselves, we cannot accept anything from them as undoubtedly true.

          But, they say, conceive within yourself of something that is incorruptible and blessed: that thing, then, is God. But this is ridiculous. For, as he who does not know Dion cannot know the properties that belong to him, as Dion. So, not knowing the substance of God, we similarly cannot know his accidents. Further, let them tell us what is blessed: whether it is that which is active according to virtue, and has a providence over the things subordinate to it; or that which is passive, and neither has any activity itself, or provides activity to another. For, differing irreconcilably even about this, they show that what they call blessed is inconceivable, and consequently God himself is also inconceivable.

GOD'S EXISTENCE IS NOT SELF-EVIDENT OR DEMONSTRABLE (3.3)

But even though we might grant some notion of God, yet it is necessary for us to suspend judgment about whether he is or he is not, at least with respect to what the dogmatists say. For, it is not self-evident that there is a God. For, if that were self-evident, the Dogmatists would have agreed about who, what, and where he is. Yet, on the contrary, there is an unending controversy among them, whereby we see that his being is not self-evident to us, and requires demonstration. Now he who says that there is a God, must either demonstrate it by either a something that is self-evident, or not self-evident. He cannot do so by something self-evident, for if that were self-evident which demonstrates there is a God (forasmuch as that which demonstrates is relative to that which is demonstrated, and consequently is grasping together with it, as we have formerly proved), then that there is a God will be also be self-evident, as being grasped together with the self-evident thing that demonstrates it. But this [i.e., God's existence] is not self-evident, therefore neither can it be demonstrated by something that is self-evident.

          But neither can God be demonstrated by what is not self-evident, for the non-self-evident will require a demonstration. If demonstrated by something self-evident, then it will no longer be non-self-evident, but instead evident that there is a God. Therefore, the non-self-evident demonstrative cannot be demonstrated by what is self-evident. But neither can it be demonstrated by something non-self-evident. For he who says so will be driven into an infinite regress, as we continually require a demonstration of the non-self-evident, that is alleged for demonstrating the thing proposed. Therefore, it cannot be demonstrated from any other thing that there is a God. So, if it is neither self-evident in itself, nor demonstrable from something else, it will be incomprehensible whether there is a God.

SUFFERING INCONSISTENT WITH PROVIDENCE (3.3)

Further, he who says there is a God, holds either that he is provident over the things in the world, or he is not provident. If God is provident, he is so either over all, or only over some. If over all, there would be no badness or evil in the world. But all things (as they admit) are full of evil; therefore, God cannot be said to be provident over all. If he is provident only over some things, why is he provident over these and not over those? For either (1) he both wills to be provident and is capable of being provident over all; or (2) he wills, but is incapable; or (3) he is capable, but does not will; or (4) he neither wills nor is capable. If he both wills and is capable [i.e., option 1], then he indeed would be provident over all. But he is not provident, as is clear from what we just said [regarding evil]. Therefore, it is not the case that he both wills to provide over all and is capable of providing over all. If he wills, but is incapable [i.e., option 2], then his power is exceeded by some cause that hinders him from being provident over the things that are outside of his providence. But it is absurd to image God to be weaker than some other thing. If he is capable of being provident over all, but does not will this [i.e., option 3], then he may be evil. If he neither wills nor is capable [i.e., option 4], then he is both evil and weak. But to say this of God is impious. Therefore, God is not provident over the things of the world. Further, if he is not provident over them, and neither performs any work or effect, then no one can say by what means he comprehends that there is a God, seeing that it neither is self-evident in itself, nor comprehended by any effects. For these reasons therefore it is incomprehensible whether there is or is not a God.

          Hence we may also argue, that they who say there is a God, cannot be excused from impiety. For, by affirming that he is provident over all things, they say that God is the author of evil. In saying that he is provident over only some and not over all, they will be forced to admit that God is either evil or weak, which cannot be said without clear impiety.

Source: Sextus Empiricus, Outlines of Pyrrhonism, translated by Mary Mills Patrick, Thomas Stanley, adapted.

_______________________

CICERO:

QUESTIONABLE GODS WITHIN CONFLICTING SCHOOLS

Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BCE) was born to a wealthy family in southeast of Rome, and rose to the consulship in 63 BC despite having no ancestors who had held major office, an achievement Romans called being a "new man." During his consulship he claimed to have saved the Republic by exposing a plot by Lucius Catilina to overthrow it, a moment Cicero referred to for the rest of his life, sometimes to the point of tedium even for his allies. He was a prolific writer in nearly every genre available to him: courtroom speeches, political oratory, and personal letters, many of which survive and offer an unusually candid record of his private opinions. He also composed multiple philosophical dialogues, including On the Nature of the Gods, written late in life partly to console himself after his daughter's death. Cicero was not a strict adherent of any single philosophical school, preferring to lay out competing positions, often through invented speakers, without always declaring a winner. His political career ended badly. After opposing Mark Antony in a series of speeches following Julius Caesar's assassination, he was placed on a proscription list and killed by soldiers in 43 BCE, reportedly presenting his neck to them without resistance. His head and hands were displayed in the Roman Forum.

          The following selections are from Cicero's On the Nature of the Gods (De Natura Deorum), which is a dialogue between an Epicurean, Stoic and Skeptic. The first main discussion presents the Epicurean view of the Gods. Speaking for that tradition, Velleius opens by condemning mythology, arguing that popular portrayals of gods are the rantings of lunatics. Epicurus, though, liberated humanity by discovering that our understanding of God rests on an innate preconception (prolepsis), which is an unlearned, prior notion that nature has implanted in all human minds, including religious matters. Because this preconception persists as a universal agreement across every culture, Velleius argues that common consent proves the gods exist. It also tells us that the divine nature is eternally blessed. For, since weakness causes anger or favor, a genuinely immortal being experiences no trouble, causes no harm, and is moved by neither wrath nor partiality. Velleius continues that the gods must be in human shape, which is the most beautiful of all forms. However, the gods do not consist of dense matter, but of a subtle quasi-body and quasi-blood. He then contrasts this life of ease of the gods with the Stoics view that God is an overworked laborer who endlessly directs the cosmos, subjecting humanity to the intrusive tyranny of fate and divination.

          In the next main discussion, the skeptic criticizes this Epicurean view of the Gods. Cotta, representing the Academic Skeptics, begins by rejecting the universal consent argument on the grounds that many savage tribes have no concept of divinity. Further, thinkers like Protagoras explicitly questioned or denied divine existence. Cotta continues attacking Epicurean physics, pointing out that anything formed from atoms, including the gods, must have a beginning and an end. Regarding the Epicurean view that the gods have "quasi-body" and "quasi-blood", Cotta sees this as an obscure verbal dodge designed to avoid admitting that their gods are subject to decay. Cotta next argues that attributing human form to the gods stems purely from cultural habit rather than objective truth. For, foreign nations worship animals. Additionally, if every animal species was rational, it would consider its own shape most beautiful. Cotta next explains that true blessedness is impossible without virtue, and virtue requires active engagement. Accordingly, an idle deity who does nothing and merely reflects on its own well-being possesses no virtue and can inspire no genuine piety or reverence. Cotta concludes that by stripping the gods of benevolence and love for humanity, Epicurus removed religion from human hearts. Cotta suggests that Epicurus retained the name of the "gods" purely to avoid public criticism in Athens while functionally promoting a hidden atheism.

          The next main discussion presents the Stoic defense of divine providence, voiced by the character Balbus, which is among the most important surviving discussions of Stoic cosmology. Balbus asserts that the order of the heavens makes divine governance self-evident. Citing Stoic founders, Zeno of Citium and Cleanthes, Balbus outlines four causes for belief in God: premonitions of the future, natural benefits, terror from severe weather, and the absolute regularity of celestial movements. Balbus next argues that because human beings possess reason yet could not have created the cosmos, the power that produced the universe must be superior to man and therefore divine. Furthermore, since no part can possess a quality absent from the whole, and because the universe produces rational beings, the universe itself must be wise, living, and rational. Balbus explains the physical mechanism of this cosmic divinity as a pure, active element of heat or fire. It is a ruling principle (hegemonikon) that holds all nature together, granting the entire universe an innate, unchangeable wisdom. He portrays universal nature as a skillful fire, that is  a master craftsman (pronoia or providence), which ensures the cosmos remains stable and beautiful. He contrasts these active celestial gods with the lifeless divine figures imagined by Epicurus. Balbus explicitly distinguishes true religion, which reveres the gods with an uncorrupted mind, from the superstitious fables of mythology, which attribute human frailties and warfare to divine beings. Finally, Balbus portrays the universe as a vast corporate state shared by gods and humans, governed under a single, eternal law. Divine providence preserves living species, while provides divination of future events so humans might receive guidance from the gods.

          In the final discussion Cotta, the skeptic, reenters the debate, refuting the Stoic view of the gods. He rejects the argument for the gods from widespread belief, arguing that the consensus of the foolish majority carries no logical weight. He attacks divination of future events as an obscure practice, adding that if events are fixed by fate, knowing the future merely inflicts useless suffering. Cotta criticizes Zeno's arguments regarding cosmic rationality. By Zeno's logic, because musical people are produced by the universe, we would have to conclude the universe itself is a lute-playing philosopher. Cotta continues that, because cosmic fire requires fuel to survive, it is mortal rather than naturally eternal. Further, attributing human virtues like bravery or justice to God is meaningless, since a supreme being faces no danger or physical desire. Cotta then argues that rationalizing popular polytheism leads to an endless slippery slope. For example, if the sun and moon are divine, then clouds, tempests, and rivers must also be worshipped as gods. Cotta then criticizes the Stoic practice of turning abstract mental qualities like hope or faith into deities, pointing out that this error led ancient societies to raise temples to harmful forces like fever and evil fortune. Finally, Cotta exposes the problem of evil underlying Stoic theology: reason is a flawed and destructive gift. If the gods gave reason to humanity, they simultaneously provided the essential instrument for deception and crime. For, the vast majority of humans use reason for destructive ends, and thus a wise providence would have withheld that ability altogether. He concludes that the prevalence of unpunished wrongdoing and the suffering of virtuous people disproves the claim that the universe is governed by benevolent divine care.

THE EPICUREAN THEORY OF THE GODS PRESENTED (One the Nature of the Gods, Book 1)

Poets' Corrupted Gods and Epicurus's Discovery of Preconception

1.16. [Velleius (Epicurean):] What I have been describing sounds more like the ravings of madmen [on the nature of the gods] than the reasoned views of philosophers. The poets are no better. Their portrayals are just as absurd, and because poetry is so appealing, the damage it does is worse. They show us gods consumed by anger and burning with desire. They stage divine wars, battles, feuds, and wounds; they show gods hating, quarreling, being born, and dying. They show gods complaining and weeping. Divine passions run to every kind of excess: adultery, imprisonment, sexual encounters with mortals, and mortal children born from immortal parents. To these fantasies of the poets we can add the extravagant claims of the Persian magi, the equally deluded beliefs of the Egyptians, and the views of ordinary people generally, which are riddled with contradictions because they rest on no real understanding.

          Anyone who sees how carelessly and thoughtlessly these views have been put forward should feel real admiration for Epicurus. He deserves a place among the very beings under discussion here, because he was the first to recognize that the gods exist, and he based that recognition on the concept of divinity that nature itself has planted in the minds of all people. Is there any nation or people anywhere who lack some prior notion of the gods, without ever having been taught one? Epicurus calls this a preconception (prolepsis): an idea of something that the mind forms in advance, and without which nothing can be understood, investigated, or even discussed. He explains the point and value of this reasoning in his landmark work on the criterion of truth and judgment.

Common Consent Proof of the Gods through our Preconception of them

1.17. You can see, then, that the foundation of this inquiry [about the existence of the gods] rests on solid ground. This belief was not established by any ordinance, custom, or law, and yet a firm consensus persists among all people without exception. That fact alone tells us the gods must exist. We carry ideas of them within us, implanted, or rather innate, and whatever all human nature agrees on must be true; so their existence has to be acknowledged. Since their existence is accepted almost universally, not just by philosophers but by ordinary people too, let's also accept a related point: that we possess a "preconception," to use my earlier term, or a "prior notion," of the gods. New terms become necessary when the things they name are themselves new, just as Epicurus applied the term "preconception" (prolepsis) to something no one had named before. We possess, I say, a preconception that leads us to think of the gods as blessed and immortal. The same nature that gave us the idea of gods has also engraved in our minds the conviction that they are blessed and eternal. If that's true, then Epicurus was right to claim that whatever is blessed and eternal experiences no trouble itself and causes none to others, and is therefore unmoved by anger or favor, since, as he put it, being susceptible to those feelings is itself a mark of weakness.

          That would be enough, if our only goal were to worship the gods with due piety and free ourselves from superstition. A divine nature of this exalted kind, eternal and supremely blessed, would naturally receive the reverent worship of humanity, since anything of surpassing excellence inspires genuine reverence. And all fear arising from divine violence or anger would vanish once we understand that anger and favor have no place in a blessed, immortal nature, and that once those feelings are set aside, the powers above pose no threat to us. Still, to confirm this belief further, the mind looks for evidence of divine form, active life, and intelligent activity in God.

Life of the Gods: Epicurean Ease versus Stoic Toil

1.18. ... Now, if the human figure surpasses the form of any other living being, and if God is a living being, then this figure, the most beautiful of all, is certainly the one God possesses. Since, moreover, we understand that the gods are supremely blessed, and since no being can be blessed without virtue, and virtue cannot exist without reason, and reason cannot exist except in human form, we must conclude that the gods have the outward form of a man, though this is not body but quasi-body, and does not contain blood but quasi-blood.

          1.19. ... Now, Balbus, it's typical of your school [of Stoicism] to ask us what the life of the gods is like, and how they spend their days. You can be sure it's a life that, in terms of blessedness and the abundant possession of every good, could not be surpassed even in imagination. God does nothing, takes on no tasks, carries out no projects. He delights in his own wisdom and virtue, confident that his condition will remain one of supreme happiness, eternally sustained.

          1.20. We would be right to call this God blessed, and your [Stoic] God a slave to labor. If the world itself is God, what could be less restful, and nothing that lacks rest can be blessed, than spinning endlessly around the celestial axis at tremendous speed without a moment's pause? And if, instead, some god resides within the world to govern and direct it, to maintain the courses of the stars, the changing seasons, and the ordered sequence of events, to watch over every land and sea, and to guard the safety and lives of human beings, then he is burdened with a heavy and exhausting task indeed. ... So you have placed our necks under the yoke of a perpetual tyrant, one we must fear day and night. Who wouldn't fear a god who foresaw everything, weighed everything, tracked everything, and considered himself involved in everything, an intrusive, meddling god? From this comes, first, your notion of predetermined necessity, which you call "fate" (heimarmenē), meaning by that term that every event that occurs has its origin in eternal truth and an unbroken chain of causes, (though what should we make of a philosophy that shares the ignorant old woman's belief that everything happens by destiny?), and second, your practice of divination (mantikē), or divinatio in Latin, which, if we let you have your way, would fill us with such superstition that we'd end up beholden to soothsayers, augurs, diviners, prophets, and dream-interpreters. Epicurus has freed us from these terrors and restored our freedom. We don't fear beings who, as we understand it, create no trouble for themselves and seek none for others; instead, we worship, with piety and reverence, a sublime and exalted nature. ...

SKEPTICAL CRITIQUE OF THE EPICUREAN VIEW OF THE GODS (Book 1)

Against the Common Consent Argument

1.23. [Cotta (Academic Skeptic):] You said that the fact that people of every race and nation hold this belief was sufficient evidence to establish that the gods exist. But that argument is not only weak, it's also false. First, how do you even know that all nations hold this belief? I myself think there are many peoples so thoroughly savage that they have no concept of such beings at all. And didn't Diagoras, known as "the godless" (atheos), and Theodorus after him, openly reject the idea of a divine nature altogether? As for Protagoras of Abdera, whom you mentioned earlier, the most eminent sophist of his time, he was banished from Athens and its territory by public decree. His books were burned in the public assembly, all because he opened one of his works with the statement, "Regarding the gods, I am unable to say either that they exist or that they do not." In my view, this incident made many people far less willing to admit their doubts, once it became clear that merely expressing uncertainty could be punished. ...

The Absurdity of the Gods' Quasi Body

1.24. ... I'll grant that all things are made of atoms, but what does that have to do with the question at hand, since we're inquiring into the nature of the gods? Let the gods be made of atoms if you like; that doesn't make them eternal. Whatever is formed from atoms came into being at some point. If that's true, then the gods did not exist before they were born, and since they had a beginning, they must also have an end, exactly as you argued a moment ago about Plato's world. So where does that leave your attributes of blessedness and eternity, the two qualities you use to define God? Whenever you try to prove them, you retreat into obscurity, as you did when you claimed that God has no body, only quasi-body, and no blood, only quasi-blood.

          1.25. This is a familiar move of yours: when you've made some improbable claim and want to avoid being called out for it, you prop it up with something even more impossible, so that it would have been better to simply concede the original point than to defend it with such shamelessness. ... He does the same thing with the divine nature. Trying to avoid the buildup of indivisible particles, for fear the gods might be subject to dispersion and decay, he claims that the gods have no body, only quasi-body, and no blood, only quasi-blood.

          1.26. It seems remarkable enough that one soothsayer can look at another without laughing, but it's even more remarkable that you Epicureans can keep from laughing among yourselves. "Not body, but quasi-body." I could understand this if it were applied to figures made of wax or clay, but I cannot understand what quasi-body and quasi-blood are supposed to mean when applied to God. ...

          1.27. As I understand your position, you are claiming that the gods possess a kind of form that has no compactness, solidity, mass, or definition, but is instead unmixed, fleeting, and transparent. Very well. Then we'll say of this form what we say of the Venus of Cos: that figure is not a body but resembles one, and that pale, glowing color mixed with white is not blood but a semblance of blood. By the same logic, we'll say that in the god of Epicurus there is nothing real, only semblances of reality. But suppose I grant you something that cannot even be properly understood; then explain to me next the forms and features of these shadowy deities of yours.

          On this question, you have no shortage of arguments ready to prove that the gods have human form. First, because our minds have formed an idea and preconception of them that makes the human shape come to mind whenever we think of God. Second, because the divine nature, being superior in every respect, ought also to possess the most beautiful kind of form, and no form is more beautiful than the human one. . . . Do you suppose there's any creature on land or in the sea that isn't most drawn to a creature of its own kind? If that weren't true, why wouldn't a bull take pleasure in mating with a mare, or a horse with a cow? Do you believe an eagle, a lion, or a dolphin would prefer any shape other than its own? And if nature has likewise instilled in humans the conviction that nothing is more beautiful than the human form, is it really so strange that this same instinct leads us to imagine the gods as human? Don't you think that if animals possessed reason, each species would claim superiority for itself? ...

Superiority of Human Form as Habit, Not Universal Truth

1.29. ... From childhood we've known Jupiter, Juno, Minerva, Neptune, Vulcan, Apollo, and the other gods in the form that painters and sculptors have handed down to us, and likewise their emblems, ages, and dress. But the Egyptians, the Syrians, and nearly the entire non-Greek world have known them differently. Among them, you would find a firmer belief invested in certain animals than we invest in the holiest temples and images of our gods. ...

          1.30. Are you not ashamed, then, as a man of science, that is, as someone who investigates and pursues the truth of nature, to seek testimony to truth in minds shaped merely by habit? ... I have known Epicureans who worshipped every trivial image. I'm also aware that some think that Epicurus retained the gods in name so as not to provoke the Athenians' anger, but he actually rejected them along with everything else. Consider his short, selected maxims, which you call the "Principal Doctrines" (kyriai doxai): the first, I believe, runs as follows: that which is blessed and immortal experiences no trouble itself, nor does it cause trouble to anyone else. ...

          1.32. ... Now I ask, since you allow nothing in nature to happen by design, what extraordinary stroke of fortune was this? I ask, setting that question aside, what accounted for this triumph of chance? How did such an opportune combination of atoms occur that human were suddenly created in the form of the gods? Are we to suppose that the seed of the gods rained down from above, and that men were born in this way, resembling their divine ancestors? I'd like you to say so. I'd be willing enough to acknowledge kinship with the gods, but instead you tell us that our resemblance to the gods was simply the work of chance. ...

          1.33. ... When you consider the specific usefulness of each limb in the human body, doesn't that alone lead you to conclude that the gods have no need of human limbs? What use are feet without walking, or hands with nothing to grasp, or any of the body's other parts, a system in which nothing is idle, undesigned, or superfluous? So God will have a tongue and never speak. He will have teeth, a palate, and a throat, all with no use for them. The organs nature gave the body for reproduction, he will possess in vain. And this holds not only for the outer parts but the inner ones as well, the heart, lungs, liver, and the rest. And if you strip away their usefulness, what charm do they retain on their own? I ask because it's for the sake of beauty that you insist God must possess these organs. ...

          1.37. Even children, even when idle, amuse themselves with some active sport. Do we wish that God's holiday-keeping should be one of such unenergetic inertia as to make us fear that, if he moved, it would be impossible for him to be happy? Statements of that kind not only deprive the gods of motion and divine activity, but lead to inertness in men as well, if, that is, even God cannot be happy when engaged in action of any kind. . . .

A Lifeless God: Blessedness Without Virtue or Action

1.40. Now let us consider his blessedness. That is certainly impossible without virtue, but virtue requires activity, and your God does nothing. He is therefore without virtue, and so without blessedness either. What, then, is his life? "An abundance of good things," you say, "with no ills mixed in." Good things of what kind? Pleasures, I presume, and of course pleasures of the body, since you Epicureans recognize no mental pleasure that doesn't arise from and refer back to the body. ...

          1.41. But he feels no pain, you say. Is that enough to constitute this supremely blessed life overflowing with good? We are told God constantly reflects on his own blessedness, having nothing else to occupy his thoughts. Picture, then, and bring before your eyes, a God whose only thought through all eternity is "I am doing well!" and "Blessed am I!" Yet I don't see how this supposedly blessed God avoids fearing death, given that he is continually battered and shaken by the endless storm of atoms, with images constantly streaming off of himself. This shows that your God is neither blessed nor eternal. ... Now can there be anything supremely excellent in a nature that delights only in its own well-being, and that has never performed, does not perform, and never will perform any action? And what piety could we owe a being from whom we've received nothing? What, in fact, could be owed at all to one from whom no benefit flows? Piety means right dealing toward the gods, but what question of "right dealing" can arise between us and them, when man shares no community with God at all? Holiness, likewise, means knowing how to worship the gods, but why we should worship them when we neither receive nor expect any good from them, I do not understand.

          1.42. And what reason would we have to revere the gods out of admiration for a nature in which we see nothing excellent? As for the freedom from superstition you are so fond of boasting about, that's easy enough to achieve once you've stripped the gods of all their power, unless you think it's plausible that Diagoras or Theodorus, who flatly denied the gods' existence, were somehow superstitious. Nor, in my view, could that be said of Protagoras either, who was convinced neither that the gods existed nor that they didn't. The truth is that the views of all these men [like Protagoras] eliminate not only superstition, which involves an irrational fear of the gods, but religion itself, which consists in their pious worship. And didn't some put an end to all religion entirely when claiming that belief in immortal gods was simply invented by wise men for political purposes, so that people who couldn't be guided to duty by reason could be guided by religion instead?

The God Who Loves No One: Epicurus's Hidden Atheism

1.43. ... But it was when he stripped the immortal gods of the capacity for help and benevolence that Epicurus tore religion out of human hearts by the roots. He claims the divine nature is supremely high and excellent, yet denies that God possesses benevolence, thereby removing the single most essential trait of a supremely high and excellent nature, since nothing is higher or more excellent than kindness and generosity. When you claim God lacks this, you're claiming that no one, god or human, is dear to God, that no one is loved by him, and no one valued by him, from which it follows that the gods are not only indifferent to human beings but indifferent to one another as well.

          1.44. ... But Epicurus also wrote a book on holiness. He's toying with us here, not so much because he has a sense of humor, but because he's a man who indulges freely in reckless writing. For what holiness could exist if the gods have no concern for human affairs? And what living nature could exist that cares about nothing at all? There's certainly more truth in what our mutual friend Posidonius argued in the fifth book of his work on the nature of the gods. He claims Epicurus doesn't actually believe the gods exist at all, and that what he said about the immortal gods was only to avoid public backlash. Surely Epicurus wouldn't have been foolish enough to imagine a god resembling an ordinary mortal, possessing only surface features and an insubstantial body, equipped with every human limb yet without the slightest use for any of them, a kind of thinned-out, transparent being who cares for no one, does nothing for anyone, is concerned with nothing, and does nothing at all. In the first place, such a nature couldn't possibly exist, and Epicurus, recognizing this, effectively eliminates the gods while retaining them in name only. In the second place, if God's defining trait is his complete detachment from benevolence and love for humanity, then we might as well say goodbye to him. Why would I say "may he be gracious to us"? He cannot be gracious to anyone, since, according to you, all service and love spring from weakness.

THE STOIC DEFENSE OF DIVINE PROVIDENCE (Book 2)

Universal Consent and the Four Causes of Belief in God

2.1. ... [Lucilius Balbus (Stoic):] I am at your service, said Balbus, and I'll speak as briefly as I can, since exposing the errors of Epicurus has already relieved me of a large part of what I'd need to say. Broadly speaking, our school divides this entire inquiry into the immortal gods into four parts. We aim to show, first, that the gods exist; second, what their nature is; third, that the world is governed under their care; and finally, that they take thought for human affairs. In this discussion, though, let's take up the first two points; the third and fourth, being more substantial, I think should be saved for another occasion. Not at all, said Cotta, our time is our own to spend, and besides, this is a subject that deserves priority even over ordinary business.

          2.2. The first point [that the gods exist], Lucilius then said, hardly seems to need discussion at all. What could be clearer or more obvious, once we've lifted our eyes to the sky and gazed upon the heavenly bodies, than that some divine power of surpassing intelligence governs them? If that weren't so, how could Ennius have written the words that meet with everyone's assent: "Look upon that dazzling sky above, which all men call Jove"? ... Nor is this agreement accidental or coincidental. There is, first of all, this reason for it [i.e., belief in the gods]: the gods frequently reveal their power through direct, tangible presence. ...

          2.3. And what about predictions and warnings of the future? What do they announce, if not that the future is being indicated, foreshadowed, portended, and predicted to us, hence the very terms "indications," "foreshowings," "portents," and "prodigies"? ... And if we care to compare our own national character with that of foreign nations, we'll find that although they may equal or even surpass us in other respects, in religion, that is, in the worship of the gods, we far exceed them. ...

          2.4. In the case of the consuls Publius Scipio and Caius Figulus, the expertise of both our own augurs and the soothsayers of Etruria was confirmed by actual events. ... Wouldn't anyone confronted with these examples, and countless others like them, be compelled to acknowledge the existence of the gods? Beings who have interpreters must themselves exist; interpreters of the gods do exist, therefore let us acknowledge that the gods exist. But, you'll object, not every prediction comes true. Well, not every sick person recovers either, yet no one concludes from that there's no such thing as the art of medicine. The gods reveal signs of future events, and whenever someone has misread those signs, the fault lies with human guesswork, not with divine nature. And so, on the central question, all people of all nations agree: the existence of the gods is an idea natural to everyone, engraved, as it were, upon the mind. Opinions differ about their nature, but no one denies that they exist.

          2.5. Now Cleanthes, a member of our own school, argued that human ideas of the gods arose from four causes. He placed first the cause I just mentioned, originating in premonitions of the future. Second, he named the one we find in the great benefits gained from a mild climate, fertile land, and abundant other resources. Third, the fear inspired in the mind by lightning, storms, tempests, snow, hail, barren wastelands, and plague, things whose sheer terror led people to imagine some divine and heavenly power at work. And as the fourth and most important cause of all, he named the regularity of motion. There is the revolutions of the heavens, the arrangement of the sun, moon, and all the stars, and their usefulness, beauty, and order, the mere sight of which would be enough to show they weren't the product of chance. Just as someone entering a house, a gymnasium, or a marketplace couldn't possibly conclude, upon seeing its layout, proportions, and arrangement, that these things came about without a cause, but would instead understand that someone had designed and organized them, so too with movements this vast and alternations this regular, in a succession of phenomena so numerous and so powerful that the boundless span of past time has never once disappointed our expectations, it's far more inevitable to conclude that such immense operations of nature are directed by some intelligence.

Argument for Cosmic Intelligence from Human Reason

2.6. Chrysippus, in turn, makes an argument that, though his own mind is remarkably sharp, seems drawn straight from nature itself rather than invented by him. "If," he says, "there is something in nature that human mind, reason, strength, and power could not have produced, then whatever produced it must surely be greater than man. Now the heavenly bodies, and all the phenomena that maintain an everlasting order, could not have been created by man; therefore, whatever created them is greater than man. And what could you call this, if not God? For if the gods don't exist, nothing in nature could be greater than man, since man alone possesses reason, and nothing surpasses reason in excellence. But for a man to think that in the whole universe nothing is greater than himself would be sheer, senseless arrogance. Therefore, something greater does exist, and therefore a God certainly exists." ...

          2.7-8. And this quality that surpasses all others, I mean reason, or, to use several terms for it, intelligence, design, reflection, foresight, where did we find it? Where did we obtain it? Should the universe possess every other quality and lack this one, the most important of all? Yet surely nothing in all creation is nobler than the universe, nothing more excellent or more beautiful. Not only does nothing surpass it, nothing nobler can even be imagined, and if reason and wisdom are the noblest qualities that exist, they must inevitably exist in whatever we recognize as supremely noble. Again, who could resist agreeing with this once he considers the harmonious, coordinated, unbroken connection running through all things? Could the earth manage to bloom at one consistent time each year, and then lie barren at another consistent time? Could the sun's approach and retreat, at the summer and winter solstices, be tracked by so many things changing on their own in response? Could the tides of the sea and of narrow straits be governed by the rising and setting of the moon? Could the differing movements of the planets be sustained within the single revolution of the whole sky? None of this could possibly happen with such mutual harmony among all parts of the universe unless it were held together by a single, all-pervading divine spirit. . . .

          These arguments, which later Stoics have expanded at length, were originally compressed by Zeno [the founder of Stoicism] into this form: "Whatever exercises reason is more excellent than whatever does not exercise reason; nothing is more excellent than the universe; therefore the universe exercises reason." By the same method, it can be shown that the universe is wise, blessed, and eternal, since anything possessing these qualities is more excellent than anything lacking them, and nothing surpasses the universe in excellence. In this way, it will be proven that the universe is divine. He also offers this: "No part can be sentient unless the whole is sentient; parts of the universe are sentient; therefore the universe is sentient." He pushes the point further with more precise terms: "Nothing lifeless and without reason can produce from itself a being that is alive and possesses reason; the universe produces beings that are alive and possess reason; therefore the universe is alive and possesses reason." As was often his habit, he also framed the argument as a comparison, along these lines: "If melodious flutes grew from an olive tree, would you doubt that the olive possessed some knowledge of flute-playing? Or if plane trees bore harps that produced rhythmic music, surely you'd conclude in the same way that plane trees possessed the art of music. Why, then, since the universe gives birth to beings that are alive and wise, should the universe itself not be considered alive and wise?"

Fiery Cosmic Spirit and the Divine Ruling Principle

2.9. Since, however, I have begun to treat the subject in a way different from what I announced at starting (for I said that this first part did not need discussion, as the existence of the gods was evident to all), I am now desirous that that point should nevertheless be itself confirmed by considerations of natural philosophy. The facts are these. Everything that receives nurture and increase contains within itself a principle of heat [fire] without which nurture and increase would be impossible. . . .

          2.11. There is, then, an element [of fire] which holds together and maintains the entire universe, an element, moreover, which is not without sensation and reason. For it is necessary that every element which is not isolated or simple, but which is joined and linked with something else, should have in itself some ruling principle, as, for instance, mind in the case of man, and in the case of animals something similar to mind, which prompts their desires. In trees, and in things which spring from the earth, the ruling principle is supposed to be placed in their roots. By ruling principle I mean the principle which the Greeks call "ruling-principle" (hegemonikon), which cannot but hold, and which ought to hold, the highest place in each genus. Consequently the thing in which the ruling principle of the whole of nature is contained, must in the same way be the most perfect of all, and the most worthy of power and dominion over all existence. Now we see that in parts of the universe (for there is nothing in the entire universe which is not a part of the whole), sensation and reason exist. These qualities must therefore exist, and exist more vividly and to a greater extent, in that part in which the ruling principle of the universe resides. Consequently, the universe must be intelligent, and the element which holds all things in its embrace must excel in perfection of reason. The universe, therefore, must be divine, and so must the element by which the whole strength of the universe is held together. This fiery glow which the universe possesses is also far purer, clearer, and nimbler, and on that account better fitted to arouse sensation, than this heat of ours, by which the objects known to us are preserved and made strong. Since, then, men and animals are maintained by this heat, and through it possess motion and sensation, it is absurd to say that the universe is without sensation, when it is maintained by a burning heat which is unmixed, and free, and pure, and at the same time in the highest degree vivid and nimble, especially considering that the heat which belongs to the universe is moved by itself and its own action, and is not stirred by anything distinct from itself, or by impact from outside. For what can be mightier than the universe, so as to act upon and set in motion the heat by which the universe is to be held together? . . .

          2.13. The fourth and highest stage consists of beings who are created naturally good and wise, in whom right reason in an unchanging form is innate from the beginning, that reason which must be regarded as more than human, and must be assigned to what is divine, that is, to the universe, in which this complete and perfect reason must exist. For it cannot be said that in any order of things there is not something final and perfect. . . . That, therefore, must be the fourth and highest stage, which no force can come near. Now it is in that stage that universal nature has its place, and since it is the characteristic of that nature that all things should be inferior to it, and nothing able to stand in its way, it necessarily follows that the universe is intelligent, and more than that wise. Besides, what is more foolish than that the nature which embraces all things should not be declared supremely excellent, or that, being supremely excellent, it should not be in the first place animate, in the second possessed of reason and forethought, and lastly wise? In what other way can it be supremely excellent? For if it resembled plants, or even animals, it would not deserve to be considered of the highest degree of excellence, but rather of the lowest, while if it participated in reason, and yet were not wise from the beginning, the condition of the universe as compared with that of man would be the lower of the two. For man can become wise, but if the universe during the limitless course of past time has been destitute of wisdom, it will assuredly never acquire it, and will therefore be lower than man. Since that is absurd, the universe must be regarded as wise from the beginning, and as divine.

          2.14. ... Since nothing is more perfect than the universe, and nothing more excellent than virtue, it follows that virtue belongs to the universe. Human nature is not perfect, and yet man attains virtue nonetheless, so how much more easily should the universe attain it! Virtue, then, does exist in the universe, which is therefore wise, and consequently divine.

          2.15. Having established that the universe is divine, we must attribute the same quality to the heavenly bodies, which are formed from the purest and most mobile portion of the aether, without any admixture of other elements, and which glow and remain transparent throughout. It is therefore entirely correct to describe them too as living beings, possessing feeling and intelligence. ...

          2.17. ... This proves that the universe is alive, and endowed with feeling, intelligence, and reason, from which it follows that the universe is divine. These facts, however, will become still easier to recognize a little later on, once we examine the actual workings of the universe. ...

          2.21. This constancy among the stars, this striking agreement of timing maintained across the whole of eternity despite such varied movements, I simply cannot understand as existing apart from mind, reason, and forethought. And since we find that the heavenly bodies possess these qualities, we cannot help but count them among the number of divine beings. Nor, indeed, are the so-called fixed stars lacking in signs of this same intelligence and foresight. ...

Nature as Artificer: Providence and Cosmic Order

2.22. Zeno, then, defines nature as a fire that works with skill, one that advances toward creation by fixed methods. He maintains that the essential function of any skill is to create and produce. Further whatever the hand accomplishes in the crafts we practice, nature accomplishes far more skillfully, through, as I said, this skillfully working fire, which is the master of every other skill. On this principle, every department of nature operates skillfully, since each has, so to speak, its own fixed path and prescribed course. But in the case of the universe itself, which encloses and contains all things within its embrace, Zeno says that the nature at work there is not merely skillful but, in the fullest sense, a craftsman, one who takes thought and makes provision for everything useful and advantageous. And just as every other part of nature is created and grows from its own seeds, and remains contained within those seeds, so too all the movements belonging to universal nature, along with its strivings and desires, which the Greeks call "impulses" (hormai), arise from within itself, and it matches these impulses with corresponding actions, exactly as we ourselves do when moved by feelings and sensations. Given that the mind of the universe operates this way, it may rightly be described as foresight, or providence, its Greek name being pronoia ("providence"). And what this providence is chiefly concerned with and occupied by is, first, ensuring that the universe is as well equipped as possible to endure, and second, ensuring that it lacks nothing, but instead possesses, in the highest possible degree, exquisite beauty and completeness of adornment.

          2.23. We have now discussed the universe as a whole, and the stars as well, so that a great multitude of divine beings has become almost visible to us, beings who are never idle, yet accomplish everything they do without strenuous or burdensome toil. They are not made up of veins, nerves, and bones; they don't live on the kind of food or drink that would leave their vital fluids too harsh or too sluggish; and their bodies aren't the sort that would make them dread a fall, fear a blow, or worry about illness brought on by exhausted limbs, the very fears that led Epicurus to invent gods who existed only in mere outline and did nothing at all. Not so with these gods. They possess a form of the utmost beauty, occupy the purest region of the sky, and appear, through their movements and the course they follow, to have joined together for the preservation and protection of all things.

          There are, moreover, many other divine beings to whom, because of their great services, a status and a name have been assigned, and not without reason, by both the wisest men of Greece and by our own ancestors. They reasoned that whatever conferred great benefit on the human race could not have come into being except through the gods' benevolence toward mankind. And so they would sometimes name the thing produced after the god who produced it, as when we call grain "Ceres" and wine "Liber," which is the source of Terence's line, "Without Ceres and Liber, Venus grows faint." ...

Superstitious Myths vs True Religion

2.28. Do you see, then, how from the valid and useful observation of natural phenomena, a shift was then made in thought toward imaginary and fictitious deities? This shift gave rise to false beliefs, wild errors, and superstitions barely worthy of an ignorant old woman. For we are made familiar with the shapes, age, clothing, and equipment of the gods, as well as their lineages, marriages, family ties, and everything in them that has been reduced to the likeness of human frailty. Thus, they are brought before us with minds prey to turmoil, for we hear of their desires, sorrows, and angers. As the stories tell, they have even experienced wars and battles, not only when they protected one side or the other of two opposing armies, as in Homer, but also when they waged their own personal wars, as against the Titans and Giants. It is foolish in the highest degree to speak of these things or to give them any credit, and they abound in futility and utter triviality. Nevertheless, while we reject and scorn these stories, we can still understand the existence and character of the gods who pervade the nature of each thing, Ceres through the earth, Neptune through the sea, one god through one realm and another through another, along with the names by which custom has designated them. It is these gods whom we ought to reverence and worship. The best, purest, holiest, and most pious worship of the gods is to reverence them always with a mind and voice that are stainless, guiltless, and uncorrupt. For religion has been distinguished from superstition not only by philosophers but by our own ancestors as well. . . . I have, I think, sufficiently shown both the existence of the gods and their nature.

The Universe as a Rational City Administered by Divine Nature

2.29. My next task is to show that the universe is administered by divine providence. . . .

          2.30. I say, then, that the universe and all its parts both received their initial order from divine providence and are continuously administered by it. . . . Indeed, if we grant that the gods are intelligent, we must also grant that they are provident, and provident regarding what is most important. Is it that they are ignorant of what matters most and how those things ought to be handled and cared for, or do they lack the strength to sustain and govern what is so vast? Ignorance is alien to the divine nature, and struggling to fulfill a duty because of weakness is entirely inconsistent with divine majesty. In this way, what we set out to prove is established: namely, that the universe is administered by divine providence.

          2.31. Now, since the gods exist—granting, as is certainly the case, that they do—they must be animate, and not only animate but also possessed of reason. They are bound together in a shared unity and fellowship, governing a single universe as though it were a corporate state and a kind of city. It follows that the same reason exists in them as in the human race, the same truth in both, and the same law, which consists in commanding good and turning away evil. From this we understand that prudence and intelligence made their way from the gods to human beings, which is why intelligence, faith, virtue, and concord were deified and publicly enshrined by the decree of our ancestors. . . .

          2.32. I have next to show that all things are subject to nature and are most exquisitely administered by it. . . . As for our own school [of Stoicism], when we say that the universe is held together and administered by nature, we do not mean this as we would of a clod of dirt, a fragment of stone, or something of that sort which lacks an internal principle of cohesion. We mean it as we would of a tree or an animal, in which nothing is random, but in which order and something like systematic art are manifest.

          2.33. But if the things the earth sustains by means of roots owe their life and vigor to the craftsmanship of nature, surely the earth itself is sustained by that same power. After being impregnated by seed, it produces and puts forth all things from itself, nourishes and increases their roots by its embrace, and is in turn nourished by the elements above that surround it. . . . Whichever view you take, it follows that the universe is administered by nature. For the maneuvering of a fleet, the deployment of an army, or, to return to the works of nature, the growth of a vine or tree, or the structure and formation of a living creature's limbs do not demonstrate as much skill on nature's part as the universe itself. Either nothing is ruled by sentient nature, or we must acknowledge that the universe is so ruled. How can that which contains all other natural forms and their seeds fail to be administered by nature itself? If anyone were to say that teeth and pubic hair were created by nature, but that the human being in whom they were created was not formed by nature, he would fail to understand that the source which produces something from itself possesses a more perfect nature than the thing produced. . . .

          2.45. Nor are these things alone deserving of our wonder; there is no more important fact than this: the universe is so stable, and so closely bound together for the sake of permanence, that nothing more compact can even be imagined, as all its parts from every side press inward toward the center with uniform force. Composite bodies are most enduring when they are held together by a kind of encircling bond, and this is precisely how that natural principle operates which permeates the entire universe, bringing all things to pass through intelligence and reason, and drawing whatever is on the outside toward the center. Consequently, if the universe is spherical, and if for that reason all its uniform parts are held together by an inherent tendency toward the center, the same must hold true for the earth. As all its parts seek the center (which in a sphere is the lowest point), there is no break in continuity that could disrupt this strong inward pressure of weight and gravity. In the same way, the sea, even though it sits above the earth, is gathered at every point into a uniform globe-like shape because of its tendency toward the earth's center, so that it never overflows or spills over. Air, which borders the sea, expands in all directions despite being carried upward by its lightness; thus, while it remains directly joined to the sea, its own nature carries it toward the sky, where the rarity and warmth temper it, enabling it to supply living creatures with life-sustaining breath. Surrounding all of this is the highest region of the sky, called the aether, which keeps its burning heat pure and unmixed while remaining in direct contact with the outermost boundary of the air. . . .

          2.51. Now, to ensure the permanent order of the world, divine providence took great care to preserve the ongoing existence of the various species of animals, trees, and all plants sustained by the earth through roots. Every plant contains within itself a seed of such potency that several others are produced from a single parent, with the seed enclosed in the innermost part of the fruit. These seeds are freely consumed by human beings and also serve to replenish the earth with fresh growth of the same species. . . .

Divination and Care for Human Affairs

2.65. Furthermore, there is the practice of divination, which both of you will likely criticize (Cotta because Carneades loved to attack the Stoics, and Velleius because Epicurus ridiculed nothing more than predicting the future). Divination seems to me the strongest proof of all that divine providence cares for human affairs. Divination certainly exists, showing itself across many places and times in both private life and public affairs. Soothsayers discern many truths, augurs anticipate many events, and oracles, prophecies, dreams, and portents reveal many outcomes. By gaining this foresight, people have frequently secured great advantages and averted serious dangers. This capacity, whether expressed as inspiration, systematic skill, or a natural gift, was undoubtedly granted by the immortal gods to human beings alone. Even if these arguments do not impress you when taken individually, they certainly ought to convince you when viewed together as a coherent whole. . . .

          2.66. . . . The frequent personal appearances of the gods show that they consult the interests of both nations and individuals, a care also evident in the signs of future events revealed to us in waking life and in dreams. We receive further warnings from portents, sacrificial entrails, and numerous other phenomena, which long experience has observed so carefully as to produce a systematic art of divination. No great person has ever lacked divine inspiration; for such a person, all circumstances turn out well—provided that the thinkers of our school, along with Socrates, the father of philosophy, have adequately demonstrated the richness and fullness of virtue. Nor should we counter this by assuming that if a storm damages someone's crops or vineyards, or if fortune takes away life's goods, that person was hated or neglected by God. The gods take care of great matters, but neglect the small.

THE SKEPTICAL REFUTATION OF STOICISM AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL (Book 3)

Fallacy of Universal Consent and the Uncertainty of Divination

3.4. [Cotta (Academic Skeptic):] You also considered it a weighty argument that belief in the immortal gods is both widespread and constantly growing. But is it really wise for our judgment on matters of such importance to be decided by the opinions of fools, especially according to your own school, which holds that all fools are mad? . . .

          3.6. . . . The future follows upon the past, for no one can escape it. Indeed, knowing what is going to happen is often not even to our advantage, for it is miserable to be tortured to no purpose and to lose even hope, that last universal solace. This is all the more true since you also claim that everything happens by fate, meaning that which has been true from all eternity. What help or defense, then, does it offer to know that an event will happen when its occurrence is already certain? Besides, what is the origin of this divination of yours? Who discovered how to interpret the divisions of the liver? Who observed the call of the crow or the signs given by lots? I accept these practices, and I cannot simply despise the augur's staff of Attus Navius that you mentioned; but how these signs came to be understood is something I ought to learn from philosophers, especially since your diviners predict incorrectly on a great many matters. You reply that physicians are also frequently mistaken. But I ask in return: what resemblance is there between medicine, whose principles I can understand, and divination, whose origin remains completely obscure to me?

          3.7. . . . I have now addressed the subject of forewarning. As for terrifying events in the heavens, on land, and at sea, we cannot deny that many people fear them when they occur and believe they are caused by the immortal gods. But the question is not whether some people believe the gods exist, but whether the gods actually exist or not.

Limits of Cosmic Design: Can the Universe Be Wise?

3.8. . . . Since you divided the whole inquiry into four parts and we have addressed the first, let's consider the second—my impression of which is that in attempting to demonstrate the nature of the gods, you ended up showing their non-existence. For although you admitted that it is extremely difficult to detach our intelligence from the habitual experience of our eyes, you declared without hesitation that because nothing is more exalted than God and nothing in all nature is more excellent than the universe, the universe itself is God. Perhaps so, if we could only conceive of the universe as a living creature—or rather, if we had as clear a mental perception of this as we have a visual perception of physical things! But when you say that nothing is more excellent than the universe, what do you mean by 'excellent'? If you mean more beautiful, I agree. If you mean better suited for our convenience, I agree to that as well. But if you mean that nothing is wiser than the universe, I disagree entirely—not because it is hard to detach the mind from what we see, but because the more I detach it, the less I am able to make sense of your position.

          3.9. . . . The central point in dispute, which later writers expanded, was summarized long ago in Zeno's brief and, as you thought, pointed syllogism: "Whatever exercises reason is more excellent than whatever does not exercise reason; nothing is more excellent than the universe; therefore, the universe exercises reason". If you accept this logic, you will soon have to claim that the universe is an expert at reading books. Following Zeno's steps, you could construct an argument like this: "Whatever is educated is more excellent than whatever is uneducated; nothing is more excellent than the universe; therefore, the universe is educated". By that same logic, the universe would also be eloquent, mathematical, musical—in short, trained in every branch of learning, and ultimately a philosopher! You repeated several times that nothing is produced except from the universe, and that nature lacks the power to fashion things unlike itself. Must I concede, then, that the universe is not only alive and wise, but also a skilled lute player and trumpeter, simply because people who practice those arts are produced by it? Such a conclusion shows there is nothing in the founder of Stoicism's argument to make us think the universe exercises reason or is even alive. The universe, therefore, is not divine—even though nothing is more excellent, beautiful, useful, magnificent, or uniform in its movements. But if the universe as a whole is not divine, neither are the stars, which you counted in endless numbers among the gods, delighting in their regular, unending courses—and rightly so, for they display wonderful constancy. Yet not everything with a fixed and uniform movement, Balbus, must be attributed to a divine principle rather than a natural one.

The Impermanence of Celestial Elements and the Critique of Divine Virtue

3.14. . . . Our earlier argument can be repeated: whatever possesses sensation must be sensitive to pleasure and pain, and whatever experiences pain must also be subject to mortality. It follows that you are equally unable to prove that fire is eternal. In fact, is it not also one of your beliefs that all fire requires fuel, unable to endure unless it is fed, and that the sun, moon, and other heavenly bodies are nourished by water—some by fresh water, others by the sea? Cleanthes offers this as the reason why the sun turns back at the summer solstice and advances no farther, and likewise at the winter solstice: to avoid straying too far from its source of nourishment. We will inquire into this entire matter in due course. For now, let us draw this conclusion: whatever can perish is not eternal by nature; fire perishes unless it is fed; therefore, fire is not eternal in its nature.

          3.15. Then again, what kind of God can we conceive of who possesses no virtue? Yet are we to attribute practical wisdom to God, which consists in distinguishing between good, evil, and what is neutral? What need has a being in whom no evil exists or can exist to discriminate between good and evil? And what need has he of reason and understanding, which we use to grasp the obscure through the evident, whereas to God nothing can be obscure? As for justice—the virtue that assigns to each his due—how is it relevant to the gods? For justice, as your school maintains, is the product of human society and fellowship. Temperance, likewise, consists in foregoing bodily pleasures; but if body has a place in heaven, so too do pleasures. And how can God be conceived of as brave? Is he brave regarding pain, labor, or danger, when not one of these things touches him? How, then, can we conceive of a God who neither exercises reason nor possesses any virtue? . . .

The Slippery Slope of Anthropomorphism and Popular Polytheism

3.17. . . . For if I take you as my guides, tell me what answer I am to give to anyone who asks me this question: "If the beings you mention are gods, are the Nymphs divine as well?"If they are, then so too are the little Pans and Satyrs. But the latter are not divine; therefore, neither are the Nymphs. Yet temples to the Nymphs have been publicly vowed and dedicated; therefore, the other beings whose temples have been dedicated are no more divine than they are." . . . This is how Carneades [the skeptic] used to argue, not to do away with the gods (for what could be less fitting for a philosopher?), but to prove that the Stoics provided no coherent account of them. . . .

          3.18. Will you say that Apollo, Vulcan, Mercury, and the rest are gods, while doubting Hercules, Aesculapius, Liber, Castor, and Pollux? Yet the latter are worshipped just as much as the former, and among some peoples even more so. Are these sons of mortal mothers, then, to be considered gods? . . .

          3.19. And if those beings whom we worship and know by tradition are gods, what reason can you give for not including Serapis and Isis in the same class, or why, if we do that, we should reject the gods of foreign nations? We would then have to grant oxen, horses, ibises, hawks, asps, crocodiles, fish, wolves, cats, and a host of other creatures a place among divine beings. If we reject these absurd conclusions, we must also reject the premises from which they sprang. . . .

          3.20. And do you not see, Balbus, how far the conclusions you derive from the sky and the heavenly bodies extend? You inferred that the sun and moon are divine, identifying the sun with Apollo and the moon with Diana. But if the moon is divine, then Lucifer and the other wandering stars must also hold rank as gods, and consequently so must the fixed stars. And why shouldn't something with the lovely appearance of the rainbow be assigned a place among divine beings? For there is beauty in the rainbow, and because it is seen as marvelously fair, Iris is depicted as the daughter of Thaumas. If the rainbow is divine by nature, what will you do with the clouds? The rainbow itself is composed of colored clouds, and one such cloud is even said to have given birth to the Centaurs. But if you count clouds among the gods, the same must be done for tempests, which Roman ritual has consecrated. Rain, thunder-clouds, storms, and whirlwinds would all have to be considered divine. Indeed, our generals customarily sacrifice to the waves when setting out by sea. Furthermore, if Ceres (as you claimed) takes her name from gerere, "to bear," then the earth itself is a goddess, for what else is Tellus than the power that bears? But if the earth is divine, so too is the sea, which you identified with Neptune, and therefore so are the rivers and springs. That is why Maso dedicated a shrine to Fons from his Corsican spoils, and why we find the Tiber, Spino, Almo, Nodinus, and other neighboring streams in the litany of the augurs. Either this principle expands indefinitely, or we must reject every instance of this kind and refuse to permit a process of endless superstition. No instance of the sort, then, should be accepted. . . .

Abstract Allegories and the Deification of Harmful Forces

3.24. After this, do you think these ideas need refutation by more elaborate arguments? Mind, faith, hope, virtue, honor, victory, safety, and concord are obviously abstractions by nature, not divinities. They are either qualities residing within ourselves—like mind, hope, faith, virtue, and concord—or things we desire, like honor, safety, and victory. I see their usefulness and the consecrated images raised to them, but why they should have the force of divinities I will not understand until someone explains it to me. Fortune in particular belongs in this category, for no one can separate fortune from caprice and chance, which are entirely unworthy of a divine being. What a risky principle to build on! There are so many names that will bring you to a complete standstill. How will you handle Vejovis and Vulcan? Yet, since you believe the word Neptune comes from nare, "to swim" (where you seem to me more at sea than Neptune himself), there is no name whose derivation you couldn't trace down to a single letter! Great and quite unnecessary pains were taken first by Zeno, then by Cleanthes, and later by Chrysippus to explain these legendary stories and account for the form of each proper name. In doing so, your school implicitly admits that the facts are far different from popular belief, maintaining that what are called gods are actually abstract qualities rather than divine persons.

          3.25. This error extended so far that even harmful things were given the title of gods and honored with sacred rites. We see, for instance, the shrine of Fever on the Palatine, the shrine of Bereavement near the temple of the Lares, and the altar of Evil Fortune dedicated on the Esquiline. All these mistaken notions should be banished from philosophy, for when discussing the immortal gods, they attribute qualities entirely unworthy of an immortal nature—qualities about which I have my own view, though I cannot agree with yours. You claim that Neptune is the intelligent principle pervading the sea, and you say the same of Ceres regarding the earth; but an intelligence of the sea or land is something I cannot understand, nor even picture in my imagination. I must therefore look elsewhere to learn whether the gods exist and what nature they possess, rather than relying on the nature you assign to them. . . .

Problem of Evil: Reason as a Flawed and Destructive Gift

3.30. . . . Do we think, then, that this widespread sowing of evil was the work of the immortal gods? I frame the question this way because if the gods gave reason to human beings, they also gave roguery—which is simply a cunning, deceitful use of reason to work mischief—as well as fraud, crime, and every other form of wrongdoing, not one of which can be planned or carried out without reason. Just as the old nurse in Medea wishes, "Would that the fir tree had never fallen to the ground in the groves of Pelion, smitten by the axe!" so one might wish that the gods had never bestowed this clever intelligence upon humanity. Very few make good use of it, and even they are often overcome by those who use it maliciously, while a countless majority turn it to evil ends. Thus, this heaven-sent gift of reason and foresight seems to have been granted to human beings for deceit rather than integrity.

          3.31. But you insist repeatedly that the fault lies with human beings, not with the gods—which is as if a physician were to denounce the severity of a disease, or a ship's captain the fury of a storm. To be sure, these are merely human professions, though even they would be acting absurdly; for who, one might ask, would employ them if those very difficulties did not exist? Against God, however, we can argue with greater freedom. You say the fault lies in human vice; then the gods ought to have granted a capacity for reason that excluded vice and error. Where was there any room for miscalculation on the part of the gods? If humans divert reason—granted by the immortal gods with good intentions—to purposes of deceit and roguery, it would have been better had reason been withheld from mankind altogether. A physician would be severely blamed if he knew that a sick patient, ordered to drink wine, would take it insufficiently diluted and die as a result. In the same way, this providence of yours must be faulted for granting reason to those it knew would make an atrocious and destructive use of it. Perhaps you will claim that providence did not know? I only wish you would say so, but you will not dare, for I know the high reverence in which you hold its name.

          3.32. This particular issue, however, can now be brought to a close. For if all philosophers agree that foolishness is a greater evil than all the harms of fortune and body combined, and if no one ever actually attains wisdom, then all of us—for whose benefit your school claims the gods made such marvelous provision—are trapped in the worst possible plight. Just as it makes no practical difference whether no one is healthy or no one can be healthy, I see no difference between no one being wise and no one being able to be wise. We are lingering too long on a point that is glaringly obvious, but Telamon settles the entire question of why the gods must be seen as indifferent to us in a single line of verse: "For if they cared for humans, it would go well with the good and ill with the wicked, which is plainly not the case". They ought to have made all human beings good, if indeed they had the interests of the human race at heart. If they failed to do that, they ought at the very least to have provided for the well-being of the good.

Source: Cicero, On the Nature of the Gods (De Natura Deorum), translated by Francis Brooks, adapted.

 

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PLOTINUS: GOD AS THE COSMIC TRIAD

Plotinus (c. 204–270 AD) was born in Egypt, though his exact birthplace is disputed, and spent his twenties studying in Alexandria. In his late thirties he joined a Roman military expedition into Persia, hoping to study Persian and Indian philosophy firsthand. The campaign collapsed and he barely escaped with his life, making his way instead to Rome, where he settled and taught for the rest of his career. He wrote nothing until he was nearly fifty, and even then his eyesight was reportedly so poor that he never corrected his own manuscripts. He left that work to his student Porphyry, who eventually organized his scattered treatises into six groups of nine, the Enneads. Plotinus lived ascetically, reportedly refused to celebrate his own birthday, and by Porphyry's account was so uninterested in his physical body that he never discussed his childhood or ancestry with anyone. Plotinus's philosophy centers on a single, ineffable source called "the One," from which all reality flows in descending stages. Plotinus's account of the One is a uniquely original adaptation of Plato's cosmology in the Republic, Parmenides and Timaeus. When Plato's writings were largely lost to the Latin West, Christian philosophers such as Augustine drew heavily on Plotinus, often crediting Plotinus's theories to Plato himself.

          The selections below follow three themes. First is Plotinus's view of the Divine Triad, which consists of three "hypostases", that is, substances that support all reality. They are (1) the One, (2) the divine intelligence and (3) the universal soul. For Plotinus, the One is the source of everything, and is analogous to the center of the sun which radiates or emanates everything else. The One is also indivisible (though not like an infinitely small geometric point), and also infinite (though not in size but in power). He continues arguing that the One is unspeakable, and we can describe it only by negation, that is, by saying what it is not (e.g., it is not like a geometrical point). The One is thus pure, undivided unity, it cannot think, know itself, or be named, and every statement we make about it inevitably falsifies it by treating it as a thing. Turning next to the Divine Intelligence, the second hypostasis, he argues Intelligence generates and contains all the Platonic Forms, binding them together in one interdependent whole. Turning next to the Universal Soul, the third hypostasis, he argues that it creates the material objects that we see around us, such as trees, by modeling them after the Forms that exist in the Divine Intelligence. The Universal Soul receives these Forms and impressing them onto matter unconsciously, in the way a mold shapes water into a circle. This produces a material world that is real but necessarily less perfect than its source.

          The second theme involves mystical union with the Divine. He describes here how the human soul ascends up toward the One. To accomplish this, we must first reject our attachment to earthly things. The human soul falls back from its vision of God because it is still troubled by bodily passion. When we accomplish this, our human souls will be absorbed in the Divinity. In this mystical union, the distinction between seer and seen dissolves entirely, and the soul, in Plotinus's words, becomes "other". It retains nothing of its former separate self. In this way, the Soul flies to the divinity, and becomes an image of the divinity itself. Something, though, remains after this vision fades. If we cultivate the virtue and wisdom, then our soul can rise again toward the Divinity it once saw face to face. For Plotinus, this then is the life of a divine and blessed person.

          The third and final theme is Plotinus's answer to the problem of evil, that is, how we reconcile the evil we experience with the divine existence. He gives multiple explanations. Most importantly, evil, he says, is located in non-being" itself, outside the reality of the One, the divine Intelligence, and universal Soul. These are thoroughly good, and evil cannot exist within any of them. Evil, then, must instead be located in "non-being," that is, within matter. He clarifies, though, that matter counts as evil by both lacking goodness, and also by lacking wisdom, beauty, and form. Next he argues that evil in the world is necessary since matter is the final emanation from the Good. Goodness cannot remain alone by itself, he says, but must overflow into further and further degrees of being. Thus, there must eventually be a final, weakest degree where the divine power runs out entirely. That termination point is matter, which thereby makes evil a structurally necessary feature of any complete emanation from the Good. He next argues there many goods that cannot arise unless there are evils to bring them about (i.e., evil-dependent goods). For example, many apparent evils, like venomous animals or even human wickedness, serve the perfection of the whole universe, spurring invention and good judgment. Finally, he argues that divine providence is not responsible for the voluntary evil committed by people". When a human soul chooses to harm others, the fault lies within that soul's voluntary character, not in divine providence. These souls, he says, already carried their particular dispositions into the world before they were even implanted within human bodies.

THREE HYPOSTASES OF THE DIVINE TRIAD: THE ONE, THE DIVINE INTELLIGENCE, THE UNIVERSAL SOUL (Enneads)

The One as the Source of Everything (1.8.2)

2. Let us now determine the nature of the Good [i.e., the One], at least so far as is demanded by the present discussion. The Good is the principle on which all depends, to which everything aspires, from which everything issues, and of which everything has need. As to Him, He suffices to himself, being complete, so He stands in need of nothing; He is the measure and the end of all things; and from Him spring intelligence, being, soul, life, and intellectual contemplation.

The One as Indivisible and Infinite (6.9.6)

6. In what sense do we use the name of unity, and how can we conceive of it? We will have to insist that the One is a unity much more perfect than the point of the monad. For in these, abstracting [geometric] magnitude, and numerical plurality, we do indeed stop at that which is most minute, and we come to rest in something indivisible. But this existed already in a divisible being, in a subject other than itself, while the One is neither in a subject other than itself, nor in anything divisible. If it is indivisible, neither is it of the same kind as that which is most minute. On the contrary, it is that which is greatest, not by [geometric] magnitude, but by power; possessing no [geometric] magnitude, it is indivisible in its power; for the beings beneath it are indivisible in their powers, and not in their mass [since they are incorporeal]. We must also insist that the One is infinite, not as would be a mass of a magnitude which could be examined serially, but by the incommensurability of its power. Even though you should conceive of it as of intelligence or divinity, it is still higher. When by thought you consider it as the most perfect unity, it is still higher. You try to form for yourself an idea of a divinity by rising to what in your intelligence is most unitary [and yet He is still simpler]; for He dwells within Himself, and contains nothing that is contingent.

The One is Unspeakable, and Describable Only by Negation (5:3:12-13)

          12. As the One is above Intelligence, it is also above consciousness. As it needs nothing, neither has it any need of knowing anything. Cognition [or, consciousness], therefore, belongs only to the second-rank nature. Consciousness is only an individual unity, while the One is absolute unity; indeed individual unity is not absolute Unity, because the absolute is [or, "in and for itself"], precedes the ["somehow determined," or] individual.

          13. This Principle, therefore, is truly indescribable. We are individualizing it in any statement about it. That which is above everything, even above the great Intelligence, truly has no name, and all that we can state about Him is, that He is not anything. Nor can He be given any name, since we cannot assert anything about Him. We refer to Him only as best we can. In our uncertainty we say, "What does He not feel? is He not self-conscious? does He not know Himself?" Then we must reflect that by speaking thus we are thinking of things, that are opposed to Him of whom we are now thinking. When we suppose that He can be known, or that He possesses self-consciousness, we are already making Him manifold. Were we to attribute to Him thought, it would appear that He needed this thought. If we imagine thought as being within Him, thought seems to be superfluous. For of what does thought consist? Of the consciousness of the totality formed by the two terms that contribute to the act of thought, and which fuse therein. That is thinking oneself, and thinking oneself is real thinking; for each of the two elements of thought is itself a unity to which nothing is lacking.

          On the contrary, the thought of objects exterior [to Intelligence] is not perfect, and is not true thought. That which is supremely simple and supremely absolute [i.e., the One] stands in need of nothing. The absolute that occupies the second rank needs itself, and, consequently, needs to think itself. Indeed, since Intelligence needs something relatively to itself, it succeeds in satisfying this need, and consequently, in being absolute, only by possessing itself entirely. It suffices itself only by uniting all the elements constituting its nature ["being"], only by dwelling within itself, only by remaining turned towards itself while thinking; for consciousness is the sensation of manifoldness, as is indicated by the etymology of the word "con-scious-ness," or, "conscience." If supreme Thought occur by the conversion of Intelligence towards itself, it evidently is manifold. Even if it said no more than "I am existence," Intelligence would say it as if making a discovery, and Intelligence would be right, because existence is manifold. Even though it should apply itself to something simple, and should say, "I am existence," this would not imply successful grasp of itself or existence. Indeed, when Intelligence speaks of existence in conformity with reality, intelligence does not speak of it as of a stone, but, merely, in a single word expresses something manifold.

          The existence that really and essentially deserves the name of existence, instead of having of it only a trace which would not be existence, and which would be only an image of it, such existence is a multiple entity. Will not each one of the elements of this multiple entity be thought? No doubt you will not be able to think it if you take it alone and separated from the others. But existence itself is in itself something manifold. Whatever object you name, it possesses existence. Consequently, He who is supremely simple cannot think Himself. If He did, He would be somewhere, [which is not the case]. Therefore, He does not think, and He cannot be grasped by thought.

Divine Intelligence Contains the Forms (6.7.2)

Intelligence Contains the Cause of All its Forms

What is the origin of the cause of what is a form, which is characteristic of Intelligence? It is not from Intelligence, because the form is not separable from Intelligence, combining with it to form one single and same thing. If then Intelligence possess the forms in their fulness, this fulness of forms implies that they contain their cause. Intelligence contains the cause of each of the forms it contains. It consists of all these forms taken together, or separately. None of them needs discovery of the cause of its production, for simultaneously with its production, it has contained the cause of its hypostatic existence. As it was not produced by chance, it contains all that belongs to its cause; consequently, it also possesses the whole perfection of its cause. Sense-things which participate in form do not only receive their nature from it, but also the cause of this nature. If all the things of which this universe is composed be intimately concatenated; and if the universe, containing all things, also contain the cause of each of them; if its relation with them be the same as that of the body with its organs, which do not mature successively, but which, towards each other, are mutually related as cause and effect; then so much the more, in the intelligible world, must things have their "causes," all of them in general in respect to the totality, and each independently in respect to itself.

The Universal Soul creates Material Objects Modeled after the Forms (2.3.17)

17. Let us examine if the "reasons" contained in the Soul are thoughts. How could the Soul produce by thoughts? It is the Reason which produces in matter; but the principle that produces naturally is neither a thought nor an intuition, but a power that fashions matter unconsciously, just as a circle gives water a circular figure and impression. Indeed, the natural generative power has the function of production. But it needs the co-operation of the governing [principle] of the Soul, which forms and which causes the activity of the generative soul engaged in matter. If the governing power of the Soul form the generative soul by reasoning, it will be considering either another object, or what it possesses in herself. If the latter be the case, she has no need of reasoning, for it is not by reasoning that the Soul fashions matter, but by the power which contains the reasons, the power which alone is effective, and capable of production. The Soul, therefore, produces by the forms. The forms she transmits are by her received from the Intelligence. This Intelligence, however, gives the forms to the universal Soul which is located immediately below her, and the universal Soul transmits them to the inferior soul [the natural generative power], fashioning and illuminating her. The inferior soul then produces, at one time without meeting any obstacles, at others, when doing so, although, in the latter case, she produces things less perfect. As she has received the power of production, and as she contains the reasons which are not the first [i.e., the "seminal reasons," which are inferior to the Ideas] not only does she, by virtue of what she has received, produce, but she also draws from herself something which is evidently inferior [matter]. It doubtless produces a living being [i.e. the material world], but a living being which is less perfect, and which enjoys life much less, because it occupies the last rank, because it is coarse and hard to manage, because the matter which composes it is the bitterness, so to speak, or the superior principles, because it spreads its bitterness around her, and communicates some of it to the universe. . . .

UNION WITH THE DIVINE (6.9.10-11)

Attachment to Earthly things Prevents the Soul from Remaining in Divine Intelligence

10. Why does the soul which has risen on high not stay there? Because she has not yet entirely detached herself from things here below. But a time will come when she will uninterruptedly enjoy the vision of the divinity, that is, when she will no longer be troubled by the passions of the body. The part of the soul that sees the divinity is not the one that is troubled [i.e., the irrational soul], but the other part [i.e., the rational soul]. Now she loses the sight of the divinity when she does not lose this knowledge which consists in demonstratings, conjectures and reasonings. In the vision of the divinity, indeed, that which sees is not the reason, but something prior and superior to reason; if that which sees is still united to reason, it then is as that which is seen. When he who sees himself sees, he will see himself as simple, being united to himself as simple, and will feel himself as simple.

The Soul becomes Absorbed in the Divinity

We should not even say that he will see, but only that he will be what he sees, in case that it would still here be possible to distinguish that which sees from that which is seen, or to assert that these two things do not form a single one. This assertion, however, would be rash, for in this condition he who sees does not, in the strict sense of the word, see; nor does he imagine two things. He becomes other, he ceases to be himself, he retains nothing of himself. Absorbed in the divinity, he is one with it, like a center that coincides with another center. While they coincide, they form but one, though they form two in so far as they remain distinct. In this sense only do we here say that the soul is other than the divinity. Consequently this manner of vision is very difficult to describe. How indeed could we depict as different from us Him who, while we were contemplating Him, did not seem other than ourselves, having come into perfect at-one-ment with us?

The Soul flies to the Divinity, and Becomes an Image of the Divinity

11. He who sees himself as having become divinity, possesses within himself an image of the divinity. If he rises above himself, he will achieve the limit of his ascension, becoming an image, so to speak, that becomes indistinguishable from its model. Then, when he will have lost sight of the divinity, he may still, by arousing the virtue preserved within himself, and by considering the perfections that adorn his soul, re-ascend to the celestial region, by virtue rising to Intelligence, and by wisdom to the Divinity Himself. Such is the life of the divinities. Such also is that of divine and blessed men, which involves detachment from all things here below, scorn of all earthly pleasures, and flight of the soul towards the Divinity that she will see face to face.

THE SOURCE OF EVIL

Evil Located in Non-Being (1.8.3)

3. Since [the Divine Intelligence and Universal Soul] are real beings, and since the first Principle [i.e., the One] is their superior, evil could not exist in such beings, and still less in Him, who is superior to them. For, all these things are good. Evil then must be located in non-being, and must, so to speak, be its form, referring to the things that mingle with it, or have some community with it. This "non-being," however, is not absolute non-being. Its difference from being resembles the difference between being and movement or rest; but only as its image, or something still more distant from reality. Within this non-being are comprised all sense-objects, and all their passive modifications. Or, evil may be something still more inferior, like their accident or principle, or one of the things that contribute to its constitution. To gain some conception of evil it may be represented by the contrast between measure and incommensurability; between indetermination and its goal; between lack of form and the creating principle of form; between lack and self-sufficiency; as the perpetual unlimited and changeableness; as passivity, insatiableness, and absolute poverty. Those are not the mere accidents of evil, but its very essence; all of that can be discovered when any part of evil is examined. The other objects, when they participate in the evil and resemble it, become evil without however being absolute Evil.

Matter Retains its Evil Quality since it is a Deprivation of Good (2.4.16)

Does matter continue to be evil when it happens to participate in the good? Yes, because it was formerly deprived of good, and did not possess it. That which lacks something, and obtains it, holds the middle between good and evil, if it is in the middle between the two. But that which possesses nothing, that which is a deprivation, or rather that which is deprivation itself, must necessarily be evil; for it is not a deprivation of wealth, but deprivation of wisdom, of virtue, of beauty, of vigor, of shape, of form, of quality. How, indeed, could such a thing not be shapeless, absolutely ugly and evil?

Evil is Necessary since Matter is the Final Emanation from the Good (1.8.7)

Here follows still another demonstration of the necessity of evil. Since good does not remain alone, evil must necessarily exist by issuing from the good. Alternatively, we might express this as the degradation and exhaustion [of the divine power, which, in the whole hierarchic series of successive emanations weakens from degree to degree]. There must, therefore, be a last degree of being, beyond which nothing further can be begotten, and that is evil. Just as the existence of something after a first [Good] is necessary, so must also a last degree [of being] be necessary. Now the last degree is matter, and contains nothing more of the First; [and, as matter and evil are identical,] the existence of evil is necessary.

Evil Dependent Goods: Some Evils Are Necessary to the Perfection of the Universe (2.3.18)

18. Must the evils in the universe be considered as necessary, because they are the consequences of the superior principles? Yes, for without them the universe would be imperfect. The greater number of evils, if not all of them, are useful to the universe; such as the venomous animals; though they often ignore their real utility. Even wickedness is useful in certain respects, and can produce many beautiful things. For example, it leads to fine inventions, it forces men to good judgment, and does not let them fall asleep in an indolent security.

Divine Providence not Responsible for Voluntary Evil Committed by People (3.2.7)

Let us first examine the actions of souls who do evil voluntarily; the actions of the wicked who, for instance, harm virtuous men, or other men equally evil. Providence need not be held responsible for the wickedness of these souls. The cause should be sought in the voluntary determinations of those souls themselves. For we have proved that the souls have characteristic motions, and that while here below they are not pure, but rather are animals [as would naturally be the case with souls united to bodies]. Now, it is not surprising that, finding themselves in such a condition, they would live conformably to that condition. Indeed, it is not the formation of the world that made them descend here below. Even before the world existed, they were already disposed to form part of it, to busy themselves with it, to infuse it with life, to administer it, and in it to exert their power in a characteristic manner, either by presiding over its [issues], and by communicating to it something of their power, or by descending into it, or by acting in respect to the world each in its individual manner. The latter question, however, does not refer to the subject we are now considering; here it will be sufficient to show that, however these circumstances occur, Providence is not to be blamed.

Source: Plotinus, Enneads, translated by Kenneth Sylvan Guthrie, adapted.

 

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PORPHYRY:

AGAINST THE CHRISTIANS

Porphyry (c. 234–305 CE) was born in Tyre, in what is now Lebanon; his birth name "Malchus" name meant "king" in his native Phoenician. He later studied in Athens and then in Rome under Plotinus, the founder of Neoplatonism, who reportedly gave him the Greek name Porphyry, meaning "purple," a color long associated with royalty, as a play on his original name. At one low point in his life he apparently considered suicide, and Plotinus talked him out of it by suggesting he travel instead, which he did, spending several years in Sicily. He eventually returned to edit and arrange his teacher's scattered writings into the Enneads. Porphyry also wrote widely on his own account, including an introduction to logic that became a standard medieval textbook, and a treatise arguing against eating meat on ethical grounds. His most consequential work may be the one that survives only in fragments: a multi-volume critique of Christianity, considered serious enough a threat that later Christian emperors ordered it burned, and it is known today mainly through quotations preserved by the Christian writers who wrote against it.

          In the selections below, he begins arguing against the Christian notion of the bodily resurrection of the dead. He mocks the idea that God will reassemble bodies scattered across fish, birds, and worms over millennia. He criticizes the contention that God can do anything, for, God cannot make contradictions true or himself evil. Thus, raising decayed matter into countless bodies, with no room left on earth to hold them, is simply absurd, thus not a mystery beyond human understanding. He continues arguing against the Christian idea of God as a monarch. A true monarch, he says, rules over beings of his own kind, so calling God a "monarch" only makes sense if he rules over other gods, not mere animals or men. He continues arguing that Christian angels are functionally identical to pagan gods, only having different name across languages and cultures. He defends pagan image-worship as honoring the divine through representation, not literally housing gods in statues. Finally, he argues that the pagan idea of God dwelling in idols is less ridiculous than God entering Mary's womb.

AGAINST THE BODILY RESURRECTION OF THE DEAD (Against the Christians, in Macarius, Apocriticus 4.24)

Let us once again discuss the question of the resurrection of the dead. For what is the reason that God should act in this way, and change in this random way the succession of events that has held good until now, whereby he ordained that races should be preserved and not come to an end, though from the beginning he has laid down these laws and framed things thus? The things which have once been determined by God, and preserved through such long ages, ought to be everlasting, and ought not to be condemned by Him who fashioned them, and destroyed as if they had been made by some mere man, and arranged as mortal things by one who is himself a mortal. Thus it is ridiculous if, when the whole is destroyed, the resurrection will follow. Will we say that he will raise the man who died three years before the resurrection, and along with him Priam and Nestor who died a thousand years before, and others who lived before them from the beginning of the human race. If anyone is prepared to grasp even this, he will find that the question of the resurrection is one full of silliness. For many have often died in the sea, and their bodies have been consumed by fishes, while many have been eaten by wild beasts and birds. How then is it possible for their bodies to rise up? Come then, and let us put to the test this statement which is so lightly made. Let us take an example. A man was shipwrecked, the mullet fish devoured his body, next these were caught and eaten by some fishermen, who were killed and devoured by dogs; when the dogs died ravens and vultures feasted on them and entirely consumed them. How then will the body of the shipwrecked man be brought together, considering that it was absorbed by so many creatures? Again, suppose another body to have been consumed by fire, and another to have come in the end to the worms, how is it possible for it to return to the essence which was there from the beginning?

          You will tell me that this is possible with God, but this is not true. For all things are not possible with him. He simply cannot bring it about that Homer should not have become a poet, or that Troy should not be taken. Nor indeed can he make two times two (which make the number four) to be calculated as a hundred, even though this may seem good to him. Nor can God ever become evil, even though he wishes. Nor would he be able to sin, since he is good by nature. If, then, he is unable to sin or to become evil, this does not come upon him through any weakness in him. In the case of those who have a disposition and capability for a certain thing, and then are prevented from doing it, it is clear that it is by their weakness that they are prevented. But God is by nature good, and is not prevented from being evil. Nevertheless, even though he is not prevented, he cannot become bad.

          Consider next how absurd it would be if the creator would stand by and watch the heaven melt, even though no one ever conceived anything more spectacular than its beauty, and the stars falling, and the earth perishing. Yet you presume [which is equally absurd] that he will raise up the rotten and corrupt bodies of men. Some of them, it is true, belong to admirable men. But others without attractiveness or symmetry before they died, present a very unpleasant sight. Again, even if he could easily make them rise in a beautiful form, it would be impossible for the earth to hold all those who had died from the beginning of the world, if they were to rise again.

AGAINST THE CHRISTIAN GOD

Objection based on the Monarchy of God (Apocriticus 4.20)

But let us make a thorough investigation concerning the single rule of a single God, and also the diverse rule of those who are worshipped as gods. You do not know how to expound the doctrine even of a single rule. For a monarch is not one who is alone in his existence, but who is alone in his rule. Clearly he rules over those who are his fellow-tribesmen, men like himself. The Emperor Hadrian was a monarch, not because he existed alone, nor because he ruled over oxen and sheep (over which herdsmen or shepherds rule), but because he ruled over men who shared his race and possessed the same nature. Likewise God would not properly be called a monarch, unless He ruled over other gods. For this would befit His divine greatness and His heavenly and abundant honor.

Objection to Monotheism based on the Immortal Angels (Apocriticus, 4.21-22)

At any rate, if you say that angels stand before God, who are not subject to feeling and death, and immortal in their nature. We ourselves speak of these as gods, because they are close to the Godhead. Why do we dispute about a name? And are we to consider it only a difference of terminology? For she who is called by the Greeks Athene is called by the Romans Minerva; and the Egyptians, Syrians, and Thracians address her by some other name. But I suppose nothing in the invocation of the goddess is changed or lost by the difference of the names. The difference therefore is not great, whether someone calls them gods or angels, since their divine nature bears witness to them. Thus Matthew writes, "And Jesus answered and said, Ye do err, not knowing the scriptures, nor the power of God; for in the resurrection they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels in heaven" (Matt. 22:29-30). Accordingly, Jesus confesses that the angels have a share in the divine nature.

In Defense of Pagen Idols

Those who make a suitable object of reverence for the gods [i.e., an idol], do not think that the god is in the wood or stone or bronze from which the image is manufactured. Nor do they consider that, if any part of the statue is cut off, it subtracts from the power of the god. For the images of living creatures and the temples were set up by the ancients for the sake of remembrance, in order that those who approach it might come to the knowledge of the god when they god. They also observe special occasions and purify themselves generally. They may make use of prayers and requests, asking from them the things of which each has need. For if a person makes an image of a friend, of course he does not think that the friend is in it, or that the limbs of his body are included in the various parts of the representation. But honor is shown towards the friend by means of the image. But in the case of the sacrifices that are brought to the gods, these are not so much matter of bringing honor to the gods, but instead a proof of the worshippers' inclination to show a sense of gratitude. It is reasonable that the form of the statues should be the form of a man, since man is considered to be the most beautiful of living creatures and an image of God. We can see this doctrine in another saying, which asserts positively that God has fingers by which he writes: "And he gave to Moses the two tables which were written by the finger of God" (Exod. 31:18). Moreover, the Christians also, imitating the construction of [pagen] temples, build large houses, into which they go together and pray, even there is nothing to prevent them from doing this in their own houses, since the Lord certainly hears from every place. But suppose that any one of the Greeks were so stupid as to think that the gods dwell within the statues. Still, his idea would be a much purer one than that of the man who believes that the Divine entered into the womb of the Virgin Mary, and became her unborn child, before being born and swaddled in due course. For it is a place full of blood and gall, and things even more unbecoming.

Source: Porphyry, Against the Christians, as quoted in Macarius, Apocriticus, translated by T.W. Crafer, adapted.

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. According to Epicurus in the "Letter to Herodotus," why does sensation perish completely when the body is dissolved at death?

2. According to Epicurus in the "Letter to Herodotus," what is the true cause of astronomical phenomena like eclipses?

3. According to Epicurus in the "Letter to Menoecius," why is death no concern to us?

4. According to Lucretius in *On the Nature of Things* (3b), how does the mind changing when cured by medicine prove that the soul is mortal?

5. According to Lucretius in "On the Nature of Things" (4b), why does a break in memory mean that a reassembled body in the future would not be us?

6. According to Lucretius in "On the Nature of Things" (5.e), how did the vision of glorious forms in dreams lead early humans to believe in immortal gods?

7. According to Sextus Empiricus in "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (1.4), how does balancing opposing reasons produce suspension of judgment?

8. According to Sextus Empiricus in "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (3.3), why does the irreconcilable disagreement among dogmatists about God's form and location show that God is inconceivable?

9. According to Sextus Empiricus in "Outlines of Pyrrhonism" (3.3), why does the presence of evil in the world disprove the claim that God provides for all things?

10. According to Velleius in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" (Book 1), what is an innate preconception ("prolepsis")?

11. According to Cotta in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" (Book 1), why is the concept of a "quasi-body" and "quasi-blood" an absurd defense of the gods' immortality?

12. According to Cotta in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" (Book 1), why does an idle god who performs no actions lack virtue and blessedness?

13. According to Balbus in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" (Book 2), what are Cleanthes' four causes for why human ideas of the gods arise?

14. According to Balbus in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" (Book 2), what is Zeno's argument that the universe itself must possess reason?

15. According to Balbus in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" (Book 2), how does true religion differ from superstitious myths?

16. According to Cotta in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" (Book 3), how does he turn Zeno's logic into an absurdity regarding the universe playing the flute or being an educated philosopher?

17. According to Cotta in Cicero's "On the Nature of the Gods" (Book 3), why does giving reason to human beings make divine providence responsible for roguery and crime?

18. According to Plotinus in the "Enneads" (5.3.12–13), why must the One be described solely by negation rather than by positive statements?

19. According to Plotinus in the "Enneads" (1.8.7), why is the existence of evil a necessary consequence of the final degree of emanation?

20. According to Porphyry in "Against the Christians", why is the bodily resurrection of someone who was consumed by fish, dogs, and birds logically impossible?

21. Short Essay Options: Please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

(a) Critics argue that Epicurus’s view of the gods is contradictory. If the gods are composed of physical atoms, those atoms must eventually disperse, meaning a physical god cannot be naturally immortal. How might Epicurus respond?

(b) Critics argue that Epicurus's claim that death is nothing to us fails because human beings do not just fear the sensation of dying; rather, they also mourn the loss of future experiences, relationships, and achievements. How might Epicurus respond?

(c) Critics argue that Lucretius’s memory break argument against personal identity fails. Even if our memory is completely wiped or interrupted, a reassembled person would still experience pain or pleasure, making death's aftermath relevant to us. How might Lucretius respond?

(d) Critics argue that radical skepticism is unlivable in practice. A person cannot continuously suspend judgment on everything without becoming paralyzed, because everyday action requires making assumptions about what is real, safe, or true. How might Sextus Empiricus respond?

(e) Critics argue that Sextus Empiricus's argument against divine providence fails because a universe with human free will must allow for the existence of evil, without that evil making God weak or malicious. How might Sextus Empiricus respond?

(f) Critics argue that the Epicurean argument from common consent is fallacious. Just because an idea is widely held or feels innate across human cultures does not mean it reflects external objective reality. How might Velleius respond to Cotta's use of this critique?

(g) Critics argue that the Stoic argument from design, which compares the natural universe to a complex clock or building, is flawed because the universe is an organic system rather than an engineered artifact. How might Balbus respond to Cotta's refutation of Stoic cosmology?

(h) Critics argue that Plotinus’s claim that evil is merely non-being or a deprivation of good trivializes actual human suffering, since physical pain and cruelty feel like active, positive forces of destruction. How might Plotinus respond?

(i) Critics argue that Plotinus’s concept of the One as entirely beyond thought and language renders it useless for philosophy, because calling it the Good or the Source contradicts the claim that nothing positive can be asserted about it. How might Plotinus respond?

(j) Critics argue that Porphyry’s attack on the doctrine of the incarnation, which claims that a supreme divinity entering a human womb is absurd and shameful, rests on an arbitrary assumption that physical matter is inherently dirty or degrading. How might Porphyry respond?