EARLY CHRISTIANS

From Classics in the Philosophy of Religion, by James Fieser

© 2026, updated 6/1/2026, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

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CONTENTS

• Philo Judaeus of Alexandria: The Logos and The Invisible God (from Cherubim, Allegorical Interpretation, Heir of Divine Things)

• Justin Martyr: Seeds of the Divine Logos (from Apology 1 and 2)

• Athenagoras of Athens: Rational Defenses of the Faith (from Plea for Christians, Resurrection of the Dead)

• Irenaeus of Lyons: Progressing Toward the Image of God (from Against Heresies)

• Clement of Alexandria: Philosophy an Asset to Faith (from Sromata)

• Tertullian: Philosophy a Hinderance to Faith (from Against Heretics, Flesh of Christ)

• Origen of Alexandria: Cosmic System of Rational Souls (from Principles)

• Lactantius: Bodiless yet Angry God (from Divine Institutes, Anger of God)

 

Christian thinkers of the first few centuries CE faced an identity crisis within the Roman Empire. The religious movement begun by John the Baptizer, and developed by Jesus himself, took place within a sectarian Jewish world that had little connection with Greek philosophy. As Christianity spread into Greek and Roman cities, its communities continued to operate largely within this self-contained religious culture. This created a disconnect between the lived world of early Christians and the intellectual world of the Roman Empire, where Greek philosophy defined the standards of educated discourse. The Christian philosophers in this chapter represent the first generation to bridge that gap. Educated in Hellenistic thought, they faced two challenges from the competing culture, the first involving Greco-Roman polytheism. Early Christian writers thought that polytheistic myths were philosophically superficial, and thus posed no serious religious threat to Christianity. However, the Roman Empire's support of this mythology resulted in waves of persecutions against Christians, with the total death toll as high as 10,000. The second challenge was brought on by Greek philosophy, which was more serious from a religious standpoint. For, it offered a sophisticated account of God, the soul, and the cosmos that directly competed with Christianity's claim to truth. Most Christian philosophers addressed this by accepting what they could of pagan thought, while criticizing the rest. Tertullian, though, was an exception, arguing for a sharp separation between Athens and Jerusalem, philosophy and faith. By contrast, Philo Judaeus and Justin Martyr adapted the Stoic concept of the cosmic logos to explain how an invisible creator interacts with the material world. Also, Clement of Alexandria and Origen embraced Plato's cosmology to describe the soul's progression toward divine goodness. All these thinkers used philosophical tools to critique their Roman rivals and defend the credibility of Christianity. Collectively, they created a philosophical foundation for the great systematic theologians of the medieval period.

 

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PHILO JUDAEUS OF ALEXANDRIA:

THE LOGOS AND THE INVISIBLE GOD

 

Philo Judaeus of Alexandria (c. 20 BCE–50 CE) was a Hellenistic Jewish philosopher whose writings represent the earliest major synthesis of Greek philosophy and biblical interpretation. Living in the cosmopolitan environment of Roman Alexandria, he drew heavily on Platonic and Stoic ideas while defending the spiritual authority of the Hebrew Scriptures. Although not a Christian thinker, Philo influenced later Christian theologians, who adopted his concepts of divine transcendence, allegorical interpretation, and the mediating Logos. Philo's central project was to reconcile Jewish monotheism with Greek metaphysics. He emphasized God's absolute transcendence, arguing that the divine essence is incomprehensible to human reason. To lessen the divide between the infinite God and the finite world, Philo developed the doctrine of the Logos, which is a rational, mediating power through which God creates and governs. His theology combines moral teaching, mystical ascent, and allegorical interpretation, which portrays the soul's journey toward God as an escape from bodily and sensory limitation. In the section on God's authority, Philo describes a moment of "divine inspiration" in which his soul perceives two primary powers in God: authority and goodness. Authority governs the world, whereas goodness creates and sustains it. Between these stands the Logos, the mediating power that unites God's rule with God's beneficence. The cherubim symbolize the two powers, while the flaming sword represents the Logos, whose "rapid motion and impetuous" activity expresses God's dynamic involvement in creation. In the section on the incomprehensible essence of God, he argues that no creature can affirm what God is, including whether God is corporeal or incorporeal. For imperfect beings, the Logos is effectively "God," while the true God remains accessible only to the wise. In the section on the mystical transcendence of the soul, he argues that to inherit divine things, the soul must "emigrate" from bodily faculties and finally from itself. This involves rejecting the illusions of sense perception and the inadequacy of language. The soul then rises beyond its own faculties and becomes capable of receiving divine truth.

 

GOD'S AUTHORITY, GOODNESS, AND THE MEDIATING LOGOS (On the Cherubim, 1.9)

I have also, on one occasion, heard a more insightful train of reasoning from my own soul, which was accustomed frequently to be seized with a certain divine inspiration, even concerning matters which it could not explain even to itself. Now, if I can remember it accurately, I will relate it. It told me that in the one living and true God there were two supreme and primary powers, namely, goodness and authority. It is by his goodness he had created everything, and by his authority he governed all that he had created. The third thing that was between the two, and had the effect of bringing them together, was the Logos, for it was because of the Logos that God was both a ruler and good. Now, the cherubim were the symbols of this ruling authority and of this goodness, being two distinct powers, but the flaming sword was the symbol of the Logos. For the Logos [generally speaking] is a thing capable of rapid motion and impetuous. This is especially so for the Logos of the Creator of all things, inasmuch as it was before everything and passed by everything, and was conceived before everything, and appears in everything. My mind received a pure impression of each of these cherubim, that thus, becoming thoroughly instructed about the ruling authority of the Creator of all things and about his goodness, you may receive a happy inheritance. For immediately you will understand the conjunction and combination of these imperishable powers, and learn in what respects God is good, his majesty arising from his sovereign power being all the time conspicuous. You will learn in what he is powerful, his goodness, being equally the object of attention, that is this way you may attain to the virtues which are engendered by these conceptions, namely, a love and a reverential awe of God, neither being inflated to arrogance by any prosperity which may come upon you, having regard always to the greatness of the sovereignty of your King; nor abjectly giving up hope of better things in the hour of unexpected misfortune, having regard, then, to the mercifulness of your great and bounteous God. Let the flaming sword teach you that these things might be followed by a prompt and fiery Logos combined with action, which never ceases being in motion with rapidity and energy to the selection of good objects, and the avoidance of all such as are evil.

INCOMPREHENSIBLE ESSENCE OF GOD (Allegorical Interpretation, 3.107)

May we not, then, say, that the truth is something of this sort? None of those beings which are capable of entertaining belief, can entertain a firm belief respecting God. For he has not displayed his nature to anyone, but keeps it invisible to every kind of creature. Who can attempt to affirm of him who is the cause of all things either that he is a body, or that he is incorporeal, or that he has such and such distinctive qualities, or that he has no such qualities? Or who, in short, can venture to affirm anything positively about his essence, or his character, or his constitution, or his movements? But He alone can utter a positive assertion respecting himself, since he alone has an accurate knowledge of his own nature, without the possibility of mistake. His positive assertion, therefore, is one which may be thoroughly trusted in the first place, since he alone has any knowledge respecting his actions. Thus, he very appropriately swore by himself, adding himself confirmation to his assertion, which it was not possible for anyone else to do. On this account men who say that they swear by God may well be considered impious. For no man can properly swear by himself, because he is not able to have any certain knowledge respecting his own nature, but we must be content if we are able to understand even his name, that is to say, his word, which is the interpreter of his will. For that must be God to us imperfect beings, but the first mentioned, or true God, is so only to wise and perfect men.

MYSTICAL TRANSCENDENCE OF THE SOUL (Heir of Divine Things, 68-74)

Who, then, will be the heir [of divine things]? Not that reasoning which remains in the prison of the body according to its own voluntary intentions, but that which is loosened from those bonds and emancipated, and which has advanced beyond the walls, and if it is possible to say so, has itself forsaken itself. The scripture says, "one who comes from your own body will be your heir" (Genesis 15:4) Therefore if any desire comes upon you, soul, to be the inheritor of the good things of God, leave not only your country, the body, and your family, the outward senses, and your fathers house, that is speech; but also flee from yourself, and depart out of yourself, like the Corybantes, or those possessed with demons, being driven to frenzy, and inspired by some prophetic inspiration. For while the mind is in a state of enthusiastic inspiration, and while it is no longer mistress of itself, but is agitated and drawn into frenzy by heavenly love, and drawn upwards to that object, truth removing all impediments out of its way, and making everything before it plain, that so it may advance by a level and easy road, its destiny is to become an inheritor of the things of God.

          But, Mind, take confidence, and explain to us how you depart and emigrate from those former things, you who utter things perceptible only by the intellect to those who have been taught to hear correctly. For you always say, I emigrated from my stay within the body when I learned to despise the flesh, and I emigrated from the outward sense when I learned to look upon the objects of outward sense as things which had no existence in reality  condemning its judicial faculties as spurious and corrupted, and full of false opinion, and also condemning the objects submitted to that judgment as speciously devised to allure and to deceive, and to snatch the truth from out of the middle of nature. Again, I departed from speech when I convicted it of great unreasonableness, although it talked of sublime subjects and puffed itself up. For it dared a considerable act of boldness, namely, to show me bodies through the medium of shadows, and things by means of words, which was impossible. Therefore it kept stumbling about over repeated obstacles, and kept on talking vainly, being unable by common expressions to give a clear representation and understanding of the unique properties of the subjects with which it was dealing. But I, learning by experience, like an infant and untaught child, decided that it was better to depart from all these things, and to attribute the powers of each to God, who makes and consolidates the body, and who prepares the outward senses to feel appropriately, and who gives to speech the power of speaking at its desire; and in the same manner in which you have departed from the other things, now rise up and emigrate from yourself. But what is the meaning of this expression? Do not treasure up in yourself the faculties of perceiving, and thinking, and comprehending, but offer and dedicate these things to him who is the cause of thinking accurately, and of comprehending without being deceived.

Source: Philo Judaeus of Alexandria, Cherubim, Allegorical Interpretation, and Heir of Divine Things, all translated by Charles Duke Yonge, adapted.

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JUSTIN MARTYR:

SEEDS OF THE DIVINE LOGOS

 

Justin Martyr (c. 100–165 CE) was born in Flavia Neapolis in Samaria. Raised in a pagan environment, he studied among the Stoic, Peripatetic, Pythagorean, and Platonic schools before converting to Christianity, which he came to regard as the only true philosophy. He subsequently traveled to Rome, where he established a philosophical school to defend the Christian faith against pagan and state hostility, an enterprise that ultimately led to his trial and execution by beheading under the Emperor Marcus Aurelius. Justin's central project was to reconcile the pagan intellectual tradition with the emerging Christian theology. For him, biblical revelation flow from the same ultimate source. He formulated the pioneering doctrine of the logos, identifying Christ as the cosmic, divine reason that structures reality and illuminates human minds. He treated Greek philosophy as a preparatory stage that anticipated the incarnation, thus validating the use of human reason.

          In the section on rational pagans as unconscious Christians, he argues that because Christ is the universal divine reason in which all humanity participates, ancient thinkers like Socrates who lived according to reason were actually Christians, despite being labeled as atheists. In the section on Stoic seeds of reason, he argues that the moral brilliance of Stoic philosophers and poets stems from a fragment or seed of the divine reason implanted within them, which simultaneously incurred the hatred of demonic forces that oppose the rational life. In the section on the necessity of eternal punishment, he argues that without an ultimate system of divine justice and eternal retribution, virtue and vice would be meaningless, human laws would be inherently unjust, and God would be entirely indifferent to humanity. In the section on Christ compared with Socrates, he argues that Christ possesses far greater authority than human philosophers because he is the entire rational being rather than a fragmented seeker. This is demonstrated by the fact that uneducated artisans willingly died for Christ, whereas no one died for Socrates. In the section on Christian claim to all truth, he concludes that whatever truths were correctly uttered by pagan writers are the rightful property of Christians. For, those early pagan authors only glimpsed reality darkly through an implanted seed, which stands in contrast to the absolute reality granted through the grace of the incarnate logos.

 

RATIONAL PAGANS AS UNCONSCIOUS CHRISTIANS (Apology 1.46)

Some people might unreasonably distort our teachings by arguing that because Christ was born only one hundred and fifty years ago under Cyrenius, and later taught under Pontius Pilate, everyone born before Him cannot be held responsible. Let us anticipate and solve this difficulty. We have been taught that Christ is the first-born of God, and we have already declared that He is the logos in whom every race of humanity participates. Consequently, those who lived according to reason are Christians, even if they were considered atheists. Among the Greeks, this includes Socrates, Heraclitus, and men like them; among the non-Greeks, it includes Abraham, Ananias, Azarias, Misael, Elijah, and many others. We will refrain from listing all their names and actions now, because we know it would be tedious. Therefore, those who lived before Christ but lived without reason were wicked and hostile to Christ, and they murdered those who lived according to reason. On the other hand, any intelligent person can understand how Christ was born of a virgin as a man, was named Jesus, was crucified, died, rose again, and ascended into heaven through the power of the logos, according to the will of God the Father and Lord of all, based on what we have already explained at length. Since proving this specific point is less necessary right now, we will turn our attention to more urgent matters.

STOIC SEEDS OF REASON (LOGOS SPERMATIKOS) (Apology 2.8)

Those of the Stoic school were admirable as far as their moral teachings went, just as the poets were in certain respects, because of the seed of logos implanted in every race of humanity. For this reason, we know they were hated and put to death, including thinkers like Heraclitus and, in our own time, Musonius and others. As we have suggested, the demons have always ensured that anyone who lives a reasonable, earnest life and shuns vice will be hated. It is not surprising, then, that the demons cause those to be hated even more intensely who live not merely according to a fraction of the diffused logos, but by the knowledge and contemplation of the whole logos, which is Christ. These demons have been condemned to eternal fire, where they will suffer their just punishment. The fact that they are even now overthrown by men through the name of Jesus Christ is a clear sign of the eternal fire that will ultimately be inflicted upon them and those who serve them. This is exactly what all the prophets foretold, and what our own teacher Jesus taught.

THE NECESSITY OF ETERNAL PUNISHMENT (Apology 2.9)

To ensure that no one dismisses our assertions as mere grandstanding or scare tactics, claiming that we only want people to live virtuously out of fear rather than because such a life is good and pleasant, I will briefly reply. If eternal punishment does not exist, then either God does not exist, or, if He does exist, He does not care about humanity; in that case, virtue and vice mean nothing, and, as we said before, lawmakers unjustly punish those who break good commandments. But since these laws are not unjust, and since their Father teaches them by the logos to act as He does, those who agree with them are not unjust. One might object that human laws vary, and that what one society considers good, another considers evil; what seems bad to some is esteemed by others. Let anyone who objects listen to our response. We know that the wicked angels established laws that matched their own wickedness, which delight people who are like them. However, the right logos, when He came, proved that not all opinions or doctrines are good, but that some are evil while others are good. Therefore, I will declare these same truths to such men, and, if necessary, explain them at greater length; but for now, I return to our main subject.

CHRIST COMPARED WITH SOCRATES (Apology 2.10)

Our doctrines, therefore, are clearly greater than all human teaching because Christ, who appeared for our sake, became the entire rational being: body, reason, and soul. Whatever lawmakers or philosophers uttered correctly, they achieved by discovering and contemplating some part of the logos. However, because they did not know the whole of the logos, which is Christ, they frequently contradicted themselves. Those who lived long before Christ were brought before tribunals as impious busybodies when they attempted to investigate and prove things through reason. Socrates, who was more zealous in this effort than any of them, was accused of the exact same crimes as we are. They claimed he was introducing new divinities and did not recognize the gods honored by the state. Yet, he cast out Homer and the other poets from the state, teaching people to reject wicked demons and the myths related about them. He exhorted them to become acquainted with the God who was unknown to them through rational investigation, famously noting that it is neither easy to find the Father and Maker of all, nor safe to declare Him to everyone once found. But our Christ accomplished these things through His own power. No one trusted Socrates enough to die for his doctrine; but in Christ, who was partially known even by Socrates, people placed absolute faith. For Christ was and is the logos who is in everyone, foretelling future events both through the prophets and in His own person when He took on our human passions and taught these doctrines. Because of this, not only philosophers and scholars believed Him, but also artisans and completely uneducated people, all of them despising glory, fear, and death. This is because He is a power of the ineffable Father, not merely an instrument of human reason.

CHRISTIAN CLAIM TO ALL TRUTH (Apology 2.13)

For I myself, when I discovered the wicked deception that the evil spirits had thrown around the divine doctrines of the Christians to turn others away from joining them, laughed both at those who framed these falsehoods and at the deception itself, as well as at popular opinion. I confess that I both boast and strive with all my strength to be found a Christian. This is not because the teachings of Plato are completely different from those of Christ, but because they are not similar in all respects, just as the teachings of the Stoics, poets, and historians are not. For each man spoke well in proportion to his share of the seeds of the logos, since he saw what was related to it.  But those who contradict themselves on the most important points appear not to have possessed the heavenly wisdom and the knowledge that cannot be spoken against. Whatever things were rightly said among all men are the property of us Christians. For next to God, we worship and love the logos who is from the unbegotten and ineffable God, since He also became man for our sakes so that, by becoming a partaker of our sufferings, He might also bring us healing.  All these writers were able to see realities darkly through the sowing of the implanted logos that was within them. For the seed and imitation of a thing, given according to one's capacity, is quite different from the reality itself, of which there is a participation and imitation granted according to His grace.

Source: Justin Martyr, Apology 1 and 2, translated by Marcus Dods, adapted.

 

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ATHENAGORAS OF ATHENS:

RATIONAL DEFENSES OF THE FAITH

 

Athenagoras of Athens (c. 133–190 CE) was an early Christian philosopher and apologist about whose life few historical details survive. Later traditions indicate that he studied Platonic and Stoic philosophy in Alexandria before his conversion. This, they say, occurred after he investigated the Christian Scriptures with the initial intent of refuting them. He is best remembered for his sophisticated philosophical defenses of Christianity addressed directly to the Roman Emperors Marcus Aurelius and Commodus. Athenagoras's central project was to vindicate Christian doctrines from the popular Roman charges of atheism, incest, and cannibalism by demonstrating their supreme rationality. Utilizing a synthesis of Platonism and Christian theology, he argued that the Christian conception of a transcendent, unified God was conceptually superior to, yet compatible with, the best insights of the Greek philosophers.

          In the section on philosophers on the unity of God, he argues that the most famous Greek thinkers, including Pythagoras, Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics, all recognized a single, uncreated Supreme Being behind their varied terminology. Consequently, Christians should not be branded as atheists for maintaining a strict monotheism rooted in the cosmic Logos. In the section on philosophical proof of monotheism, he presents a rigorous spatial argument against polytheism, demonstrating that multiple, uncreated deities cannot coexist in the same location because they are indivisible, nor can they exist separately, because the sole Creator fills all regions above and around the spherical world, leaving no space for another god to occupy or govern. In the section on the physics of the resurrection, he refutes the materialist objection that human bodies consumed by wild beasts or fish cannot be resurrected; he argues that God's exquisite biological engineering ensures that human flesh never actually incorporates into the permanent anatomy of an animal, but is instead naturally rejected as non-nutritive refuse, allowing the Creator to cleanly separate and reassemble every original human part.

PHILOSOPHERS ON THE UNITY OF GOD (A Plea for the Christians, 6)

Philolaus, too, when he says that all things are included in God as in a stronghold, teaches that He is one, and that He is superior to matter. Lysis and Opsimus thus define God: the one says that He is an ineffable number, the other that He is the excess of the greatest number beyond that which comes nearest to it. So that since ten is the greatest number according to the Pythagoreans, being the Tetractys, and containing all the arithmetic and harmonic principles, and the Nine stands next to it, God is a unit--that is, one. For the greatest number exceeds the next least by one. Then there are Plato and Aristotle--not that I am about to go through all that the philosophers have said about God, as if I wished to exhibit a complete summary of their opinions. For I know that, as you excel all men in intelligence and in the power of your rule, in the same proportion do you surpass them all in an accurate acquaintance with all learning, cultivating as you do each several branch with more success than even those who have devoted themselves exclusively to anyone. But, inasmuch as it is impossible to demonstrate without the citation of names that we are not alone in confining the notion of God to unity, I have presented an enumeration of opinions. Plato, then, says, "To find out the Maker and Father of this universe is difficult; and, when found, it is impossible to declare Him to all," conceiving of one uncreated and eternal God. If he recognizes others as well, such as the sun, moon, and stars, yet he recognizes them as created: "gods, offspring of gods, of whom I am the Maker, and the Father of works which are indissoluble apart from my will; but whatever is compounded can be dissolved." If, therefore, Plato is not an atheist for conceiving of one uncreated God, the Framer of the universe, neither are we atheists who acknowledge and firmly hold that He is God who has framed all things by the Logos, and holds them in being by His Spirit. Aristotle, again, and his followers, recognizing the existence of one whom they regard as a sort of compound living creature, speak of God as consisting of soul and body, thinking His body to be the ethereal space and the planetary stars and the sphere of the fixed stars, moving in circles. But His soul, the reason which presides over the motion of the body, itself not subject to motion, but becoming the cause of motion to the other.

          The Stoics also, although by the names they employ to suit the changes of matter, which they say is permeated by the Spirit of God, they multiply the Deity in name, yet in reality they consider God to be one. For, if God is an artistic fire advancing methodically to the production of the several things in the world, embracing in Himself all the seminal principles by which each thing is produced in accordance with fate, and if His Spirit pervades the whole world, then God is one according to them, being named Zeus in respect of the fervid part of matter, and Hera in respect of the air, and called by other names in respect of that particular part of matter which He pervades. . . .

PHILOSOPHICAL PROOF OF MONOTHEISM (A Plea for the Christians, 8)

Concerning the doctrine that there was from the beginning one God, the Maker of this universe, consider it in this way, that you may be acquainted with the argumentative grounds also of our faith. If there were from the beginning two or more gods, they were either in one and the same place, or each of them separately in his own. They could not be in one and the same place. For, if they are gods, they are not alike, but because they are uncreated they are unlike. For created things are like their patterns; but the uncreated are unlike, being neither produced from any one, nor formed after the pattern of any one. Hand and eye and foot are parts of one body, making up together one man: is God in this sense one? Indeed Socrates was compounded and divided into parts, just because he was created and perishable; but God is uncreated, and, impassible, and indivisible--does not, therefore, consist of parts. But if, on the contrary, each of them exists separately, since He that made the world is above the things created, and about the things He has made and set in order, where can the other or the rest be? For if the world, being made spherical, is confined within the circles of heaven, and the Creator of the world is above the things created, managing that by His providential care of these, what place is there for the second god, or for the other gods? For he is not in the world, because it belongs to the other; nor about the world, for God the Maker of the world is above it. But if he is neither in the world nor about the world (for all that surrounds it is occupied by this one), where is he? Is he above the world and [the first] God? In another world, or about another? But if he is in another or about another, then he is not about us, for he does not govern the world; nor is his power great, for he exists in a circumscribed space. But if he is neither in another world (for all things are filled by the other), nor about another (for all things are occupied by the other), he clearly does not exist at all, for there is no place in which he can be. Or what does he do, Seeing there is another to whom the world belongs, and he is above the Maker of the world, and yet is neither in the world nor about the world? Is there, then, some other place where he can stand? But God, and what belongs to God, are above him. And what, too, will be the place, seeing that the other fills the regions which are above the world? Perhaps he exerts a providential care? [By no means.] Yet, unless he does so, he has done nothing. If, then, he neither does anything nor exercises providential care, and if there is not another place in which he is, then this Being of whom we speak is the one God from the beginning, and the sole Maker of the world.

THE PHYSICS OF THE RESURRECTION (On the Resurrection of the Dead, 4-5)

[Critics of the resurrection of the dead] say that many bodies of those who have come to an unhappy death in shipwrecks and rivers have become food for fishes, and many of those who die in war, or who from some other sad cause or state of things are deprived of burial, lie exposed to become the food of any animals which may chance to see them. Since, then, bodies are thus consumed, and the members and parts composing them are broken up and distributed among a great multitude of animals, and by means of nutrition become incorporated with the bodies of those that are nourished by them, in the first place, they say, their separation from these is impossible. . . .

          But it appears to me that such persons, in the first place, are ignorant of the power and skill of Him that fashioned and regulates this universe. For, He has adapted to the nature and kind of each animal the nourishment suitable and correspondent to it. He has neither ordained that everything in nature will unite and combine with every kind of body. Nor is He at any loss to separate what has been so united, but grants to the nature of each several created being or thing to do or to suffer what is naturally suited to it, and sometimes also hinders and allows or forbids whatever He wishes, and for the purpose He wishes. Further, they have not considered the power and nature of each of the creatures that nourish or are nourished. Otherwise they would have known that not everything which is taken for food under the pressure of outward necessity turns out to be suitable nourishment for the animal. For, some things no sooner come into contact with the folds of the stomach than they tend to be tainted, and are vomited or expelled, or disposed of in some other way, so that not even for a little time do they undergo the first and natural digestion, much less become incorporated with that which is to be nourished. Also, not even everything which has been digested in the stomach and received the first change actually arrives at the parts to be nourished. For, some of it loses, its nutritive power even in the stomach, and some during the second change, and the digestion that takes place in the liver is separated and passes into something else which is destitute of the power to nourish. Indeed, the change which takes place in the liver does not all issue in nourishment to men, but the matter changed is separated as refuse according to its natural purpose. The nourishment which is left in the members and parts themselves that have to be nourished sometimes changes to something else, according as that predominates which is present in greater or less, abundance, and is apt to corrupt or to turn into itself that which comes near it.

Source: Athenagoras of Athens, Plea for Christians, and Resurrection of the Dead, translated by Benjamin Plummer Pratten, adapted.

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IRENAEUS OF LYONS:

PROGRESSING TOWARD THE IMAGE OF GOD

Irenaeus of Lyons (c. 130–202 CE) was born in Smyrna, Asia Minor. He studied directly under Polycarp, a disciple of the Apostle John, before migrating westward to serve the church at Lugdunum (modern Lyons). During intense Roman persecution and internal theological divisions, Irenaeus emerged as the premier orthodox defender of the faith, composing his monumental multi-volume treatise Against Heresies, to dismantle the esoteric cosmologies of speculative Gnosticism. Irenaeus's central project was to articulate a unified view of history, creation, and redemption against Gnostic dualism. He rejected the notion that the material world was an accidental blunder created by an inferior deity, presenting it instead as a purposeful classroom orchestrated by the true creator. Through his foundational doctrine of recapitulation, he argued that the historical incarnation of Jesus Christ systematically reunited, renewed, and perfected humanity, transforming the physical creation into a vehicle for eternal spiritual growth.

          In the section below on human infancy and divine nourishment, Irenaeus argues that created things are inherently inferior to their creator because of their later origin. This requires human beings to begin existence as spiritual infants who are initially incapable of receiving absolute perfection. Consequently, he argues, Christ accommodated our frailty by approaching humanity in an accessible, human form, offering himself like milk to nourish our capacities for immortality. In the section on necessity of human imperfection, he argues that the early church's moral failings demonstrate that spiritual maturity requires disciplined habits. This suggests that if God had granted unmediated perfection to recently created humans at the beginning of the world, they would have lacked the capacity to retain it. In the section on daily progress toward God's image, he argues that creation functions as a hierarchy where humanity makes gradual progress by ascending toward the God through a sequential process of growth, recovery from sin, and eventual glorification. In the section on folly of demanding immediate divinity, he criticizes those who blame God for not creating us as gods from the very beginning. For, we must first humbly accept our finite human nature before we can be elevated to participate in the divine image through the creator's love.

HUMAN INFANCY AND DIVINE NOURISHMENT (from Against Heresies, Section 1)

If, however, anyone should ask, "Could God not have presented humanity as perfect from the beginning?" let him know that, since God is always the same and unbegotten in Himself, all things are possible for Him. But created things must be inferior to the one who created them, simply because of their later origin; for it was not possible for things recently created to have been uncreated. Since they are not uncreated, for this very reason they fall short of perfection. Because these things are of a later date, they are infantile; they are unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline. For just as it is certainly in the power of a mother to give strong food to her infant, though she does not do so because the child is not yet able to receive more substantial nourishment, so also it was possible for God Himself to have made humanity perfect from the first, but human beings could not receive this perfection, being as yet infants. For this cause our Lord, in these last times, when He had summed up all things into Himself, came to us, not as He might have come, but as we were capable of beholding Him. He might easily have come to us in His immortal glory, but in that case we could never have endured the greatness of that glory; therefore it was that He, who was the perfect bread of the Father, offered Himself to us as milk, because we were as infants. He did this when He appeared as a man, so that we, being nourished from the breast of His flesh, and having, by such a course of milk nourishment, become accustomed to eat and drink the Word of God, may be able also to contain in ourselves the Bread of immortality, which is the Spirit of the Father.

NECESSITY OF HUMAN IMPERFECTION (Section 2)

For this reason, Paul declares to the Corinthians, "I have fed you with milk, not with meat, for hitherto you were not able to bear it." This means, you have indeed learned of the coming of our Lord as a man. Nevertheless, because of your infirmity, the Spirit of the Father has not yet rested upon you. For when envy, strife, and dissension are among you, are you not carnal, and walking as men? This indicates that the Spirit of the Father was not yet with them because of their imperfection and the shortcomings of their walk in life. Thus, the apostle had the power to give them strong meat (for those upon whom the apostles laid hands received the Holy Spirit, who is the food of eternal life). However, they were not capable of receiving it, because they had the sentient faculties of the soul still feeble and undisciplined in the practice of things pertaining to God. So, in like manner, God had power at the beginning to grant perfection to humanity. But as humanity was only recently created, he could not possibly have received it, or even if he had received it, could he have contained it, or containing it, could he have retained it. It was for this reason that the Son of God, although He was perfect, passed through the state of infancy in common with the rest of mankind. He participated in it thus not for His own benefit, but for that of the infantile stage of human existence, in order that humanity might be able to receive Him. Therefore, there was nothing impossible or deficient in God implied in the fact that man was not an uncreated being. But this limitation merely applied to him who was lately created, namely, man.

DAILY PROGRESS TOWARD GOD'S IMAGE (Section 3)

With God there are simultaneously exhibited power, wisdom, and goodness. His power and goodness appear in this, that of His own will He called into being and fashioned things having no previous existence; His wisdom is shown in His having made created things parts of one harmonious and consistent whole. Those things which, through His supreme kindness, receive growth and a long period of existence, do reflect the glory of the uncreated One, of that God who bestows what is good ungrudgingly. For from the very fact of these things having been created, it follows that they are not uncreated; but by their continuing in being throughout a long course of ages, they shall receive a faculty of the Uncreated, through the gratuitous bestowal of eternal existence upon them by God. Thus in all things God has the preeminence, who alone is uncreated, the first of all things, and the primary cause of the existence of all, while all other things remain under God's subjection. But being in subjection to God is continuance in immortality, and immortality is the glory of the uncreated One. By this arrangement, therefore, and these harmonies, and a sequence of this nature, man, a created and organized being, is rendered after the image and likeness of the uncreated God; the Father planning everything well and giving His commands, the Son carrying these into execution and performing the work of creating, and the Spirit nourishing and increasing what is made, but man making progress day by day, and ascending towards the perfect, that is, approximating to the uncreated One. For the Uncreated is perfect, that is, God. Now it was necessary that man should in the first instance be created; and having been created, should receive growth; and having received growth, should be strengthened; and having been strengthened, should abound; and having abounded, should recover from the disease of sin; and having recovered, should be glorified; and being glorified, should see his Lord. For God is He who is yet to be seen, and the beholding of God is productive of immortality, but immortality renders one near unto God.

FOLLY OF DEMANDING IMMEDIATE DIVINITY (Section 4)

Irrational, therefore, in every respect, are they who do not await the time of increase, but ascribe to God the infirmity of their nature. Such persons know neither God nor themselves, being insatiable and ungrateful, unwilling to be at the outset what they have also been created, namely, men subject to passions. Instead, they go beyond the law of the human race, and before they become men, they wish to be even now like God their Creator. They who are more destitute of reason than dumb animals insist that there is no distinction between the uncreated God and man, a creature of today. For these dumb animals bring no charge against God for not having made them men; but each one, just as he has been created, gives thanks that he has been created. But we cast blame upon Him, because we have not been made gods from the beginning, but at first merely men, and then at length gods; although God has adopted this course out of His pure benevolence, so that no one may impute to Him envy or grudgingness. He declares, "I have said, You are gods; and you are all sons of the Highest." But since we could not sustain the power of divinity, He adds, "But you shall die like men," setting forth both truths, the kindness of His free gift, and our weakness, and also that we were possessed of power over ourselves. For after His great kindness He graciously conferred good upon us, and made men like to Himself in their own power; while at the same time by His prescience He knew the infirmity of human beings, and the consequences which would flow from it; but through His love and His power, He shall overcome the substance of created nature. For it was necessary, at first, that nature should be exhibited; then, after that, that what was mortal should be conquered and swallowed up by immortality, and the corruptible by incorruptibility, and that man should be made after the image and likeness of God, having received the knowledge of good and evil. 

Source: Irenaeus of Lyons, Against Heresies, translated by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, adapted.

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CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA: PHILOSOPHY AN ASSET TO FAITH

Clement of Alexandria (c. 150–215 CE) was head of the Catechetical School of Alexandria. Born into a pagan family, likely in Athens, he traveled across the Mediterranean to study under various intellectual teachers before converting to Christianity and settling in Egypt. When Christian persecution under Emperor Septimius Severus intensified, Clement fled Alexandria, and spent his remaining years in Jerusalem and Syria. Clement's central project was to demonstrate that classical Greek learning and Christian revelation are compatible. He rejected the anti-intellectualism of contemporary Christians who shunned secular thought, arguing instead that philosophy is a divine gift designed to mature human intellect. By using an eclectic approach that draws upon multiple sources of truth, he suggest that the ultimate goal of the Christian life is a journey toward true gnosis. Through this, rational inquiry and philosophical training purify the soul, enabling it to better comprehend the depths of scriptural truth.

          In the section on philosophy as the handmaid of theology, he argues that philosophy acted as a preparatory schoolmaster to lead the Hellenic people to Christ. It functions as an essential tool to strengthen wisdom and defend faith against sophistry. In the section on eclectic method and divine virtue, he argues that while historical sects like the Stoics or Platonists contain fragmented truths, divine philosophy consists of an eclectic selection of whatever teaches righteousness, thereby spreading across humanity like a universal rain from the cosmic logos. In the section on the necessity of intellectual training, he argues that demanding bare faith without natural science is as foolish as expecting to harvest grapes without cultivating the vine. A truly learned seeker must harness geometry, music, and philosophy to guard the faith against intellectual assaults. In the section on all philosophies contain some truth, he argues that rival philosophical schools have torn apart the single body of truth. Nevertheless, their diverse dogmas ultimately harmonize when unified under the authority of Christ. In the section on knowledge of God through abstraction, he argues that human minds can approach the First Cause only through a rigorous method of philosophical analysis. We must systematically strip away all spatial and bodily attributes from God, and thereby discover the God by understanding what he is not.

PHILOSOPHY THE HANDMAID OF THEOLOGY (Stromata, 1.5)

Accordingly, before the coming of the Lord, philosophy was necessary to the Greeks for attaining righteousness. Now it is beneficial for piety, being a kind of preparatory training for those who achieve faith through demonstration. For, it is said, "your foot will not stumble" (Proverbs 3:23) if you refer what is good to Providence, whether belonging to the Greeks or to us. For God is the cause of all good things, some primarily through the Old and the New Testament, and others because of philosophy. Perhaps, too, philosophy was given to the Greeks directly and primarily, until the Lord should call the Greeks. For this was a schoolmaster to bring the Hellenic mind to Christ, just as the law was for the Hebrews (Galatians 3:24). Philosophy, therefore, was a preparation, paving the way for him who is perfected in Christ.

          Now, Solomon says, defend wisdom, and it will elevate you, and it will shield you with a crown of pleasure (Proverbs 4:8-9). For when you have strengthened wisdom through philosophy, and with right effort, you will preserve it without attack by sophists. The way of truth is therefore one, but, like a river, streams flow into it from all sides. . . .

ECLECTIC METHOD AND DIVINE VIRTUE (Stromata, 1.7)

The Greek preparatory culture, therefore, with philosophy itself, is shown to have come down from God to men, not with a definite direction, but in the way in which showers fall down on the good land, on the dunghill, and on the houses. Similarly, on tombs we find growing grass wheat, figs and a variety of wild trees. Things that grow appear as a type of truth. For they enjoy the same influence of the rain. But they do not have the same grace as those which spring up in rich soil, insofar as they are withered or plucked up. Here we are aided by the parable of the sower, which the Lord interpreted. For the husbandman of the soil which is among men is one; He who from the beginning, from the foundation of the world, sowed nutritious seeds; He who in each age rained down the Lord, the logos. But the times and places which received [such gifts], created the differences which exist. Further, the husbandman sows not only wheat (of which there are many varieties), but also other seeds— barley, and beans, and peas, and vetches, and vegetable and flower seeds. To the same husbandry belongs both planting and the operations necessary in the nurseries, and gardens, and orchards, and the planning and rearing of all sorts of trees.

          In like manner, with the care of sheep, the care of herds, breeding of horses and dogs, beekeeping, all arts and, generally speaking, the care of flocks and the rearing of animals: these all differ from each other more or less, but are still all useful for life. So too with Philosophy. I do not mean the Stoic, or the Platonic, or the Epicurean, or the Aristotelian, but, rather, whatever has been well said by each of those schools which teach righteousness along with a science pervaded with piety. This eclectic whole I call philosophy. But the conclusions of human reasoning that men have cut away and falsified, I would never call divine.

NECESSITY OF INTELLECTUAL TRAINING (Stromata, 1.9)

Some who think themselves naturally gifted do not wish to touch either philosophy or logic, and, even more, they do not wish to learn natural science. They demand bare faith alone, as if they wished to immediately gather clusters of grapes right from the start, without giving any care to the vine. Now the Lord is figuratively described as the vine, from which, with pains and the art of farming, according to the logos, the fruit is to be gathered. We must lop, dig, bind, and perform the other operations. The pruning-knife, the pick-axe, and the other agricultural implements, I think, are necessary for the culture of the vine so that it may produce eatable fruit.

          As it is with farming, so too it is with medicine. He who has practiced the various lessons has learned with purpose, and can cultivate and heal. So also here, I call him truly learned who brings everything to bear on the truth, including geometry, music, grammar, and philosophy itself. Selecting what is useful, he guards the faith against assault. Now, as was said, the athlete is despised who is not prepared for the contest. For instance, too, we praise the experienced helmsman who has seen the cities of many men, and the physician who has had vast experience, so too some describe the scientist. He who brings everything to bear on a right life, procuring examples from the Greeks and barbarians, this man is an experienced searcher after truth. He is in reality a man of great judgment, like the touch-stone (that is, the Lydian), which is believed to possess the power of distinguishing the false from the genuine gold. Our much-knowing gnostic [i.e., seeker of true knowledge] can distinguish sophistry from philosophy, the art of winning trophies from gymnastics, cookery from medicine, and rhetoric from dialectics, and the other schools which are according to the barbarian philosophy, from the truth itself. How necessary is it for him who desires to be partaker of the power of God, to treat intellectual subjects by philosophizing.

          It is greatly useful to distinguish expressions which are ambiguous, and which in the Old and New Testaments are used synonymously. For the Lord, at the time of His temptation, skillfully matched the devil by an ambiguous expression.

ALL PHILOSOPHIES CONTAIN SOME TRUTH (Stromata, 1.13)

Truth is one, for falsehood has ten thousand side-paths. Just as the Bacchantes tore apart the limbs of Pentheus, so too the schools of both the barbarian and Hellenic philosophy have done with truth, and each brags to have the whole truth from the mere portion that has fallen to it. But, in my opinion, all are illuminated by the dawn of Light. Let all, therefore, both Greeks and barbarians, who have aspired after the truth (both those who possess not a little, and those who have any portion) produce whatever they have of the logos of truth.

          Eternity, for instance, presents in an instant the future, the present, and the past of time. But truth, much more powerful than limitless duration, can collect its proper germs, though they have fallen on foreign soil. For we will find that very many of the dogmas that are held by such schools as have not become utterly senseless, and are not cut out from the order of nature (by cutting off Christ, as the women of the fable dismembered the man), though appearing unlike one another, correspond in their origin and with the truth as a whole. For they coincide in one, either as a part, or a species, or a genus. For instance, though the highest note is different from the lowest note, yet both compose one harmony. In numbers an even number differs from an odd number, but both are part of arithmetic, and so too with shape, circle, triangle, square, and whatever figures differ from each other. Also, in the whole universe, all the parts, though differing one from another, preserve their relation to the whole.

KNOWLEDGE OF GOD THROUGH ABSTRACTION (Stromata, 5.11)

To understand the type of purification [of the soul] by confession, and also that of contemplation by analysis, we must advance by analysis to the first notion, beginning with the properties that underlie it. We abstract from the body its physical properties, and take away the dimension of depth, then that of breadth, and then that of length. The point which then remains is a unit, so to speak, having position. If we then abstract position from this, there is the conception of unity.

          If, then, abstracting all that belongs to bodies and things called incorporeal, we throw ourselves into the greatness of Christ, and thence advance into immensity by holiness, we may reach somehow to the conception of the Almighty, knowing not what He is, but what He is not. Form and motion, or standing, or a throne, or place, or right hand or left, are not at all to be conceived as belonging to the Father of the universe, although it is so written. But what each of these means will be shown in its proper place. The First Cause is not then in space, but above both space, and time, and name, and conception.

Source: Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, translated by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, adapted.

 

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TERTULLIAN:

PHILOSOPHY A HINDERANCE TO FAITH

Tertullian (c. 155–220 CE) was from Carthage in North Africa. Trained in Roman law and classical rhetoric, he converted to Christianity in mid-life and used his arguing skills to protect the North African church from both imperial persecution and internal Gnostic factions. Later in life he associated with the Montanist movement. Tertullian's central project was to protect biblical revelation from the corrupting influence of Greco-Roman philosophy, thus making him the leading Chrisitan anti-rationalist of the time. He rejected the eclectic approach of Clement of Alexandria, arguing that human reasoning and pagan metaphysics were the direct causes of every theological perversion. Defending a strict rule of faith, Tertullian saw scriptural authority as a self-contained and undeniable system of truth. Once an individual possesses the absolute reality of the Gospel, all intellectual curiosity and philosophical speculation must cease.

          In the section below on the inevitability of heresy, he argues that the widespread existence of theological error should not surprise believers. For, it serves a divine purpose is to test and ultimately approve the strength of genuine faith. Like a physical fever, heresy has a power to consume the weak, yet it is powerless when it encounters an unyielding conviction. In the section on Athens versus Jerusalem, he presents his iconic criticism that faith and philosophy have nothing to do with each other. Philosophy is merely a rash interpreter of the divine nature and the birthplace of heresy. This is particularly evident in Gnostic religious systems that draw from Plato and Stoicism. Accordingly, he rejects any attempts to construct a hybrid Christianity that contains dialectic reasoning, and argues that the Church has nothing in common with the Academy. In the section on the paradox of the crucifixion, he refutes Marcion's docetic claim that Christ possessed only a phantom body. Instead, Tertullian says, realities of the incarnation and crucifixion must be held as historically true precisely because they defy human logic. We must believe in the death of the Son of God because it is absurd, and his resurrection is entirely certain because it is humanly impossible.

INEVITABILITY OF HERESY (Prescription Against Heretics 1, 2)

1. The character of the times in which we live is such as to bring forth from us the following warning: we ought not to be astonished at the heresies [which abound], and neither should their existence surprise us, for it was foretold that they would occur. Nor should we be surprised at the fact that they subvert the faith of some, for their final cause [i.e., purpose] is, by providing a trial to faith, they also give it the opportunity of being "approved" (1 Corinthians 11:19). It is thus a groundless and inconsiderate offense when the many are scandalized by the very fact that heresies prevail to such a degree. How great (might their offense have been) if they had not existed. When it has been determined that a thing must certainly exist, it receives the [final] cause for which it has its being. This secures the power through which it exists, in such a way that it is impossible for it not to have existence.

          2. Taking the similar case of fever, which is assigned a place among all other deadly and excruciating issues [of life] for destroying man. We are not surprised either that it exists, for there it is, or that it consumes man, for that is the purpose of its existence. The same applies to heresies, which are produced for the weakening and the extinction of faith. Since we feel a dread because they have this power, we should first dread the fact of their existence. For as long as they exist, they have their power, and as long as they have their power, they have their existence. But, still since fever is an evil both in its cause and in its power, as all know, we loathe it rather than wonder at it, and we guard against it to the best of our ability since we do not have the power to eliminate it. However, some men prefer wondering at heresies for possessing this power (which brings with them eternal death and the heat of a stronger fire); instead, they should avoid this power when they have the means to escape it. But heresies would have no power, if [men] would stop being astonished that they have such power. For it either happens that, while men are astonished, they fall into a snare, or, because they are ensnared, they cherish their surprise, as if heresies were so powerful because of some truth which belonged to them. It would no doubt be a thing of wonder that evil should have any force of its own, if it were not for the fact that heresies are strong in those persons who are not strong in faith. In a combat of boxers and gladiators, generally speaking, it is not because a man is strong that he gains the victory, or loses it because he is not strong. Rather, it is because he who is defeated was a man of no strength. Indeed this very conqueror, when afterwards matched against a really powerful man, actually retires in discouragement from the contest. In precisely the same way, heresies derive such strength as they have from the infirmities of individuals; they have no strength whenever when they encounter a very powerful faith. . . .

ATHENS VERSUS JERUSALEM (Prescription Against Heretics 7)

These are "the doctrines" of men and "of demons" (1 Timothy 4:1). They are produced for itching ears of the spirit of this world's wisdom. This the Lord called "foolishness," and "chose the foolish things of the world" to confound even philosophy itself. For it is [philosophy] which is the material of the world's wisdom, the rash interpreter of the nature and the dispensation of God. Indeed heresies are themselves instigated by philosophy. From this source came the [the Gnostic view of] Aeons, and I known not what infinite forms, and the trinity of man in the system of [the Gnostic] Valentinus, who was from Plato's school. From the same source came Marcion's better god [of love in the New Testament], with all his tranquility; he came from the Stoics. Then, again, the Epicureans held the opinion that the soul dies [with the body]. The denial of the resurrection of the body is taken from the combined school of all the philosophers. Further, when matter is made equal to God, then you have the teaching of Zeno [the Stoic]. When any doctrine is alleged touching a god of fire, then Heraclitus comes in. The same subject-matter is discussed over and over again by the heretics and the philosophers; the same arguments are involved. What is the origin of evil? Why is it permitted? What is the origin of man? In what way does he come? Further, there is the question which Valentinus has very recently proposed: What is the origin of God? He settles with the answer: From enthymesis and ectroma. Unhappy Aristotle, who invented dialectics for these men, the art of building up and pulling down. It is an art so evasive in its propositions, so far-fetched in its conjectures, so harsh, in its arguments, so productive of contentions. It is embarrassing even to itself, retracting everything, and really treating of nothing!

          What is the source of those "fables and endless genealogies," (1 Timothy 1:4) and "unprofitable questions," (Titus 3:9) and "words which spread like a cancer" (2 Timothy 2:17)? When the apostle [Paul] would restrain us from all of these, he expressly names philosophy as that which he would have us be on our guard against. Writing to the Colossians, he says, "See that no one enchant you through philosophy and vain deceit, in the tradition of men, and contrary to the wisdom of the Holy Ghost." He had been at Athens, and had in his discussions [with its philosophers] become acquainted with that human wisdom which pretends to know the truth, while it only corrupts it, and is itself divided into its own many heresies, by the variety of its mutually opposed schools. What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem? What harmony is there between the Academy and the Church? What between heretics and Christians? Our instruction comes from "the porch of Solomon," who had himself taught that "the Lord should be sought in simplicity of heart" (Wisdom 1:1). Away with all attempts to produce a Christianity speckled with Stoic, Platonic, and dialectic composition! We want no inquisitive disputation after possessing Christ Jesus, no investigation after enjoying the gospel! With our faith, we desire no further belief. For this is our praiseworthy faith, that there is nothing that we ought to believe besides it.

PARADOX OF THE CRUCIFIXION (On the Flesh of Christ, 5)

There are, to be sure, other things also quite as foolish [as the birth of Christ], regarding the humiliations and sufferings of God. Otherwise, let them call a crucified God "wisdom." But Marcion [who argued that Christ had no genuine physical body] will apply the knife to this doctrine [of the crucifixion] also, and even with greater reason. For, which of the following is more unworthy of God, and is more likely to raise a blush of embarassment: that God should be born, or that he should die? That he should bear the flesh, or the cross? Be circumcised, or be crucified? Be cradled, or be coffined? Be laid in a manger, or in a tomb? Talk of "wisdom!" You will be more arbitrary if you refuse to believe this also. But, after all, you will not be "wise" unless you become a "fool" to the world, by believing "the foolish things of God." Have you, then, [like Marcion] removed all sufferings from Christ, on the ground that, as a mere phantom, he was incapable of experiencing them? We have said above that He might possibly have undergone the unreal mockeries of an imaginary birth and infancy. But now answer me, you that murder truth:  Was not God really crucified?  Having been really crucified, did He not really die? And, having indeed really died, did He not really rise again? [If not, then] falsely did Paul "determine to know nothing amongst us but Jesus and Him crucified;" falsely has he impressed upon us that He was buried; falsely inculcated that He rose again. False, therefore, is our faith also. All that we hope for from Christ will be a phantom. You most wicked of men, who acquit the murderers of God of all guilt! For nothing did Christ suffer from them, if He really suffered nothing at all. Spare the whole world's one only hope, you who are destroying the indispensable dishonor of our faith. Whatsoever is unworthy of God, is of gain to me. I am safe, if I am not ashamed of my Lord. "Whosoever," He says, "will be ashamed of me, of him will I also be ashamed." Other matters for shame find I none which can prove me to be shameless in a good sense, and foolish in a happy one, by my own contempt of shame. The Son of God was crucified; I am not ashamed because men are ashamed of it. The Son of God died; it is by all means to be believed, because it is absurd. He was buried, and rose again; the fact is certain, because it is impossible. But how will all this be true in him, if he was not himself true—if he really had not in himself that which might be crucified, might die, might be buried, and might rise again?

Source: Tertullian: Against Heretics, and Flesh of Christ, translated by Alexander Roberts, adapted.

 

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ORIGEN OF ALEXANDRIA:

COSMIC SYSTEM OF RATIONAL SOULS

Origen of Alexandria (c. 185–254 CE) was one of the most prolific and daring theologians of the early Christian Church. Born into a Christian family in Egypt, he assumed the leadership of the Alexandrian Catechetical School at a remarkably young age after his father was martyred. Origen spent his life engaged in rigorous textual criticism, producing the Hexapla, and lecturing widely before relocating to Caesarea. His immense intellectual output eventually led to his imprisonment and torture during the Decian persecution, from which he never fully recovered. Origen's central project was to construct a comprehensive, philosophically rigorous system of Christian theology that could withstand pagan intellectual scrutiny. Drawing heavily on Middle Platonism, he envisioned reality as a cosmic cycle of spiritual education and development. He held that all rational spirits were originally created equal, but through the exercise of free will, they drifted into a complex hierarchy of angels, humans, and demons. He accordingly offers a metaphysical system wherein physical worlds serve as temporary schools designed to purify souls and guide them back to their divine origin.

          In the section on God not having a body, Origen argues that we must not literally interpret anthropomorphisms like describing God as fire or spirit. Rather, he says, God is an immaterial and intellectual light that illuminates our rational understanding. As such, God bears no more resemblance to physical sunlight than physical objects do to abstract truths. In the section on the incomprehensibility of God, he argues that, like the brilliance of the sun, the divine nature is unspeakably superior to human thought. As such, our bodily-bound minds hold only the dimness of a single spark in comparison to the blinding and unmeasurable brilliance of the Creator. In the next section he argues that God originally created all rational spirits completely equal. However, our individual free will choices caused diversity between us in the world. This prompted divine Providence to arrange these unequal souls into a single and harmonious cosmic order, based entirely on individual merit. In the section on universal redemption and the final restoration, Origen presents his doctrine of universal salvation (apokatastasis).  Because the end of creation must mirror its unified beginning, God's goodness will eventually bring all rational natures back to a state of absolute subjection to Christ, systematically conquering every enemy. In the section on salvation of the devil and demons, he extends this restorative theme to the most unrelenting sources of evil. Through ages of severe, corrective training through the spiritual realm, even the devil and his angels will use their free will to convert to righteousness and revert back to their heavenly positions. In the section on all spirits requiring some type of body, Origen argues that an entirely incorporeal existence is an exclusive prerogative of the Trinity. Consequently, all created spirits require a material structure. This transforms into crasser bodies when souls fall, but refines into radiant, spiritual clothing when they ascend to holiness. In the section on God creating an eternity of worlds, Origen concludes by refuting critics who ask what an omnipotent God was doing before this world began. He argues that divine goodness is never inactive, establishing that an endless succession of past and future worlds exists in time to accommodate the perpetual proficiency and failure of free rational agents.

DEFENSE OF THE INVISIBLE CHRISTIAN GOD

God does Not Have a Body (Principles, 1.1.1)

I know that some will attempt to say that, even according to the declarations of our own Scriptures, God is a body, because in the writings of Moses they find it said, that "our God is a consuming fire;" and in the Gospel according to John, that "God is a Spirit, and they who worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth." Fire and spirit, according to them, are to be regarded as nothing else than a body. Now, I would like to ask these people what they have to say respecting that passage where it is declared that God is light. As John writes in his Epistle, "God is light, and in Him there is no darkness at all." Truly He is that light which illuminates the whole understanding of those who are capable of receiving truth, as is said in the thirty-sixth Psalm, "In Your light we will see light." For what other light of God can be named, "in which any one sees light," save an influence of God, by which a man, being enlightened, either thoroughly sees the truth of all things, or comes to know God Himself, who is called the truth? Such is the meaning of the expression, "In Your light we will see light;" i.e., in Your word and wisdom which is Your Son, in Himself we will see You the Father. Because He is called light, will He be supposed to have any resemblance to the light of the sun? Or how should there be the slightest ground for imagining, that from that corporeal light any one could derive the cause of knowledge, and come to the understanding of the truth?

God is Incomprehensible, like the Splendor of the Sun (Principles, 1.1.5)

Having refuted, then, as well as we could, every notion which might suggest that we were to think of God as in any degree corporeal, we go on to say that, according to strict truth, God is incomprehensible, and incapable of being measured. For whatever be the knowledge which we are able to obtain of God, either by perception or reflection, we must of necessity believe that He is by many degrees far better than what we perceive Him to be. For, as if we were to see any one unable to bear a spark of light, or the flame of a very small lamp, and desired to acquaint such a one, whose vision could not admit a greater degree of light than what we have stated, with the brightness and splendor of the sun, would it not be necessary to tell him that the splendor of the sun was unspeakably and incalculably better and more glorious than all this light which he saw? Our understanding is restricted by the shackles of flesh and blood, and made, through its participation in such material substances, duller and more stupid (although, in comparison with our bodily nature, it is esteemed to be far superior). Yet, in its efforts to examine and see incorporeal things, the understanding barely holds the place of a spark or lamp. But among all intelligent incorporeal beings, what is so superior to all others as God? He is unspeakably and incalculably superior. His nature cannot be grasped or seen by the power of any human understanding, even the purest and brightest.

All Creatures Created Equal, but through Free Will become Unequal (Principles, 2.9.6)

We, however, although but men, not to nourish the insolence of the heretics by our silence, will return to their objections such answers as occur to us, so far as our abilities enable us. We have frequently shown, by those declarations which we could produce from the holy Scriptures, that God, the Creator of all things, is good, and just, and all-powerful. When He in the beginning created those beings which He desired to create (i.e., rational natures), He had no other reason for creating them than because of Himself, namely, His own goodness. As He Himself, then, was the cause of the existence of those things which were to be created, in whom there was neither any variation nor change, nor want of power, He created all whom He made equal and alike. For, there was in Himself no reason for producing variety and diversity. But since those rational creatures themselves (as we have frequently shown and will yet show in the proper place), were endowed with the power of free-will, this freedom of will incited each one to either advance by imitating of God, or be reduced to failure through negligence. This, as we have already stated, is the cause of the diversity among rational creatures, deriving its origin not from the will or judgment of the Creator, but from the freedom of the individual will.

          Now God, who deemed it just to arrange His creatures according to their merit, brought down these different understandings into the harmony of one world. He did this so that He might adorn, as it were, one house, in which there ought to be not only vessels of gold and silver, but also of wood and clay (and some indeed to honor, and others to dishonor), with those different vessels, or souls, or understandings. These are the causes, in my opinion, why that world presents the aspect of diversity, while Divine Providence continues to regulate each individual according to the variety of his movements, or of his feelings and purpose. For this reason, the Creator will neither appear to be unjust in distributing (for the causes already mentioned) to everyone according to his merits; nor will the happiness or unhappiness of each one's birth, or whatever be the condition that falls to his lot, be deemed accidental. Nor will different creators, or souls of different natures, be believed to exist.

GRAND SYSTEM OF UNIVERSAL RESTORATION (APOKATASTASIS)

Universal Redemption and the Final Restoration (Principles, 1.6.1-2)

The end of the world, then, and the final consummation, will take place when everyone will be subjected to punishment for his sins; a time which God alone knows, when He will give each one what he deserves. We think, indeed, that the goodness of God, through His Christ, may recall all His creatures to one end, even His enemies being conquered and subdued. . . . I am of opinion the that it is this very subjection by which we also wish to be subject to Him, by which the apostles also were subject, and all the saints who have been followers of Christ. For the name "subjection," by which we are subject to Christ, indicates that the salvation which proceeds from Him belongs to His subjects, agreeably to the declaration of David, "Will not my soul be subject to God? From Him comes my salvation."

          2. In the end, all enemies will be subdued to Christ, when death (the last enemy)  will be destroyed, and the kingdom will be delivered up by Christ (to whom all things are subject) to God the Father. From such an end as this, let us contemplate the beginnings of things. For the end is always like the beginning: and, therefore, as there is one end to all things, so ought we to understand that there was one beginning. As there is one end to many things, so there spring from one beginning many differences and varieties, which again, through the goodness of God, and by subjection to Christ, and through the unity of the Holy Spirit, are recalled to one end, which is like the beginning.

Salvation of the Devil and Demons (Principles, 1.6.3)

It is to be kept in mind, however, that certain beings who fell away from that one beginning of which we have spoken, have sunk to such a depth of unworthiness and wickedness as to be deemed altogether undeserving of that training and instruction by which the human race, while in the flesh, are trained and instructed with the assistance of the heavenly powers. On the contrary, they continue in a state of enmity and opposition to those who are receiving this instruction and teaching. Hence it is that the whole of this mortal life is full of struggles and trials, caused by the opposition and enmity of those who fell from a better condition without at all looking back, and who are called the devil and his angels, and the other orders of evil, which the apostle classed among the opposing powers. Consider, now, whether any of these orders of evil who act under the government of the devil, and obey his wicked commands, will in a future world (a) be converted to righteousness because of their possessing the faculty of freedom of will, or (b) be changed from their persistent and inveterate wickedness by the power of habit into nature. This is something that you, reader, may approve of. If neither in these present worlds (which are seen and temporal), nor in those which are unseen and are eternal, that portion is to differ wholly from the final unity and fitness of things. But in the meantime, both in those temporal worlds which are seen, as well as in those eternal worlds which are invisible, all those beings are arranged, according to a regular plan, in the order and degree of their merits. Thus, some of them will be in the first, others in the second, some even in the last times. They will undergo heavier and severer punishments, enduring this for a lengthened period, and for many ages, so to speak, will improve by this stern method of training, and will be restored at first by the instruction of the angels, and subsequently by the powers of a higher grade. Thus, advancing through each stage to a better condition, they reach even to that which is invisible and eternal, having travelled through, by a kind of training, every single office of the heavenly powers. From this, I think the following can be inferred. Every rational nature may, in passing from one order to another, go through each to all, and advance from all to each, while made the subject of various degrees of proficiency and failure according to its own actions and endeavors, put forth in the enjoyment of its power of freedom of will.

All Spirits require Some Type of Body (Principles, 2.2.1-2)

1. On this topic some are inclined to inquire whether the following. The Father generates an uncreated Son, and brings forth a Holy Spirit (not as if He had no previous existence, but because the Father is the origin and source of the Son or Holy Spirit), and no "before" or "after" can be understood as existing in them.  So too, then, a similar kind of union or relationship can be understood to exist between rational natures and bodily matter. That this point may be more fully and thoroughly examined, the start of the discussion is generally directed to the inquiry whether this very bodily nature, which bears the lives and contains the movements of spiritual and rational minds, will be equally eternal with them, or will altogether perish and be destroyed. That the question may be determined with greater precision, we have, in the first place, to inquire if it is possible for rational natures to remain altogether incorporeal after they have reached the summit of holiness and happiness (which seems to me a most difficult and almost impossible attainment), or whether they must always of necessity be united to bodies. Suppose that someone could give a reason why it was possible for them to dispense entirely with bodies. It would then appear to follow that, if a bodily nature was produced when it did not exist (created out of nothing after intervals of time), then it must cease to be when the purposes which it served had no longer an existence.

          2. Suppose, on the other hand, it is impossible for this point to be at all maintained (that is, that any other nature than the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit can live without a body). The necessity of logical reasoning compels us to understand that rational natures were indeed created at the beginning, but that material substance was separated from them only in thought and understanding. It appears to have been formed for them (or after them), and that they never have lived nor do live without it. For an incorporeal life will correctly be considered a prerogative of the Trinity alone. As we have remarked above, therefore, the material substance of this world, possessing a nature admitting of all possible transformations, is, when dragged down to beings of a lower order, molded into the crasser and more solid condition of a body, so as to distinguish those visible and varying forms of the world. But when it becomes the servant of more perfect and more blessed beings, it shines in the splendor of celestial bodies, and adorns either the angels of God or the sons of the resurrection with the clothing of a spiritual body, out of all which will be filled up the diverse and varying state of the one world.

God Creates an Eternity of Worlds, Past and Future (Principles, 3.5.3)

This is the objection which they generally raise: they say, "If the world had its beginning in time, what was God doing before the world began? For it is at once impious and absurd to say that the nature of God is inactive and immoveable, or to suppose that goodness at one time did not do good, and omnipotence at one time did not exercise its power." Such is the objection which they are accustomed to make to our statement that this world had its beginning at a certain time, and that, agreeably to our belief in Scripture, we can calculate the years of its past duration. To these propositions I consider that none of the heretics can easily return an answer that will be in conformity with the nature of their opinions. But we can give a logical answer in accordance with the standard of religion, when we say that when God made this visible world, this was not the first time that God began to work. For, just as after the destruction of this world God will create another world, so too do we believe that other worlds existed before the present one came into being. Both of these positions will be confirmed by the authority of holy Scripture. . . . It is not, however, to be supposed that several worlds existed at once, but that, after the end of this present world, others will take their beginning.

Source: Origen of Alexandria, Principles, translated by Alexander Roberts and James Donaldson, adapted.

 

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LACTANTIUS: BODILESS YET ANGRY GOD

Lactantius (c. 250–325 CE) served as an advisor to Constantine, the first Christian Roman Emperor. Born in North Africa, Lactantius initially had a distinguished career as a pagan professor of rhetoric in Nicomedia under the patronage of Emperor Diocletian. After converting to Christianity around 300 CE, he resigned his official post during the subsequent Diocletian persecution. He endured financial hardship until Constantine later appointed him as the personal tutor to his son, Crispus. Lactantius's central project was to dismantle pagan Roman theology and philosophy using the very classical rhetorical forms his elite audience respected. In his major work, the Divine Institutes, he sought to demonstrate that the polytheistic myths of the Roman state were intellectually indefensible. He thus presented Christian monotheism not as a foreign superstition, but as the supreme realization of true reason and cosmic order. He rejected the popular philosophical consensus that a perfect deity must remain completely passionless. Instead, he argued that a full account of divine providence suggests that God must be emotionally reactive, even to the point of anger.

          In the section on the universe governed by one God, Lactantius argues that the absolute stability and perfection of supreme excellence require the divine nature to be unified. This is just as a multiplicity of rulers would inevitably fragment cosmic power into weak, mutually restrictive boundaries. Further, he argues that, just as a single human body is directed by a single mind, so too the immense fabric of the universe is governed by a similar single intellect that created it from nothing. In the section on God having no body, Lactantius argues that, unlike the Roman conceptions of their gods, a genuinely eternal and self-sustaining Deity has no need for corporeal substance, gender, or sexual procreation. Accordingly, the popular Roman deities were merely historic human kings who were mythologized after death by unreflective people. In the section on the Stoic error of a passionless deity, he criticizes the popular philosophical notion that anger is incompatible with the serene majesty of God. For, philosophers have mistakenly conflate flawed human rage with the purposeful judgment of the divine nature. In the section on the inseparable link between divine anger and kindness, Lactantius argues that affection and aversion are naturally connected. For, he argues, if God is incapable of experiencing anger against the unrighteous, then he must also be incapable of loving the righteous. Accordingly, divine anger is the crucial turning point of true religion, insofar as it establishes the necessary fear and honor that bind humanity to their creator. Lactantius concludes by addressing the problem of evil as formulated by Epicurus. The question is how a benevolent and omnipotent God can allow evil to exist in the world. Lactantius responds by arguing that evil is a necessary stimulus that enables human wisdom and virtue, which outweigh the pain of hardship. Without experiencing and overcoming evil, humanity could neither recognize true goodness nor achieve immortality.

AGAINST THE ROMAN VIEW OF GODS WITH BODIES

The Universe Governed by One God (Divine Institutes, 1.3)

Let the start of our work therefore be that inquiry which closely follows and is connected with the first: Whether the universe is governed by the power of one God or of many. There is no one, who possesses intelligence and uses reflection, who does not understand that it is one Being who both created all things and governs them with the same energy by which He created them. For what need is there of many to sustain the government of the universe? Unless we should happen to think that, if there were more than one, each would possess less might and strength. And they who hold that there are many gods, do indeed effect this; for those gods must of necessity be weak, since individually, without the aid of the others, they would be unable to sustain the government of so vast a mass. But God, who is the Eternal Mind, is undoubtedly of excellence, complete and perfect in every part. And if this is true, He must of necessity be one. For power or excellence, which is complete, retains its own peculiar stability. But that is to be regarded as solid from which nothing can be taken away, that as perfect to which nothing can be added.

          Who can doubt that he would be a most powerful king who should have the government of the whole world? And not without reason, since all things which everywhere exist would belong to him, since all resources from all quarters would be centred in him alone. But if more than one divide the government of the world, undoubtedly each will have less power and strength, since every one must confine himself within his prescribed portion. In the same manner also, if there are more gods than one, they will be of less weight, others having in themselves the same power. But the nature of excellence admits of greater perfection in him in whom the whole is, than in him in whom there is only a small part of the whole. But God, if He is perfect, as He ought to be, cannot but be one, because He is perfect, so that all things may be in Him. Therefore the excellences and powers of the gods must necessarily be weaker, because so much will be wanting to each as shall be in the others; and so the more there are, so much the less powerful will they be. Why should I mention that this highest power and divine energy is altogether incapable of division? For whatever is capable of division must of necessity be liable to destruction also. But if destruction is far removed from God, because He is incorruptible and eternal, it follows that the divine power is incapable of division. Therefore God is one, if that which admits of so great power can be nothing else: and yet those who deem that there are many gods, say that they have divided their functions among themselves; but we will discuss all these matters at their proper places.

          In the meantime, I affirm this, which belongs to the present subject. If they have divided their functions among themselves, the matter comes back to the same point, that any one of them is unable to supply the place of all. He cannot, then, be perfect who is unable to govern all things while the others are unemployed. And so it comes to pass, that for the government of the universe there is more need of the perfect excellence of one than of the imperfect powers of many. But he who imagines that so great a magnitude as this cannot be governed by one Being, is deceived. For he does not comprehend how great are the might and power of the divine majesty, if he thinks that the one God, who had power to create the universe, is also unable to govern that which He has created. But if he conceives in his mind how great is the immensity of that divine work, when before it was nothing, yet that by the power and wisdom of God it was made out of nothing — a work which could only be commenced and accomplished by one — he will now understand that that which has been established by one is much more easily governed by one.

          Someone may perhaps say that so immense a work as that of the universe could not even have been fabricated except by many. But however many and however great he may consider them — whatever magnitude, power, excellence, and majesty he may attribute to the many — the whole of that I assign to one, and say that it exists in one: so that there is in Him such an amount of these properties as can neither be conceived nor expressed. And since we fail in this subject, both in perception and in words — for neither does the human breast admit the light of so great understanding, nor is the mortal tongue capable of explaining such great subjects — it is right that we should understand and say this very same thing. I see, again, what can be alleged on the other hand, that those many gods are such as we hold the one God to be. But this cannot possibly be so, because the power of these gods individually will not be able to proceed further, the power of the others meeting and hindering them. For either each must be unable to pass beyond his own limits, or, if he shall have passed beyond them, he must drive another from his boundaries. They who believe that there are many gods, do not see that it may happen that some may be opposed to others in their wishes, from which circumstance disputing and contention would arise among them. . . . So, in this government of the affairs of nature, unless there shall be one to whom the care of the whole is referred, all things will be dissolved and fall to decay.

          But to say that the universe is governed by the will of many, is equivalent to a declaration that there are many minds in one body, since there are many and various offices of the members, so that separate minds may be supposed to govern separate senses; and also the many affections, by which we are accustomed to be moved either to anger, or to desire, or to joy, or to fear, or to pity, so that in all these affections as many minds may be supposed to operate; and if any one should say this, he would appear to be destitute even of that very mind, which is one. But if in one body one mind possesses the government of so many things, and is at the same time occupied with the whole, why should any one suppose that the universe cannot be governed by one, but that it can be governed by more than one? And because those maintainers of many gods are aware of this, they say that they so preside over separate offices and parts, that there is still one chief ruler. The others, therefore, on this principle, will not be gods, but attendants and ministers, whom that one most mighty and omnipotent appointed to these offices, and they themselves will be subservient to his authority and command. If, therefore, all are not equal to one another, all are not gods; for that which serves and that which rules cannot be the same. For if God is a title of the highest power, He must be incorruptible, perfect, incapable of suffering, and subject to no other being; therefore they are not gods whom necessity compels to obey the one greatest God. But because they who hold this opinion are not deceived without cause, we will presently lay open the cause of this error. Now, let us prove by testimonies the unity of the divine power.

God Has No Body (Divine Institutes, 1.8)

It is proved, therefore, by these witnesses, so numerous and of such authority, that the universe is governed by the power and providence of one God, whose energy and majesty Plato in the Timaeus asserts to be so great, that no one can either conceive it in his mind, or give utterance to it in words, on account of His surpassing and incalculable power. And then can any one doubt whether anything can be difficult or impossible for God, who by His providence designed, by His energy established, and by His judgment completed those works so great and wonderful, and even now sustains them by His spirit, and governs them by His power, being incomprehensible and unspeakable, and fully known to no other than Himself? Wherefore, as I often reflect on the subject of such great majesty, they who worship the gods sometimes appear so blind, so incapable of reflection, so senseless, so little removed from the mute animals, as to believe that those who are born from the natural intercourse of the sexes could have had anything of majesty and divine influence; since the Erythraean Sibyl says: It is impossible for a God to be fashioned from the loins of a man and the womb of a woman. And if this is true, as it really is, it is evident that Hercules, Apollo, Bacchus, Mercury, and Jupiter, with the rest, were but men, since they were born from the two sexes. But what is so far removed from the nature of God as that operation which He Himself assigned to mortals for the propagation of their race, and which cannot be affected without corporeal substance?

          Therefore, if the gods are immortal and eternal, what need is there of the other sex, when they themselves do not require succession, since they are always about to exist? For assuredly in the case of mankind and the other animals, there is no other reason for difference of sex and procreation and bringing forth, except that all classes of living creatures, inasmuch as they are doomed to death by the condition of their mortality, may be preserved by mutual succession. But God, who is immortal, has no need of difference of sex, nor of succession. Some one will say that this arrangement is necessary, in order that He may have some to minister to Him, or over whom He may bear rule. What need is there of the female sex, since God, who is almighty, is able to produce sons without the agency of the female? For if He has granted to certain minute creatures that they

          Should gather offspring for themselves with their mouth from leaves and sweet herbs, why should any one think it impossible for God Himself to have offspring except by union with the other sex? No one, therefore, is so thoughtless as not to understand that those were mere mortals, whom the ignorant and foolish regard and worship as gods. Why, then, some one will say, were they believed to be gods? Doubtless because they were very great and powerful kings; and since, on account of the merits of their virtues, or offices, or the arts which they discovered, they were beloved by those over whom they had ruled, they were consecrated to lasting memory. And if any one doubts this, let him consider their exploits and deeds, the whole of which both ancient poets and historians have handed down.

IN DEFENSE OF GOD'S ANGER  (On the Anger of God)

The Stoic Error of a Passionless Deity (Chapter 5)

5. The Stoics and some others are supposed to have entertained much better sentiments respecting the divine nature, who say that there is kindness in God, but not anger. A very pleasing and popular speech, that God is not subject to such smallness of mind as to imagine that He is injured by any one, since it is impossible for Him to be injured; so that that serene and holy majesty is excited, disturbed, and maddened, which is the part of human frailty. For they say that anger is a commotion and perturbation of the mind, which is inconsistent with God. Since, when it falls upon the mind of anyone, as a violent tempest it excites such waves that it changes the condition of the mind, the eyes gleam, the countenance trembles, the tongue stammers, the teeth chatter, the countenance is alternately stained now with redness spread over it, now with white paleness. But if anger is unbecoming to a man, provided he be of wisdom and authority, how much more is so foul a change unbecoming to God! And if man, when he has authority and power, inflicts widespread injury through anger, sheds blood, overthrows cities, destroys communities, reduces provinces to desolation, how much more is it to be believed that God, since He has power over the whole human race, and over the universe itself, would have been about to destroy all things if He were angry.

          Therefore they think that so great and so pernicious an evil ought to be absent from Him. And if anger and excitement are absent from Him, because it is disfiguring and injurious, and He inflicts injury on no one, they think that nothing else remains, except that He is mild, calm, propitious, beneficent, the preserver. Ultimately, he may be called the common Father of all, and the best and greatest, which His divine and heavenly nature demands. For if among men it appears praiseworthy to do good rather than to injure, to restore to life rather than to kill, to save rather than to destroy, and innocence is not undeservedly numbered among the virtues — and he who does these things is loved, esteemed, honoured, and celebrated with all blessings and vows — in short, on account of his deserts and benefits is judged to be most like to God; how much more right is it that God Himself, who excels in divine and perfect virtues, and who is removed from all earthly taint, should conciliate the whole race of man by divine and heavenly benefits!

Inseparable Link Between Divine Anger and Kindness (Chapters 5–6)

These things are said erroneously and in a popular manner, and they draw many to believe them. But they who entertain these sentiments approach nearer indeed to the truth, but they partly fail, not sufficiently considering the nature of the case. For if God is not angry with the impious and the unrighteous, it is clear that He does not love the pious and the righteous. Therefore the error of those is more consistent who take away at once both anger and kindness. For in opposite matters it is necessary to be moved to both sides or to neither. Thus, he who loves the good also hates the wicked, and he who does not hate the wicked does not love the good; because the loving of the good arises from the hatred of the wicked, and the hating of the wicked has its rise from the love of the good. There is no one who loves life without a hatred of death, nor who is desirous of light, but he who avoids darkness. These things are so connected by nature, that the one cannot exist without the other. . . .

          6. These are the opinions entertained by the philosophers respecting God. But if we have discovered that these things which have been spoken are false, there remains that one last resource, in which alone the truth can be found, which has never been embraced by philosophers, nor at any time defended: that it follows that God is angry, since He is moved by kindness. This opinion is to be maintained and asserted by us; for this is the sum and turning-point on which the whole of piety and religion depend: and no honor can be due to God, if He affords nothing to His worshippers; and no fear, if He is not angry with him who does not worship Him.

Epicurus's Problem of Evil (Chapter 13)

You can see that we need wisdom precisely because evil exists. Without these challenges, we would not be rational creatures. Once you understand this point, which the Stoics could never quite grasp, the famous dilemma of Epicurus falls apart. Epicurus argued that God either wishes to remove evil and cannot, or can and is unwilling, or is neither willing nor able, or is both willing and able. He claimed that if God is willing but unable, He is weak, which contradicts His nature. If He is able but unwilling, He is malicious, which is equally out of character. If He is neither, He is both weak and malicious, meaning He is not God. And if He is both willing and able—the only option that fits a true God—then where does evil come from, and why does He not remove it? I know this argument frequently rattles philosophers who defend divine providence, often driving them to reluctantly conclude that God simply does not care, which was Epicurus's main goal. However, once we examine the issue closely, we can easily dismiss this formidable objection.

          God can do whatever He pleases, and He is entirely free of weakness and malice. He is certainly able to eliminate evil, but He chooses not to do so, and that does not make Him malicious. He withholds removal because He simultaneously provides wisdom, as I have explained. The goodness and joy found in wisdom far outweigh the pain caused by evil. Wisdom allows us to truly know God, and through that knowledge, we attain immortality, which is our highest good. Therefore, unless we first experience evil, we cannot possibly recognize good. Epicurus and every other thinker failed to realize that removing evil automatically removes wisdom as well. Without evil, no trace of human virtue would remain, because the very nature of virtue consists in enduring and overcoming hardship. Ultimately, if we demanded the complete removal of evil for a minor comfort, we would sacrifice a good that is monumental, genuine, and uniquely human. It is therefore clear that everything in the world, both good and bad, serves a deliberate purpose for humanity.

Source: Lactantius: Divine Institutes and The Anger of God, translated by William Fletcher, adapted.

 

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. According to Philo Judaeus in On the Cherubim, what are the two primary powers of God symbolized by the cherubim, and how does the Logos function as the mediating power between them?

2. According to Philo Judaeus in Allegorical Interpretation, why is the true God's essence incomprehensible to imperfect human beings, and why is the Logos considered "God to us"?

3. According to Philo Judaeus in Heir of Divine Things, what radical "emigration" must the soul undergo in order to transcend bodily senses and speech to become an inheritor of divine things?

4. According to Justin Martyr in Apology 1, why were pre-Christian rational thinkers like Socrates and Heraclitus actually "Christians," even though they lived before Christ's birth?

5. According to Justin Martyr in Apology 2, how does Christ as the "whole Logos" differ from human philosophers, and why did uneducated artisans willingly die for Christ when no one died for Socrates?

6. According to Justin Martyr in Apology 2, why are all truths correctly uttered by pagan writers considered the rightful property of Christians?

7. According to Athenagoras of Athens in A Plea for the Christians, how do ancient philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics support the Christian assertion that God is ultimately one?

8. According to Athenagoras of Athens in A Plea for the Christians, what spatial argument proves that two or more uncreated gods cannot possibly coexist?

9. According to Athenagoras of Athens in On the Resurrection of the Dead, why does the consumption of human corpses by animals or fish fail to prevent the ultimate biological reassembly of human bodies at the resurrection?

10. According to Irenaeus of Lyons in Against Heresies, why was humanity created in an "infantile" state rather than being made spiritually perfect from the very beginning?

11. According to Irenaeus of Lyons in Against Heresies, why is it foolish for human beings to demand immediate divinity rather than accepting a gradual process of growth toward God's image?

12. According to Clement of Alexandria in the Stromata, how did philosophy serve as a "schoolmaster" to lead the Hellenic mind to Christ in the same way the Mosaic Law did for the Hebrews?

13. According to Clement of Alexandria in the Stromata, why is intellectual training in disciplines like geometry, music, and philosophy necessary for guarding bare Christian faith against sophistry?

14. According to Clement of Alexandria in the Stromata, how does the mind arrive at a conception of God through the method of mathematical and spatial abstraction?

15. According to Tertullian in Prescription Against Heretics, why does he reject any synthesis of Christian doctrine with Greek metaphysics, famously asking "What indeed has Athens to do with Jerusalem?"

16. According to Tertullian in On the Flesh of Christ, why does he declare that the death of the Son of God is to be believed "because it is absurd," and His resurrection is certain "because it is impossible"?

17. According to Origen of Alexandria in Principles, why are all rational creatures born into unequal and diverse positions in the world if God originally created them all completely equal?

18. According to Origen of Alexandria in Principles, what is the doctrine of universal restoration (apokatastasis), and how does it eventually extend even to the devil and his angels?

19. According to Lactantius in the Divine Institutes, why does the absolute stability and perfection of supreme power require that the universe be governed by one God rather than many?

20. According to Lactantius in On the Anger of God, why are divine anger and divine kindness inseparably linked, and why is the concept of a passionless deity a philosophical error?

21. Short Essay Options: Please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

(a) Critics argue that Philo's doctrine of an incomprehensible God makes his positive claims about divine authority and goodness self-contradictory; if the divine essence is entirely beyond human apprehension, we have no basis for attributing specific moral qualities to God. How might Philo respond?

(b) Critics argue that Justin Martyr's concept of the logos spermatikos (seed of reason) blurs the line between divine revelation and human philosophy, effectively making explicit Christian faith redundant for anyone living a rational life. How might Justin respond?

(c) Critics argue that Athenagoras's spatial proof for monotheism mistakenly treats God as a physical entity bounded by spatial dimensions, thereby failing to conceive of non-spatial, omnipresent spiritual presence. How might Athenagoras respond?

(d) Critics argue that Irenaeus's defense of human weakness as "infancy" makes God responsible for moral evil; if God intentionally created humans imperfect, sin becomes a designed feature of human growth rather than a culpable fault. How might Irenaeus respond?

(e) Critics argue that Clement's insistence on secular philosophical education creates an elitist hierarchy within the Church, favoring wealthy, educated scholars over simple, uneducated believers. How might Clement respond?

(f) Critics argue that Tertullian's radical rejection of philosophy ("I believe because it is absurd") leads to anti-intellectual fideism, leaving believers unable to defend their faith against irrational superstitions or internal fanaticism. How might Tertullian respond?

(g) Critics argue that Origen's doctrine of apokatastasis (universal restoration) eliminates the real moral weight of human free will and divine judgment, since ultimate salvation is guaranteed regardless of one's earthly life. How might Origen respond?

(h) Critics argue that Lactantius's insistence on divine anger anthropomorphizes God, attributing petty human emotional instability to a supreme being who ought to be impassible and serene. How might Lactantius respond?

(i) Critics argue that the early Christian apologists' wholesale borrowing of Greek philosophical concepts like the Logos resulted in a "Hellenization" of Christianity that corrupted its original Jewish apocalyptic context. How might either Philo, Justin, or Clement respond?

(j) Critics argue that early Christian arguments for bodily resurrection rely on outdated ancient physics that cannot survive modern scientific understandings of cellular decomposition and matter recycling. How might Athenagoras respond?