MEDIEVALS

From Classics in the Philosophy of Religion, by James Fieser

© 2026, updated 6/1/2026, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

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CONTENTS

• Augustine: Divine Illumination, Foreknowledge, Evil (from City of God, 83 Questions, On Free Choice, Enchiridion)

• Pseudo-Dionysius: Positive and Negative Theology (from Mystical Theology)

• Boethius: Free Will and Divine Foreknowledge (from Consolation of Philosophy)

• Hesychius of Sinai: The Jesus Prayer (from Philokalia)

• Anselm: Ontological Argument for God (from Proslogium)

• Averroes: Reconciling Scripture with Reason (from Decisive Treatise)

• Thomas Aquinas: Proofs of God's Existence and Unity (from Summa Theologiae)

Historians date the medieval period from around 500 to 1500 CE, and virtually all philosophy during this time was done within the context of Christian, Jewish and Muslim religious institutions. Philosophers no longer offered secular explanations of the world, and, instead, philosophy was tasked with defending and explaining religious doctrine. Early Christian philosophers already began integrating classical Greek and Hellenistic thought into Christian theology. Medieval philosophers continued that project, but had fewer Greek philosophical text to draw upon. Perhaps 95% of classical and Hellenistic philosophy books disappeared permanently. What survived of the Epicureans, Stoics and Skeptics was rejected because of their anti-supernatural views. Plato and Aristotle did gain acceptance, but most of their surviving works were temporarily lost in Western Europe. At first Plato was the dominant philosophical influence in the Middle Ages, not directly, but as filtered through Plotinus's Neoplatonism. Augustine did the most to shape Christian Platonism. He kept Plato's basic division between the changing material world and the eternal realm of the Forms. However, Augustine relocated the Forms into the mind of God, rather than having them float free as independent entities. Pseudo-Dionysius, Boethius, and Anselm each worked within this same Platonic structure in the centuries that followed. This Christian Platonism continued until the twelfth century, when interest shifted toward Aristotle when his works were discovered in Arabic-speaking regions of the mediterranean. Thomas Aquinas represents the pinnacle of this turn, using Aristotelian metaphysical concepts to construct arguments for the existence and unity of God. By the close of the medieval period, philosophy of religion had become a combination of Christianized Platonism and Aristotelianism. This was a picture of the cosmos that the writers of the scientific revolution would eventually dismantle.

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AUGUSTINE: DIVINE ILLUMINATION, FOREKNOWLEDGE, EVIL

Augustine of Hippo (354–430 CE) was born in the North African town of Thagaste. His family was modest; his father was a pagan minor official and his mother, Monica, was a devout Christian. He received a thorough classical education at Madaura and Carthage, and he initially built a career teaching rhetoric in Carthage, Rome, and Milan. For much of his early adulthood, Augustine searched for truth across competing intellectual systems. He spent nearly a decade as a follower of Manichaeism, briefly turned to Academic skepticism, and eventually embraced Neoplatonism. This philosophical shift, combined with the preaching of Bishop Ambrose, led to his conversion to Christianity in Milan. He returned to North Africa in 388, established a small monastic community, and was ordained a priest in Hippo in 391. Four years later, he became the Bishop of Hippo, a position he held for thirty-five years. During these decades, he produced an extraordinary body of literature, including Confessions, The City of God, and On the Trinity. His writings emerged from major controversies with Manichaeans, Donatists, and Pelagians. He died in Hippo in 430 while the Vandals besieged the city. The selections here are from four of his works.

          In the section on divine illumination, Augustine presents his version of Plato's concept of the "Forms", or, as Augustine variously calls them, "eternal things", "intelligible things" or "reasons". He says that we have only brief glimpses of them which we quickly forget, yet we eventually remember them and turn them into systematic knowledge. How do we gain access to the Forms? Not through recollection as Plato believed. Rather, according to Augustine, all the Forms reside in God's mind, which he used to create the world, and he reveals them to our minds through divine illumination. He compares divine illumination to how the sun illuminates material objects. It reveals truth to us, it helps us form good habits, and we also benefit from identifying those things that are not illuminated, such as foolishness. In the section on free will and divine foreknowledge, he argues that God's capacity to foreknow future events does not mean that I have been determined to perform the evil deeds that I commit. I still do them of my own free choice, and, when God looks into the future, it is my free choice that he foresees.

          In the section on goodness and evil in creation he addresses the problem of evil. He first argues that we are not justified in criticizing the way the universe operates, since this implies that God should have added or subtracted something from it, which we are not in a position to do. He next argues that the unhappiness that we experience through our own sin contributes to the universe's completeness. This is just as dimmer things set off brighter ones. He continues arguing that Christians need not master the physical details scientists investigate, but only be aware that God's goodness is the sole cause of everything that exists. Indeed, the supremely good creator made all things good, and while individual creatures are only imperfectly good, the created universe as a whole is very good, given its order and beauty. What we call "evil", he says, is just the absence of good, in the way that disease is the absence of health.

DIVINE ILLUMINATION

Platonists Hold to a Supreme Immaterial God (City of God, 8)

This principle is the understanding of man, the rational soul. It is certainly not a body, since that likeness of a body which it sees and judges of is itself not a body. The soul is neither earth, nor water, nor air, nor fire, of which four bodies, called the four elements, we see that this world is composed. If the soul is not a body, how could God, its Creator, be a body? Let all those philosophers, then, give place, as we have said, to the Platonists, and those also who have been ashamed to say that God is a body, but yet have thought that our souls are of the same nature as God. They have not been astounded by the great changeableness of the soul (an attribute which it would be impious to ascribe to the divine nature), but they say it is the body which changes the soul, for in itself it is unchangeable. As well might they say, "Flesh is wounded by some body, for in itself it is invulnerable." In a word, that which is unchangeable can be changed by nothing, so that that which can be changed by the body cannot properly be said to be immutable.

           6. These [Platonist] philosophers, then, whom we see not undeservedly elevated above the rest in fame and glory, have seen that no material body is God, and therefore they have transcended all [material] bodies in seeking for God. They have seen that whatever is changeable is not the most high God, and therefore they have transcended every soul and all changeable spirits in seeking the supreme. They have seen also that, in every changeable thing, the form which makes it that which it is, whatever be its mode or nature, can only be through Him who truly is, because He is unchangeable. We may consider the whole body of the world, its figure, qualities, and orderly movement, and also all the bodies which are in it. Or we may consider all life, either that which nourishes and maintains, as the life of trees, or that which, besides this, has also sensation, as the life of animals. Or we may consider that which adds intelligence to all these things, such as the life of man. Or we may consider that which does not need the support of nutriment, but only maintains, feels, understands, such as the life of angels. Regardless of which of these we consider, all can only be through Him who absolutely is. For to Him it is not one thing to be, and another to live, as though He could be, not living. Nor is it to Him one thing to live, and another thing to understand, as though He could live, not understanding. Nor is it to Him one thing to understand, another thing to be blessed, as though He could understand and not be blessed. . .

Divine Illumination of Forms that Exist in God's Mind (83 Questions, 46)

Where are we to believe that these reasons [i.e., Forms by which God created things] exist, if not in the very mind of the Creator? Indeed he saw nothing outside of him that could serve him as a type for what he wanted. To make such a supposition would be sacrilegious. Suppose that these reasons of all things (created or yet to be created) are contained in the divine intelligence. Suppose also that there can be nothing in the divine intelligence that is not eternal and immutable. Suppose finally that it is these first reasons of things which Plato calls ideas. It thus follows that not only do ideas exist, but that they are true because they are eternal, permanent in their form, and immutable. It is by participation in them that everything exists, in whatever way it exists. Now, the rational soul prevails over all creatures, and it is close to God when it is pure. In the proportion in which it is united to Him by charity, it finds itself filled and illuminated by that intelligible light, by means of which it sees. It is not by the eyes of the body, but by that which is best in itself that it sees, namely, by its intelligence. When contemplating these reasons she enjoys great happiness. Further, as we have said, we call these reasons ideas, or forms, or species, or reasons. People may name it as they choose, but it is only very few who can see the truth.

Spiritual Illumination compared with Material Illumination (City of God, 11.10)

The soul itself, too, though it is always wise (as it will be eternally when it is redeemed), will be so by participating in the unchangeable wisdom, which it is not; for though the air be never robbed of the light that is shed abroad in it, it is not on that account the same thing as the light. I do not mean that the soul is air, as has been supposed by some who could not conceive a spiritual nature. But, with much dissimilarity, the two things have a kind of likeness, which makes it suitable to say that the immaterial soul is illumined with the immaterial light of the simple wisdom of God, as the material air is irradiated with material light. Accordingly, as the air, when deprived of this light, grows dark, (for material darkness is nothing else than air lacking light) so too the soul, when deprived of the light of wisdom, grows dark.

Proof for God from Eternal Truths (On Free Choice, 2.14-15)

There exist Unchanging Truths Higher

Even if the [bodily] beauty of seeing light and hearing voices were always present to me, it would be no great thing, considering that it would be common to me and to the animals. But the [intellectual] beauty of truth and wisdom, so long as there is a persistent will to enjoy it, does not exclude any spectators because of a crowded mass of listeners, nor does it pass through time, nor move to different places, nor is it interrupted by night or blocked by shadows, nor is it subject to the senses of the body. To those who from the whole world have turned to it for their delight, it is very near to everyone, and to everyone eternal. It is in no specific place, it is never away. It reprimands openly but it teaches inwardly. It changes all who see it for the better, but changes none for the worse. No one judges it, but without it no one judges well. From this it is clear beyond all doubt that it is superior to our minds, which are each made wise by it. You may not judge it, but through it you may judge everything else.

These Truths are Higher than Anything Else outside our Minds, and are God

Now, you conceded, that if I would show you something higher than our minds, you would confess that it is God, if there were nothing yet higher. Accepting this concession of yours I said that it would be enough if I should prove this. For if there is something still more excellent than truth, that instead is God. But if not, then truth itself is God. Whether therefore there is this more excellent thing, or whether there is not, you cannot deny that God exists, which was the question set for our discussion and examination.

FREE WILL AND DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE

God's Foreknowledge does not Necessitate Human Sin (On Free Choice, 3.2)

Possible Conflict between God's Foreknowledge and Human Choice to Sin

          A. It is this, to be sure, that troubles you, and that you cannot understand why these two things are not conflicting and opposed: that God has foreknowledge of all things to come, and that we sin, not by necessity, but by our own will. For, you say, if God foreknows that a man is going to sin, it is necessary that he should sin; but if it is necessary, there is then no choice of the will in sinning, but rather an inevitable and fixed necessity. By this reasoning, indeed, you are afraid that it might follow either that (1) God's foreknowledge of all things to come is impiously denied; or (2) if we deny this, that we admit that man sins not by choice, but by necessity. Is there anything else that troubles you?

          E. Nothing else at the moment. . . .

God Foreknows our Wills, and our Wills are within our own Power

          A. Tell me, please, are not you His creature, and will not your happiness be made in you?

          E. I am indeed His creature, and in me will it happen that I will be happy.

          A. Therefore your happiness will come to pass in you not by will, but by necessity, God doing it.

          E. His will is my necessity.

          A. So, then, you will be happy against your will?

          E. If I had the power to be happy I would surely be so. For even now I wish to be, and am not; because it is not I, but He that makes me happy.

          A. Most excellently does the truth cry out from you. For you cannot perceive anything else to be in our power, except that which we do when we will. Thus, nothing is so completely in our power as the will itself. For it is present with absolutely no interval, as soon as we will. Therefore we can say rightly that we grow old not by will, but by necessity; or that we die not by will, but by necessity; and anything else like that. But who but a crazy man would say that we do not will by will?

          For this reason, although God foreknows our wills to be, it does not thereby follow that we do not will a thing by our will. You said about happiness that you could not become happy through yourself, and said it as if I would deny it. But I say, when you are going to be happy you are not going to be happy against your will, but wanting to be happy. When, therefore, God foreknows your future happiness, it cannot come to pass otherwise than as He has foreknown it, else there is no foreknowledge; nevertheless we are not obliged to think what is most absurd and far removed from the truth, that you are going to be happy when you do not want to. Further, just as God's foreknowledge, which today is certain of your future happiness, does not take away your will for happiness when you begin to be happy; so also a culpable will, if you are going to have one, will be nonetheless your own will because God foreknows that it is to be so. . . .

          Further, because it is in our power, it is free to us. For that is not free to us that we have not, or cannot have, in our power. So, it comes about both that we do not deny that God foreknows all that is to be, and nevertheless we may will what we will. For when He foreknows our will, it will be that very will that He foreknows. It will therefore be a will, because His foreknowledge is of a will. Nor can it be a will if it is not in our power. Therefore He also foreknows the power. Therefore that power is not taken from me by His foreknowledge; rather, because of it, it will be more surely present to me, since He whose foreknowledge never errs has foreknown that it will be present to me.

          E. Observe now that I no longer deny that whatever God foreknows must come to pass, and [I assert instead] that He so foreknows our sins and at the same time there yet remains to us a will that is free, and placed in our power.

GOODNESS AND EVIL IN CREATION

The Misery of the Souls of Sinners Contributes to the Perfection of the Universe (On Free Choice, 3.9)

Criticisms of the Universe imply the Desire to Add to or Diminish something in It

          A. Suppose he says the following: It would not have been difficult or troublesome for almighty God to make all things in a way that each should have its own order, and so that no creature would be unhappy. For being almighty, He would not lack the power, and being good He would not grudge it. To this I answer that the order of creatures so descends by just degrees from the highest to the lowest. He, then, is merely spiteful when saying "This should not have been," and he who says, "This should have been so and so" is also spiteful. For if he wishes it to be something higher, [such a higher thing] already exists, and in such measure that it should not be added to, for it is perfect. He therefore who says, "This should be so and so" either wishes to add to a higher that is perfect (and thus will be intemperate and unjust), or he wishes to do away with it (and thus will be wicked and ill-willed". But he who says: "This should not exist", will be no less wicked and ill-willed, since he is not willing that it should be, while he is yet constrained to praise that which is inferior to it.

          It is as if he would say there should be no moon; while he must either acknowledge (or foolishly and contentiously deny), that even the light of a lamp, though far inferior in brightness, is yet beautiful in its own kind in the darkness of earth, and seemly and useful for the uses of night, and in all these uses thoroughly praiseworthy in its small way. How therefore can he rightly attempt to say "There should be no moon in the universe" when he knows that if he said "There should be no lamp" he would be laughed at. But suppose that he does not say there should be no moon, but, rather, when seeing the sun says that the moon should be like the sun. In this case, he does not realize that what he is saying is: "There should be no moon, but there should be two suns". By saying this he commits two errors: he desires to add to the perfection of things by wanting another sun, and he desires to diminish it by taking away the moon.

Greater Objects depend upon the Lesser Objects

In contemplating the differences of [celestial] bodies, and seeing that some are brighter, you would be unjust if you would seek to take away those that you see to be dimmer, or to make them equal to the brighter. For referring all things to the perfection of the universe, you see that their existence depends upon the degree that they are brighter or dimmer among themselves. Nor would the world seem perfect to you unless the greater things were results in the lesser ones by comparison. In like manner, you may think of the differences of souls. You will find here that their unhappiness (about which you lament) very much serves the same purpose in that they have the power to complete the universe, even though they have become unhappy because they have willed to sin. Not only is it wrong to say that God should not have made such, on the contrary, He is praised for making even creatures far inferior to unhappy souls.

Christians need to Know that God is Creator, but not Theories of Natural Philosophy (Enchiridion, 9)

9. When the question is asked what we are to believe in regard to religion, it is not necessary to probe into the nature of things, as was done by those whom the Greeks call physici. Nor need we be alarmed that the Christian might be ignorant of the force and number of the elements; the motion, and order, and eclipses of the heavenly bodies; the form of the heavens; the species and the natures of animals, plants, stones, steams, rivers, mountains; about chronology and distances; the signs of coming storms; and a thousand other things which those philosophers either have found out, or think they have found out. For even these men themselves, endowed though they are with so much genius, burning with zeal, abounding in leisure, tracking some things by the aid of human conjecture, searching into others with the aids of history and experience, have not discovered everything. Even their boasted discoveries are oftener mere guesses than certain knowledge. It is enough for the Christian to believe that the only cause of all created things, whether heavenly or earthly, whether visible or invisible, is the goodness of the Creator the one true God; and that nothing exists but Himself that does not derive its existence from Him; and that He is the Trinity, that is, the Father, the Son begotten of the Father, and the Holy Spirit proceeding from the same Father, but one and the same Spirit of Father and Son.

The Supremely Good Creator Made All Things Good (Enchiridion, 10)

10. The Trinity (which is supremely and equally and unchangeably good) created all things. The creations are not supremely and equally and unchangeably good, but yet they are good, even taken separately. Taken as a whole, however, they are very good, because their ensemble constitutes the universe in all its wonderful order and beauty.

What is Called Evil in the Universe is Just the Absence of Good (Enchiridion, 11)

11. In the universe, even that which is called evil, when it is regulated and put in its own place, only enhances our admiration of the good; for we enjoy and value the good more when we compare it with the evil. For the Almighty God (who, as even the heathen acknowledge, has supreme power over all things) being Himself supremely good, would never permit the existence of anything evil among His works, unless He were not so omnipotent and good that He could bring good even out of evil. For what is that which we call evil but the absence of good? In the bodies of animals, disease and wounds mean nothing but the absence of health. For when a cure is effected, that does not mean that the evils which were present (namely, the diseases and wounds) go away from the body and dwell elsewhere. Instead, they completely cease to exist. The wound or disease is not a substance, but a defect in the fleshly substance. For, the flesh itself is a substance, and therefore something good, of which those evils are accidental properties, insofar as the evils are privations of the good that we call health. In the same way, what are called vices in the soul are nothing but privations of natural good. When they are cured, they are not transferred elsewhere. When they cease to exist in the healthy soul, they cannot exist anywhere else.

Source: Augustine, from City of God, translated by Marcus Dods, adapted; 83 Questions, independently machine translated; On Free Choice, translated by Carroll Mason Sparrow, adapted, this work is in the public domain in the United States due to non-renewal of its initial copyright term under the US Copyright Act of 1909; Enchiridion, translated by J. F. Shaw, adapted.

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PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS: 

MYSTICAL THEOLOGY

Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite is the name modern scholars use for an unknown author who wrote under the pseudonym Dionysius the Areopagite, a figure mentioned in the New Testament. He lived in the late fifth or early sixth century CE, most likely writing in or around Syria. He was influenced by Neoplatonism his writings emphasize the attainment of mystical union with God. The selection below is his brief but complete "Mystical Theology".  He argues here that God's nature is shrouded in darkness, and that to attain any knowledge of God we should first make "positive" assertions about him and then "negatively" deny these assertions. The common positive descriptions of God are of three types. First are theological attributes where God is father, son, and holy spirit; these are profound but give us little detail. Second are philosophical attributes where God is goodness, existence, life, wisdom, and virtue; these are less profound but have more detail. Third are human metaphors where God has a physical form like a person and experiences emotions; these are the least profound, but the most detailed. The next step is to negatively deny that God has any one of these characteristics in the way that we humanly think of him. Through such denials, we reach a truer and more indescribable experience of God.

DIVINE DARKNESS

Union with God by Entering Divine Darkness (Chapter 1)

Most exalted Trinity, you are the Divinity beyond all knowledge, whose goodness passes understanding, who guides Christians to divine wisdom. I pray that you direct our way to the summit of your mystical oracles, which are completely incomprehensible, completely lucid and completely exalted. [At that summit], the simple, pure and unchangeable mysteries of theology are revealed in the darkness which is clearer than light, and in that silence in which secret things are hidden. It is a darkness that shines brighter than light, that invisibly and intangibly illuminates with splendors of inconceivable beauty the soul that does not see. Let this be my prayer. But, Timothy, by diligently giving yourself to mystical contemplation, you must leave the senses, the operations of the intellect, all sensible and intelligible things, and things that exist and do not exist. In this way, to the extent that you can, you may ascend to union with Him who is beyond all knowledge and all being, through ways that are [equally] beyond knowledge. Thus, in freedom and abandonment of everything, you may be carried, through pure, entire and absolute removal of yourself from all things, into the supernatural radiance of the divine darkness.

          But see that none of the uninitiated hear these things, I mean those who cling to created things, and suppose that nothing exists in a supernatural manner, beyond nature. They imagine instead that by their own natural understanding they know Him who has made darkness His secret place. But if the principles of the divine mysteries are beyond the understanding of these people, what is to be said of those who are even more uninstructed, who call the absolute First Cause of all according to the lowest things in nature, and say that He is in no way beyond the images which they fashion after various designs. They would declare and affirm that in Him is the cause of all, and in Him is all that may be predicated positively of created things. However, they might more properly deny these predicates to Him, as being far beyond everything. They would hold that here denial is not contrary to affirmation, since He is infinitely beyond all notion of deprivation, and beyond all affirmation and negation.

          Brother Bartholomew says that Theology is both much and very little, and that the Gospel is great and plentiful, and yet short. His sublime meaning is, I think, that the beneficent cause of all things says much, yet says little, and is altogether silent, as having neither [human] speech nor [human] understanding. For, He is essentially beyond all created things. He reveals Himself unveiled as He truly is only to those who pass beyond everything that is either pure or impure. They must rise above the highest height of holy things and abandon all divine light and sound and heavenly speech. They then are absorbed into that darkness where, as the Scripture says, He truly is, who is beyond all things.

          It was not without a deeper meaning that the divine Moses was commanded first to be himself purified, and then to separate himself from the impure. After all this purification he heard many sounds of trumpets, saw many lights casting many pure rays. He was then separated from the multitude and together with the elect priests came to the height of the divine ascents. Yet so he did not reach the presence of God Himself. He did not see Him [since He cannot be looked upon], but instead saw the place where He was. This, I think, signifies that the divinest and most exalted of visible and intelligible things are, as it were, suggestions of those that are immediately beneath Him who is beyond everything. By this the presence of Him who passes all understanding is shown. It stands, as it were, in that spot which is conceived by the intellect as the highest of His holy places. Then they, who are free and unhindered by all that is seen and all that sees, enter the true mystical darkness of ignorance, from which all perception of understanding is excluded, and dwell in that which is intangible and invisible. They will be completely absorbed in Him who is beyond all things, and no longer belong to anything, neither to themselves nor to another. Rather, they are united in their higher part to Him who is wholly unintelligible. By understanding nothing, they understand Him in a manner that is beyond all intelligence.

See Divine Darkness by Asserting Divine Attributes, then Denying them (Chapter 2)

We desire to dwell in this most luminous darkness. Without sight or knowledge, we desire to see that which is beyond sight or knowledge, by means of that very fact that we do not see do not and know. By the denying of all that is natural [in our conception of Him], we truly see, know and praise Him who is beyond nature in a manner that is beyond nature. It is just as someone might make a statue out of the natural stone by removing all the surrounding material which obstructs the sight of the shape lying concealed within it, and by that removal alone reveal its hidden beauty. It is necessary, as I think, to make this removal in a manner precisely opposite to that in which we deal with the Divine attributes. For we add [the Divine attributes] together, beginning with the primary ones, then passing from them to the secondary ones, and eventually to the last ones. Here, though, we ascend from the last to the first, by then denying all those attributes. By doing so, we will unveil and know that which is beyond knowledge, and which in all things is hidden from our sight by things which can be known. We will then see that supernatural darkness which is hidden by the light that is in created things.

AFFIRMATIONS AND DENIALS

Affirm Attributes, Highest to Lowest, then Deny them, Lowest to Highest (Chapter 3)

In my Outlines of Theology I previously showed those matters which are properly the subject of positive theology. I showed [regarding the theological attributes of God] in what sense the holy divine nature is one, in what sense three, in what sense Fatherhood and Sonship apply to it, and what the doctrine of the Holy Ghost signifies. I showed how from the uncreated and undivided good those blessed and perfect Lights came forth, yet remained one with the divine nature, with each other, and in themselves, dwelling coeternally, and undivided in their transmission. I showed how Jesus, though immaterial, became material in the truth of human nature. I showed other things taken from Scripture we have expounded in the same place.

          In my Book of Divine Names I further showed [regarding the philosophical attributes of God] how the words good, existence, life, wisdom, virtue, and other names spiritually applied to Him. Finally, in my treatise on Symbolical Theology I showed [regarding human metaphors about God] what names have been symbolically ascribed to Him from sensible things. I discussed what is symbolically meant by descriptions of His form, figure, limbs, instruments, location, dress, fury, anger, grief, drunkenness, oaths, curses, sleep, waking, and other types of sacred and symbolical terminology.

          I think you will have understood why the last are wordier than the first, that is, why the exposition of theological doctrine and the explanation in the Book of Divine Names are necessarily shorter than the treatise on Symbolic Theology. For, in proportion as we ascend higher, our speech is narrowed to the limits of our view of the purely intelligible. So now, when we enter that darkness which is beyond understanding, we pass not merely into brevity of speech, but even into absolute silence, and the negation of thought.

          Thus, in these other treatises, our subject took us from the highest [type of divine attributes] to the lowest, and in proportion to this descent our treatment of it extended itself. Now, however, [with our denials] we rise from beneath to that which is the highest, and accordingly our speech is restricted in proportion to the height of our ascent. When our ascent is finally accomplished, language will cease altogether, and we will be absorbed into the ineffable.

          You may ask why we add in the first and begin to remove in the last. The reason is that when we affirm that which is beyond all affirmation, we must compare it with that which is most nearly related to it, and we are therefore compelled to make a hypothetical affirmation. But when we deny that which is beyond all denial, we must also distinguish it from those things that are most remote from it. Is not God more like life and goodness than air or a stone? Must we not deny more fully that He is drunk or enraged, than that He can be spoken of or understood?

Denial of Metaphors: God cause Sensible Things but is not Part of Them (Chapter 4)

[Concerning human metaphors about God], we say that the cause of all things, who is himself beyond all things, is  neither without being nor without life, nor without reason nor without intelligence; nor is He a body; nor has He form or shape, or quality or quantity or mass; He is not localized or visible or tangible; He is neither sensitive nor sensible; He is subject to no disorder or disturbance arising from material passion; He is not subject to failure of power, or to the accidents of sensible things; He needs no light; He suffers no change or corruption or division, or privation or flux; and He neither has nor is anything else that belongs to the senses.

Denial of Philosophical and Theological Attributes (Chapter 5)

Again, ascending, [concerning philosophical attributes of God], we say that He is neither soul nor intellect; nor has He imagination, nor opinion or reason; He has neither speech nor understanding, and is neither declared nor understood; He is neither number nor order, nor greatness nor smallness, nor equality nor likeness nor unlikeness; He does not stand or move or rest; He neither has power nor is power; nor is He light, nor does He live, nor is He life; He is neither being nor age nor time; nor is He subject to intellectual contact; He is neither knowledge nor truth, nor royalty nor wisdom; He is neither one nor unity, nor divinity, nor goodness; nor is He spirit, as we understand spirit.

          Finally [concerning theological attributes of God] He is neither sonship nor fatherhood nor anything else known to us or to any other beings, either of the things that are or the things that are not; nor does anything that is, know Him as He is, nor does He know anything that is as it is. He has neither word nor name nor knowledge; He is neither darkness nor light nor truth nor error; He can neither be affirmed nor denied; indeed, though we may affirm or deny the things that are beneath Him, we can neither affirm nor deny Him; for the perfect and sole cause of all is beyond all affirmation, and that which transcends all is beyond all subtraction, absolutely separate, and beyond all that is.

Source: Pseudo Dionysius, Mystical Theology, translated by A.B. Sharpe, adapted.

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BOETHIUS:

FREE WILL AND DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE

Boethius (c. 477–524 AD) was born into a distinguished Roman senatorial family and was orphaned young, raised afterward by a leading senator whose daughter he later married. He rose to become consul in 510 under Theodoric  and later served as Theodoric's chief administrative official. Fluent in Greek at a time when it was becoming rare in the West, Boethius set out on an ambitious project to translate the entire works of Plato and Aristotle into Latin and reconcile their philosophies, though he completed only a small portion of it before his career ended abruptly. In 523 he was accused of treasonous correspondence with the Eastern Roman Empire, a charge he denied, and Theodoric had him imprisoned and eventually executed, reportedly by strangulation with a cord. While awaiting execution, Boethius wrote his best-known work, The Consolation of Philosophy, a dialogue between himself and a personification of Philosophy. The work never explicitly references Christian doctrine despite his own Christian faith, but it nevertheless became one of the most widely read books in medieval Europe.

          The selections below are from his Consolation, in which he discusses a potential conflict between human free will and divine foreknowledge. In the first section, he sets up the problem: if God foresees everything, then whatever he sees must of necessity happen, including all human choices. What makes matters worse, if our actions are beyond our control, this would make all moral rewards and punishments unjust. In the second section he gives his solution that God exists outside of time and God's foreknowledge consists of seeing all things in a single glance. This removes any conflict with free will since God, from his eternal vantage sees our choices unfold without causally forcing them. In the third section he argues that actions are free when viewed in their own nature, but necessitated when viewed from the perspective of God's knowledge outside time.

CONFLICT BETWEEN FREE WILL AND FOREKNOWLEDGE (Book 5)

          Boethius: Again I am thrown into yet more doubt and difficulty.

          Philosophy: What are they, though I have already my idea of what your trouble consists?

          Boethius: There seems to me to be an incompatibility between the existence of God's universal foreknowledge and that of any freedom of judgment. For if God foresees all things and cannot in anything be mistaken, then that, which His Providence sees will happen, must result. Thus, if it knows beforehand not only men's deeds but even their designs and wishes, there will be no freedom of judgment. For there can neither be any deed done, nor wish formed, except such as the infallible Providence of God has foreseen. . . .

          How, too, would God's Providence be better than man's opinion, if, as men do, He only sees to be uncertain such things as have an uncertain result? But if there can be no uncertainty with God, the surest source of all things, then the fulfilment of all that He has surely foreknown, is certain. Thus we are led to see that there is no freedom for the intentions or actions of men. For the mind of God, foreseeing all things without error or deception, binds all together and controls their results. When we have once allowed this, it is plain how complete is the fall of all human actions in consequence. It is pointless for rewards or punishments to be linked with good or bad, for there is no free or voluntary action of the mind to deserve them. What we just now determined was most fair [regarding rewarding good and punishing evil], will instead prove to be the most unfair thing of all, namely to punish the dishonest or reward the honest. For, their own will does not put them in the way of honesty or dishonesty, but the unfailing necessity of development constrains them. Thus, neither virtues nor vices are anything, but there is rather an indiscriminate confusion of all rewards and punishments. Nothing could be more vicious than this. For, if the whole order of all comes from Providence, and nothing is left to human intention, it follows that our crimes, as well as our good deeds, must all be held due to the author of all good.

GOD'S ETERNALITY CONSISTS OF BEING OUTSIDE OF TIME (Book 5)

Philosophy: This is the old complaint concerning Providence which was so strongly argued by Cicero in Of Divination, and you yourself have often and at length questioned the same subject. But so far, none of you have explained it with enough diligence or certainty. The cause of this obscurity is that the working of human reason cannot approach the directness of divine foreknowledge. If this could be understood at all, there would be no doubt left. . . .

          The common opinion, according to all living men, is that God is eternal. Let us therefore consider what is eternity. For eternity will, I think, make clear to us at the same time both divine nature and divine knowledge. Now, eternity is the possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single moment. This will appear more clearly if we compare it with temporal things. All that lives under the conditions of time moves through the present from the past to the future; there is nothing set in time which can at one moment grasp the whole space of its lifetime. It cannot yet comprehend to-morrow; yesterday it has already lost. In this life of to-day your life is no more than a changing, passing moment. As Aristotle said of the universe, so it is of all that is subject to time; though it never began to be, nor will ever cease, and its life is co-extensive with the infinity of time, yet it is not such as can be held to be eternal. For though it apprehends and grasps a space of infinite lifetime, it does not embrace the whole simultaneously; it has not yet experienced the future.

          What we should rightly call eternal is that which grasps and possesses wholly and simultaneously the fullness of unending life, which lacks nothing of the future, and has lost nothing of the fleeting past. Such an existence must be ever present in itself to control and aid itself, and also must keep present with itself the infinity of changing time. Therefore, people who hear that Plato thought that this universe had no beginning of time and will have no end, are not right in thinking that in this way the created world is co-eternal with its creator.  For to pass through unending life, the attribute which Plato ascribes to the universe is one thing. But it is another thing to grasp simultaneously the whole of unending life in the present. This is plainly a peculiar property of the mind of God.

          Further, God should not be regarded as older than His creations by any period of time, but rather by the peculiar property of His own single nature. For the infinite changing of temporal things tries to imitate the ever simultaneously present immutability of His life. It cannot succeed in imitating or equaling this, but sinks from immutability into change, and falls from the single directness of the present into an infinite space of future and past. Since this temporal state cannot possess its life completely and simultaneously, but it does in the same manner exist for ever without ceasing, it therefore seems to try in some degree to rival that which it cannot fulfil or represent, for it binds itself to some sort of present time out of this small and fleeting moment. But inasmuch as this temporal present bears a certain appearance of that enduring present, it somehow makes those, to whom it comes, seem to be in truth what they imitate. But since this imitation could not be enduring, the unending march of time has swept it away, and thus we find that it has bound together, as it passes, a chain of life, which it could not by enduring embrace in its fullness. Thus if we would apply proper epithets to those subjects, we can say, following Plato, that God is eternal, but the universe is continual.

DIVINE FOREKNOWLEDGE AS SEEING ALL THINGS IN A SINGLE GLANCE (Book 5)

Philosophy: All judgment apprehends the subjects of its thought according to its own nature. Now, since God has a condition of ever-present eternity, where His knowledge, which passes over every change of time, embracing infinite lengths of past and future. Thus, his knowledge views in its own direct comprehension everything as though it were taking place in the present. If you would weigh the foreknowledge by which God distinguishes all things, you will more properly view it as a knowledge of a never-failing constancy in the present, rather than a foreknowledge of the future. Thus, Providence is more rightly to be understood as a "looking down" than a "looking forward", because it is set far from low matters and looks down upon all things as from a lofty mountain-top above all.

          Why then do you demand that all things occur by necessity, if divine light rests upon them, while men do not make necessary such things as they can see? Because you can see things of the present, does your sight therefore put upon them any necessity? Surely not. If one may not unworthily compare this present time with the divine, just as you can see things in this your temporal present, so God sees all things in His eternal present. Accordingly, this divine foreknowledge does not change the nature or individual qualities of things: it sees things present in its understanding just as they will result at some time in the future. It makes no confusion in its distinctions, and with one view of its mind it discerns all that will come to pass whether of necessity or not. For instance, when you see at the same time a man walking on the earth and the sun rising in the heavens, you see each sight simultaneously, yet you distinguish between them, and decide that one is moving voluntarily, the other of necessity. In like manner the perception of God looks down upon all things without disturbing at all their nature, though they are present to Him but future under the conditions of time. Accordingly, this foreknowledge is not opinion but knowledge resting upon truth, since He knows that a future event is, though He knows too that it will not occur of necessity.

ACTIONS ARE FREE WHEN VIEWED IN THEIR OWN NATURE, BUT NECESSITATED WHEN VIEWED FROM GOD'S KNOWLEDGE (Book 5)

Suppose you answer, "What God sees about to happen, must happen, and that what must happen is bound by necessity". You then lock me down to the word necessity, and I will grant that we have a matter of most firm truth. But it is one to which scarcely any man can approach unless he be a contemplator of the divine. For I will answer that such a thing will occur of necessity when it is viewed from the standpoint of divine knowledge. But when it is examined in its own nature, it seems perfectly free and unrestrained. For there are two kinds of necessities, where one is simple, for instance, a necessary fact, "all men are mortal". The other is conditional, for instance, if you know that a man is walking, then he must be walking: for what each man knows cannot be otherwise than it is known to be. But the conditional one is by no means followed by this simple and direct necessity, for there is no necessity to compel a voluntary walker to proceed, even though it is necessary that, if he walks, he should be proceeding. In the same way, if Providence sees an event in its present, that thing must be, though it has no necessity of its own nature. God looks in His present upon those future things which come to pass through free will. Therefore if these things are looked at from the point of view of God's insight, they come to pass of necessity under the condition of divine knowledge. If, on the other hand, they are viewed by themselves, they do not lose the perfect freedom of their nature. Without doubt, then, all things that God foreknows do come to pass, but some of them proceed from free will. Even though they result by coming into existence, they nevertheless do not lose their own nature, because before they came to pass they could also not have come to pass.

          "What then," you may ask, "is the difference in their not being bound by necessity, since they result under all circumstances as by necessity, because of the condition of divine knowledge?" This is the difference, as I just now put forward: take the sun rising and a man walking; while these operations are occurring, they cannot but occur: but the one was bound to occur before it did; the other was not so bound. What God has in His present, does exist without doubt; but of such things some follow by necessity, others by their authors' wills. Thus, I was justified in saying that if these things be regarded from the view of divine knowledge, they are necessary, but if they are viewed by themselves, they are perfectly free from all ties of necessity. This is just as when you refer anything to reason which is otherwise clear to the senses: it becomes general truth, but it remains particular if regarded by itself.

          "But," you will say, "if it is in my power to change a purpose of mine, I will disregard Providence, since I may change what Providence foresees." To this I answer, yes, you can change your purpose, but the truth of Providence already knows in its present that you can do so, whether in fact you do so, and in what direction you may change it. Therefore you cannot escape that divine foreknowledge. It is just as you cannot avoid the glance of a present eye, though you may by your free will turn yourself to all kinds of different actions.

          "What?" you will say, "Can I by my own action change divine knowledge, so that if I choose first one thing, then another, Providence too will seem to change its knowledge?" No, for divine insight precedes all future things, turning them back and recalling them to the present time of its own unique knowledge. It does not change, as you may think, between this and that alternation of foreknowledge. It is constant in preceding and embracing by one glance all your changes. God does not receive this ever-present grasp of all things and vision of the present at the occurrence of future events, but from His own unique directness. From this also is that difficulty solved which you laid down earlier, that it was not worthy to say that our future events were the cause of God's knowledge. For this power of knowledge, ever in the present and embracing all things in its perception, does itself constrain all things, and owes nothing to following events from which it has received nothing. Thus, therefore, mortal men have their freedom of judgment intact. Since their wills are freed from all binding necessity, laws do not set rewards or punishments unjustly. God is ever the constant foreknowing overseer, and the ever-present eternity of His sight moves in harmony with the future nature of our actions, as it dispenses rewards to the good, and punishments to the bad.

          Hopes are not pointlessly put in God, nor prayers in pointlessly offered. If these are proper, they will be answered. Turn therefore from vice and embrace virtue. Raise your soul to upright hopes, send up on high your prayers from this earth. If you would be honest, great is the necessity urged upon your goodness, since all you do is done before the eyes of an all-seeing Judge.

Source: Boethius, Consolation of Philosophy, translated by W.V. Cooper, adapted.

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HESYCHIUS: THE JESUS PRAYER

Hesychius of Sinai was an eighth-century Eastern Orthodox monk and abbot of the Saint Catherine Monastery on Mount Sinai. Little is known about his personal life, but his writings mark a crucial step in the development of hesychasm, a mystical tradition focused on inner stillness. His text appears in the Philokalia, a famous collection of eastern monastic guidebooks written between the fourth and fourteenth centuries. Compiled by monks on Mount Athos and published in 1782, the Philokalia is a practical manual for overcoming mental distractions and directly encountering God within the heart. In the section below on the Jesus Prayer and internal attentiveness, Hesychius argues that repetitively reciting the name of Jesus Christ is essential for maintaining strict mental watchfulness and preventing spiritual laziness. He argues that monks must actively empty their minds of all mental images and daydreams, since dark spirits use these concepts as hiding places to infiltrate the soul. A safeguarded heart, however, remains free from malice and open to divine contemplation. In the section on repelling demons through constant prayer, he outlines a clear strategy for internal combat. He instructs the mystic to detect approaching enemy thoughts, attack them with angry words from the heart, and immediately invoke the name of Jesus so the demonic ghost flees. He concludes that this heartfelt prayer purifies the mind from dark clouds and turns demonic enticements to dust, especially when combined with fasting, humility, and rhythmic physical breathing.

THE JESUS PRAYER AND INTERNAL ATTENTIVENESS

          102. Just as water extinguishes fire, laxity may extinguish the safeguarding of our minds. But repetitive reciting the Jesus Prayer, along with constant attentiveness, removes such laxity from our hearts. Just as a lamp requires a wick, the Jesus Prayer requires attentiveness.

          103. We must struggle to preserve what is precious, and what is truly precious to us is simply that which protects us from every evil, both sensual and mental. What is precious, then, is to safeguard of our minds by reciting the [name of] Jesus Christ, though which we continuously look deep into our hearts and remain silent in thought (including, I will say, from thoughts that appear to be upright). We must try to empty ourselves of all thoughts in general, so that the demons do not hide beneath them. As painful as this may be, through persistence in our hearts, comfort will be near.

          104. When our hearts are constantly safeguarded so that they repel the forms, images and daydreams of dark and evil spirits, our hearts will produce illuminated thoughts. Just as coal or a candle produces a flame, so too will God (who has dwelled within our hearts ever since our holy baptism) spark contemplation within our minds, when he finds that the air of our hearts is free from the winds of malice, and protected by the safeguarded mind.

          105. We must continually repeat the name Jesus Christ within our hearts, just as lightning repeatedly appears in the sky before it rains. Those who have spiritual experience of internal warfare know this very well. We can wage this mental war in the following order. The first thing is attentiveness. Second, when we detect that an enemy's thought is approaching, we will attack him with angry curse words from our hearts. The third thing is to pray for him, turning our hearts to reciting the [name of] Jesus Christ, so that this demonic ghost may immediately flee and our minds and we will not go down the path of this evil daydream like a child seduced by some skilled magician.

          106. We must shout out like David, and cry "Lord Jesus Christ!" until we lose our voices. Our spiritual eyes must never cease struggling for hope in the Lord our God (Psalm 69:3).

          107. We must always keep in mind the parable of the unrighteous judge, which the Lord spoke to teach us that we should always pray and not lose heart. By so doing, we will receive both benefit and vindication (Luke 18:1-8).

          108. Just as one who looks at the sun will have his eyes illumined, so too one who look earnestly into his heart will be illuminated. . . .

REPELLING DEMONS THROUGH CONSTANT PRAYER

          174. The heartfelt Jesus Prayer destroys the demons and turns their enticements to dust. For when we invoke Jesus, God and Son of God, continuously and not lazily, God does not at all allow the demons to even begin introducing sin within us (that is, through their ploys). He does not allow any demonic image to be show into the mirror of the mind, or any demonic words to enter the heart. But if no image is pressed into the heart, then it will be empty from thoughts, as I have already said, for demons usually secretly talk through thoughts within the soul and teach it evil.

          175. Through constant prayer, the air of our mind becomes pure from dark clouds and storms of the demons.  When that air is clear, then nothing prevents the divine light of Jesus from shining through it, so long as we do not inflate ourselves with vanity, self-conceit, and boastfulness, and we don't rush to the intangible, and thereby deprive ourselves of Jesus's assistance. For Christ, being the model of humility, despises all of this.

          176. We must fast to obtain prayer and humility, since these two weapons, along with attentiveness, are like a sword of fire that wages war against the demons. If we live our lives like this, then every day and hour we can experience a quiet celebration of joy within our hearts. . . .

          188. Eating rotten food triggers an alarm of pain within the body, and those who do eat it and feel this pain can quickly expel it and remain unharmed. Similarly, when our minds have accepted and absorbed vicious thoughts and we taste their bitterness, if we proclaim the Jesus Prayer deep within our hearts, we can quickly cast these thoughts out, far away from us, and thus avoid all harm from them.  Through God's grace, what we learn in this respect from both others and our own experience reveals an understanding of activity of attentiveness.

          189. As you breathe, combine both attentiveness and the name of Jesus, or the thought of death and humility, for both may bring you great blessings.

Source: Hesychius of Sinai, "On Attentiveness and Holiness", Philokalia, independently machine translated from the Russian of Theophan Zatvornik.

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ANSELM: PROOFS FOR GOD'S EXISTENCE

Anselm of Canterbury (1033–1109) was born into a noble family in Aosta, northern Italy. After a monastic education, he left home and entered the Benedictine abbey of Bec in Normandy. He studied under Lanfranc and eventually succeeded him as abbot, gaining a reputation for both intellectual rigor and contemplative leadership. During his time at Bec, he wrote the Monologium and Proslogium, where he developed his famous arguments for God's existence and explored the relationship between faith and reason. In 1093, Anselm was appointed Archbishop of Canterbury, a position he reportedly accepted only with great reluctance. This role forced him into long conflicts with the English crown over church authority, resulting in multiple periods of exile. He died in Canterbury at seventy-six.

The selections below are from his Monologium and Proslogium. The first section is his Neoplatonistic argument for God from absolute goodness, similar to ones presented earlier by Augustine and Boethius:

(1) Goodness exists in a variety of ways and degrees;

(2) This would be impossible without an absolute standard of good, in which all goods participate;

(3) Therefore, an absolute standard of good exists, which is God.

Anselm's fame, though, rests on a second and thoroughly original proof now called the "ontological argument". The main intuition is that the attribute of existence is included in the very concept of God as "the greatest possible being" (or "that than which nothing greater can be conceived" as he words it). More formally, the argument is this:

(1) God is defined as "the Greatest Possible Being";

(2) The Greatest Possible Being must have every quality that would make it greater (or more superior) than it would be otherwise;

(3) Having the quality of real existence is greater than having the quality of imaginary existence;

(4) Therefore, the Greatest Possible Being must have the quality of real existence.

Using this same strategy, he argues that God must not only exist, but he must have necessary existence, and be "just, truthful and blessed" since, in each case, it is greater to have these attributes than not have them. The discussion here also includes a criticism of the ontological argument by a fellow monk named Gaunilo, which is now called the "parody argument": if we replace "the greatest possible being" with "the greatest possible island" in the ontological argument, then we can prove the existence of that island, which clearly is ridiculous. Anselm responded that the island parody fails since it is not a parallel argument.

PROOF FOR GOD FROM ABSOLUTE GOODNESS (Monologium 1)

Suppose that a person, either from ignorance or unbelief, has no knowledge of the existence of one Nature which is the highest of all existing beings, which is also self-sufficient in its eternal blessedness, and which, through its omnipotent goodness, confers upon and effects in all other beings the very fact of their existence, and the fact that in any way their existence is good. Suppose also that this person has no knowledge of many other things, which we necessarily believe regarding God and his creatures. Nevertheless, that person may still believe that he can at least convince himself of these truths in great part, even if his mental abilities are very ordinary, by the force of reason alone.

          Although he could do this in many ways, I will adopt one which I consider easiest for such a person. For, since all desire to enjoy only those things which they suppose to be good, it is natural that this person should, at some time, turn his mind's eye to the examination of that cause by which these things are good, which he does not desire, except as he judges them to be good. Thus, as reason leads the way and follows up these considerations, he advances rationally to those truths of which, without reason, he has no knowledge. If, in this discussion, I use any argument which no greater authority gives, I wish it to be received in this way. However, on the grounds that I will see fit to adopt, the conclusion is reached as if necessarily, yet it is not, for this reason, said to be absolutely necessary, but merely that it can appear so for the time being.

          It is easy, then, for one to say to himself: Since there are goods so innumerable, whose great diversity we experience by the bodily senses, and discern by our mental faculties, must we not believe that there is some one thing, through which all goods whatever are good?  Or are they good one through one thing and another through another? To be sure, the answer is most certain and clear for all who are willing to see. Consider those things that are said to possess any attribute in such a way that in mutual comparison they may be said to possess it in greater, or less, or equal degree. Those things are said to possess it by virtue of some fact, which is not understood to be one thing in one case and another in another. Rather, it is the same in different cases, whether it is regarded as existing in these cases in equal or unequal degree. For, whatever things are said to be just, when compared with each other, whether equally, or more, or less, cannot be understood as just, except through the quality of justness, which is not one thing in one instance, and another in another.

          Since it is certain, then, that all goods, if mutually compared, would prove either equally or unequally good, necessarily they are all good by virtue of something which is conceived of as the same in different goods, although sometimes they seem to be called good, the one by virtue of one thing, the other by virtue of another. For, apparently, it is by virtue of one quality that a horse is called good because he is strong, and by virtue of another quality he is called good because he is swift. For, though he seems to be called good by virtue of his strength, and good by virtue of his swiftness, yet swiftness and strength do not appear to be the same thing.

          But if a horse, because he is strong and swift, is therefore good, how is it that a strong, swift robber is bad? Rather, then, just as a strong, swift robber is bad because he is harmful, so a strong, swift horse is good, because he is useful. Indeed, nothing is ordinarily regarded as good, except either for some utility (for instance, safety is called good, and those things which promote safety) or for some honorable character (for instance, beauty is reckoned to be good, and what promotes beauty).

          But, since the reasoning which we have observed is in no way refutable, necessarily, again, all things, whether useful or honorable, if they are truly good, are good through that same being through which all goods exist, whatever that being is. But who can doubt this very being, through which all goods exist, to be a great good? This must be, then, a good through itself, since every other good is through it.

          It follows, therefore, that all other goods are good through another being than that which they themselves are, and this being alone is good through itself. Hence, this alone is supremely good, which is alone good through itself. For it is supreme in that it so surpasses other beings, that it is neither equaled nor excelled. But that which is supremely good is also supremely great. There is, therefore, some one being which is supremely good, and supremely great, that is, the highest of all existing beings.

ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

Anselm's Motivation behind Constructing the Ontological Argument [Proslogium, Preface]

At the kind request of certain brothers, I published a brief work [the Monologium] as an example of a meditation on the grounds of faith, in the person of one who investigates, in a course of silent reasoning with himself, matters of which he is ignorant. But after considering that this book was knit together by the linking of many arguments, I began to ask myself whether there might be found a single argument which would require no other for its proof than itself alone. By itself this might suffice to demonstrate that God truly exists, and that there is a supreme good requiring nothing else, which all other things require for their existence and well-being, and whatever we believe regarding the divine Being.

          I often and earnestly directed my thought to this end, and at times that which I sought seemed to be just within my reach, while again it wholly evaded my mental vision. Eventually, in despair I was about to give up, as if from the search for a thing which could not be found. I tried to put aside this thought to avoid busying my mind to no purpose, and distracting myself from other thoughts, in which I might be successful. But more and more, though I was unwilling and avoided it, it began to force itself upon me, with a kind of insistence. So, one day, when I was exhausted by resisting its insistence, in the very conflict of my thoughts, the proof of which I had despaired offered itself, and I eagerly embraced the thoughts which I was strenuously repelling.

          I considered that what I rejoiced to have found would, if put in writing, be welcome to some readers, of this very matter, and of some others. Accordingly, I have written the following treatise, in the person of someone who strives to lift his mind to the contemplation of God, and seeks to understand what he believes.

The Ontological Argument: There must exist a Being than which Nothing Greater can Exist  (Proslogium, 2)

Lord, as you give understanding to faith to the extent that you know it is profitable, please allow me to understand that you are as we believe, and that you are that which we believe. Indeed, we believe that you are a being than which nothing greater can be conceived. Or is there no such nature, since the fool has said in his heart, there is no God? (Psalms 14:1). But, in any event, this very fool, when he hears of this being of which I speak (a being than which nothing greater can be conceived) understands what he hears, and what he understands is in his understanding; even though he does not understand it to exist.

          For, it is one thing for an object to be in the understanding, and another to understand that the object exists. When a painter first conceives of what he will afterwards perform, he has it in his understanding, but he does not yet understand it to be, because he has not yet performed it. But after he has made the painting, he both has it in his understanding, and he understands that it exists because he has made it.

          Hence, even the fool is convinced that something exists in the understanding, at least, that than which nothing greater can be conceived. For, when he hears of this, he understands it. Whatever is understood, exists in the understanding. Undoubtedly, that than which nothing greater can be conceived, cannot exist in the understanding alone. For, suppose it exists in the understanding alone: then it can be conceived to exist in reality, and this is greater.

          Therefore, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, exists in the understanding alone, the very being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, is one, than which a greater can be conceived. But obviously this is impossible. Hence, there is no doubt that there exists a being, than which nothing greater can be conceived, and it exists both in the understanding and in reality.

God Exists Cannot be conceived Not to Exist (Proslogium, 3)

It undoubtedly exists so truly, that it cannot be conceived not to exist. For, it is possible to conceive of a being which cannot be conceived not to exist; and this is greater than one which can be conceived not to exist. Hence, if that than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction. There is, then, so truly a being than which nothing greater can be conceived to exist, that it cannot even be conceived not to exist; and this being you are, Lord, our God.

          So truly, therefore, do you exist, Lord, my God, that you cannot be conceived not to exist, and rightly so. For, if a mind could conceive of a being better than thee, the creature would rise above the Creator; and this is most absurd. Indeed, whatever else there is, except thee alone, can be conceived not to exist. To you alone, therefore, it belongs to exist more truly than all other beings, and hence in a higher degree than all others. For, whatever else exists does not exist so truly, and hence in a less degree it belongs to it to exist. Why, then, has the fool said in his heart, there is no God (Psalms14:1)? For, it is so evident to a rational mind that you exist in the highest degree of all. Why [would someone doubt this], except that he is dull and a fool?

God can be Conceived not to Exist Verbally, but not in Reality (Proslogium, 4)

But how has the fool said in his heart what he could not conceive; or how is it that he could not conceive what he said in his heart? since it is the same to say in the heart, and to conceive.

But, if really, nay, since really, he both conceived, because he said in his heart; and did not say in his heart, because he could not conceive; there is more than one way in which a thing is said in the heart or conceived. For, in one sense, an object is conceived, when the word signifying it is conceived; and in another, when the very entity, which the object is, is understood.

          In the former sense, then, God can be conceived not to exist; but in the latter, not at all. For no one who understands what fire and water are can conceive fire to be water, in accordance with the nature of the facts themselves, although this is possible according to the words. So, then, no one who understands what God is can conceive that God does not exist; although he says these words in his heart, either without any or with some foreign, signification. For, God is that than which a greater cannot be conceived. He who thoroughly understands this, assuredly understands that this being so truly exists, that not even in concept can it be non-existent. Therefore, he who understands that God so exists, cannot conceive that he does not exist.

          I thank you, gracious Lord. I thank you because what I formerly believed by you bounty, I now so understand by your illumination, that if I were unwilling to believe that you do exist, I would be unable not to understand this to be true.

God's Attributes (Proslogium, 5)

What are you, then, Lord God, than whom nothing greater can be conceived? But what are you, except that which, as the highest of all beings, alone exists through itself, and creates all other things from nothing? For, whatever is not this is less than a thing which can be conceived of. But this cannot be conceived of you. What good, therefore, does the supreme Good lack, through which every good is? Therefore, you are just, truthful, blessed, and whatever it is better to be than not to be. For it is better to be just than not just; better to be blessed than not blessed.

CRITICISM AND REPLY

Gaunilo's Criticism: The Lost Island Parody Argument (On Behalf of the Fool, 6, 7)

It is said that somewhere in the ocean is an island, which, because of the difficulty (or rather the impossibility) of discovering what does not exist, is called the lost island. They say that this island has an inestimable wealth of all manner of riches and delicacies in greater abundance than is told of the Islands of the Blest. Having no owner or inhabitant, it is said to be more excellent than all other countries, which are inhabited by mankind, in the abundance with which it is stored.

          Now if someone would tell me that there is such an island, I would easily understand his words, in which there is no difficulty. But suppose that he went on to say, as if by a logical inference: "You can no longer doubt that this island which is more excellent than all lands exists somewhere, since you have no doubt that it is in your understanding. For, it is more excellent not to be in the understanding alone, but to exist both in the understanding and in reality, for this reason it must exist. For if it does not exist, any land which really exists will be more excellent than it; and so the island already understood by you to be more excellent will not be more excellent."

          If someone would try to prove to me by such reasoning that this island truly exists, and that its existence would no longer be doubted, either I would think that he was joking, or I do not know which I ought to regard as the greater fool. Perhaps it is myself for accepting this proof, perhaps it is him for supposing that he had established with any certainty the existence of this island. For, he ought to show first that the hypothetical excellence of this island exists as a real and indubitable fact, and in no way as any unreal object, or one whose existence is uncertain, in my understanding.

          This, in the meantime, is the answer the fool could make to the arguments urged against him. When he is assured in the first place that this being is so great that its non-existence is not even conceivable, and that this in turn is proved on no other ground than the fact that otherwise it will not be greater than all things, the fool may make the same answer. Thus, he may say, When did I say that any such being exists in reality, that is, a being greater than all others?--that on this ground it should be proved to me that it also exists in reality to such a degree that it cannot even be conceived not to exist? Whereas in the first place it should be in some way proved that a nature which is higher, that is, greater and better, than all other natures, exists; in order that from this we may then be able to prove all attributes which necessarily the being that is greater and better than all possesses.

          Further, it is said that the non-existence of this being is inconceivable. It might better be said, perhaps, that its non-existence, or the possibility of its non-existence, is unintelligible. For according to the true meaning of the word, unreal objects are unintelligible. Yet their existence is conceivable in the way in which the fool conceived of the non-existence of God. I am most certainly aware of my own existence; but I know, nevertheless, that my non-existence is possible. Further, as to that supreme being which God is, I understand without any doubt both his existence, and the impossibility of his non-existence. Whether, however, so long as I am most positively aware of my existence, I can conceive of my non-existence, I am not sure. But if I can, why can I not conceive of the non-existence of whatever else I know with the same certainty? If, however, I cannot, God will not be the only being of which it can be said, it is impossible to conceive of his non-existence.

Anselm's Reply: The Lost Island Parody is not a Parallel Argument (In Reply to Gaunilo, 3)

You say, it is as if one should suppose an island in the ocean, which surpasses all lands in its fertility, and which, because of the difficulty, or the impossibility, of discovering what does not exist, is called a lost island; and should say that there can no doubt that this island truly exists in reality, for this reason, that one who hears it described easily understands what he hears.

          Now I promise confidently that if any man will devise anything existing either in reality or in concept alone (except that than which a greater be conceived) to which he can adapt the sequence of my reasoning, I will discover that thing, and will give him his lost island, not to be lost again.

          But it now appears that this being than which a greater is inconceivable cannot be conceived not to be, because it exists on so assured a ground of truth; for otherwise it would not exist at all.

          Hence, if any one says that he conceives this being not to exist, I say that at the time when he conceives of this either he conceives of a being than which a greater is inconceivable, or he does not conceive at all. If he does not conceive, he does not conceive of the non-existence of that of which he does not conceive. But if he does conceive, he certainly conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist. For if it could be conceived not to exist, it could be conceived to have a beginning and an end. But this is impossible.

          He, then, who conceives of this being conceives of a being which cannot be even conceived not to exist; but he who conceives of this being does not conceive that it does not exist; else he conceives what is inconceivable. The non-existence, then, of that than which a greater cannot be conceived is inconceivable.

Anselm's Reply: The Non-existence of Finite Objects with Parts is Conceivable (In Reply to Gaunilo, 4)

You say, further, that whereas I assert that this supreme being cannot be conceived not to exist, it might better be said that its non-existence, or even the possibility of its non-existence, cannot be understood.

          But it is more proper to say, it cannot be conceived. For if I had said that the object itself cannot be understood not to exist, possibly you yourself, who say that in accordance with the true meaning of the term what is unreal cannot be understood, would offer the objection that nothing which is can be understood not to be, for the non-existence of what exists is unreal: hence God would not be the only being of which it could be said, it is impossible to understand its non-existence. For thus one of those beings which most certainly exist can be understood not to exist in the same way in which certain other real objects can be understood not to exist.

          But this objection, certainly, cannot be urged against the term conception, if one considers the matter well. For although no objects which exist can be "understood" not to exist, yet all objects, except that which exists in the highest degree, can be "conceived" not to exist. For all those objects, and those alone, can be conceived not to exist, which have a beginning or end or composition of parts: also, as I have already said, whatever at any place or at any time does not exist as a whole.

          That being alone, on the other hand, cannot be conceived not to exist, in which any conception discovers neither beginning nor end nor composition of parts, and which any conception finds always and everywhere as a whole.

          Be assured, then, that you can conceive of your own non-existence, although you are most certain that you exist. I am surprised that you should have admitted that you are ignorant of this. For we conceive of the non-existence of many objects which we know to exist, and of the existence of many which we know not to exist; not by forming the opinion that they so exist, but by imagining that they exist as we conceive of them.

          Indeed, we can conceive of the non-existence of an object, although we know it to exist, because at the same time we can conceive of the former and know the latter. We cannot conceive of the nonexistence of an object, so long as we know it to exist, because we cannot conceive at the same time of existence and non-existence.

          If, then, one will thus distinguish these two senses of this statement, he will understand that nothing, so long as it is known to exist, can be conceived not to exist. Whatever exists, except that being than which a greater cannot be conceived, can be conceived not to exist, even when it is known to exist.

          So, then, of God alone it can be said that it is impossible to conceive of his non-existence; and yet many objects, so long as they exist, in one sense cannot be conceived not to exist. But in what sense God is to be conceived not to exist, I think has been shown clearly enough in my book.

Source: Anselm, Monologium and Proslogium, translation by Sidney Norton Deane, adapted.

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AVERROES: RECONCILING SCRIPTURE WITH REASON

 

Averroes (Ibn Rushd, 1126–1198) was born in Cordova, Spain, from a prominent family of Sunni legal scholars. He balanced his career as a working jurist with his scholarly life, writing detailed commentaries on Aristotle that shaped much of medieval European thought. He composed The Decisive Treatise in 1179 during a period of theological debate regarding whether philosophical inquiry was permissible under Islamic law. Averroes's central project was to demonstrate that rational inquiry is not an enemy of religion. Rather, it is a divinely encouraged path toward understanding the creator, establishing a systematic framework for harmonizing human intellect with holy text. In the section below on metaphorical interpretation of scripture, Averroes argues that because truth cannot contradict truth, rational investigation and philosophy will always verify the inner meaning of scripture. Consequently, when a text apparently conflicts with a truth proved by philosophy, a learned scholar must use the rules of language to shift the words from a literal to a metaphorical interpretation. In the section on apparent and hidden scriptural passages, he explains that scripture contains two layers. First is an exoteric, outer one composed of simple parables for ordinary believers who lack philosophical training. Second is an esoteric, hidden layer containing rational truths that can only be uncovered by trained philosophers. In the section on literal interpretation of fundamental principles in scripture, he concludes that allegorical interpretation must never be applied to the foundational principles of faith, such as the reality of the afterlife or the day of judgment. To interpret these foundational realities metaphorically is an act of unbelief. By contrast, failing to metaphorically interpret the secondary, obscure passages is an act of heresy for a learned philosopher.

METAPHORICAL INTERPRETATION OF SCRIPTURE (from The Decisive Treatise)

As this scripture is true and leads to the consideration of the knowledge of God, we Muslims should believe that rational investigation is not contrary to scripture, for truth cannot contradict truth, but verifies it and bears testimony to it.

          If that is so, and rational observation is directed to the knowledge of any existent objects, then scripture may be silent about it, or it may mention it. If it is silent, then no dispute arises. It would be equivalent to the absence of its mention in scripture as obligatory, and hence the jurist derives it from legal conjecture. But if scripture mentions it, either it will agree with that which has been proved by inference, or else it will disagree with it. If it is in agreement it needs no comment, but if it is opposed to scripture, an interpretation is to be sought. Interpretation means to carry the meaning of a word from its original sense to a metaphorical one. But this should be done in such a manner as will not conflict with the custom of the Arabic language. It is to avoid the naming of an object, by simply mentioning its like, its cause, its attribute, or associate, etc. which are commonly quoted in the definition of the different kinds of metaphorical utterances. If the jurist does so in many of the legal injunctions, how very appropriate would it be for a learned man to do the same with his arguments. For the jurist has only his fanciful conjectures to depend upon, while a learned man possesses positive ones.

          We hold it to be an established truth that if scripture is apparently opposed to a truth proved by philosophy, then it admits of an interpretation according to the canons of the Arabic language. This is a proposition which a Muslim cannot doubt and a believer cannot mistrust. One who is accustomed to these divine things can experience for himself what we have said. The aim of this discourse is to bring together intellectual and traditional science. Indeed, we would even say that no logical conclusion will be found to be opposed to scripture, which when sifted and investigated in its different parts will be found in accordance, or almost so, with it.

          That is why all Muslims are agreed that all the words of scripture are not to be taken literally, nor all of them given an interpretation. But they vary in verses, which are or are not to be interpreted. For example, the Asharites put an interpretation upon the verse self-direction and on the "Tradition of Descent", while the Hanbalites take them literally. The Law has made two sides of these -- apparent (exoteric) and hidden (esoteric) -- because of the differences of human nature and minds in verifying a thing. The purpose of an opposed hidden (esoteric) meaning is to call the attention of the learned to find out a comprehensive interpretation. . . .

          Here it may be objected that in scripture there are things which all Muslims have agreed to take esoterically (hidden), while there are others on which they have agreed to put an allegorical interpretation, while there are some about which they disagree. Is it justifiable to use logic in the interpretation of those which have been taken literally, or otherwise? We would say that if the agreement is positive there is no need to apply logic; but if it be conjectural there is. . . .

APPARENT AND HIDDEN SCRIPTURAL PASSAGES

But there are things which, because of their obscurity, cannot be understood by inference. So, God has favored such of his creatures as cannot understand logic, either because of their nature, habit, or lack of mental training, by quoting examples and parables of such things and has urged them to testify as to their truth through them. For everyone has mental capacity enough to understand them by the help of dogmatic and exhortatory argument which are common to all men. This is why scripture has been divided into two kinds: apparent (exoteric) and hidden (esoteric, inner). The apparent (exoteric) part consists of those examples which have been coined to express certain meanings; while the hidden (esoteric) is the meanings themselves, which are not manifested except to the learned in philosophy.

LITERAL INTERPRETATION OF FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES IN SCRIPTURE

If it so happens as we have said that we can know of a thing by any of the above mentioned three methods, then we do not stand in need of any examples for understanding them. Such things should be taken literally and interpretation should find no place with regard to them. If these things form a part of the fundamental principles of scripture, one who puts an interpretation upon them is an unbeliever. For instance, if a man believes [concerning the Day of Judgment] that there is no happiness or misery in the afterlife, and that the teaching is only an artifice to safeguard the life and property of the people from one another and that there is no goal for men other than this life, then he is certainly an unbeliever.

          When this has once been established it will become clear to you that allegorical interpretation is unlawful with some apparent (exoteric) texts of scripture. If such allegorical interpretation is used in the fundamental principles of the scripture, it is infidelity, and if used in general things it is heresy. But there are also a certain apparent (exoteric) texts which require allegorical interpretation by learned men. It is unbelief for them to take these in their mere apparent (exoteric) meaning, but at the same time it is religious heresy if ignorant people try to interpret or explain them.

Source: Averroes, Decisive Discourse, tr. Mohammad Jamil-Ub-Behman Barod, adapted.

 

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THOMAS AQUINAS:

PROOFS OF GOD'S EXISTENCE AND UNITY

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) was born at Roccasecca in Sicily. His family was noble and well-connected, and they sent him to be educated first by the Benedictine monks and later at the University of Naples. There, he encountered Aristotelian philosophy and decided to join the Dominican Order, an act his family resisted so fiercely that his brothers kidnapped him and imprisoned him in a family fortress for over a year. Once free, he completed his advanced studies in Paris and Cologne under the direction of Albert the Great. Aquinas then launched a distinguished academic career, alternating between periods of teaching and writing in Paris and various Italian cities. His primary intellectual project was to integrate Christian doctrine with the newly recovered writings of Aristotle. His major works are Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa Theologiae, in which he addresses issues where philosophy and theology overlap. In these he used a style of writing called quaestio, where he poses a specific theological question, presents the strongest possible objections against his own view, states his own position, and then systematically refutes each initial objection. In 1274, he was summoned to attend the Second Church Council of Lyon, but he became ill during the journey and died at the age of forty-nine. The selections below are from Summa Theologiae

          In the first section below on proofs for God's existence, argues that knowledge of God's existence can demonstrating these through reason alone. He begins by rejecting Anselm's ontological argument for God on the grounds that it is not self-evident to everyone that the mere definition of God entails existence. He then offers five ways to prove God. First, he argues, an infinite regress of motion, where one thing is moved by another, is impossible, and such a chain of motion must originate with a first mover. Second, an infinite regress of changes, where one thing is caused by another, is impossible, and such a chain of causes must originate with a first cause. Third, contingent beings, which come and go out of existence, require some necessary being. An infinite regress of necessary beings is impossible, and so there must be an ultimately necessary being. Fourth, some things exhibit varying degrees of perfection, such as being slightly good or very good. Goodness in this sense is relative to something which is maximally good, from which lesser things receive their goodness. Thus, there must be some maximally good thing. Fifth, natural objects like trees, which act for a purpose, must be guided by intelligence, not chance. Since trees themselves are unintelligent, then an intelligent being must exist who guides such natural things to their end. On a related topic of whether the world was created or is eternal, he states that through scripture we know it was created. However, he argues that there is nothing contrary to reason to suppose that there could be an infinite chain of temporal causes (causes per accidens), which trace back through time to infinity past. By contrast, the type of causal chain that is impossible is an infinite chain of essential causes (causes per se), which happen simultaneously. This implies that the first three ways to prove God's existence are based on the impossibility of an infinite chain of simultaneous causes, not an infinite chain of temporal causes.

          In the section on divine attributes and predicates, Aquinas argues that reason alone can give us at least some knowledge of God's nature. First, reason shows that God is simple, that is, he is not composed of separate parts or attributes. However, to the finite mind God appears to have distinct parts, and, in our finite ways of thinking, we can deduce different attributes of him. For example, if God is simple, then he is fully actualized, and thus is perfect. Further, God must have all perfections since, being the cause of all human perfections such as goodness, God must have these perfections in their highest degree. However, since God is in reality a simple being with no parts, all of these perfections are unified within him. None of the names or attributes which our minds form of God adequately describes God, and, thus, it is impossible to define God in his true simplicity.

          Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity then raises the question of how our human words apply to God, such as when we say that God is "good". Aquinas answers that human "goodness" and divine "goodness" do not mean the same thing, that is, they are not "univocal". Neither do they mean entirely different things, that is, they are not "equivocal". Rather, there is some overlap between the two uses through analogy and, thus, our human descriptions of God are "analogical". But there are three types of analogical reasoning, only one of which Aquinas accepts as a means for describing God. The first, often called "analogy of proportionality", is our normal notion of analogy where "A is to B just as C is to D". An example is "God is good just as a city mayor is good". Each are good by exhibiting qualities that are essential for their differing job descriptions. Aquinas, though, rejects this: since God is simplicity, the relationship of God to his properties cannot be compared to the relation between finite composite things to their properties. The second is called "analogy of imitation" where, for example, "a mayor is good because she imitates (or participates in) God's goodness". Aquinas rejects this, though, since human goodness becomes a mere passive reflection of God's goodness, and Aquinas believes that God is more actively involved in the world. The third type is called "analogy of attribution", and a common example is this: "If the bread is good, then the baker is good", where the baker is the active cause of the bread. The baker is not warm and fluffy in the same way that the bread is, but the two are both good in their own respective ways. The goodness of the bread is thus an indication of the goodness of the baker. Similarly, we can say about God that "if the world is good, then God is good" where God is the active cause of the world. The world's goodness, then, is an indication of the creator's goodness.

          In the section on miracles, Aquinas resists saying that miracles violate or are contrary to natural order, since this implies a conflict within God's providence. Rather, he says, miracles are "outside" of natural order, where natural order as a "secondary cause" is subservient to God providence as the first cause. Some miracles, then, are greater than others to the degree that they surpass the power of nature.

PROOFS FOR GOD

Whether the Existence of God Is Self-Evident (Summa Theologiae 1.2.1)

          Objection 1: It seems that the existence of God is self-evident. Now those things are said to be self-evident to us the knowledge of which is naturally implanted in us, as we can see in regard to first principles. But as Damascene says (De Fide Orth. i, 1,3), "the knowledge of God is naturally implanted in all." Therefore the existence of God is self-evident.

          Obj. 2 [ontological argument]: Further, those things are said to be self-evident which are known as soon as the terms are known, which the Philosopher (1 Poster. iii) says is true of the first principles of demonstration. Thus, when the nature of a whole and of a part is known, it is at once recognized that every whole is greater than its part. But as soon as the signification of the word "God" is understood, it is at once seen that God exists. For by this word is signified that thing than which nothing greater can be conceived. But that which exists actually and mentally is greater than that which exists only mentally. Therefore, since as soon as the word "God" is understood it exists mentally, it also follows that it exists actually. Therefore the proposition "God exists" is self-evident.

          Obj. 3: Further, the existence of truth is self-evident. For whoever denies the existence of truth grants that truth does not exist: and, if truth does not exist, then the proposition "Truth does not exist" is true: and if there is anything true, there must be truth. But God is truth itself: "I am the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6) Therefore "God exists" is self-evident.

          On the contrary, No one can mentally admit the opposite of what is self-evident; as the Philosopher (Metaph. iv, lect. vi) states concerning the first principles of demonstration. But the opposite of the proposition "God is" can be mentally admitted: "The fool said in his heart, There is no God" (Ps. 52:1). Therefore, that God exists is not self-evident.

          I answer that, A thing can be self-evident in either of two ways: on the one hand, self-evident in itself, though not to us; on the other, self-evident in itself, and to us. A proposition is self-evident because the predicate is included in the essence of the subject, as "Man is an animal," for animal is contained in the essence of man. If, therefore the essence of the predicate and subject be known to all, the proposition will be self-evident to all; as is clear with regard to the first principles of demonstration, the terms of which are common things that no one is ignorant of, such as being and non-being, whole and part, and such like. If, however, there are some to whom the essence of the predicate and subject is unknown, the proposition will be self-evident in itself, but not to those who do not know the meaning of the predicate and subject of the proposition. Therefore, it happens, as Boethius says (Hebdom., the title of which is: "Whether all that is, is good"), "that there are some mental concepts self-evident only to the learned, as that incorporeal substances are not in space." Therefore I say that this proposition, "God exists," of itself is self-evident, for the predicate is the same as the subject, because God is His own existence as will be hereafter shown (Q. 3, Art. 4). Now because we do not know the essence of God, the proposition is not self-evident to us; but needs to be demonstrated by things that are more known to us, though less known in their nature—namely, by effects.

          Reply Obj. 1: To know that God exists in a general and confused way is implanted in us by nature, inasmuch as God is man's beatitude. For man naturally desires happiness, and what is naturally desired by man must be naturally known to him. This, however, is not to know absolutely that God exists; just as to know that someone is approaching is not the same as to know that Peter is approaching, even though it is Peter who is approaching; for many there are who imagine that man's perfect good which is happiness, consists in riches, and others in pleasures, and others in something else.

          Reply Obj. 2: Perhaps not everyone who hears this word "God" understands it to signify something than which nothing greater can be thought, seeing that some have believed God to be a body. Yet, granted that everyone understands that by this word "God" is signified something than which nothing greater can be thought, nevertheless, it does not therefore follow that he understands that what the word signifies exists actually, but only that it exists mentally. Nor can it be argued that it actually exists, unless it be admitted that there actually exists something than which nothing greater can be thought; and this precisely is not admitted by those who hold that God does not exist.

          Reply Obj. 3: The existence of truth in general is self-evident but the existence of a Primal Truth is not self-evident to us.

Whether God Exists (The Five Ways) (ST 1.2.3)

          Objection 1 [problem of evil]: It seems that God does not exist; because if one of two contraries be infinite, the other would be altogether destroyed. But the word "God" means that He is infinite goodness. If, therefore, God existed, there would be no evil discoverable; but there is evil in the world. Therefore God does not exist.

          Obj. 2 [argument from simplicity]: Further, it is superfluous to suppose that what can be accounted for by a few principles has been produced by many. But it seems that everything we see in the world can be accounted for by other principles, supposing God did not exist. For all natural things can be reduced to one principle which is nature; and all voluntary things can be reduced to one principle which is human reason, or will. Therefore there is no need to suppose God's existence.

          On the contrary, It is said in the person of God: "I am Who am." (Ex. 3:14)

          I answer that, The existence of God can be proved in five ways.

Primary Mover Producing Motion in the World

The first and more clear way is the argument from motion. It is certain, and evident to our senses, that in the world some things are in motion. Now whatever is in motion is put in motion by another, for nothing can be in motion unless it is in potentiality to that towards which it is in motion; whereas a thing moves since it is in act. For motion is nothing else than the reduction of something from potentiality to actuality. But nothing can be reduced from potentiality to actuality, except by something in a state of actuality. Thus that which is actually hot, as fire, makes wood, which is potentially hot, to be actually hot, and thereby moves and changes it. Now it is not possible that the same thing should be at once in actuality and potentiality in the same respect, but only in different respects. For what is actually hot cannot simultaneously be potentially hot; but it is simultaneously potentially cold. It is therefore impossible that in the same respect and in the same way a thing should be both mover and moved, i.e. that it should move itself. Therefore, whatever is in motion must be put in motion by another. If that by which it is put in motion be itself put in motion, then this also must be put in motion by another, and that by another again. But this cannot go on to infinity, because then there would be no first mover, and, consequently, no other mover; seeing that subsequent movers move only inasmuch as they are put in motion by the first mover, just as the staff moves only because it is put in motion by the hand. Therefore it is necessary to arrive at a first mover, put in motion by no other; and this everyone understands to be God.

Primary Efficient Cause producing Order of Efficient Causes

The second way is from the nature of the efficient cause. In the world of sense we find there is an order of efficient causes. There is no case known (neither is it, indeed, possible) in which a thing is found to be the efficient cause of itself; for then it would be prior to itself, which is impossible. Now in efficient causes it is not possible to go on to infinity, because in all efficient causes following in order, the first is the cause of the intermediate cause, and the intermediate is the cause of the ultimate cause, whether the intermediate cause be several, or only one. Now to take away the cause is to take away the effect. Therefore, if there is no first cause among efficient causes, there will be no ultimate, nor any intermediate cause. But if in efficient causes it is possible to go on to infinity, there will be no first efficient cause, neither will there be an ultimate effect, nor any intermediate efficient causes; all of which is plainly false. Therefore it is necessary to admit a first efficient cause, to which everyone gives the name of God.

Primary Necessary Being

The third way is taken from possibility and necessity, and runs thus. We find in nature things that are possible to be and not to be, since they are found to be generated, and to corrupt, and consequently, they are possible to be and not to be. But it is impossible for these always to exist, for that which is possible not to be at some time is not. Therefore, if everything is possible not to be, then at one time there could have been nothing in existence. Now if this were true, even now there would be nothing in existence, because that which does not exist only begins to exist by something already existing. Therefore, if at one time nothing was in existence, it would have been impossible for anything to have begun to exist; and thus even now nothing would be in existence—which is absurd. Therefore, not all beings are merely possible, but there must exist something the existence of which is necessary. But every necessary thing either has its necessity caused by another, or not. Now it is impossible to go on to infinity in necessary things which have their necessity caused by another, as has been already proved in regard to efficient causes. Therefore we cannot but postulate the existence of some being having of itself its own necessity, and not receiving it from another, but rather causing in others their necessity. This all men speak of as God.

Maximally Perfect Being causing Lower Degrees of Perfection

The fourth way is taken from the gradation to be found in things. Among beings there are some more and some less good, true, noble and the like. But "more" and "less" are predicated of different things, according as they resemble in their different ways something which is the maximum, as a thing is said to be hotter according as it more nearly resembles that which is hottest; so that there is something which is truest, something best, something noblest and, consequently, something which is uttermost being; for those things that are greatest in truth are greatest in being, as it is written in Metaphysics. ii. Now the maximum in any genus is the cause of all in that genus; as fire, which is the maximum heat, is the cause of all hot things. Therefore there must also be something which is to all beings the cause of their being, goodness, and every other perfection; and this we call God.

Intelligent Being moving Natural Things Towards and End

The fifth way is taken from the governance of the world. We see that things which lack intelligence, such as natural bodies, act for an end, and this is evident from their acting always, or nearly always, in the same way, so as to obtain the best result. Hence it is plain that not fortuitously, but designedly, do they achieve their end. Now whatever lacks intelligence cannot move towards an end, unless it be directed by some being endowed with knowledge and intelligence; as the arrow is shot to its mark by the archer. Therefore some intelligent being exists by whom all natural things are directed to their end; and this being we call God.

          Reply Obj. 1 [problem of evil]: As Augustine says (Enchiridion 11): "Since God is the highest good, He would not allow any evil to exist in His works, unless His omnipotence and goodness were such as to bring good even out of evil." This is part of the infinite goodness of God, that He should allow evil to exist, and out of it produce good.

          Reply Obj. 2 [argument from simplicity]: Since nature works for a determinate end under the direction of a higher agent, whatever is done by nature must be traced back to God, as to its first cause. So also whatever is done voluntarily must also be traced back to some higher cause other than human reason or will, since these can change or fail; for all things that are changeable and capable of defect must be traced back to an immovable and self-necessary first principle, as was shown in the body of the Article.

Whether It Is an Article of Faith That the World Began? (ST 1.46.2)

          Objection 1: It would seem that it is not an article of faith but a demonstrable conclusion that the world began. For everything that is made has a beginning of its duration. But it can be proved demonstratively that God is the effective cause of the world; indeed this is asserted by the more approved philosophers. Therefore it can be demonstratively proved that the world began.

          Obj. 7: Further, if the world was eternal, generation also was eternal. Therefore one man was begotten of another in an infinite series. But the father is the efficient cause of the son (Phys. ii, text 5). Therefore in efficient causes there could be an infinite series, which is disproved (Metaph. 2, text 5).

          On the contrary, The articles of faith cannot be proved demonstratively, because faith is of things "that appear not" (Heb. 11:1). But that God is the Creator of the world: hence that the world began, is an article of faith; for we say, "I believe in one God," etc. Again, Gregory says (Hom. 1 in Ezech.), that Moses prophesied of the past, saying, "In the beginning God created heaven and earth": in which words the newness of the world is stated. Therefore the newness of the world is known only by revelation; and therefore it cannot be proved demonstratively.

          I answer that, By faith alone do we hold, and by no demonstration can it be proved, that the world did not always exist, as was said above of the mystery of the Trinity (Q. 32, A. 1). The reason of this is that the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated on the part of the world itself. For the principle of demonstration is the essence of a thing. Now everything according to its species is abstracted from "here" and "now"; accordingly it is said that universals are everywhere and always. Hence it cannot be demonstrated that man, or heaven, or a stone were not always. Likewise neither can it be demonstrated on the part of the efficient cause, which acts by will. For the will of God cannot be investigated by reason, except as regards those things which God must will of necessity; and what He wills about creatures is not among these, as was said above (Q. 19, A. 3). But the divine will can be displayed by revelation, on which faith rests. Hence it is an object of faith that the world began to exist, but not of demonstration or science. It is useful to consider this, so that no one, presuming to demonstrate what is of faith, should bring forward reasons that are unconvincing, so as to give occasion to unbelievers to laugh, thinking that on such grounds we believe things that are of faith.

          Reply Obj. 7: In efficient causes it is impossible to proceed to infinity per se [i.e., when they occur simultaneously]. Thus, there cannot be an infinite number of causes that are per se required for a certain effect; for instance, that a stone be moved by a stick, the stick by the hand, and so on to infinity. But it is not impossible to proceed to infinity accidentally as regards efficient causes [i.e., when they occur through time]; for instance, if all the causes thus infinitely multiplied should have the order of only one cause, their multiplication being accidental, as an artificer acts by means of many hammers accidentally, because one after the other may be broken. It is accidental, therefore, that one particular hammer acts after the action of another; and likewise it is accidental to this particular man as generator to be generated by another man; for he generates as a man, and not as the son of another man. For all men generating hold one grade in efficient causes—viz. the grade of a particular generator. Hence it is not impossible for a man to be generated by man to infinity; but such a thing would be impossible if the generation of this man depended upon this man, and on an elementary body, and on the sun, and so on to infinity.

DIVINE ATTRIBUTES AND PREDICATES

Whether God Is Altogether Simple (ST 1.3.7)

          I answer that, The absolute simplicity of God may be shown in many ways. First, from the previous articles of this question. For there is neither composition of quantitative parts in God, since He is not a body; nor composition of matter and form; nor does His nature differ from His being (suppositum); nor His essence from His existence; neither is there in Him composition of genus and difference, nor of subject and accident. Therefore, it is clear that God is in no way composite, but is altogether simple. Secondly, because every composite is posterior to its component parts, and is dependent on them; but God is the first being, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3). Thirdly, because every composite has a cause, for things in themselves different cannot unite unless something causes them to unite. But God is uncaused, as shown above (Q. 2, A. 3), since He is the first efficient cause. Fourthly, because in every composite there must be potentiality and actuality; but this does not apply to God; for either one of the parts actuates another, or at least all the parts are potential to the whole. Fifthly, because nothing composite can be predicated of any single one of its parts. This is evident in a whole made up of dissimilar parts; for no part of a man is a man, nor any of the parts of the foot, a foot. But in wholes made up of similar parts, although something which is predicated of the whole may be predicated of a part (as a part of the air is air, and a part of water, water), nevertheless certain things are predicable of the whole which cannot be predicated of any of the parts; for instance, if the whole volume of water is two cubits, no part of it can be two cubits. Thus in every composite there is something which is not it itself. But, even if this could be said of whatever has a form, viz. that it has something which is not it itself, as in a white object there is something which does not belong to the essence of white; nevertheless in the form itself, there is nothing besides itself. So, since God is absolute form, or rather absolute being, He can be in no way composite. Hilary implies this argument, when he says (De Trin. vii): "God, Who is strength, is not made up of things that are weak; nor is He Who is light, composed of things that are dim."

Humans Speak of Simple Things as Composite (ST 1.3.3.R1)

We can speak of simple things only as though they were like the composite things from which we derive our knowledge. Therefore in speaking of God, we use concrete nouns to signify His subsistence, because with us only those things subsist which are composite; and we use abstract nouns to signify His simplicity. In saying therefore that Godhead, or life, or the like are in God, we indicate the composite way in which our intellect understands, but not that there is any composition in God.

Simplicity implies Perfection (ST 1.4.1)

As the Philosopher relates (Metaphysics 12), some ancient philosophers, namely, the Pythagoreans and Leucippus, did not predicate "best" and "most perfect" of the first principle. The reason was that the ancient philosophers considered only a material principle; and a material principle is completely imperfect. For since matter as such is merely potential, the first material principle must be simply potential, and thus most imperfect. Now God is the first principle, not material, but in the order of efficient cause, which must be most perfect. For just as matter, as such, is merely potential, an agent, as such, is in the state of actuality. Hence, the first active principle must be most actual, and therefore most perfect; for a thing is perfect in proportion to its state of actuality, because we call that perfect which lacks nothing of the manner of its perfection.

Whether What Is Said of God and of Creatures is Univocally Predicated of Them? (ST 1.13.5)

Univocal predication is impossible between God and creatures [i.e., words used exactly the same way]. The reason of this is that every effect which is not an adequate result of the power of the efficient cause, receives the similitude of the agent not in its full degree, but in a measure that falls short, so that what is divided and multiplied in the effects resides in the agent simply, and in the same manner; as for example the sun by exercise of its one power produces manifold and various forms in all inferior things. In the same way, as said in the preceding article, all perfections existing in creatures divided and multiplied, pre-exist in God unitedly. Thus when any term expressing perfection is applied to a creature, it signifies that perfection distinct in idea from other perfections; as, for instance, by the term "wise" applied to man, we signify some perfection distinct from a man's essence, and distinct from his power and existence, and from all similar things; whereas when we apply to it God, we do not mean to signify anything distinct from His essence, or power, or existence. Thus also this term "wise" applied to man in some degree circumscribes and comprehends the thing signified; whereas this is not the case when it is applied to God; but it leaves the thing signified as incomprehended, and as exceeding the signification of the name. Hence it is evident that this term "wise" is not applied in the same way to God and to man. The same rule applies to other terms. Hence no name is predicated univocally of God and of creatures.

          Neither, on the other hand, are names applied to God and creatures in a purely equivocal sense [i.e., completely different from each other], as some have said. Because if that were so, it follows that from creatures nothing could be known or demonstrated about God at all; for the reasoning would always be exposed to the fallacy of equivocation. Such a view is against the philosophers, who proved many things about God, and also against what the Apostle says: "The invisible things of God are clearly seen being understood by the things that are made" (Rom. 1:20). Therefore it must be said that these names are said of God and creatures in an analogous sense, i.e., according to proportion.

          Now names are thus used in two ways. The first is according as many things are proportionate to one, thus for example "healthy" predicated of medicine and urine in relation and in proportion to health of a body, of which the former is the sign and the latter the cause. The second is according as one thing is proportionate to another, thus "healthy" is said of medicine and animal, since medicine is the cause of health in the animal body. In this way some things are said of God and creatures analogically, and not in a purely equivocal nor in a purely univocal sense. For we can name God only from creatures (A. 1). Thus whatever is said of God and creatures, is said according to the relation of a creature to God as its principle and cause, wherein all perfections of things pre-exist excellently. Now this manner of community of idea is a mean between pure equivocation and simple univocation. For in analogies the idea is not, as it is in univocals, one and the same, yet it is not totally diverse as in equivocals; but a term which is thus used in a multiple sense signifies various proportions to some one thing; thus "healthy" applied to urine signifies the sign of animal health, and applied to medicine signifies the cause of the same health.

MIRACLES

God Can Act Outside the Established Order of Nature (ST 1.105.6)

          Objection 1: It would seem that God cannot do anything outside the established order of nature. For Augustine (Contra Faust. 26.3) says: "God the Maker and Creator of each nature, does nothing against nature." But that which is outside the natural order seems to be against nature. Therefore God can do nothing outside the natural order. . . .

          On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. 26.3): "God sometimes does things which are contrary to the ordinary course of nature."

          I answer that, From each cause there results a certain order to its effects, since every cause is a principle. Thus, according to the multiplicity of causes, there results a multiplicity of orders, subjected one to the other, as cause is subjected to cause. For this reason, a higher cause is not subjected to a cause of a lower order; but conversely. An example of this may be seen in human affairs. On the father of a family depends the order of the household; which order is contained in the order of the city; which order again depends on the ruler of the city; while this last order depends on that of the king, by whom the whole kingdom is ordered.

          If therefore we consider the order of things depending on the first cause, God cannot do anything against this [highest] order; for, if He did so, He would act against His foreknowledge, or His will, or His goodness. But if we consider the order [lower] of things depending on any secondary cause, thus God can do something outside such order. For, He is not subject to the order of secondary causes, but, on the contrary, this order is subject to Him, since it proceeds from Him, not by a natural necessity, but by the choice of His own will. For, He could have created another order of things. Thus, God can do something outside this order created by Him, when He chooses, for instance by producing the effects of secondary causes without them, or by producing certain effects to which secondary causes do not extend. So Augustine says (Contra Faust. 26.3): "God acts against the wonted course of nature, but by no means does He act against the supreme law; because He does not act against Himself."

          Reply Obj. 1: In natural things something may happen outside this natural order, in two ways. It may happen by the action of an agent which did not give them their natural inclination; as, for example, when a man moves a heavy body upwards, which does not owe to him its natural inclination to move downwards; and that would be against nature. It may also happen by the action of the agent on whom the natural inclination depends; and this is not against nature, as is clear in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is not against nature; although it is against the natural movement of water in a downward direction; for it is owing to the influence of a heavenly body, on which the natural inclination of lower bodies depends. Therefore since the order of nature is given to things by God; if He does anything outside this order, it is not against nature. Thus, Augustine says (Contra Faust. 26, 3): "That is natural to each thing which is caused by Him from Whom is all mode, number, and order in nature."

All of God's Miracle are done Outside Natural Order (ST 1.105.7)

          Objection 1: It would seem that not everything which God does outside the natural order of things, is miraculous. For the creation of the world, and of souls, and the justification of the unrighteous, are done by God outside the natural order; as not being accomplished by the action of any natural cause. Yet these things are not called miracles. Therefore not everything that God does outside the natural order is a miracle. . . .

          On the contrary, Augustine says (Contra Faust. 26, 3): "Where God does anything against that order of nature which we know and are accustomed to observe, we call it a miracle."

          I answer that, The word miracle is derived from astonishment, which arises when an effect is visible, whereas its cause is hidden; such as when a man sees an eclipse without knowing its cause, as the Philosopher says in the beginning of his Metaphysics. Now the cause of a visible effect may be known to one, but unknown to others. Thus, a thing is astonishing to one man, and not at all to others: such as an eclipse is to a country person, but not to an astronomer. Now a miracle is so called as being full of astonishment; as having a cause absolutely hidden from all: and this cause is God. Thus, those things which God does outside those causes which we know, are called miracles.

          Reply Obj. 1: Creation, and the justification of the unrighteous, though done by God alone, are not, properly speaking, miracles, because they are not of a nature to proceed from any other cause; so they do not occur outside the order of nature, since they do not belong to that order. . . .

Some Miracles are Greater Than Others (ST 1.105.8)

I answer that, Nothing is called a miracle by comparison with the Divine Power; because no action is of any account compared with the power of God, according to Isa. 40:15: "Observe that the Gentiles are as a drop from a bucket, and are counted as the smallest grain of a balance." But a thing is called a miracle by comparison with the power of nature which it surpasses. So the more the power of nature is surpassed, the greater the miracle. Now the power of nature is surpassed in three ways: firstly, in the substance of the deed, for instance, if two bodies occupy the same place, or if the sun goes backwards; or if a human body is glorified: such things nature is absolutely unable to do; and these hold the highest rank among miracles. Secondly, a thing surpasses the power of nature, not in the deed, but in that wherein it is done; as the raising of the dead, and giving sight to the blind, and the like; for nature can give life, but not to the dead; and such hold the second rank in miracles. Thirdly, a thing surpasses nature's power in the measure and order in which it is done; as when a man is cured of a fever suddenly, without treatment or the usual process of nature; or as when the air is suddenly condensed into rain, by Divine power without a natural cause, as occurred at the prayers of Samuel and Elias; and these hold the lowest place in miracles. Moreover, each of these kinds has various degrees, according to the different ways in which the power of nature is surpassed.

Source: Thomas Aquinas, from Summa Theologiae, translated by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, adapted.

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. According to Augustine in 83 Questions, how do human minds gain access to the Forms or reasons of created things, and how does his doctrine of divine illumination differ from Plato's concept of recollection?

2. According to Augustine in On Free Choice, how does he resolve the potential conflict between God's divine foreknowledge and human free will?

3. According to Augustine in the Enchiridion, what is the nature of evil, and why does the existence of evil fail to contradict the absolute goodness of the Creator?

4. According to Pseudo-Dionysius in Mystical Theology, what are the three types of positive descriptions of God, and why must the seeker eventually progress from positive affirmations to negative denials?

5. According to Pseudo-Dionysius in Mystical Theology, why does the ascent into the "divine darkness" require absolute silence and the abandonment of all human speech and intellectual concepts?

6. According to Boethius in Book 5 of The Consolation of Philosophy, how does defining eternity as the "possession of endless life whole and perfect at a single moment" resolve the dilemma of divine foreknowledge and human free choice?

7. According to Boethius in The Consolation of Philosophy, why are human actions free when viewed in their own nature, yet necessary when viewed from the perspective of God's eternal glance?

8. According to Hesychius of Sinai in the Philokalia, what is the practical method of the Jesus Prayer, and how does it safeguard the heart against dark thoughts and demonic enticements?

9. According to Anselm in the Monologium, how does the existence of varying degrees of goodness in finite things prove the existence of an absolute standard of good?

10. According to Anselm in Proslogium 2, how does he construct the "ontological argument" to prove that a being "than which nothing greater can be conceived" must exist in reality as well as in the understanding?

11. According to Anselm's reply to Gaunilo, why does Gaunilo's "Lost Island" parody argument fail to apply to the concept of the Greatest Possible Being?

12. According to Averroes in The Decisive Treatise, why can truth never contradict truth, and what procedure must a learned scholar follow when scripture appears to conflict with demonstrative philosophical truth?

13. According to Averroes in The Decisive Treatise, how does he distinguish between the exoteric (apparent) and esoteric (hidden) layers of scripture, and why is allegorical interpretation forbidden for fundamental principles of faith?

14. According to Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae 1.2.1, why is the proposition "God exists" self-evident in itself, but not self-evident to human reason?

15. In Summa Theologiae 1.2.3, what are the Five Ways Thomas Aquinas uses to prove the existence of God?

16. According to Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae 1.46.2, why is the temporal beginning of the world an article of faith rather than a demonstratively provable fact, and how does he distinguish between causes per se and causes per accidens?

17. According to Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae 1.3.7, what does it mean to say that God is "altogether simple," and why does divine simplicity imply absolute perfection?

18. According to Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae 1.13.5, why are terms like "wise" or "good" predicated of God and creatures analogically, rather than univocally or equivocally?

19. According to Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae 1.105.6, why are divine miracles described as happening "outside" the established order of natural secondary causes rather than "against" nature?

20. According to Thomas Aquinas in Summa Theologiae 1.105.8, by what criteria are certain divine miracles classified as greater than others?

21. Short Essay Options: Please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

(a) Critics argue that Augustine's privation theory of evil (evil as the mere absence of good) fails to capture the active, destructive reality of moral malice and physical suffering. How might Augustine respond?

(b) Critics argue that Pseudo-Dionysius's radical apophatic (negative) theology leads to complete agnosticism, rendering God entirely unknowable and religiously irrelevant. How might Pseudo-Dionysius respond?

(c) Critics argue that Boethius's concept of God existing in a timeless present destroys divine providence and responsiveness, as a timeless God cannot act sequentially in human history. How might Boethius respond?

(d) Critics argue that Hesychius's mystical technique of repetitively reciting the Jesus Prayer reduces Christian contemplation to a mechanical, psychological exercise of sensory deprivation. How might Hesychius respond?

(e) Critics argue that Anselm's ontological argument improperly treats "existence" as a real property or predicate, making a logical leap from a mental concept to real-world reality. How might Anselm respond?

(f) Critics argue that Averroes's distinction between exoteric and esoteric meanings of scripture creates a double-truth theory that undermines the authority of sacred texts for ordinary believers. How might Averroes respond?

(g) Critics argue that Aquinas's Five Ways establish at most an abstract metaphysical first cause or prime mover, but fail to prove that this entity is the personal, loving God of Christian revelation. How might Aquinas respond?

(h) Critics argue that Aquinas's doctrine of divine simplicity makes God's attributes indistinguishable from one another, making it unintelligible to say God possesses distinct perfections like justice and mercy. How might Aquinas respond?

(i) Critics argue that medieval Christian Platonism unnecessarily degraded the material world by locating true reality exclusively in an immaterial, heavenly realm of Forms. How might either Augustine or Anselm respond?

(j) Critics argue that the medieval synthesis of Aristotelian natural philosophy with Christian theology dogmatized outdated scientific assumptions, creating an inflexible worldview that hindered scientific progress. How might Aquinas respond?