Early Modern Empiricists | Classics in the Philosophy of Religion

EARLY MODERN EMPIRICISTS

From Classics in the Philosophy of Religion, by James Fieser

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CONTENTS

• Thomas Hobbes: Psychological Mechanics of Religious Belief

• John Locke: Limitations of Religious Knowledge

• George Berkeley: God as the Source of All Perceptions (from Principles, Dialogues, Alciphron)

Rationalist philosophers in the previous chapter responded to the scientific revolution with innovative theories about God's role in the cosmos, which were grounded more in speculative reason than in sense perception. The result was a series of bizarre metaphysical accounts of how God interfaced with the material cosmos, which Hume later ridiculed as a "fairyland". But a rival group of philosophers, today called "empiricists", approached the matter differently. They placed less emphasis on pure speculative reason and more on what we know through our perceptions. Empiricism as a theory of knowledge leans towards skepticism for the simple reason that there are clear limits to what our perceptions can tell us about the world. These limits apply to the physical world that we can see, but they apply even more so to any spiritual realm that we cannot see at all. We have no direct perception of a divine being, or an afterlife, or miraculous violations of natural laws. We might try to draw supernatural inferences from what we do see, but those inferences might only be guesses. Thomas Hobbes takes this empiricist approach in his analysis of religion, with all its skeptical implications. For Hobbes, religion results from purely natural psychological mechanisms, many of which are unflattering aspects of human nature. Those same natural mechanisms shaped the development and institutionalization of religious beliefs. For Hobbes, the safest thing we can do now is to just go along with religion, but at the same time privately be aware of its shaky foundations. Decades later, John Locke established the official empiricist methodology that influenced generations after him. He came to many of the same conclusions about religion as Hobbes, but expressed them more delicately. George Berkeley, though, is an outlier. He followed Locke's skeptically-leaning empiricism, but interprets the problem through the rationalist lens of Malebranche. For Berkeley, we have no knowledge of the physical world, but the best explanation of what we do see around us is that God is injecting into our spirit-minds a virtual reality that appears three dimensional to us. Ultimately, Locke's version of empiricism was unstoppable, influencing a wave of theologians, which in turn were attacked by a wave of critics, including David Hume.

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THOMAS HOBBES:

PSYCHOLOGICAL MECHANICS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF

Thomas Hobbes (1588–1679) was born in Westport, England, prematurely, after his mother went into early labor when hearing that the Spanish Armada was approaching. He later joked that "fear and I were born twins." He studied at Oxford, then became tutor and secretary to the wealthy Cavendish family, a position that gave him access to their library and, on his travels with them across Europe, to figures like Galileo. He spent the English Civil War in exile in Paris, where he briefly tutored the future Charles II in mathematics, before returning to England once the political climate allowed it. His masterwork, Leviathan (1651), argued that life without a strong central government would be a war of all against all, and its materialist, mechanistic account of human nature drew persistent accusations of atheism that followed him for the rest of his life. Even in old age he remained active, reportedly still playing tennis in his seventies and, in his eighties, translating both the Iliad and the Odyssey largely to keep himself occupied. He died at ninety-one, and was reported to have described death as "a great leap in the dark."

The majority of the selections here are from Leviathan, and they follow four themes, the first of which is the natural causes of religion. Hobbes argues that anxiety about the future drives humans to investigate the causes of things, a process that ultimately leads to a belief in an indescribable eternal first Causec, which men call God. However, scientifically uneducated people, driven by fear through ignorance, invent invisible powers and religion out of their own imaginations, a tendency that politicians exploit to enforce obedience. While polytheism arises from this fear of unknown causes, monotheism is derived from the philosophical inference of a first cause. The first specific cause of religion is the presumption that invisible agents are incorporeal, a concept derived from the misinterpretation of dreams and reflections as real, external substances. Hobbes notes that divine incomprehensibility arises from the unintelligibility of this concept of incorporeality, since the phrase "incorporeal spirit" is a linguistic contradiction that cannot be naturally imagined. The second cause, superstition, arises from remembering chance correlations, leading people to expect future events based on past antecedents that have no causal connection. The third cause is that we honor invisible powers the way we honor people, utilizing gifts, petitions, and submissive behaviors. Lastly, the fourth cause is that we assume chance correlations are divine signs, mistaking casual encounters for prognostics. These four causes lead to a variety of religious ceremonies, which rulers enforce to make people more obedient and civil, a strategy reinforced by Gentile rulers who claimed divine authorization, aligned divine displeasure with state laws, and prescribed appeasing rituals. Conversely, true revealed religion contains the laws of God's temporal and spiritual kingdom, which makes civil laws an inherent part of religion.

Regarding the second theme, that miracles are not believable, Hobbes maintains that citizens must verbally assent to legally authorized miracles even when they are not personally believable. While religion contains mysteries above reason, reason should not be abandoned, rather, the will must captivate the understanding to avoid open contradiction of lawful authority. Properly defined, miracles are astonishing works of God, signify God's intention, are rare, and are performed entirely outside of nature. Uneducated people are easily fooled by contrived miracles, such as ventriloquism, astronomy, or coordinated impostures. For this reason, strict precautions are necessary when assessing miracles. We must consult established religious authorities and actively look for natural explanations. Using the example of the miracle of transubstantiation, Hobbes argues that there is no rational reason to believe bread becomes a god unless the sovereign's vicar validates it. Ultimately, miracle reports today are not believable because supernatural wonders are no longer witnessed. Accordingly, private judgments about miracles must give way to the public judgment by God's lieutenant.

The third theme addresses the issue of head of the church. For Hobbes, there is no universal Church on earth, and temporal and spiritual government are the exact same thing. To prevent civil war, the king is the head of the church, holding supreme authority over external religious actions and the interpretation of Scripture. Consequently, it is a sin to not worship God according to the laws of the state. The final theme covers controversial religious doctrines. Hobbes held that atheism is only a sin of imprudence, or poor judgment, which thus does not deserve punishment. However, he acknowledges that it still can be punished by the right of war, since atheists are enemies of God who lack the reason to discern Him., Hobbes also argued that God is a corporeal (bodily) spirit, not incorporeal, since anything that exists must have magnitude and occupy space. Further, we should understand the notion of "hell" metaphorically as a grief from the loss of resurrection and eternal felicity, rather than literal underground fire. Lastly, the only article of faith required for salvation is that Jesus is the Messiah, though the state may command the profession of additional articles.

THE NATURAL CAUSE OF RELIGION (Leviathan, Chapters 11, 12)

Anxiety about the Future makes us Investigate the Causes of Things which Leads to Belief in an indescribable First Cause

Anxiety for the future time, disposes men to inquire into the causes of things: because the knowledge of them, makes men the better able to order the present to their best advantage. Curiosity, or love of the knowledge of causes, draws a man from the consideration of the effect, to seek the cause; and again, the cause of that cause; till of necessity he must come to this thought at last, that there is some cause, whereof there is no former cause, but is eternal; which is it men call God. So that it is impossible to make any profound inquiry into natural causes, without being inclined thereby to believe there is one God eternal; though they cannot have any idea of him in their mind, answerable to his nature. For as a man that is born blind, hearing men talk of warming themselves by the fire, and being brought to warm himself by the same, may easily conceive, and assure himself, there is somewhat there, which men call fire, and is the cause of the heat he feels; but cannot imagine what it is like; nor have an idea of it in his mind, such as they have that see it: so also by the visible things in this world, and their admirable order, a man may conceive there is a cause of them, which men call God; and yet not have an idea, or image of him in his mind.

Scientifically Uneducated People invent Invisible Powers and Religion from Fear and Politicians Exploit This

And they that make little, or no inquiry into the natural causes of things, yet from the fear that proceeds from the ignorance itself, of what it is that has the power to do them much good or harm, are inclined to suppose, and feign unto themselves, several kinds of powers invisible; and to stand in awe of their own imaginations; and in time of distress to invoke them; as also in the time of an expected good success, to give them thanks; making the creatures of their own fancy, their gods. By which means it has come to pass, that from the innumerable variety of fancy, men have created in the world innumerable sorts of gods. And this fear of things invisible, is the natural seed of that, which everyone in himself calls religion; and in them that worship, or fear that power otherwise than they do, superstition.

And this seed of religion, having been observed by many; some of those that have observed it, have been inclined thereby to nourish, dress, and form it into laws; and to add to it of their own invention, any opinion of the causes of future events, by which they thought they should be best able to govern others, and make unto themselves the greatest use of their powers.

Polytheism arises from Fear of Unknown Causes, Monotheism by inferring a First Cause of These Unknown Causes

This perpetual fear, always accompanying mankind in the ignorance of causes, as it were in the dark, must needs have for object something. And therefore when there is nothing to be seen, there is nothing to accuse, either of their good, or evil fortune, but some power, or agent invisible: in which sense perhaps it was, that some of the old poets said, that the gods were at first created by human fear: which spoken of the gods, that is to say, of the many gods of the Gentiles, is very true. But the acknowledging of one God, eternal, infinite, and omnipotent, may more easily be derived, from the desire men have to know the causes of natural bodies, and their several virtues, and operations; than from the fear of what was to befall them in time to come. For he that from any effect he sees come to pass, should reason to the next and immediate cause thereof, and from thence to the cause of that cause, and plunge himself profoundly in the pursuit of causes; shall at last come to this, that there must be, as even the heathen philosophers confessed, one first mover; that is, a first, and an eternal cause of all things; which is that which men mean by the name of God: and all this without thought of their fortune; the solicitude whereof, both inclines to fear, and hinders them from the search of the causes of other things; and thereby gives occasion of feigning of as many gods, as there be men that feign them.

Cause 1 of Religion: Invisible Causes Presumed to be Incorporeal

And [firstly,] for the matter, or substance of the invisible agents, so fancied; they could not by natural cogitation, fall upon any other conceit, but that it was the same with that of the soul of man; and that the soul of man, was of the same substance, with that which appears in a dream, to one that sleeps; or in a looking-glass, to one that is awake; which, men not knowing that such apparitions are nothing else but creatures of the fancy, think to be real, and external substances; and therefore call them ghosts; as the Latins called them imagines, and umbra [i.e., shadow]; and thought them spirits, that is, thin aerial bodies; and those invisible agents, which they feared, to be like them; save [i.e., except] that they appear, and vanish when they please.

Divine Incomprehensibility arises from the Unintelligibility of the Concept of Incorporeality

But the opinion that such spirits were incorporeal, or immaterial, could never enter into the mind of any man by nature; because, though men may put together words of contradictory signification, as spirit, and incorporeal; yet they can never have the imagination of anything answering to them: and therefore, men that by their own meditation, arrive to the acknowledgment of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, chose rather to confess he is incomprehensible, and above their understanding, than to define his nature by spirit incorporeal, and then confess their definition to be unintelligible: or if they give him such a title, it is not dogmatically, with intention to make the divine nature understood; but piously, to honor him with attributes, of significations, as remote as they can from the grossness of bodies visible.

Cause 2: Superstition Arises from remembering Chance Correlations

Then [secondly], for the way by which they think these invisible agents wrought [i.e., created] their effects; that is to say, what immediate causes they used, in bringing things to pass, men that know not what it is that we call causing, that is, almost all men, have no other rule to guess by, but by observing, and remembering what they have seen to precede the like effect at some other time, or times before, without seeing between the antecedent and subsequent event, any dependence or connection at all. And therefore from the like things past, they expect the like things to come; and hope for good or evil luck, superstitiously, from things that have no part at all in the causing of it: as the Athenians did for their war at Lepanto, demand another Phormio; the Pompeian faction for their war in Africa, another Scipio; and others have done in divers other occasions since. In like manner they attribute their fortune to a stander by, to a lucky or unlucky place, to words spoken, especially if the name of God be amongst them; as charming and conjuring, the liturgy of witches; insomuch as to believe, they have power to turn a stone into bread, bread into a man, or anything into anything.

Cause 3: We Honor Invisible Powers the way we Honor People

Thirdly, for the worship which naturally men exhibit to powers invisible, it can be no other, but such expressions of their reverence, as they would use towards men; gifts, petitions, thanks, submission of body, considerate addresses, sober behavior, premeditated words, swearing, that is, assuring one another of their promises, by invoking them. Beyond that reason suggests nothing; but leaves them either to rest there; or for further ceremonies, to rely on those they believe to be wiser than themselves.

Cause 4: We Assume that Chance Correlations are Divine Signs

Lastly, concerning how these invisible powers declare to men the things which shall hereafter come to pass, especially concerning their good or evil fortune in general, or good or ill success in any particular undertaking, men are naturally at a stand; save [i.e., except] that using to conjecture of the time to come, by the time past, they are very apt, not only to take casual things, after one or two encounters, for prognostics [i.e., divine signs] of the like encounter ever after, but also to believe the like prognostics from other men, of whom they have once conceived a good opinion.

These Four Causes of Religion lead to a Variety of Religious Ceremonies

And in these four things, opinion of ghosts, ignorance of second causes, devotion towards what men fear, and taking of things casual for prognostics, consists the natural seed of religion; which by reason of the different fancies, judgments, and passions of several men, has grown up into ceremonies so different, that those which are used by one man, are for the most part ridiculous to another.

Religion Enforced to Make People more Obedient and Civil

For these [four] seeds have received culture from two sorts of men. One sort have been they, that have nourished, and ordered them, according to their own invention. The other have done it, by God's commandment, and direction. But both sorts have done it, with a purpose to make those men that relied on them, the more apt to obedience, laws, peace, charity, and civil society. So that the religion of the former sort, is a part of human politics; and teaches part of the duty which earthly kings require of their subjects. And the religion of the latter sort is divine politics; and contains precepts to those that have yielded themselves subjects in the kingdom of God. Of the former sort, were all the founders of commonwealths, and the law-givers of the Gentiles: of the latter sort, were Abraham, Moses, and our blessed savior; by whom have been derived unto us the laws of the kingdom of God. . . .

Gentile Rulers Reinforced Obedience through Three Aspects of Religion

And therefore the first founders, and legislators of commonwealths among the Gentiles, whose ends were only to keep the people in obedience, and peace, have in all places taken care; first, to imprint in their minds a belief, that those precepts which they gave concerning religion, might not be thought to proceed from their own device, but from the dictates of some god, or other spirit; or else that they themselves were of a higher nature than mere mortals, that their laws might the more easily be received. So Numa Pompilius pretended to receive the ceremonies he instituted amongst the Romans, from the nymph Egeria: and the first king and founder of the kingdom of Peru, pretended himself and his wife to be the children of the Sun; and Mahomet, to set up his new religion, pretended to have conferences with the Holy Ghost, in form of a dove. Secondly, they have had a care, to make it believed, that the same things were displeasing to the gods, which were forbidden by the laws. Thirdly, to prescribe ceremonies, supplications, sacrifices, and festivals, by which they were to believe, the anger of the gods might be appeased; and that ill success in war, great contagions of sickness, earthquakes, and each man's private misery, came from the anger of the gods, and their anger from the neglect of their worship, or the forgetting, or mistaking some point of the ceremonies required. And though amongst the ancient Romans, men were not forbidden to deny, that which in the poets is written of the pains, and pleasures after this life: which divers of great authority, and gravity in that state have in their harangues openly derided; yet that belief was always more cherished, than the contrary.

And by these, and such other institutions, they obtained in order to their end, which was the peace of the commonwealth, that the common people in their misfortunes, laying the fault on neglect, or error in their ceremonies, or on their own disobedience to the laws, were the less apt to mutiny against their governors; and being entertained with the pomp, and pastime of festivals, and public games, made in honour of the gods, needed nothing else but bread to keep them from discontent, murmuring, and commotion against the state. And therefore the Romans, that had conquered the greatest part of the then known world, made no scruple of tolerating any religion whatsoever in the city of Rome itself; unless it had something in it, that could not consist with their civil government; nor do we read, that any religion was there forbidden, but that of the Jews; who, being the peculiar kingdom of God, thought it unlawful to acknowledge subjection to any mortal king or state whatsoever. And thus you see how the religion of the Gentiles was a part of their policy.

The True Revealed Religion contains laws of God's Temporal and Spiritual Kingdom

But where God himself, by supernatural revelation, planted religion; there he also made to himself a peculiar kingdom: and gave laws, not only of behavior towards himself, but also towards one another; and thereby in the kingdom of God, the policy, and laws civil, are a part of religion; and therefore the distinction of temporal, and spiritual domination, has there no place. It is true, that God is king of all the earth: yet may he be king of a peculiar, and chosen nation. For there is no more incongruity therein, than that he that has the general command of the whole army, should have withal a peculiar regiment, or company of his own. God is king of all the earth by his power: but of his chosen people, he is king by covenant. But to speak more largely of the kingdom of God, both by nature, and covenant, I have in the following discourse assigned another place (Chapter 35).

MIRACLES NOT BELIEVABLE (Chapter 37)

Verbally Assent to Legally Authorized Miracles Even when Not Believable

[T]he ground of my discourse must be, not only the natural word of God, but also the prophetical [i.e., revelation].

Nevertheless, we are not to renounce our senses, and experience; nor, that which is the undoubted word of God, our natural reason. For they are the talents which he has put into our hands to negotiate, till the coming again of our blessed Savior; and therefore not to be folded up in the napkin of an implicit faith, but employed in the purchase of justice, peace, and true religion. For though there be many things in God's word above reason; that it is to say, which cannot by natural reason be either demonstrated, or confuted; yet there is nothing contrary to it; but when it seems so, the fault is either in our unskillful interpretation, or erroneous ratiocination.

Therefore, when anything therein written is too hard for our examination, we are bidden to captivate our understanding to the words; and not to labor in sifting out a philosophical truth by logic, of such mysteries as are not comprehensible, nor fall under any rule of natural science. For it is with the mysteries of our religion, as with wholesome pills for the sick; which swallowed whole, have the virtue to cure; but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.

But by the captivity of our understanding, is not meant a submission of the intellectual faculty to the opinion of any other man; but of the will to obedience, where obedience is due. For sense, memory, understanding, reason, and opinion are not in our power to change; but always, and necessarily such, as the things we see, hear, and consider suggest unto us; and therefore are not effects of our will, but our will of them. We then captivate our understanding and reason, when we forbear [i.e., avoid] contradiction; when we so speak, as by lawful authority we are commanded; and when we live accordingly; which, in sum, is trust and faith reposed [i.e., placed] in him that speaks, though the mind be incapable of any notion at all from the words spoken.

Miracles are Astonishing, Signify God's Intention, Rare, Done Outside of Nature

By miracles are signified the admirable works of God: and therefore they are also called wonders. And because they are for the most part, done, for a signification of his commandment, in such occasions, as without them, men are apt to doubt, (following their private natural reasoning,) what he has commanded, and what not, they are commonly, in holy Scripture, called signs, in the same sense, as they are called by the Latins, ostenta, and portenta, from showing and fore-signifying that, which the Almighty is about to bring to pass. And must therefore be rare, and whereof there is no natural cause known. . . .

From that which I have here set down, of the nature and use of a miracle, we may define it thus: a miracle is a work of God, (besides [i.e., outside] his operation by the way of nature, ordained in the creation) done, for the making manifest to his elect, the mission of an extraordinary minister for their salvation.

And from this definition, we may infer, first, that in all miracles, the work done, is not the effect of any virtue in the prophet; because it is the effect of the immediate hand of God; that is to say God has done it, without using the prophet therein, as a subordinate cause.

Secondly, that no devil, angel, or other created spirit, can do a miracle. For it must either be by virtue of some natural science, or by incantation, that is, by virtue of words. For if the enchanters do it by their own power independent, there is some power that proceeds not from God; which all men deny: and if they do it by power given them, then is the work not from the immediate hand of God, but natural, and consequently no miracle.

Uneducated People are Easily Fooled by Contrived Miracles

For such is the ignorance and aptitude to error generally of all men, but especially of them that have not much knowledge of natural causes, and of the nature and interests of men; as by innumerable and easy tricks to be abused. What opinion of miraculous power, before it was known there was a science of the course of the stars, might a man have gained, that should have told the people, this hour or day the sun should be darkened? A juggler by the handling of his goblets and other trinkets, if it were not now ordinarily practiced, would be thought to do his wonders by the power at least of the devil. A man that has practiced to speak by drawing in of his breath, (which kind of men in ancient time were called ventriloqui), and so make the weakness of his voice seem to proceed, not from the weak impulsion of the organs of speech, but from distance of place, is able to make very many men believe it is a voice from Heaven, whatsoever he please to tell them. And for a crafty man, that has inquired into the secrets, and familiar confessions that one man ordinarily makes to another of his actions and adventures past, to tell them him again is no hard matter; and yet there be many, that by such means as that obtain the reputation of being conjurers. But it is too long a business, to reckon up the several sorts of those men, which the Greeks called thaumaturgi, that is to say, workers of things wonderful: and yet these do all they do, by their own single dexterity. But if we look upon the impostures wrought by confederacy, there is nothing how impossible soever to be done, that is impossible to be believed. For two men conspiring, one to seem lame, the other to cure him with a charm, will deceive many: but many conspiring, one to seem lame, another so to cure him, and all the rest to bear witness, will deceive many more.

Precautions when Assessing Miracles: Consult Religious Authorities, Look for Natural Explanations

In this aptitude of mankind, to give too hasty belief to pretended miracles, there can be no better, nor I think any other caution, than that which God has prescribed, first by Moses, as I have said before in the precedent chapter, in the beginning of the 13th and end of the 18th of Deuteronomy; that we take not any for prophets, that teach any other religion, than that which God's lieutenant, which at that time was Moses, has established; nor any, though he teach the same religion, whose prediction we do not see come to pass. Moses therefore in his time, and Aaron and his successors in their times, and the sovereign governor of God's people, next under God himself, that is to say, the head of the Church, in all times, are to be consulted, what doctrine he has established, before we give credit to a pretended miracle or prophet. And when that is done, the thing they pretend to be a miracle, we must both see it done, and use all means possible to consider, whether it be really done; and not only so, but whether it be such, as no man can do the like by his natural power, but that it requires the immediate hand of God.

Example of the Miracle of Transubstantiation

And in this also we must have recourse to God's lieutenant, to whom in all doubtful cases, we have submitted our private judgments. For example; if a man pretend, after certain words spoken over a piece of bread, that presently God has made it not bread, but a god, or a man, or both, and nevertheless it looks still as like bread as ever it did; there is no reason for any man to think it really done, nor consequently to fear him, till he inquire of God, by his vicar or lieutenant, whether it be done, or not. If he say, not, then follows that which Moses says (Deut. 18:22) he has spoken it presumptuously, thou shalt not fear him. If he say, it is done, then he is not to contradict it. So also if we see not, but only hear tell of a miracle, we are to consult the lawful Church; that is to say, the lawful head thereof, how far we are to give credit to the relators of it.

Miracle Reports Today are Not Believable

And this is chiefly the case of men, that in these days live under Christian sovereigns. For in these times, I do not know one man, that ever saw any such wonderous work, done by the charm, or at the word, or prayer of a man, that a man endued but with a mediocrity of reason would think supernatural: and the question is no more, whether what we see done, be a miracle; whether the miracle we hear, or read of, were a real work, and not the act of a tongue, or pen; but in plain terms, whether the report be true, or a lie.

Private Judgments about Miracles must Give Way to Public Judgement by God's Lieutenant

In which question we are not everyone, to make our own private reason, or conscience, but the public reason, that is, the reason of God's supreme lieutenant, judge; and indeed we have made him judge already, if we have given him a sovereign power, to do all that is necessary for our peace and defense. A private man has always the liberty, because thought is free, to believe or not believe in his heart those acts that have been given out for miracles, according as he shall see what benefit can accrue by men's belief, to those that pretend or countenance them, and thereby conjecture whether they be miracles or lies. But when it comes to confession of that faith, the private reason must submit to the public; that is to say, to God's lieutenant. But who is this lieutenant of God, and head of the Church, shall be considered in its proper place hereafter.

HEAD OF THE CHURCH

No Universal Church, Temporal and Spiritual Government the Same (Chapter 38)

It follows also, that there is on earth, no such universal Church, as all Christians are bound to obey; because there is no power on earth, to which all other commonwealths are subject. There are Christians, in the dominions of several princes and states; but every one of them is subject to that commonwealth, whereof he is himself a member; and consequently, cannot be subject to the commands of any other person. And therefore a Church, such a one as is capable to command, to judge, absolve, condemn, or do any other act, is the same thing with a civil commonwealth, consisting of Christian men; and is called a civil state, for that the subjects of it are men: and a Church, for that the subjects thereof are Christians. Temporal and spiritual government, are but two words brought into the world, to make men see double, and mistake their lawful sovereign. It is true, that the bodies of the faithful, after the resurrection, shall be not only spiritual, but eternal; but in this life they are gross, and corruptible. There is therefore no other government in this life, neither of state, nor religion, but temporal; nor teaching of any doctrine, lawful to any subject, which the governor both of the state, and of the religion forbids to be taught. And that governor must be one; or else there must needs follow faction and civil war in the commonwealth, between the Church and State; between spiritualists and temporalists; between the sword of justice, and the shield of faith: and, which is more, in every Christian man's own breast, between the Christian, and the man. The doctors of the Church, are called pastors; so also are civil sovereigns. But if pastors be not subordinate one to another, so as that there may be one chief pastor, men will be taught contrary doctrines; whereof both may be, and one must be false. Who that one chief pastor is, according to the law of nature, has been already shown; namely, that it is the civil sovereign: and to whom the Scripture has assigned that office, we shall see in the chapters following.

King is the Head of the Church (Chapter 42)

From this consolidation of the right politic and ecclesiastic in Christian sovereigns, it is evident, they have all manner of power over their subjects, that can be given to man, for the government of men's external actions, both in policy and religion; and may make such laws as themselves shall judge fittest, for the government of their own subjects, both as they are the commonwealth, and as they are the Church; for both State and Church are the same men.

If they please, therefore, they may, as many Christian kings now do, commit the government of their subjects in matters of religion to the Pope; but then the Pope is in that point subordinate to them, and exercises that charge in another's dominion jure civili [by civil law], in the right of the civil sovereign; not jure divino [divine law], in God's right; and may therefore be discharged of that office, when the sovereign, for the good of his subjects, shall think it necessary. They may also, if they please, commit the care of religion to one supreme pastor, or to an assembly of pastors; and give them what power over the Church, or one over another, they think most convenient; and what titles of honor, as of archbishops, bishops, priests, or presbyters, they will; and make such laws for their maintenance, either by tithes or otherwise, as they please, so they do it out of a sincere conscience, of which God only is the judge. It is the civil sovereign that is to appoint judges and interpreters of the canonical Scriptures; for it is he that makes them laws. It is he also that giveth strength to excommunications; which but for such laws and punishments, as may humble obstinate libertines, and reduce them to union with the rest of the Church, would be contemned. In sum, he has the supreme power in all causes, as well ecclesiastical as civil, as far as concerns actions and words, for those only are known and may be accused; and of that which cannot be accused, there is no judge at all but God, that knows the heart. And these rights are incident to all sovereigns, whether monarchs or assemblies: for they that are the representants of a Christian people, are representants of the Church: for a Church, and a commonwealth of Christian people, are the same thing.

It is a Sin to Not Worship God according to the Laws of the State (De Civi, 15.19)

From what has been said may be gathered, that God reigning by the way of natural reason only, subjects do sin, First, if they break the moral laws, which are unfolded in the second and third chapters. Secondly, if they break the laws, or commands of the city in those things which pertain to justice. Thirdly, if they worship not God, kata ta nomika [i.e., "lawfully"]. Fourthly, if they confess not before men, both in words, and deeds, that there is one God most good, most great, most blessed, the Supreme king of the world, and of all worldly kings; that is to say, if they do not worship God. This fourth sin in the natural Kingdom of God, by what has been said in the foregoing chapter, in the second article, is the sin of treason against the divine majesty; for it is a denying of the divine power, or atheism. For sins proceed here, just as if we should suppose some man to be the sovereign king, who being himself absent, should rule by his viceroy; against whom sure they would transgress who should not obey his viceroy in all things, except he usurped the kingdom to himself, or would give it to some other; but they who should so absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception, might be said to be guilty of treason.

CONTROVERSIAL RELIGIOUS DOCTRINES

Atheism is only a Sin of Imprudence (De Civi, 14.19)

Criticism of Hobbes: If Atheism is only a Sin of Imprudence (bad judgment) then it Cannot be Punished, which is Absurd

But seeing there is no sin which is not against some Law, and that there is no Law which is not the command of him who has the supreme power, and that no man has a supreme power which is not bestowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said to sin, who either denies that there is a God, or that he governs the world, or casts any other reproach upon him? For he [i.e., the atheist] will say, that he never submitted his will to Gods will, not conceiving him so much as to have any being. And granting that his opinion were erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet were it to be numbered among those of imprudence or ignorance, which by right cannot be punished. This speech [of the atheist] seems so far forth to be admitted, that though this kind of sin be the greatest and most hurtful, yet is it to be referred to sins of imprudence; but that it should be excused by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the atheist is punished either immediately by God himself, or by kings constituted under God; not as a subject is punished by a king, because he keeps not the laws, but as one enemy by another, because he would not accept of the laws; that is to say, by the right of war, as the giants warring against God: For whosoever are not subject either to some common Lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.

Hobbes's Response: Atheism is only a Sin of Imprudence, but it still Can be Punished

[Against the critic, I respond that it nevertheless should be considered a sin of imprudence.] Many find fault that I have referred atheism to imprudence, and not to injustice; yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not declared myself an enemy bitter enough against Atheists: They object farther, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be known there is a God, by natural reason, I ought to have acknowledged that they sin at least against the law of nature, and therefore are not only guilty of imprudence, but injustice too. But I am so much an enemy to atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently desired to find some law whereby I might condemn them of injustice; but when I found none, I inquired next what name God himself did give to men so detested by him. Now God speaks thus of the Atheist: The fool has said in his heart, there is no God. Therefore I placed their sin in that rank which God himself refers to; next, I shew them to be enemies of God. But I conceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, than that of an unjust man. Lastly, I affirm that they may under that notion be justly punished both by God, and supreme magistrates, and therefore by no means excuse or extenuate this sin. Now that I have said that it might be known by natural reason that there is a God, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this, except they think that because Archimedes by natural reason found out what proportion the circle has to the square, it follows thence, that everyone of the vulgar could have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be known to some by the light of reason that there is a God, yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures, or seeking of riches and honor, also men that are not wont [i.e., inclined] to reason aright, or cannot do it, or care not to do it, lastly, fools, in which number are atheists, cannot know this.

God is a Corporeal Spirit, not Incorporeal (Answer to Bishop Bramhall)

[Bishop Bramhall] accuses me first of destroying the existence of God; that is to say, he would make the world believe I were an atheist. But upon what ground? Because I say, that God is a spirit, but corporeal. But to say that, is allowed me by St. Paul, that says (1 Cor. 15:44): There is a spiritual body, and there is an animal body. He that holds there is a God, and that God is really somewhat, (for body is doubtlessly a real substance), is as far from being an atheist, as it is possible to be. But he that says God is an incorporeal substance, no man can be sure whether he be an atheist or not. For no man living can tell whether there be any substance at all, that is not also corporeal. For neither the word incorporeal, nor immaterial, nor any word equivalent to it, is to be found in Scripture, or in reason. But on the contrary, that the Godhead dwelleth bodily in Christ, is found in Colos. ii. 9; and Tertullian maintains that God is either a corporeal substance or nothing. Nor was he ever condemned for it by the church. For why?

Not only Tertullian, but all the learned, call body, not only that which one can see, but also whatsoever has magnitude, or that is somewhere; for they had greater reverence for the divine substance, than that they durst think it had no magnitude, or was nowhere. But they that hold God to be a phantasm, as did the exorcists in the Church of Rome, that is, such a thing as were at that time thought to be the sprites, that were said to walk in churchyards and to be the souls of men buried, do absolutely make God to be nothing at all. But how were they atheists? No. For though by ignorance of the consequence they said that which was equivalent to atheism, yet in their hearts they thought God a substance, and would also, if they had known what substance and what corporeal meant, have said he was a corporeal substance. So that this atheism by consequence is a very easy thing to be fallen into, even by the most godly men of the church.

Hell understood Metaphorically as a Grief from Loss of Resurrection (Leviathan, Chapter 38)

Seeing now there is none, that so interprets the Scripture, as that after the day of judgment, the wicked are all eternally to be punished in the Valley of Hinnon; or that they shall so rise again, as to be ever after underground or under water; or that after the resurrection, they shall no more see one another, nor stir from one place to another: it follows, methinks, very necessarily, that that which is thus said concerning hell fire, is spoken metaphorically; and that therefore there is a proper sense to be inquired after, (for of all metaphors there is some real ground, that may be expressed in proper words,) both of the place of hell, and the nature of hellish torments, and tormenters. . . .

The torments of hell, are expressed sometimes, by weeping, and gnashing of teeth (as Matth. 8:12). Sometimes by the worm of conscience (as Isaiah 46:24, and Mark 9:44, 46, 48): sometimes, by fire, as in the place now quoted, where the worm dies not, and the fire is not quenched, and many places beside: sometimes by shame and contempt (as Dan. 12:2), And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth, shall awake; some to everlasting life; and some to shame, and everlasting contempt. All which places design metaphorically a grief and discontent of mind, from the sight of that eternal felicity in others, which they themselves through their own incredulity and disobedience have lost. And because such felicity in others, is not sensible but by comparison with their own actual miseries; it follows that they are to suffer such bodily pains, and calamities, as are incident to those, who not only live under evil and cruel governors, but have also for enemy the eternal king of the saints, God Almighty. And amongst these bodily pains, is to be reckoned also to every one of the wicked a second death. For though the Scripture be clear for an universal resurrection; yet we do not read, that to any of the reprobate is promised an eternal life. For whereas St. Paul (1 Cor. 15:42, 43) to the question concerning what bodies men shall rise with again, says, that The body is sown in corruption, and is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power. Glory and power cannot be applied to the bodies of the wicked: nor can the name of second death be applied to those that can never die but once: and although in metaphorical speech, a calamitous life everlasting, may be called an everlasting death, yet it cannot well be understood of a second death.

The Only Article of Faith for Salvation is that Jesus is the Messiah (De Civi, 18.6)

Faith and obedience both necessarily concurring to salvation, what kind of obedience that same is, and to whom due (has been showed above in the third article). But now we must inquire what articles of faith are requisite: And I say, that to a Christian there is no other article of Faith requisite as necessary to salvation, but only this, "that Jesus is the Christ". But we must distinguish (as we have already done before in the forth Article) between faith, and profession. A profession therefore of more articles (if they be commanded) may be necessary. For it is a part of our obedience due to the laws; but we inquire not now what obedience, but what faith is necessary to salvation. And this is proved first out of the scope of the evangelists which was by the description of our saviors' life to establish this one article.

Source: Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan (1651); De Civi (1642), adapted.

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JOHN LOCKE:

LIMITATIONS OF RELIGIOUS KNOWLEDGE

John Locke (1632–1704) was born in Somerset, England, and trained in medicine at Oxford, though he never practiced conventionally. He became a physician and political advisor to Anthony Ashley Cooper, later Earl of Shaftesbury. In 1668 he supervised a risky operation to drain an abscess on Shaftesbury's liver, an intervention that likely saved his patron's life and assured Locke's place in his household. Political entanglement with Shaftesbury's opposition to the crown eventually forced Locke into exile in the Netherlands for several years, and he returned to England only after the Glorious Revolution of 1688. He published his two major works soon after, the Essay Concerning Human Understanding under his own name, and the Two Treatises of Government anonymously, not publicly acknowledging his authorship of the latter until near his death. He never married, and spent his final years living at Oates, the Essex home of Damaris Masham, a philosopher in her own right and his close friend and correspondent for decades. He died there in 1704, reportedly while she read the Psalms aloud to him.

The selections here follow four themes, from four different publications. The first of these is Locke's foundational statement of the empiricist methodology, and how this results in significant limits to our human knowledge. Locke begins stating that all ideas originate from either (a) sensation, specifically our five senses, or (b) reflection on the operations of our minds. He completely rejects the doctrine of innate ideas. He proposes that the mind is blank white paper, empty of characters, and is supplied solely by experience through the two sources of knowledge. Next, Locke addresses the possibility of thinking matter, that is, whether our material human brains alone can produce consciousness without an immaterial spirit. Human reason, he says, is incapable of proving that the mind exists independently of the body. However, he suggests that God has the power to resurrect human consciousness in an afterlife, which preserves divine judgement in the afterlife, and thus moral and religious accountability here on earth. Next he addresses the severe limitations to human knowledge. He attributes this this ignorance to three causes: he lack of ideas, the lack of a discoverable connection between them, and a failure to examine them. Since we lack adequate ideas of the minute mechanical parts of closest bodies, there is no science of bodies within our reach. Similarly, there can be no science of unembodied spirits, which leaves us in absolute ignorance the nature of angels or other conscious spiritual beings without the aid of revelation.

The second theme focuses on religious tolerance, which Locke defines as the defining characteristic of genuine Christianity rather than a struggle for political dominance. He argues that secular government exists solely to protect earthly well-being, specifically physical safety, personal freedom, and property ownership. This naturally requires the state to remain neutral on spiritual matters. State power, he argues, relies entirely on physical coercion, whereas genuine faith requires authentic internal conviction. As such, the government has no right to ban peaceful religious practices that are otherwise legal in secular life. This toleration extends to the protection of all local religions. For, as Locke warns, granting the state authority to suppress non-traditional worship creates a dangerous precedent that rulers will inevitably weaponize against orthodox believers to satisfy their own geopolitical ambitions. However, secular tolerance has strict limits. For, the state must reject ideologies that subvert basic social stability, and religious groups that pledge allegiance to foreign rulers. It also must reject atheism, since social contracts and legal oaths carry no moral weight for someone who denies a supreme authority.

The third theme outlines the minimum requirements of religious belief, navigating between the theological extremes of universal hereditary damnation and the total rejection of Christ's redemptive role. Locke argues that humanity lost literal immortality through the original fall, defining biblical death as absolute non-existence rather than eternal torture, and regained the potential for eternal life through Jesus. Consequently, Christian salvation requires absolute acceptance of only one fundamental proposition: that Jesus is the promised savior. Locke insists that this conviction is an active, transformative commitment rather than mere intellectual agreement with historical facts. Furthermore, he says, a believer's salvation is never threatened by a failure to understand or agree on minor, non-essential scriptural interpretations.

The fourth theme covers belief in miracles, which he defined as any observable event that exceeds a viewer's understanding, contradicts their perception of natural laws, and "is taken by him to be divine". This final clause ("is taken by him") makes miracle belief a subjective judgment, rather than one grounded in objective fact. Critics may argue that this subjective definition makes miracles too relative; Locke responds arguing that humans can only judge what is extraordinary based on their personal understanding of nature. Locke also considers the criticism that this definition weakens miracles as proofs of revelation; he responds that, so long as we personally believe in these miracles, this will compel us to believe in revelation. Finally, Locke insists that the definition of "miracle" must not rely on abstract claims about cosmic laws or the hidden limits of supernatural beings. For, such complex standards are completely useless to ordinary people who cannot inspect the hidden mechanics of the universe.

THE LIMITED EXTENT OF HUMAN KNOWLEDGE

All Ideas Originate from Sensation or Reflection (Essay 2.1)

1. Every man being conscious to himself that he thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt that men have in their minds several ideas, – such as are those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and others: it is in the first place then to be inquired, How he comes by them? I know it is a received doctrine, that men have native ideas, and original characters, stamped upon their minds in their very first being. This opinion I have at large examined already; and, I suppose what I have said in the foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas it has; and by what ways and degrees they may come into the mind; for which I shall appeal to every one's own observation and experience.

2. Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas: How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from experience. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. Our observation employed either, about external sensible objects, or about the internal operations of our minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that which supplies our understandings with all the materials of thinking. These two are the fountains of knowledge, from whence all the ideas we have, or can naturally have, do spring.

3. First, our senses, conversant about particular sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct perceptions of things, according to those various ways wherein those objects do affect them. And thus we come by those ideas we have of yellow, white, heat, cold, soft, hard, bitter, sweet, and all those which we call sensible qualities; which when I say the senses convey into the mind, I mean, they from external objects convey into the mind what produces there those perceptions. This great source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I call sensation.

4. Secondly, the other fountain from which experience furnishes the understanding with ideas is, – the perception of the operations of our own mind within us, as it is employed about the ideas it has got; – which operations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas, which could not be had from things without. And such are perception, thinking, doubting, believing, reasoning, knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own minds; – which we being conscious of, and observing in ourselves, do from these receive into our understandings as distinct ideas as we do from bodies affecting our senses. This source of ideas every man has wholly in himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and might properly enough be called internal sense. But as I call the other sensation, so I Call this reflection, the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself. By reflection then, in the following part of this discourse, I would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations in the understanding. These two, I say, viz. external material things, as the objects of sensation, and the operations of our own minds within, as the objects of reflection, are to me the only originals from whence all our ideas take their beginnings. The term operations here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satisfaction or uneasiness arising from any thought.

The Possibility of Thinking Matter (Essay 4.3)

1. Knowledge, as has been said, lying in the perception of the agreement or disagreement of any of our ideas, it follows from hence, That, First, it extends no further than we have Ideas. . . .

6. Whether matter may not be made by God to think is more than man can know. For I see no contradiction in it, that the first eternal thinking being, or omnipotent spirit [i.e., God], should, if he pleased, give to certain systems of created senseless matter, put together as he thinks fit, some degrees of sense, perception, and thought: though, as I think I have proved (bk. 4. Ch. 10, Sect 14, etc.), it is no less than a contradiction to suppose matter (which is evidently in its own nature void of sense and thought) should be that eternal first-thinking being. What certainty of knowledge can anyone have, that some perceptions, such as, v.g., pleasure and pain, should not be in some bodies themselves, after a certain manner modified and moved, as well as that they should be in an immaterial substance, upon the motion of the parts of body. Body, as far as we can conceive, being able only to strike and affect body, and motion, according to the utmost reach of our ideas, being able to produce nothing but motion; so that when we allow it to produce pleasure or pain, or the idea of a colour or sound, we are fain [i.e., glad] to quit our reason, go beyond our ideas, and attribute it wholly to the good pleasure of our maker.

For, since we must allow he has annexed effects to motion which we can no way conceive motion able to produce, what reason have we to conclude that he could not order them as well to be produced in a subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a subject we cannot conceive the motion of matter can any way operate upon? I say not this, that I would any way lessen the belief of the soul's immateriality: I am not here speaking of probability, but knowledge; and I think not only that it becomes the modesty of philosophy not to pronounce magisterially, where we want [i.e., lack] that evidence that can produce knowledge; but also, that it is of use to us to discern how far our knowledge does reach. For the state we are at present in, not being that of vision, we must in many things content ourselves with faith and probability: and in the present question, about the immateriality of the soul, if our faculties cannot arrive at demonstrative certainty, we need not think it strange. All the great ends of morality and religion are well enough secured, without philosophical proofs of the soul's immateriality; since it is evident, that he [i.e., God] who made us at the beginning to subsist here, sensible intelligent beings, and for several years continued us in such a state, can and will restore us to the like state of sensibility in another world, and make us capable there to receive the retribution he has designed to men, according to their doings in this life.

And therefore it is not of such mighty necessity to determine one way or the other, as some, over-zealous for or against the immateriality of the soul, have been forward to make the world believe. Who, either on the one side, indulging too much their thoughts immersed altogether in matter, can allow no existence to what is not material: or who, on the other side, finding not cogitation within the natural powers of matter, examined over and over again by the utmost intention of mind, have the confidence to conclude – that omnipotency itself cannot give perception and thought to a substance which has the modification of solidity. . . .

Our Great Ignorance and The Abyss of Darkness

22. Our knowledge being so narrow, as I have shown, it will perhaps give us some light into the present state of our minds if we look a little into the dark side, and take a view of our ignorance; which, being infinitely larger than our knowledge, may serve much to the quieting of disputes, and improvement of useful knowledge; if, discovering how far we have clear and distinct ideas, we confine our thoughts within the contemplation of those things that are within the reach of our understandings, and launch not out into that abyss of darkness, (where we have not eyes to see, nor faculties to perceive anything), out of a presumption that nothing is beyond our comprehension. But to be satisfied of the folly of such a conceit, we need not go far. He that knows anything, knows this, in the first place, that he need not seek long for instances of his ignorance. The meanest and most obvious things that come in our way have dark sides, that the quickest sight cannot penetrate into. The clearest and most enlarged understandings of thinking men find themselves puzzled and at a loss in every particle of matter. We shall the less wonder to find it so, when we consider the causes of our ignorance; which, from what has been said, I suppose will be found to be these three: first, want [i.e., lack] of ideas. Its causes. Secondly, want of a discoverable connection between the ideas we have. Thirdly, want of tracing and examining our ideas.

No Science of Bodies within our Reach

26. . . . I am apt to doubt that, how far soever human industry may advance useful and experimental philosophy in physical things, scientifical will still be out of our reach: because we want [i.e., lack] perfect and adequate ideas of those very bodies which are nearest to us, and most under our command. Those which we have ranked into classes under names, and we think ourselves best acquainted with, we have but very imperfect and incomplete ideas of. Distinct ideas of the several sorts of bodies that fall under the examination of our senses perhaps we may have: but adequate ideas, I suspect, we have not of any one amongst them. And though the former of these will serve us for common use and discourse, yet whilst we want the latter, we are not capable of scientifical knowledge; nor shall ever be able to discover general, instructive, unquestionable truths concerning them. Certainty and demonstration are things we must not, in these matters, pretend to. By the color, figure, taste, and smell, and other sensible qualities, we have as clear and distinct ideas of sage and hemlock, as we have of a circle and a triangle: but having no ideas of the particular primary qualities of the minute parts of either of these plants, nor of other bodies which we would apply them to, we cannot tell what effects they will produce; nor when we see those effects can we so much as guess, much less know, their manner of production. Thus, having no ideas of the particular mechanical affections of the minute parts of bodies [and corpuscles] that are within our view and reach, we are ignorant of their constitutions, powers, and operations: and of bodies more remote [within the vast universe] we are yet more ignorant, not knowing so much as their very outward shapes, or the sensible and grosser parts of their constitutions.

No Science of Unembodied Spirits

27. This at first will show us how disproportionate our knowledge is to the whole extent even of material beings; to which if we add the consideration of that infinite number of spirits that may be, and probably are, which are yet more remote from our knowledge, whereof we have no cognizance, nor can frame to ourselves any distinct ideas of their several ranks and sorts, we shall find this cause of ignorance conceal from us, in an impenetrable obscurity, almost the whole intellectual world; a greater certainly, and more beautiful world than the material. For, bating some very few, and those, if I may so call them, superficial ideas of spirit, which by reflection we get of our own, and from thence the best we can collect of the Father of all spirits, the eternal independent Author of them, and us, and all things, we have no certain information, so much as of the existence of other spirits, but by revelation. Angels of all sorts are naturally beyond our discovery; and all those intelligences, whereof it is likely there are more orders than of corporeal substances, are things whereof our natural faculties give us no certain account at all. That there are minds and thinking beings in other men as well as himself, every man has a reason, from their words and actions, to be satisfied: and the knowledge of his own mind cannot suffer [i.e., permit] a man that considers, to be ignorant that there is a God. But that there are degrees of spiritual beings between us and the great God, who is there, that, by his own search and ability, can come to know? Much less have we distinct ideas of their different natures, conditions, states, powers, and several constitutions wherein they agree or differ from one another and from us. And, therefore, in what concerns their different species and properties we are in absolute ignorance.

RELIGIOUS TOLERANCE (from Letter Concerning Toleration, 1689)

Toleration an Attribute of True Christianity

Since you are pleased to inquire what are my thoughts about the mutual toleration of Christians in their different professions of religion, I must needs answer you freely, that I esteem that toleration to be the chief characteristical mark of the true church. For whatsoever some people boast of the antiquity of places and names, or of the pomp of their outward worship; others, of the reformation of their discipline; all of the orthodoxy of their faith, for everyone is orthodox to himself: these things, and all others of this nature, are much rather marks of men's striving for power and empire over one another, than of the church of Christ. . . . The toleration of those that differ from others in matters of religion, is so agreeable to the gospel of Jesus Christ, and to the genuine reason of mankind, that it seems monstrous for men to be so blind, as not to perceive the necessity and advantage of it, in so clear a light. . . .

Role of Civil Government limited to Things in This Life, which requires Religious Toleration

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests.

Civil interest I call life, liberty, health, and indolency [i.e., lack of pain] of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like.

It is the duty of the civil magistrate, by the impartial execution of equal laws, to secure unto all the people in general, and to every one of his subjects in particular, the just possession of these things belonging to this life. If anyone presume to violate the laws of public justice and equity, established for the preservation of these things, his presumption is to be checked by the fear of punishment, consisting in the deprivation or diminution of those civil interests, or goods, which otherwise he might and ought to enjoy. . . .

Now that the whole jurisdiction of the magistrate reaches only to these civil concernments; and that all civil power, right, and dominion, is bounded and confined to the only care of promoting these things; and that it neither can nor ought in any manner to be extended to the salvation of souls; these following considerations seem unto me abundantly to demonstrate.

First, because the care of souls is not committed to the civil magistrate, any more than to other men. It is not committed unto him, I say, by God; because it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another, as to compel any one to his religion. . . . In the second place, the care of souls cannot belong to the civil magistrate, because his power consists only in outward force: but true and saving religion consists in the inward persuasion of the mind, without which nothing can be acceptable to God. . . . In the third place, the care of the salvation of men's souls cannot belong to the magistrate; because, though the rigor of laws and the force of penalties were capable to convince and change men's minds, yet would not that help at all to the salvation of their souls. . . .

By this we see what difference there is between the church and the commonwealth. Whatsoever is lawful in the commonwealth, cannot be prohibited by the magistrate in the church. Whatsoever is permitted unto any of his subjects for their ordinary use, neither can nor ought to be forbidden by him to any sect of people for their religious uses. If any man may lawfully take bread or wine, either sitting or kneeling, in his own house, the law ought not to abridge him of the same liberty in his religious worship; though in the church the use of bread and wine be very different, and be there applied to the mysteries of faith, and rites of divine worship. But those things that are prejudicial to the commonwealth of a people in their ordinary use, and are therefore forbidden by laws, those things ought not to be permitted to churches in their sacred rites. Only the magistrate ought always to be very careful that he do not misuse his authority, to the oppression of any church under pretense of public good.

Toleration of Indigenous Religions

It may be said, what if a church be idolatrous, is that also to be tolerated by the magistrate? In answer, I ask, what power can be given to the magistrate for the suppression of an idolatrous church, which may not, in time and place, be made use of to the ruin of an orthodox one? For it must be remembered, that the civil power is the same everywhere, and the religion of every prince is orthodox to himself. . . . Let us trace this matter to the bottom. Thus it is: an inconsiderable and weak number of Christians, destitute of everything, arrive in a pagan country; these foreigners beseech the inhabitants, by the bowels of humanity, that they would succor them with the necessaries of life; those necessaries are given them, habitations are granted, and they all join together and grow up into one body of people. The Christian religion by this means takes root in that country, and spreads itself; but does not suddenly grow the strongest. While things are in this condition, peace, friendship, faith, and equal justice, are preserved amongst them. At length the magistrate becomes a Christian, and by that means their party becomes the most powerful. Then immediately all compacts are to be broken, all civil rights to be violated, that idolatry may be extirpated: and unless these innocent pagans, strict observers of the rules of equity and the law of nature, and no ways offending against the laws of the society, I say unless they will forsake their ancient religion, and embrace a new and strange one, they are to be turned out of the lands and possessions of their forefathers, and perhaps deprived of life itself. Then at last it appears what zeal for the church, joined with the desire of dominion, is capable to produce: and how easily the pretense of religion, and of the care of souls, serves for a cloak to covetousness, rapine [i.e., seizing of property], and ambition.

Religious Views that are Not to be Tolerated: Immorality, Foreign Loyalty, Atheism

But to come to particulars. I say, First, No opinions contrary to human society, or to those moral rules which are necessary to the preservation of civil society, are to be tolerated by the magistrate. But of those indeed examples in any church are rare. For no sect can easily arrive to such a degree of madness, as that it should think fit to teach, for doctrines of religion, such things as manifestly undermine the foundations of society, and are therefore condemned by the judgment of all mankind: because their own interest, peace, reputation, everything would be thereby endangered.

Another more secret evil, but more dangerous to the commonwealth, is when men arrogate to themselves, and to those of their own sect, some peculiar prerogative covered over with a specious show of deceitful words, but in effect opposite to the civil rights of the community. For example: We cannot find any sect that teaches expressly and openly, that men are not obliged to keep their promise; that princes may be dethroned by those that differ from them in religion; or that the dominion of all things belongs only to themselves. For these things, proposed thus nakedly and plainly, would soon draw on them the eye and hand of the magistrate, and awaken all the care of the commonwealth to a watchfulness against the spreading of so dangerous an evil. But nevertheless, we find those that say the same things in other words. What else do they mean, who teach that, "faith is not to be kept with heretics?" . . .

Again: That church can have no right to be tolerated by the magistrate, which is constituted upon such a bottom, that all those who enter into it, do thereby ipso facto deliver themselves up to the protection and service of another prince. For by this means the magistrate would give way to the settling of a foreign jurisdiction in his own country, and suffer his own people to be listed, as it were, for soldiers against his own government.

Lastly, those are not at all to be tolerated who deny the being of God. Promises, covenants, and oaths, which are the bonds of human society, can have no hold upon an atheist. The taking away of God, though but even in thought, dissolves all.

MINIMUM REQUIREMENTS OF RELIGIOUS BELIEF (from The Reasonableness of Christianity, 1695)

Two Extremes regarding Adam's Fall: Eternal Doom vs. No Redemption Necessary

It is obvious to anyone, who reads the New Testament, that the doctrine of redemption, and consequently of the gospel, is founded upon the supposition of Adam's fall. To understand, therefore, what we are restored to by Jesus Christ, we must consider what the scriptures show we lost by Adam. This I thought worthy of a diligent and unbiased search: since I found the two extremes that men run into on this point, either on the one hand shook the foundations of all religion, or, on the other, made Christianity almost nothing: for while some men would have all Adam's posterity doomed to eternal, infinite punishment, for the transgression of Adam, whom millions had never heard of, and no one had authorized to transact for him, or be his representative; this seemed to others so little consistent with the justice or goodness of the great and infinite God, that they thought there was no redemption necessary, and consequently, that there was none; rather than admit of it upon a supposition so derogatory to the honor and attributes of that infinite Being; and so made Jesus Christ nothing but the restorer and preacher of pure natural religion; thereby doing violence to the whole tenor of the New Testament. And, indeed, both sides will be suspected to have trespassed this way, against the written word of God, by anyone, who does but take it to be a collection of writings, designed by God, for the instruction of the illiterate bulk of mankind, in the way to salvation. . . .

Immortality Lost through Adam, Regained through Jesus the Second Adam

To one that, thus unbiased, reads the scriptures, what Adam fell from (is visible) was the state of perfect obedience, which is called justice in the New Testament; though the word, which in the original signifies justice, be translated righteousness: and by this fall he lost paradise, wherein was tranquility and the tree of life; i.e. he lost bliss and immortality. . . .

This is so clear in these cited places, and so much the current of the New Testament, that nobody can deny, but that the doctrine of the gospel is, that death came on all men by Adam's sin; only they differ about the signification of the word death: for some will have it to be a state of guilt, wherein not only he, but all his posterity was so involved, that everyone descended of him deserved endless torment, in hell-fire. I shall say nothing more here, how far, in the apprehensions of men, this consists with the justice and goodness of God, having mentioned it above: but it seems a strange way of understanding a law, which requires the plainest and directest words, that by death should be meant eternal life in misery. Could anyone be supposed, by a law, that says, "For felony thou shalt die;" not that he should lose his life; but be kept alive in perpetual, exquisite torments? And would anyone think himself fairly dealt with, that was so used? . . .

I must confess, by death here, I can understand nothing but a ceasing to be, the losing of all actions of life and sense. Such a death came on Adam, and all his posterity, by his first disobedience in paradise; under which death they should have lain forever, had it not been for the redemption by Jesus Christ. If by death, threatened to Adam, were meant the corruption of human nature in his posterity, it is strange, that the New Testament should not any-where take notice of it, and tell us, that corruption seized on all, because of Adam's transgression, as well as it tells us so of death. But, as I remember, every one's sin is charged upon himself only. . . .

And thus men are, by the second Adam [i.e. Jesus], restored to life again; that so by Adam's sin they may none of them lose anything, which by their own righteousness they might have a title to: for righteousness, or an exact obedience to the law, seems, by the scripture, to have a claim of right to eternal life . . .

Salvation depends Solely on Belief in the Proposition that Jesus is the Messiah

By which place it is plain, that believing on the Son is the believing that Jesus was the Messiah; giving credit to the miracles he did, and the profession he made of himself. For those who are said to believe on him, for the saying of the woman, ver. 39, tell the woman that they now believed not any longer, because of her saying: but that having heard him themselves, they knew, i. e. believed, past doubt, that he was the Messiah.

This was the great proposition that was then controverted, concerning Jesus of Nazareth, "Whether he was the Messiah or no?" And the assent to that was that which distinguished believers from unbelievers. . . .

To convince men of this, he did his miracles; and their assent to, or not assenting to this, made them to be, or not to be, of his church; believers, or not believers. . . . Whereby it is plain, that the gospel was writ to induce men into a belief of this proposition, "That Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah;" which if they believed, they should have life. . . .

[In Jesus' public preaching] he inculcates to the people, on all occasions, that the kingdom of God is come: he shows the way of admittance into this kingdom, viz. repentance and baptism; and teaches the laws of it, viz. good life, according to the strictest rules of virtue and morality. But who the King was of this kingdom, he leaves to his miracles to point out, to those who would consider what he did, and make the right use of it now; or to witness to those who should hearken to the apostles hereafter when they preached it in plain words, and called upon them to believe it, after his resurrection, when there should be no longer room to fear, that it should cause any disturbance in civil societies, and the governments of the world.

Belief in Jesus is a Saving Faith, not merely a Historical Faith

To this, it is likely, it will be objected by some, that to believe only that Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah, is but an historical, and not a justifying, or saving faith.

To which I answer, that I allow to the makers of systems and their followers to invent and use what distinctions they please, and to call things by what names they think fit. But I cannot allow to them, or to any man, an authority to make a religion for me, or to alter that which God hath revealed. And if they please to call the believing that which our Savior and his apostles preached, and proposed alone to be believed, an historical faith; they have their liberty. But they must have a care, how they deny it to be a justifying or saving faith, when our Savior and his apostles have declared it so to be; and taught no other which men should receive, and whereby they should be made believers unto eternal life: unless they can so far make bold with our Savior, for the sake of their beloved systems, as to say, that he forgot what he came into the world for; and that he and his apostles did not instruct people right in the way and mysteries of salvation. For that this is the sole doctrine pressed and required to be believed in the whole tenor of our Savior's and his apostles preaching, we have showed through the whole history of the evangelists and the Acts. And I challenge them to show that there was any other doctrine, upon their assent to which, or disbelief of it, men were pronounced believers or unbelievers; and accordingly received into the church of Christ, as members of his body; as far as mere believing could make them so: or else kept out of it. This was the only gospel-article of faith which was preached to them. . . .

These two [acts], faith and repentance, i.e., believing Jesus to be the Messiah, and a good life, are the indispensable conditions of the new covenant, to be performed by all those who would obtain eternal life. The reasonableness, or rather necessity of which, that we may the better comprehend, we must a little look back to what was said in the beginning [regarding the loss of immortality through Adam].

Salvation not Jeopardized by Disbelief in Scriptural Propositions that are Not Fundamental

The other parts of divine revelation are objects of faith, and are so to be received. They are truths, whereof no one can be rejected; none that is once known to be such, may, or ought to be disbelieved. For to acknowledge any proposition to be of divine revelation and authority; and yet to deny, or disbelieve it; is to offend against this fundamental article and ground of faith, that God is true. But yet a great many of the truths revealed in the gospel, everyone does, and must confess, a man may be ignorant of; nay, disbelieve, without danger to his salvation: as is evident in those, who, allowing the authority, differ in the interpretation and meaning of several texts of scripture, not thought fundamental: in all which, it is plain, the contending parties on one side or the other, are ignorant of, nay, disbelieve the truths delivered in holy writ; unless contrarieties and contradictions can be contained in the same words; and divine revelation can mean contrary to itself.

Though all divine revelation requires the obedience of faith, yet every truth of inspired scriptures is not one of those, that by the law of faith is required to be explicitly believed to justification. What those are, we have seen by what our Savior and his apostles proposed to, and required in those whom they converted to the faith. Those are fundamentals, which it is not enough not to disbelieve: everyone is required actually to assent to them. But any other proposition contained in the scripture, which God has not thus made a necessary part of the law of faith, (without an actual assent to which, he will not allow anyone to be a believer,) a man may be ignorant of, without hazarding his salvation by a defect in his faith.

BELIEF IN MIRACLES (from "A Discourse of Miracles", composed in 1702)

Definition of "Miracle"

To discourse of miracles without defining what one means by the word miracle, is to make a show, but in effect to talk of nothing.

A miracle then I take to be a sensible operation, which being above the comprehension of the spectator, and in his opinion contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by him to be divine.

He that is present at the fact, is a spectator: he that believes the history of the fact, puts himself in the place of a spectator.

This definition, it is probable, will not escape these two exceptions [i.e., objections]:

Objection 1: Miracles would be Uncertain since Dependent on Spectator's Opinion

1. That hereby what is a miracle is made very uncertain; for it depending on the opinion of the spectator, that will be a miracle to one which will not be so to another.

In answer to which, it is enough to say, that this objection is of no force, but in the mouth of one who can produce a definition of a miracle not liable to the same exception, which I think not easy to do. For it being agreed, that a miracle must be that which surpasses the force of nature in the established, steady laws of causes and effects, nothing can be taken to be a miracle but what is judged to exceed those laws. Now everyone being able to judge of those laws only by his own acquaintance with nature, and notions of its force (which are different in different men) it is unavoidable that that should be a miracle to one, which is not so to another.

Objection 2: Miracles would be Invalidated as Proofs of Revelation since Not Necessarily Supernatural

2. Another objection to this definition, will be, that the notion of a miracle thus enlarged, may come sometimes to take in operations that have nothing extraordinary or supernatural in them, and thereby invalidate the use of miracles for the attesting of divine revelation.

To which I answer, not at all, if the testimony which divine revelation receives from miracles be rightly considered.

To know that any revelation is from God, it is necessary to know that the messenger that delivers it is sent from God, and that cannot be known but by some credentials given him by God himself. Let us see then whether miracles, in my sense, be not such credentials, and will not infallibly direct us right in the search of divine revelation.

It is to be considered, that divine revelation receives testimony from no other miracles, but such as are wrought [i.e., made] to witness his mission from God who delivers the revelation. All other miracles that are done in the world, how many or great soever, revelation is not concerned in. Cases wherein there has been, or can be need of miracles for the confirmation of revelation, are fewer than perhaps is imagined. The heathen world, amidst an infinite and uncertain jumble of deities, fables, and worships, had no room for a divine attestation of any one against the rest. Those owners of many gods were at liberty in their worship; and no one of their divinities pretending to be the one only true God, no one of them could be supposed in the pagan scheme to make use of miracles to establish his worship alone, or to abolish that of the other. . . .

If we will direct our thoughts by what has been, we must conclude that miracles, as the credentials of a messenger delivering a divine religion, have no place but upon a supposition of one only true God; and that it is so in the nature of the thing, and cannot be otherwise, I think will be made appear in the sequel of this discourse. Of such who have come in the name of the one only true God, professing to bring a law from him, we have in history a clear account but of three, viz. Moses, Jesus, and Mahomet. For what the Persees say of their Zoroaster, or the Indians of their Brama (not to mention all the wild stories of the religions farther east), is so obscure, or so manifestly fabulous, that no account can be made of it. Now of the three before mentioned, Mahomet having none to produce, pretends to no miracles for the vouching his mission; so that the only revelations that come attested by miracles, being those of Moses and Christ, and they confirming each other. . .

For example, Jesus of Nazareth professes himself sent from God: he with a word calms a tempest at sea. This one looks on as a miracle, and consequently cannot but receive his doctrine. Another thinks this might be the effect of chance, or skill in the weather, and no miracle, and so stands out; but afterwards seeing him walk on the sea, owns that for a miracle and believes: which yet upon another has not that force, who suspects it may possibly be done by the assistance of a spirit. But yet the same person, seeing afterwards our Saviour cure an inveterate palsy by a word, admits that for a miracle, and becomes a convert. Another overlooking it in this instance, afterwards finds a miracle in his giving sight to one born blind, or in raising the dead, or his raising himself from the dead, and so receives his doctrine as a revelation coming from God. By all which it is plain, that where the miracle is admitted, the doctrine cannot be rejected; it comes with the assurance of a divine attestation to him that allows the miracle, and he cannot question its truth. . . .

Definition Should Not Include "Beyond Power of Created Beings" or "Against Established Laws of Nature"

For miracles being the basis on which divine mission is always established, and consequently that foundation on which the believers of any divine revelation must ultimately bottom their faith, this use of them [i.e., miracles] would be lost, if not to all mankind, yet at least to the simple and illiterate, (which is the far greatest part,) if miracles be defined to be none but such divine operations as are in themselves beyond the power of all created beings, or at least operations contrary to the fixed and established laws of nature. For as to the latter of those, what are the fixed and established laws of nature, philosophers alone, if at least they, can pretend to determines. And [as to the former] if they are to be operations performable only by divine power, I doubt whether any man, learned or unlearned, can in most cases be able to say of any particular operation, that can fall under his senses, that it is certainly a miracle. Before he can come to that certainty, he must know that no created being has a power to perform it. We know good and bad angels have abilities and excellencies exceedingly beyond all our poor performances or narrow comprehensions. But to define what is the utmost extent of power that any of them has, is a bold undertaking of a man in the dark, that pronounces without seeing, and sets bounds in his narrow cell to things at an infinite distance from his model and comprehension.

Such definitions therefore of miracles, however specious in discourse and theory, fail us when we come to use, and an application of them in particular cases.

Source: An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (1690); A Letter Concerning Toleration (1689); The Reasonableness of Christianity (1695); "A Discourse of Miracles" (1702), adapted.

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GEORGE BERKELEY:

GOD AS THE SOURCE OF ALL PERCEPTIONS

George Berkeley (1685–1753) was born in Ireland and educated at Trinity College Dublin, where he was later ordained a clergyman in the Church of Ireland. By his late twenties he had completed the major philosophical works for which he is best known, where he argued that material objects have no existence apart from being perceived. He then travelled widely through Europe, keeping detailed journals of his experiences, including an eyewitness account of the eruption of Mount Vesuvius. In the 1720s he conceived an ambitious plan to found a college in Bermuda to educate both colonists and Native Americans, and was promised government funding to support it. He sailed to Rhode Island in 1728 to wait for the money, and wrote his dialogue Alciphron during his three years there. But the promised funds never arrived, and he returned to Ireland without ever reaching Bermuda. He later became Bishop of Cloyne and, in his final years, developed an interest in tar-water, a pine-resin tonic that he promoted as a near-universal medical cure. He died in 1753 while visiting Oxford, reportedly while his wife was reading Scripture to him.

The selections below are from three of his works, and follow three themes. The first is that God is the source of all of our perceptions. Berkeley presents here his central philosophical position, today called "subjective idealism". On this view, the three-dimensional material world does not exist at all. Instead, only spirit-minds exist, and it is God who injects into our spirit-minds perceptions of a world that appears to be three-dimensional, much like a virtual reality. In the section "God the Cause of All Ideas" Berkeley considers two possible sources of the perceptions of the world: (a) material objects, or (b) God. He dismisses the first since material objects cannot be the cause of their own existence or change. This leaves God as the source, a being that is an incorporeal and active spirit. The section "Proof for God's Existence" builds directly on this: since sensible things plainly exist yet do not depend on any individual's perceiving them, they must exist in some other mind, which is God. The existence of God's mind is not inferred from a prior belief in God, but instead is demonstrated immediately from the sheer existence of the perceived world.

The second theme is the problem of evil. In the section "Suffering results from General Natural Laws" Berkeley follows Malebranche's view. He argues that apparent natural evils (monstrosities, blighted crops, human misery) are the unavoidable byproduct of God governing through simple, general laws rather than constant particular intervention. Further, nature's apparent waste and imperfection actually add variety and beauty to the whole, similar to how shadows set off a painting's brighter passages. In the next section Berkeley answers the charge that, if God is the direct cause of all perceptions, this makes him the author of sin and suffering. His response is that sin does not lie in the physical action itself, but in the willful motive behind it. God does not have such motives. However, he says, finite spirits retain genuine power over their own actions, enough to bear the guilt of what they do.

The third theme, drawn from Berkeley's dialogue Alciphron, debates whether religion is natural. In the section "Freethinkers Good" Berkeley presents Alciphron's deistic case that free thinking has cleared away centuries of priestly superstition and political manipulation. In the section "Freethinkers Bad", Berkeley gives the countercase, voiced by Crito: such free thinkers have stripped away morality, providence, and hope of immortality, thereby reducing humanity to the level of brutes. The section "Religion not Natural since not Universal" presents Alciphron's argument. Since belief in God is not found identically in all people at all times, the way sensation or basic appetite is, it cannot be natural, but only an effect of custom and education. The section "Religion Natural since Rational" gives Euphranor's reply. Whatever is agreeable to reason is agreeable to human nature. And, since religious truths that are rationally deduced meet that standard, Alciphron's own definition of "natural" undercuts his conclusion rather than supporting it. The section "Variety of Views of God does not Imply their Falsehood" extends this. Differing opinions about God no more prove there's no truth about him than differing folk explanations of a lunar eclipse prove there's no true cause of eclipses. Finally, the section "The Usefulness of Religion" has Crito press the practical conclusion. If we grant that virtuous behavior is strengthened by belief in God, it makes sense to endorse religious worship practices as an appropriate expression of such belief in God.

GOD THE SOURCE OF ALL PERCEPTIONS

God the Cause of All Ideas (Principles, 25)

25. We perceive a continual succession of ideas, some are anew excited, others are changed or totally disappear. There is therefore some cause of these ideas, whereon they depend, and which produces and changes them. That this cause cannot be any quality or idea or combination of ideas, is clear from the preceding section. It must therefore be a substance; but it has been shown that there is no corporeal or material substance: it remains therefore that the cause of ideas is an incorporeal active substance or Spirit.

Proof for Gods Existence: An All-Perfect Mind Needed to for us to Perceive Sensible Objects (Three Dialogues, 2)

Phil. ... To me it is evident for the reasons you allow of, that sensible things cannot exist otherwise than in a mind or spirit. Whence I conclude, not that they have no real existence, but that, seeing they depend not on my thought, and have all existence distinct from being perceived by me, there must be some other Mind wherein they exist. As sure, therefore, as the sensible world really exists, so sure is there an infinite omnipresent Spirit who contains and supports it.

Hyl. What! This is no more than I and all Christians hold; nay, and all others too who believe there is a God, and that He knows and comprehends all things.

Phil. Aye, but here lies the difference. Men commonly believe that all things are known or perceived by God, because they believe the being of a God; whereas I, on the other side, immediately and necessarily conclude the being of a God, because all sensible things must be perceived by Him.

Hyl. But, so long as we all believe the same thing, what matter is it how we come by that belief?

Phil. But neither do we agree in the same opinion. For philosophers, though they acknowledge all corporeal beings to be perceived by God, yet they attribute to them an absolute subsistence distinct from their being perceived by any mind whatever; which I do not. Besides, is there no difference between saying, There is a God, therefore He perceives all things; and saying, Sensible things do really exist; and, if they really exist, they are necessarily perceived by an infinite Mind: therefore there is an infinite Mind or God? This furnishes you with a direct and immediate demonstration, from a most evident principle, of the being of a God. Divines and philosophers had proved beyond all controversy, from the beauty and usefulness of the several parts of the creation, that it was the workmanship of God. But that – setting aside all help of astronomy and natural philosophy, all contemplation of the contrivance, order, and adjustment of things – an infinite Mind should be necessarily inferred from the bare existence of the sensible world, is an advantage to them only who have made this easy reflection: that the sensible world is that which we perceive by our several senses; and that nothing is perceived by the senses beside ideas; and that no idea or archetype of an idea can exist otherwise than in a mind.

PROBLEM OF EVIL

Suffering results from General Natural Laws, Increasing Beauty, Good of the Larger System (Principles, 151)

151. It will, I doubt not, be objected that the slow and gradual methods observed in the production of natural things do not seem to have for their cause the immediate hand of an almighty agent. Besides, monsters, untimely births, fruits blasted in the blossom, rains falling in desert places, miseries incident to human life, and the like, are so many arguments that the whole frame of nature is not immediately actuated and superintended by a spirit of infinite wisdom and goodness. But the answer to this objection is in a good measure plain from sect. 62; it being visible that the aforesaid methods of nature are absolutely necessary, in order to working by the most simple and general rules, and after a steady and consistent manner; which argues both the wisdom and goodness of God. Such is the artificial contrivance of this mighty machine of nature that, whilst its motions and various phenomena strike on our senses, the hand which actuates the whole is itself unperceivable to men of flesh and blood. "Verily" (says the prophet) "thou art a God that hidest thyself" (Isaiah, 45:15). But, though the lord conceal himself from the eyes of the sensual and lazy, who will not be at the least expense of thought, yet to an unbiased and attentive mind nothing can be more plainly legible than the intimate presence of an all-wise spirit, who fashions, regulates and sustains the whole system of beings. It is clear, from what we have elsewhere observed, that the operating according to general and stated laws is so necessary for our guidance in the affairs of life, and letting us into the secret of nature, that without it all reach and compass of thought, all human sagacity and design, could serve to no manner of purpose; it were even impossible there should be any such faculties or powers in the mind. See sect. 31. Which one consideration abundantly outbalances whatever particular inconveniences may thence arise.

152. We should further consider that the very blemishes and defects of nature are not without their use, in that they make an agreeable sort of variety, and augment the beauty of the rest of the creation, as shades in a picture serve to set off the brighter and more enlightened parts. We would likewise do well to examine whether our taxing the waste of seeds and embryos, and accidental destruction of plants and animals, before they come to full maturity, as an imprudence in the author of nature, be not the effect of prejudice contracted by our familiarity with impotent and saving mortals. In man indeed a thrifty management of those things which he cannot procure without much pains and industry may be esteemed wisdom. But, we must not imagine that the inexplicably fine machine of an animal or vegetable costs the great creator any more pains or trouble in its production than a pebble does; nothing being more evident than that an omnipotent spirit can indifferently produce everything by a mere fiat or act of His will. Hence, it is plain that the splendid profusion of natural things should not be interpreted weakness or prodigality in the agent who produces them, but rather be looked on as an argument of the riches of his power.

153. As for the mixture of pain or uneasiness which is in the world, pursuant to the general laws of nature, and the actions of finite, imperfect spirits, this, in the state we are in at present, is indispensably necessary to our well-being. But our prospects are too narrow. We take, for instance, the idea of some one particular pain into our thoughts, and account it evil; whereas, if we enlarge our view, so as to comprehend the various ends, connections, and dependencies of things, on what occasions and in what proportions we are affected with pain and pleasure, the nature of human freedom, and the design with which we are put into the world; we shall be forced to acknowledge that those particular things which, considered in themselves, appear to be evil, have the nature of good, when considered as linked with the whole system of beings.

God Does not Mediate, Lacks Evil Motive, Not the Only Agent (Three Dialogues, 3)

Hylas. You are not aware, Philonous, that in making God the immediate author of all the motions in nature, you make him the author of murder, sacrilege, adultery, and the like heinous sins.

Philonous. In answer to that, I observe, first, that the imputation of guilt is the same, whether a person commits an action with or without an instrument. In case therefore you suppose God to act by the mediation of an instrument or occasion, called matter, you as truly make him the author of sin as I, who think him the immediate agent in all those operations vulgarly ascribed to nature. I farther observe that sin or moral turpitude does not consist in the outward physical action or motion, but in the internal deviation of the will from the laws of reason and religion. This is plain, in that the killing an enemy in a battle, or putting a criminal legally to death, is not thought sinful; though the outward act be the very same with that in the case of murder. Since, therefore, sin does not consist in the physical action, the making God an immediate cause of all such actions is not making him the author of sin. Lastly, I have nowhere said that God is the only agent who produces all the motions in bodies. It is true I have denied there are any other agents besides spirits; but this is very consistent with allowing to thinking rational beings, in the production of motions, the use of limited powers, ultimately indeed derived from God, but immediately under the direction of their own wills, which is sufficient to entitle them to all the guilt of their actions.

AGAINST FREETHINKERS (from Alciphron)

[Key Characters in the dialogue:

• Alciphron: An intellectual, deistic free-thinkers of the upper class.

• Euphranor: A "philosopher and farmer," and grounded, practical Christian thinker who uses reason and observation to defend religious truth.

• Crito: A learned gentleman of estate, he represents the Established Church and the social necessity of religious institutions for maintaining a virtuous society.]

Freethinkers Good: Oppose Superstition, Prejudice, Conspiracy of Priests and Magistrates (Alciphron's View)

1.2. Alciphron. Thought is that which we are told distinguished man from beast; and freedom of thought makes as great a difference between man and man. It is to the noble assertors of this privilege and perfection of humankind, the free-thinkers I mean, who have sprung up and multiplied of late years, that we are indebted for all those important discoveries, that ocean of light, which has broke in and made its way, in spite of slavery and superstition. . . . You must know, said he, that the mind of man may be fitly compared to a piece of land. What stubbing, ploughing, digging, and harrowing are to the one, that thinking, reflecting, examining are to the other. Each has its proper culture; and, as land that is suffered to lie waste and wild for a long tract of time will be overspread with brush-wood, brambles, thorns, and such vegetables which have neither use nor beauty. Even so there will not fail to sprout up in a neglected uncultivated mind a great number of prejudices and absurd opinions, which owe their origin partly to the soil itself, the passions and imperfections of the mind of man, and partly to those seeds which chance to be scattered in it by every wind of doctrine, which the cunning of statesmen, the singularity of pedants, the superstition of fools, or the imposture of priests shall raise. Represent to yourself the mind of man, or human nature in general, that for so many ages had lain obnoxious to the frauds of designing and the follies of weak men; how it must be overrun with prejudices and errors, what firm and deep roots they must have taken, and consequently how difficult a task it must be to extirpate them! And yet this work, no less difficult than glorious, is the employment of the modern freethinkers. Alciphron having said this made a pause, and looked round on the company. . . .

1.3. Euphranor. The clergy, no doubt, are on all occasions ready to forward and applaud your worthy endeavors.

Upon hearing this Lysicles could hardly refrain from laughing. And Alciphron with an air of pity told Euphranor that he perceived he was unacquainted with the real character of those men. For, said he, you must know that of all men living they are our greatest enemies. If it were possible, they would extinguish the very light of nature, turn the world into a dungeon, and keep mankind forever in chains and darkness.

Euphranor. I never imagined anything like this of our Protestant clergy, particularly those of the established church, whom, if I may be allowed to judge by what I have seen of them and their writings, I should have thought lovers of learning and useful knowledge.

Alciphron. Take my word for it, priests of all religions are the same: wherever there are priests there will be priestcraft; and wherever there is priestcraft there will be a persecuting spirit, which they never fail to exert to the utmost of their power against all those who have the courage to think for themselves, and will not submit to be hoodwinked and manacled by their reverend leaders. Those great masters of pedantry and jargon have coined several systems, which are all equally true, and of equal importance to the world. The contending sects are each alike fond of their own, and alike prone to discharge their fury upon all who dissent from them. Cruelty and ambition being the darling vices of priests and churchmen all the world over, they endeavor in all countries to get an ascendant over the rest of mankind. And the magistrate, having a joint interest with the priest in subduing, amusing, and scaring the people, too often lends a hand to the hierarchy, who never think their authority and possessions secure, so long as those who differ from them in opinion are allowed to partake even in the common rights belonging to their birth or species. To represent the matter in a true light, figure to yourselves a monster or specter made up of superstition and enthusiasm, the joint issue of statecraft and priestcraft, rattling chains in one hand, and with the other brandishing a flaming sword over the land, and menacing destruction to all who shall dare to follow the dictates of reason and common sense. Do but consider this, and then say if there was not danger as well as difficulty in our undertaking. Yet, such is the generous ardor that truth inspires, our free-thinkers are neither overcome by the one nor daunted by the other. In spite of both we have already made so many proselytes among the better sort, and their numbers increase so fast, that we hope we shall be able to carry all before us, beat down the bulwarks of all tyranny, secular or ecclesiastical, break the fetters and chains of our countrymen, and restore the original inherent rights, liberties, and prerogatives of mankind. . . .

1.9. Alciphron. Atheism therefore, that bugbear of women and fools, is the very top and perfection of free-thinking. It is the grand arcanum to which a true genius naturally rises, by a certain climax or gradation of thought, and without which he can never possess his soul in absolute liberty and repose. . . .

Freethinkers Bad: Undermine Morality, Civil Order, Belief in Immortality (Crito's View)

1.10. Euphranor. If you please then, to avoid confusion, let us call your sect by the same name that Tully (who understood the force of language) bestowed upon them.

Alciphron. With all my heart. Pray what may that name be?

Euphranor. Why, he calls them minute philosophers.

Crito. Right, said Crito, the modern free-thinkers are the very same with those Cicero called minute philosophers; which name admirably suits them, they being a sort of sect which diminish all the most valuable things, the thoughts, views, and hopes of men. All the knowledge, notions, and theories of the mind they reduce to sense. Human nature they contract and degrade to the narrow low standard of animal life, and assign us only a small pittance of time instead of immortality. . . .

Euphranor. O Alciphron! These minute philosophers (since that is their true name) are a sort of pirates who plunder all that come in their way. I consider myself as a man left stripped and desolate on a bleak beach. . . .

1.13. Crito. The profound thinkers of this way have taken a direct contrary course to all the great philosophers of former ages, who made it their endeavor to raise and refine human-kind, and remove it as far as possible from the brute; to moderate and subdue men's appetites; to remind them of the dignity of their nature; to awaken and improve their superior faculties, and direct them to the noblest objects; to possess men's minds with a high sense of the divinity, of the supreme good, and the immortality of the soul. They took great pains to strengthen the obligations to virtue; and upon all those subjects have wrought out noble theories, and treated with singular force of reason. But it seems our minute philosophers act the reverse of all other wise and thinking men; it being their end and aim to erase the principles of all that is great and good from the mind of man, to unhinge all order of civil life, to undermine the foundations of morality, and, instead of improving and ennobling our natures, to bring us down to the maxims and way of thinking of the most uneducated and barbarous nations, and even to degrade human-kind to a level with brute beasts. And all the while they would pass upon the world for men of deep knowledge. But, in effect, what is all this negative knowledge better than downright savage ignorance? That there is no providence, no spirit, no future state, no moral duty: truly a fine system for an honest man to own, or an ingenious man to value himself upon!

Religion not Natural since not Universal (Alciphron's View)

1.13. Alciprhon: Alciphron, who heard this discourse with some uneasiness, very gravely replied: disputes are not to be decided by the weight of authority, but by the force of reason. You may pass, indeed, general reflections on our notions, and call them brutal and barbarous if you please: but it is such brutality and such barbarism as few could have attained to if men of the greatest genius had not broken the ice, there being nothing more difficult than to get the better of education, and conquer old prejudices. To remove and cast off a heap of rubbish that has been gathering upon the soul from our very infancy requires great courage and great strength of faculties. Our philosophers, therefore, do well deserve the name of esprits forts [i.e., freethinker], men of strong heads, free-thinkers, and such like appellations, betokening great force and liberty of mind. It is very possible the heroic labors of these men may be represented (for what is not capable of misrepresentation?) as a piratical plundering, and stripping the mind of its wealth and ornaments, when it is in truth divesting it only of its prejudices, and reducing it to its untainted original state of nature. Oh nature! The genuine beauty of pure nature!

Euphranor. You seem very much taken with the beauty of nature. Be pleased to tell me, Alciphron, what those things are which you esteem natural, or by what mark I may know them.

1.14. Alciphron. For a thing to be natural, for instance, to the mind of man, it must appear originally therein; it must be universally in all men; it must be invariably the same in all nations and ages. These limitations of original, universal, and invariable exclude all those notions found in the human mind which are the effect of custom and education. The case is the same with respect to all other species of beings. A cat, for example, has a natural inclination to pursue a mouse, because it agrees with the forementioned marks. But, if a cat be taught to play tricks, you will not say those tricks are natural. For the same reason, if upon a plum-tree peaches and apricots are engrafted, nobody will say they are the natural growth of the plum-tree.

Religion Natural since Rational (Euphranor's View)

1.14. Euphranor. But to return to man. It seems you allow those things alone to be natural to him which show themselves upon his first entrance into the world; to wit, the senses, and such passions and appetites as are discovered upon the first application of their respective objects.

Alciphron. That is my opinion. . . .

Euphranor. Whatever, therefore, is agreeable to reason is agreeable to the nature of man.

Alciphron. It is.

Euphranor. Will it not follow from hence that truth and virtue are natural to man?

Alciphron. Whatever is reasonable I admit to be natural.

Euphranor. And, as those fruits which grow from the most generous and mature stock, in the choicest soil, and with the best culture, are most esteemed; even so ought we not to think those sublime truths, which are the fruits of mature thought, and have been rationally deduced by men of the best and most improved understandings, to be the choicest productions of the rational nature of man? And, if so, being in fact reasonable, natural, and true, they ought not to be esteemed unnatural whims, errors of education, and groundless prejudices, because they are raised and forwarded by manuring and cultivating our tender minds, because they take early root, and sprout forth betimes by the care and diligence of our instructors?

Alciphron. Agreed, provided still they may be rationally deduced. But to take this for granted of what men vulgarly call the truths of morality and religion, would be begging the question.

Euphranor. You are in the right: I do not, therefore, take for granted that they are rationally deduced. I only suppose that, if they are, they must be allowed natural to man; or, in other words, agreeable to, and growing from, the most excellent and peculiar part of human nature.

Alciphron. I have nothing to object to this.

Euphranor. What shall we think then of your former assertions— that nothing is natural to man but what may be found in all men, in all nations and ages of the world; that, to obtain a genuine view of human nature, we must extirpate all the effects of education and instruction, and regard only the senses, appetites, and passions, which are to be found originally in all mankind; that, therefore, the notion of a God can have no foundation in nature, as not being originally in the mind, nor the same in all men? Be pleased to reconcile these things with your late concessions, which the force of truth seems to have extorted from you.

Variety of Views of God does not Imply their Falsehood (Euphranor's View)

1.15. Alciphron. Tell me, Euphranor, whether truth be not one and the same, uniform, invariable thing: and, if so, whether the many different and inconsistent notions which men entertain of God and duty be not a plain proof there is no truth in them?

Euphranor. That truth is constant and uniform I freely own, and that consequently opinions repugnant to each other cannot all be true: but I think it will not hence follow they are all alike false. If, among various opinions about the same thing, one be grounded on clear and evident reasons, that is to be thought true, and others only so far as they consist with it. Reason is the same, and rightly applied will lead to the same conclusions, in all times and places. Socrates, two thousand years ago, seems to have reasoned himself into the same notion of a God which is entertained by the philosophers of our days, if you will allow that name to any who are not of your sect. And the remark of Confucius, that a man should guard in his youth against lust, in manhood against faction, and in old age against covetousness, is as current morality in Europe as in China.

Alciphron. But still it would be a satisfaction if all men thought the same way; difference of opinions implying uncertainty.

Euphranor. Tell me, Alciphron, what you take to be the cause of a lunar eclipse?

Alciphron. The shadow of the earth interposing between the sun and moon.

Euphranor. Are you sure of this?

Alciphron. Undoubtedly.

Euphranor. Are all mankind agreed in this truth?

Alciphron. By no means. Ignorant and barbarous people assign different ridiculous causes of this appearance.

Euphranor. It seems, then, there are different opinions about the nature of an eclipse?

Alciphron. There are.

Euphranor. And nevertheless one of these opinions is true.

Alciphron. It is.

Euphranor. Diversity, therefore, of opinions about a thing, does not hinder that the thing may be, and one of the opinions concerning it may be true?

Alciphron. I acknowledge it.

Euphranor. It should seem, therefore, that your argument against the belief of a God, from the variety of opinions about his nature, is not conclusive. Nor do I see how you can conclude against the truth of any moral or religious tenet, from the various opinions of men upon the same subject. Might not a man as well argue, that no historical account of a matter of fact can be true, when different relations are given of it? Or, may we not as well infer that, because the several sects of philosophy maintain different opinions, none of them can be in the right; not even the minute philosophers themselves?

The Usefulness of Religion (Crito's View)

5.2. Crito. You have granted that a life of virtue is upon all accounts eligible, as most conducive both to the general and particular good of mankind; and you allow that the beauty of virtue alone is not a sufficient motive with mankind to the practice of it. This led you to acknowledge that the belief of a God would be very useful in the world; and that, consequently, you should be disposed to admit any reasonable proof of His being: which point hath been proved, and you have admitted the proof.

If then we admit a Divinity, why not Divine worship? And if worship, why not religion to teach this worship? And if a religion, why not the Christian, if a better cannot be assigned, and it be already established by the laws of our country, and handed down to us from our forefathers? Shall we believe a God, and not pray to him for future benefits, nor thank him for the past? Neither trust in his protection, nor love his goodness, nor praise his wisdom, nor adore his power? And if these things are to be done, can we do them in a way more suitable to the dignity of God or man than is prescribed by the Christian religion?

Alciphron. I am not, perhaps, altogether sure that religion must be absolutely bad for the public: but I cannot bear to see policy and religion walk hand in hand. I do not like to see human rights attached to the Divine. I am for no pontifex maximus, such as in ancient or in modern Rome; no high-priest, as in Judea; no royal priests, as in Egypt and Sparta; no such things as Dairos of Japan, or Lamas of Tartary.

Source: George Berkeley, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (1710); Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous (1713); Alciphron, or The Minute Philosopher (1732), adapted.

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. According to Hobbes in Leviathan, how does human anxiety about the future and curiosity regarding causes lead to belief in an eternal first Cause, and why are scientifically uneducated people inclined to feign invisible powers out of fear?

2. According to Hobbes in Leviathan, what are the four natural causes of religion, and how have Gentile rulers historically exploited these causes to maintain civil obedience and social order?

3. According to Hobbes in Leviathan, why does he define a miracle as a rare work of God done outside of natural operations, and why must private judgments regarding miraculous events give way to the public judgment of the civil sovereign?

4. According to Hobbes in Leviathan and De Cive, why are temporal and spiritual government identical, making the civil king the supreme head of the church, and why does he argue that atheism is a sin of imprudence rather than injustice?

5. According to Hobbes in his Answer to Bishop Bramhall and Leviathan, why does he assert that God is a corporeal spirit rather than an incorporeal substance, and how does he interpret scriptural descriptions of hell metaphorically?

6. According to Hobbes in De Cive, why is the single proposition "Jesus is the Messiah" the only required article of faith for Christian salvation, and how does he distinguish between inward faith and outward profession?

7. According to Hobbes in Leviathan, how does he explain the vulnerability of uneducated people to contrived miracles such as ventriloquism or coordinated impostures?

8. According to Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, how does his foundational empiricist claim that all ideas originate from sensation or reflection lead to his rejection of innate ideas?

9. According to Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, why is human reason unable to determine whether matter can think, and how does God's power to restore consciousness in an afterlife safeguard moral accountability?

10. According to Locke in An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, what three primary causes account for human ignorance, and why can there be no genuine science of physical bodies or unembodied spirits?

11. According to Locke in A Letter Concerning Toleration, why is mutual toleration the chief mark of true Christianity, and what are the strict limits of civil magistrate authority over religious practices?

12. According to Locke in A Letter Concerning Toleration, what three categories of religious or philosophical views must be excluded from secular toleration, and why?

13. According to Locke in The Reasonableness of Christianity, how does he navigate between theological extremes to argue that salvation requires explicit assent to only one fundamental proposition: that Jesus is the Messiah?

14. According to Locke in A Discourse of Miracles, how does he define a miracle, and why does he insist that a workable definition must not rely on abstract claims about operations being beyond the power of created beings?

15. According to Berkeley in A Treatise Concerning Human Understanding, why must the cause of our perceptual ideas be an incorporeal active spirit rather than material substances?

16. According to Berkeley in Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, how does his proof for God's existence from the immediate necessity of an infinite Mind perceiving the sensible world differ from traditional theological arguments?

17. According to Berkeley in A Treatise Concerning Human Understanding, how does he explain natural blemishes, monstrosities, and human suffering as consequences of God governing through simple, general laws?

18. According to Berkeley in Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous, how does he respond to the objection that making God the immediate cause of all physical motions makes Him the author of moral sin?

19. According to Berkeley in Alciphron, how does Alciphron define "natural," and how does Euphranor counter this definition to show that rationally deduced religious truths are entirely agreeable to human nature?

20. According to Berkeley in Alciphron, how does Euphranor use the analogy of a lunar eclipse to show that a diversity of human opinions about God does not prove that all those opinions are false?

21. Short Essay Options: Please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

(a) Critics argue that Hobbes's reduction of religion to psychological fear and political utility leaves no room for genuine divine revelation or authentic personal piety. How might Hobbes respond?

(b) Critics argue that Hobbes's claim that God is a corporeal spirit is a self-contradictory absurdity that implicitly embraces materialist atheism. How might Hobbes respond?

(c) Critics argue that Locke's willingness to entertain "thinking matter" undermines the spiritual immortality of the human soul and opens the door to physicalist determinism. How might Locke respond?

(d) Critics argue that Locke's refusal to grant religious toleration to atheists is an ungrounded prejudice that violates his own principles of civil liberty and freedom of thought. How might Locke respond?

(e) Critics argue that Locke's subjective definition of a miracle ("in his opinion contrary to the established course of nature") makes miraculous evidence entirely relative and incapable of providing objective proof for divine revelation. How might Locke respond?

(f) Critics argue that Berkeley's subjective idealism collapses the distinction between physical reality and hallucination, turning the universe into an illusory virtual reality. How might Berkeley respond?

(g) Critics argue that Berkeley's defense of physical evil as a necessary tradeoff for general natural laws fails to explain why an omnipotent God could not prevent horrific suffering without disrupting cosmic order. How might Berkeley respond?

(h) Critics argue that the empiricist insistence that all knowledge derives from sense perception inevitably leads to radical skepticism regarding divine existence and the supernatural realm. How might either Locke or Berkeley respond?

(i) Compare the treatment of miracles in Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley: how do their differing empiricist premises affect their evaluations of miraculous claims?

(j) Compare the critique of "freethinking" or deism in Hobbes, Locke, and Berkeley: how do these three British empiricists defend the social necessity of institutional religion against secular skeptics?