Early Modern Women Metaphysicians | Classics in the Philosophy of Religion

EARLY MODERN WOMEN METAPHYSICIANS

From Classics in the Philosophy of Religion, by James Fieser

_______________________

CONTENTS

• Margaret Cavendish: God Known by Every Part of Nature (from Observations)

• Anne Finch Conway: The Medium Between God and the World (from Principles)

• Damaris Cudworth Masham: Balancing Natural Religion with Revelation (from Observations)

• Catherine Trotter Cockburn: Immateriality not Required for Immortality (from Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay)

Since the ancient world, it had been difficult for women to become established philosophers. For centuries, the discipline was tightly bound to public academies and civic roles from which women were legally and culturally barred. Consequently, those who wished to pursue philosophical inquiries had to do so without any institutional recognition or professional pathways. That carried over even more during the Middle Ages, when philosophers were primarily monastic theologians with access to theological training and libraries that were not available to women. Monastic training was heavily based on Aristotle, which required years of study. Descartes is widely credited with ushering in the modern era of philosophy, and he did so in a way that briefly opened the door for any educated person to engage in philosophy. He held that all investigation into science and philosophy must begin afresh, wiping away all previous authorities, including Aristotle. With that barrier removed, dozens of educated women with access to libraries could read the most recent scientific and philosophical texts.

Many, if not most, of these women were self-educated, for the simple reason that institutional higher education remained entirely closed to their gender. Most were also from the upper class, which allowed them to afford books, and whose reputations put them in contact with leading thinkers of the time, including Descartes, Locke, and Leibniz. They then entered the dialogue as critics, defenders, and thoroughly original thinkers. Several engaged specifically as metaphysicians and philosophical commentators on issues in the philosophy of religion. Margaret Cavendish denied a spirit-realm and held that even the tiniest elements of matter had some knowledge of God. Anne Conway argued that the gap between the changeable world and an unchangeable God is so vast that a cosmic intermediary is needed. Damaris Cudworth Masham held that natural reason can discover an all-good creator from the order of the universe. But this still requires the enforcement of revelation to provide knowledge of an afterlife and genuinely guide human conduct. Catherine Trotter Cockburn defended the view that a rational assurance of future rewards and punishments is entirely sufficient for morality. This implied that the soul's immortality remains completely independent of whether it is material or immaterial. Unfortunately, by the early nineteenth century, the door of entry into the field of philosophy closed again for women as the discipline became confined largely to academic centers that excluded them.

_______________________

MARGARET CAVENDISH:

GOD KNOWN BY EVERY PART OF NATURE

Margaret Cavendish (1623–1673) was born Margaret Lucas near Colchester, Essex, into a prosperous royalist family. During the English Civil War she joined the exiled court in Paris as a lady-in-waiting to Queen Henrietta Maria, where she met William Cavendish, then Marquess of Newcastle, thirty years her senior. They married in 1645. Largely self-taught, she went on to publish an unusual range of work: poetry, plays, an early work of science fiction (The Blazing World, 1666), an autobiography, and several volumes of natural philosophy, including the Observations upon Experimental Philosophy. In 1667 she became the first woman permitted to attend a meeting of the Royal Society, an event that drew crowds and considerable gossip. She was known throughout London for her theatrical, sometimes outlandish fashion choices, and when she rode out in her carriage, people would gather in the street just to watch her pass, a spectacle that she seems to have enjoyed. Contemporaries nicknamed her "Mad Madge," though the label said more about her defiance of convention rather than her sanity. She died in 1673 and is buried in Westminster Abbey. The following selections are from her Observations.

In the section "Philosophical Speculation is Superior to Scientific Technology and Experimentation," Cavendish responds directly to Robert Hooke's defense of microscopes and experimental philosophy. She argues that instruments cannot reveal the truth of nature's infinite parts, since art is itself only a finite creature working on finite creatures. Sense, being more easily deceived than reason, cannot serve as the foundation of knowledge, so speculative reasoning must guide and correct what instruments show us, rather than the reverse. In the section "Mind-Body Materialism," she turns to Joseph Glanvill's claim that reason and sense are shaped by the body's temperament, moved like the hands of a clock by inner machinery. Cavendish agrees with the underlying picture: sense and reason are themselves corporeal, not immaterial substances, and treating human faculties as literally god-like is a presumption bordering on blasphemy. Still, she insists our natural rational perceptions are not simply illusions, and that even a purely material nature reliably knows there is a God.

In the section "All Parts of Nature have Knowledge of God and Worship Him," Cavendish argues that belief in God does not depend on having eyes or any sense organ to admire creation. Rather, knowledge of God is native to all of nature's parts, sensitive and rational alike, which is why the belief is universal even though particular religions differ. In "Concession to Revealed Religion," she draws a boundary around what natural philosophy alone can establish: reason can show us that God exists, but knowing God's particular will requires revelation, which only the church has authority to interpret. It is noteworthy that, in this discussion, she suggests the notion of a "divine soul" or "supernatural soul". But this is best read as a political concession made for her own safety, rather than a real departure from her materialist account of the soul. In "A Natural Philosopher cannot be an Atheist", she answers a charge current in her own time, that materialism leads to atheism. Cavendish argues the reverse is true, since reason is nature's highest faculty and its chief conclusion is the existence of God; she suggests that critics who treat immaterial substance as the only possible divinity commit a kind of idolatry of their own. Finally, in "Panpsychism: All Matter is Animated and thus has a Natural Soul," she extends this reasoning to claim that every part of nature, not only humans, possesses sense and reason appropriate to its own kind — so a stone has a mineral sense and reason, different from human sense but no less real.

In the section "Against Reincarnation," Cavendish rejects the Pythagorean idea that a single soul can migrate between bodies, comparing it to the absurdity of one body occupying many places at once. In "Humans Have Multiple Material Souls, Not a Single Soul," she draws out her own alternative: since nature is a single infinite body divided into innumerable interconnected parts, a person does not have one soul but many, distributed through the body's material parts. When the body dies and its parts disperse and recombine with other matter, those parts keep their vital and rational character in whatever new configuration they join.

SPECULATIVE REASON AND MATERIALISM (from Observations upon Experimental Philosophy)

Philosophical Speculation is Superior to Scientific Technology and Experimentation (1.2)

Some [defenders of experimental and mechanical philosophy, such as Robert Hooke] are of opinion,

That by art [i.e., scientific technology like microscopes] there can be a reparation made of the mischiefs and imperfections mankind has drawn upon itself by negligence and intemperance, and a willful and superstitious deserting the prescripts and rules of nature, whereby every man, both from a derived corruption, innate and born with him, and from his breeding and converse with men, is very subject to slip into all sorts of errors. [Robert Hooke, Micrographia (1665), Preface)

But the all-powerful God, and his servant nature, know that art, which is but a particular creature, cannot inform us of the truth of the infinite parts of nature, being but finite itself. For though every creature has a double perception, rational and sensitive, yet each creature or part has not an infinite perception. Nay, although each particular creature or part of nature may have some conceptions of the infinite parts of nature, yet it cannot know the truth of those infinite parts, being but a finite part itself, which finiteness causes errors in perceptions.

Wherefore it is well said, when they [i.e., Robert Hooke] confess themselves, "That the uncertainty and mistakes of human actions proceed either from the narrowness and wandering of our senses, or from the slipperiness or delusion of our memory, or from the confinement or rashness of our understanding." But, say they,

It is no wonder that our power over natural causes and effects is so slowly improved, seeing we are not only to contend with the obscurity and difficulty of the things whereon we work and think, but even the forces of our minds conspire to betray us. And these being the dangers in the process of human reason, the remedies can only proceed from the real, the mechanical, the experimental philosophy, which has this advantage over the philosophy of discourse and disputation, that whereas that chiefly aims at the subtilty of its deductions and conclusions, without much regard to the first ground-work, which ought to be well laid on the sense and memory, so this [i.e., experimental philosophy] intends the right ordering of them all, and making them serviceable to each other. [Robert Hooke, Ibid.]

In which discourse I do not understand, first, what they mean by our power over natural causes and effects. For we have no power at all over natural causes and effects, but only one particular effect may have some power over another, which are natural actions. But neither can natural causes nor effects be over-powered by man so, as if man was a degree above nature, but they must be as nature is pleased to order them. For man is but a small part, and his powers are but particular actions of nature, and therefore he cannot have a supreme and absolute power. Next, I say, that sense, which is more apt to be deluded than reason, cannot be the ground of reason, no more than art can be the ground of nature. Wherefore [rational] discourse shall sooner find or trace nature's corporeal figurative motions, than deluding arts can inform the senses. For how can a fool order his understanding by art, if nature has made it defective? Or how can a wise man trust his senses, if either the objects be not truly presented according to their natural figure [i.e., characteristics] and shape, or if the senses be defective, either through age, sickness, or other accidents, which do alter the natural motions proper to each sense? And hence I conclude, that experimental and mechanic philosophy cannot be above the speculative part, by reason most experiments have their rise from the speculative, so that the artist or mechanic is but a servant to the student.

Mind-Body Materialism (2.10)

Those authors [such as Joseph Glanvill] which confess,

that vulgar reason is no better than a more refined imagination, and that both reason, fancy and the senses, are influenced by the bodies temperament, and like the index [i.e., hands] of a clock, are moved by the inward springs and wheels of the corporeal machine, [Joseph Glanvill, The Vanity of Dogmatizing (1661), Ch. 13]

seem, in my opinion, to confirm, that natural sense and reason is corporeal, although they do it in an obscure way, and with intricate arguments. But truly, do what they can, yet they must prove reason by reason. For irrational discourse cannot make proofs and arguments to evince the truth of nature. But first it must be proved, what sense and reason is, whether divine or natural, corporeal or immaterial.

Those that believe natural sense and reason to be immaterial, are in my opinion in a great error, because nature is purely corporeal, as I have declared before; and those which affirm, that our understanding, will and reason are in some manner like to God's, shall never gain my assent. For if there be so great a difference between God's understanding, will and decree, and between natures, as no comparison at all can be made between them, much more is there between a part of nature, viz. Man, and the omnipotent and incomprehensible God; for there is an infinite difference between divine attributes and natural properties. Wherefore to similize [i.e., compare] our reason, will, understanding, faculties, passions, and figures, etc. to God, is too high a presumption, and in some manner a blasphemy. Nevertheless, although our natural reason and faculties are not like to divine attributes, yet our natural rational perceptions are not always delusions. And therefore it is certain, that natures knowing parts, both sensitive and rational, do believe a God, that is some being above nature. But many writers endeavor rather to make divisions in religion, than promote the honor and worship of God by a mutual and united agreement, which I confess, is an irregularity and imperfection in some parts of nature, and argues, that nature is not so perfect but she has some faults and infirmities, otherwise she would be a God, which she is not.

BELIEF IN GOD

All Parts of Nature have Knowledge of God and Worship Him (2.11)

It is not the sight of the beauteous frame of this world (as some do conceive) that makes men believe and admire God, but the knowledge of the existence of God is natural, and there's no part of nature but believes a God; for, certainly, were there not any optic sense in nature, yet God would be the God of nature, and be worshiped and adored by her creatures, which are her parts; for it is irreligious to say, God should want admiration and adoration for want of an eye, or any other of the animal or humane organs; surely nature has more ways then five to express and declare God's omnipotency: it is infinite sense and reason that doth worship and adore God, and the several perceptions of this sense and reason know there is a God that ought to be worshipped and adored, and not only ears, or eyes, or the like exterior organs of man.

Neither is it man alone, but all creatures, that do acknowledge God; for although God cannot be perfectly known what he is in his essence, yet he may be known in as much as nature can know of him. But since nature is dividable in her parts, each part has but a particular knowledge of God, which is the cause of several religions, and several opinions in those religions; and nature being also composable, it causes a conformity and union of those opinions and religions in the fundamental knowledge, which is, the existence of God: wherefore that which makes a general and united knowledge of the existence of God, is, that nature is entire in herself, as having but one body, and therefore all her parts which are of that body have also one knowledge of God; for though the parts be different in the worship of God, yet they have not a different belief of the existence of God; not that God can be perfectly known either by nature, or any of her parts, for God is incomprehensible, and above nature; but in as much as can be known, to wit, his being; and that he is all-powerful, and that not any thing can be compared or likened to him; for he is beyond all draught and likeness, as being an eternal, infinite, omnipotent, incorporeal, individual, immovable being.

And thus it is not one part or creature viewing another that causes either the knowledge or admiration of God, but the soul and life of nature, which are her sensitive and rational parts; and nature being the eternal servant and worshipper of God, God hath been also eternally worshipped and adored; for surely God's adoration and worship has no beginning in time: neither could God be worshipped and adored by himself so, as that one part of him should adore and worship another; for God is an individual and simple being, not composed of parts; and therefore, as it is impossible for me to believe, that there is no general worship and adoration of God, so it is impossible also to believe, that God has not been adored and worshipped from all eternity, and that nature is not eternal; for although God is the cause of nature, and nature the effect of God, yet she may be eternal however, there being nothing impossible to be effected by God; but he, as an eternal cause, is able to produce an eternal effect, for although it is against the rules of logic, yet it is not above the power of God.

Concession to Revealed Religion (2.12)

Natural philosophy is the chief of all sorts of knowledges; for she is a guide, not only to other sciences, and all sorts of arts, but even to divine knowledge itself; for she teaches that there is a being above nature, which is God, the author and master of nature, whom all creatures know and adore. But to adore God, after a particular manner, according to his special will and command, requires his particular grace, and divine instructions, in a supernatural manner or way, which none but the chosen creatures of God do know, at least believe, nor none but the sacred church ought to explain and interpret: and the proof, that all men are not of the number of those elect and chosen people of God, is, that there can be but one true religion, and that yet there are so many several and different opinions in that religion; wherefore the truth can only be found in some, which are those that serve God truly, according to his special will and command, both in believing and acting that which he has been pleased to reveal and command in his holy word: and I pray God, of his infinite mercy, to give me grace, that I may be one of them, which I doubt not but I shall, as long as I follow the instruction of our blessed church, in which I have been educated.

'Tis true, many persons are much troubled concerning free-will and predestination, complaining, that the Christian church is so divided about this article, as they will never agree in one united belief concerning that point; which is the cause of the trouble of so many consciences, nay, in some even to despair. But I do verily believe, that if man do but love God from his soul, and with all his power, and pray for his saving graces, and offend not any creature when offences can or may be avoided, and follow the only instructions of the sacred church, not endeavoring to interpret the word of God after his own fancy and vain imagination, but praying zealously, believing undoubtedly, and living virtuously and piously, he can hardly fall into despair, unless he be disposed and inclined towards it through the irregularities of nature, so as he cannot avoid it. But I most humbly thank the omnipotent God, that my conscience is in peace and tranquility, beseeching him of his mercy to give to all men the like.

A Natural Philosopher cannot be an Atheist (2.14)

I wonder how some of our learned writers can imagine, that those who study reason and philosophy should make them their vouchees of licentious practices, and their secret scorn of religion, and should account it a piece of wit and gallantry to be an atheist, and of atheism to be a philosopher; considering that reason and philosophy is the only way that brings and leads us to the natural knowledge of God: for it would be as much absurdity to say, reason and philosophy induce atheism, as to say, reason is not reason; for reason is the most knowing and wisest part of nature, and the chief knowledge of nature is to know there is a God; wherefore those that do argue in such a manner, argue without reason, and by calling others weak heads and fools, prove themselves irrational.

But I perceive their supposition is built upon a false ground; for they are of opinion, that the exploding of immaterial substances, and the unbounded prerogative of matter must needs infer atheism: which whether it do not shew a weaker head then those have that believe no immaterial substances in nature, rational men may judge: for by this it is evident, that they make immaterial substances to be Gods, by reason they conclude, that he who believes no immaterial substance in nature is an atheist: and thus by proving others atheists, they commit blasphemy themselves; for he that makes a God of a creature, sins as much, if not more, then he who believes no God at all. And as for the unbounded prerogative of matter, I see no reason, why men should exclaim against it; for why should immaterial substances have more prerogative then material? Truly, I may upon the same ground conclude the prerogative of matter, as well as they do the prerogative of spirits; for both are but creatures, and in that case, one has no more prerogative then the other, for God could make a material being to move itself as well as a material nothing.

Nevertheless, although matter is self-moving, yet it has not a God-like omnipotent power, nor any divine attributes; but an infinite natural power, that is, a power to produce infinite effects in her own self, by infinite changes of motions: neither doth it argue that nature is above God, or at least God-like; for I do not say, that nature has her self-moving power of herself, or by chance, but that it comes from God the author of nature; which proves that God must needs be above nature, although nature is infinite and eternal; for these proprieties do not derogate anything from the attributes of God, by reason nature is naturally infinite, which is infinite in quantity and parts; but God is a spiritual, supernatural and incomprehensible infinite; and as for the eternity of nature, it is more probable to regular reason, then that nature should have any beginning; for all beginning supposes time, but in God is no time, and therefore neither beginning nor ending, neither in himself, nor in his actions; for if God be from all eternity, his actions are so too, the chief of which is the production or creation of nature. Thus natural reason may conceive that nature is the eternal servant of God; but how it was produced from all eternity, no particular or finite creature is able to imagine; by reason that not only God, but also nature is infinite, and a finite creature can have no idea or conception of infinite.

Panpsychism: All Matter is Animated and thus has a Natural Soul (2.15)

Of all the opinions concerning the natural soul of man, I like that best which affirms the soul to be a self-moving substance, but yet I will add a material self-moving substance. For the soul of man is part of the soul of nature, and the soul of nature is material (I mean only the natural, not the divine soul of man, which I leave to the church). And this natural soul, otherwise called reason, is nothing else but corporeal natural self-motion, or a particle of the purest, most subtle and active part of matter, which I call animate; which animate matter is the life and soul of nature, and consequently of man, and all other creatures. For we cannot in reason conceive that man should be the only creature that partakes of this soul of nature, and that all the rest of nature's parts, or most of them, should be soul-less, or (which is all one) irrational, although they are commonly called, nay, believed to be such. Truly, if all other creatures cannot be denied to be material, they can neither be accounted irrational, insensible, or inanimate, by reason there is no part, nay, not the smallest particle in nature, our reason is able to conceive, which is not composed of animate matter, as well as of inanimate; of life and soul, as well as of body. And, therefore, no particular creature can claim a prerogative in this case before another, for there is a thorough mixture of animate and inanimate matter in nature, and all her parts.

But some may object that, if there be sense and reason in every part of nature, it must be in all parts alike, and then a stone, or any other the like creature, may have reason, or a rational soul, as well as man. To which, I answer: I do not deny that a stone has reason, or does partake of the rational soul of nature as well as man does, because it is part of the same matter man consists of. But yet it has not animal or human sense and reason, because it is not of animal kind, but, being a mineral, it has mineral sense and reason. For it is to be observed, that as animate self-moving matter moves not one and the same way in all creatures, so there can neither be the same way of knowledge and understanding, which is sense and reason, in all creatures alike; but nature being various, not only in her parts, but in her actions, it causes a variety also amongst her creatures. And hence come so many kinds, sorts and particulars of natural creatures, quite different from each other; though not in the general and universal principle of nature, which is self-moving matter, (for in this they agree all) yet in their particular interior natures, figures and proprieties.

Thus, although there be sense and reason (which is not only motion, but a regular and well-ordered self-motion) apparent in the wonderful and various productions, generations, transformations, dissolutions, compositions, and other actions of nature in all natures parts and particles, yet by reason of the variety of this self-motion (whose ways and modes do differ according to the nature of each particular figure) no figure or creature can have the same sense and reason, that is, the same natural motions which another has. And, therefore, no stone can be said to feel pain as an animal does, or be called blind because it has no eyes. For this kind of sense, as seeing, hearing, tasting, touching and smelling, is proper only to an animal figure, and not to a stone, which is a mineral. So that those which frame an argument from the want [i.e., lack] of animal sense and sensitive organs, to the defect of all sense and motion (as for example, that a stone would withdraw itself from the carts going over it, or a piece of iron from the hammering of a smith) conclude, in my opinion, very much against the artificial rules of logic. And although I understand none of them, yet I question not but I shall make a better argument by the rules of natural logic. . . .

HUMAN SOULS (1.37.Q23)

Against Reincarnation

Concerning the natural soul of man, which is part of nature, and consists of the purest and subtlest degree of matter, which is the rational, it is without question, that it is dividable and composable, because it is material, and therefore subject to changes and transmutations; but as for the supernatural soul, because she is spiritual and consequently individable, as having no parts, and therefore not the propriety of a body which is to have figurative actions, it cannot be said of her that she is subject to compositions, divisions, transmutations, &c. However, put the case [i.e., suppose that] the supernatural soul should have those proprieties of a body, although no body herself; yet there could be but one infinite soul in one infinite body, and as the body did divide, so the soul must of necessity do also otherwise one soul would have many bodies, and some bodies would be soul-less; which would cause a horrid confusion between souls and bodies.

Wherefore in my opinion Pythagoras's doctrine concerning the transmigration of souls, or that one soul can take several bodies, is as absurd, as that one body can quit one place and acquire another, and so have more places then bodies; which if it were thus, we might with as much probability affirm, that many bodies could be in one place, and in the resurrection of bodies there would certainly arise a great dispute between several bodies for one soul, and between several souls for one body, especially if one body was particularly beloved of more then one soul; all which would breed such a war between souls and bodies, souls and souls, and bodies and bodies, that it would put all the world into a confusion. . . .

Humans Have Multiple Material Souls, Not a Single Soul

[A]nd therefore my opinion is, that nature is but one only infinite body, which being self-moving, is dividable and composable, and consists of infinite parts of several degrees, which are so intermix, that in general they cannot be separated from each other, or from the body of nature, and subsist single and by themselves; neither can it be otherwise, unless nature had several bodies, but though she has infinite parts, yet has she but one infinite body; for parts and body are but one corporeal, self-moving, self-living and self-knowing nature; and as for the degrees of animate and inanimate matter, they are also but parts of that one body of nature, and the various and infinite knowledges, perceptions, lives, etc. considered in general, are nothing else but the life, knowledge and perception of the infinite body of nature.

And from hence it follows, that one man may have numerous souls, as well as he has numerous parts and particles; which as long as the whole figure of man lasts, their functions and actions are according to the nature of that figure; but when the figure of man dissolves (which dissolution is nothing else but a change of those motions that were proper to the nature of its figure) then all the parts of that figure, if they be joined and composed with other parts and figures, become not soul-less, or life-less; but because they consist all of a commixture of animate and inanimate matter, they retain life and soul, only the actions of that life and soul are according to the nature of those figures which the parts of the animal body did change into. Thus, as I have mentioned in my philosophical letters, no creature can challenge a particular life and soul to itself, but every creature may have by the dividing and composing-nature of this self-moving matter, more or fewer natural souls and lives.

Source: Margaret Cavendish, Observations upon Experimental Philosophy (1666), adapted.

_______________________

ANNE FINCH CONWAY:

THE MEDIUM BETWEEN GOD AND THE WORLD

Anne Conway (1631–1679) was born Anne Finch in London, the daughter of a Speaker of the House of Commons who died before her birth. Largely self-taught, she began a philosophical correspondence in her early teens with Henry More, the Cambridge Platonist, who became her lifelong friend and tutor by mail. In 1651 she married Edward Conway, later Earl of Conway, and settled at Ragley Hall, which became something of a salon for philosophers and, later, Quakers. From adolescence onward she suffered from persistent headaches, for which she tried nearly every remedy of the age, including a consultation about trepanning (drilling into the skull) which she declined. Her search for relief eventually resulted in the alchemist and physician Francis Mercury van Helmont coming to live at Ragley. Through him she was introduced to Kabbalistic thought and, shortly before her death, converted to Quakerism. The selections below are from her sole philosophical work, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, which circulated in manuscript and was published posthumously, first in Latin (1690) then English (1692). Leibniz later credited her, alongside van Helmont, as a direct influence on his theory of monads.

In the section "Attributes of God (1:1-7)" Conway lays out the standard divine attributes: spirit, infinite wisdom, goodness, power. She then argues that since God has no parts and undergoes no change, he can have no new knowledge, no passions, and no succession of time. Conway then reworks the Trinity around two of these attributes: God's eternal "Idea" (his self-knowledge, or Wisdom) and his "Will" (the power that brings that Idea into created being). She proposes dropping the language of "three distinct Persons" entirely, since it has no basis in Scripture and needlessly offends Jews and Muslims, while Idea and Will alone still capture what Christians mean by the doctrine. In the section "Christ as the Medium Between God and Creatures (5:1-3)" she argues that between an utterly unchangeable God and creatures that can change for better or worse, there must exist a third kind of being: one that can only improve and never degrade. This middle being is Christ, identified with the Kabbalists' heavenly Adam. Without such a medium, Conway argues, there would be an unbridgeable gap between God and the created world. In the section "Only Three Kinds of Being (6:4)" she states the resulting principle directly: reality contains exactly three essentially distinct kinds of being — God, wholly unchangeable; Christ, changeable only toward greater good; and creatures, changeable toward good or evil alike. No fourth kind is needed, since these three already account for every possibility, and all individual creatures, despite their variety, share one common created nature.

In the section "Transmigration as Divine Punishment (6:7)" Conway extends this structure into a theory of justice that governs every creature, not only humans. Every creature is bound by a law written into its own nature, and every violation brings an appropriate penalty. Conway illustrates this with the Mosaic law's treatment of animals, then argues that a person who lives an entirely bestial life, governed by appetite like an animal, may after death be reborn into the body of the very beast his spirit most resembled, since corruption of the spirit is the deeper degradation, and the body only follows suit. In the section "Devils' Torment is Temporary (6:8)" she defends this doctrine against the objection that it insults human dignity, answering that inward likeness to a beast is worse than outward, so nothing further is lost. She adds that not every sin deserves hell-fire, and Christ's own teaching reserves that penalty for the worst offenses. Accordingly, punishment is proportioned to fit the transgression, and always aimed at eventually restoring the sinner, rather than simply making them suffer. In the section "Universal Restoration (6:10)" she applies the same logic to the great flood and the future fire prophesied to end the present world. Each punishment matches the character of the sin it answers, water correcting a bestial humanity, fire correcting a devilish one. Even so, fire is also the element from which spirits originate, so it purifies as much as it destroys. Conway closes by generalizing the point: every punishment God inflicts, however severe, is medicinal, meant to cure and restore the creature rather than merely repay its sin.

GOD AND THE ETERNAL MEDIUM

Attributes of God (1:1-7)

§. 1. God is a spirit, light, and life, infinitely wise, good, just, mighty, omniscient, omnipresent, omnipotent, creator and maker of all things visible and invisible.

§. 2. In God there is neither time nor change, nor composition, nor division of parts: he is wholly and universally one in himself, and of himself, without any manner of variety or mixture: he hath no manner of darkness, or corporiety in him, and so consequently no kind of form or figure whatsoever.

§. 3. He is also in a proper and real sense, a substance or essence distinct from his creatures, although he is not divided, or separated from them; but most strictly and in the highest degree intimately present in them all; yet so as they are not parts of him, nor can be changed into him, nor he into them: he is also in a true and proper sense a creator of all things, who doth not only give them their form and figure, but also being, life, body, and whatsoever else of good they have.

§. 4. Seeing then that in him there is no time, nor any mutability, hence it is that in him there can exist no new knowledge or will, but his knowledge and will are eternal, and without or above time.

§. 5. Likewise in God there can exist no passion, which to speak properly comes from his creatures: for every passion is something temporal, and hath its beginning, and end with time.

§. 6. In God is an idea, which is the image of himself, or a word existing within him; which in substance or essence is one and the same with him, by which he knows not only himself, but all other things, and according to which, yea by which idea or word, all things were made and created.

§. 7. By the like reason in God is a spirit or will which proceeds from him, and yet as to substance or essence is something one with him, by which creatures receive their being and activity: for creatures have their being and existence simply and alone from him, because God would have them to be, whose will is according to knowledge most infinite. And thus wisdom and will in God, are not a certain substance or being distinct from him; but only distinct manners or properties of one and the same substance; and seeing this is that which some of the wisest and most judicious Christians understand by the word trinity. If now we should neglect that phrase of three distinct persons, which is a stone of offence to jews as well as Turks, and other people, and indeed in itself hath no sound reason, nor can be anywhere found in scripture; yet all would easily agree in this point: for they cannot deny that God hath wisdom, and an essential idea, and such a word in himself by which he knows all things; and when they grant he giveth all things their being, they will be necessarily forced to acknowledge that there is a will in him, by which he can accomplish and bring that into act which was hid in the idea, that is, can produce it, and from thence make a distinct essential substance; and this alone is to create, viz. The essence of a creature: nevertheless the idea alone doth not give being to the creature; but the will joined with the idea, as when a master-builder conceives in his mind the idea of an house, he doth not build that house by the idea alone, but the will is joined with the idea, and co-operates therewith.

Christ as the Medium Between God and Creatures (5:1-3)

Although we have already, in the aforegoing chapter, spoken a few things concerning the son of God, who is the first begotten of all creatures; yet more remains to be said of this matter, very necessary for the right understanding of what follows; to which purpose we have here designed a peculiar chapter.

§. 1. By the son of God, the first begotten of all creatures, whom we Christians do call by the name of Jesus Christ, according to the scriptures, as is above declared, not only is meant his divinity, but also his humanity, in eternal union with the divinity; that is, as his heavenly humanity was united with the divinity before the world was, and so by consequence before he came in the flesh. Of whom the ancient cabbalists have delivered many things, viz. Concerning the son of God, how he was created, and of his existence in the order of nature, before all creatures; also that all receive benediction and sanctification in him, and by him, whom also in their writings they call the heavenly Adam, Adam Kadmon, or first man, the great priest, husband, or spouse of the church, as Philo Judaeus calls the first begotten son of God.

§. 2. This son of God, the first begotten of all creatures, to wit, this heavenly Adam, and great priest, as the Jewish doctors call him, is properly a medium between God and the creatures. And that there is such a middle being, is as demonstrable as that there is a God; where is meant such a being, which in its own nature is indeed less than God, and yet greater and more excellent than all other creatures; whence also for his excellency he is properly called the son of God.

§. 3. In order to this demonstration we must first consider the nature or being of God, the chiefest being; and then the nature and essence of creatures, which are to be compared one with another, whence this middle nature will immediately discover itself to us. The nature and essence of God, as is shown in the preceding chapters, is altogether unchangeable, which not only the holy scriptures, but also the strength of reason which God hath indued our minds with, sufficiently declares; for if there should be any mutability in God, it must needs tend to some higher degree or measure of goodness, and then he would not be the chiefest good, which is contradictory; for if anything advances to a greater degree of goodness, this wholly comes to pass by reason of some greater being, of whose virtue and influence it doth participate: but there is no greater being than God, and so by consequence he is no way meliorated, nor can become better than he is, much less decrease, which would argue an imperfection; therefore it is manifest that God, or the chiefest being, is altogether unchangeable. Now seeing the nature of creatures is really distinct from the nature of God, so that there are some attributes of God, which are incommunicable to creatures, among which is reckoned immutability: hence it necessarily follows that creatures are changeable, or else they would be God himself: moreover also daily experience teaches us that creatures are changeable, and do continually vary from one state unto another: but there is a two-fold mutability, the one whereof hath a power in it of changing it self either unto good or evil; and this is common to all creatures, but not to the first begotten of all creatures; the other is only a power to, proceed from goodness to goodness. Here is therefore a three-fold classis or rank of beings: the first whereof is that which is wholly unchangeable: the second changeable only to good▪ so that that which in its own nature is good, may become yet better: the third is that which though it was in its own nature indeed good; yet could be indifferently changed, as well into good, as from good into evil. The first and last of these are extremes; and the second is a natural medium between them, by which the extremes are united, and this medium partakes of both extremes, and therefore is the most convenient and proper medium; for it partakes of the one extreme, viz. Mutability, to wit, from good to a greater degree or measure of goodness, and of the other extreme, viz. That it is altogether unchangeable from good into evil; and such a medium was necessarily required in the very nature of things; for otherwise there would remain a chasm or gap, and one extreme would be united with another, without a medium, which is impossible, and repugnant to the nature of things, as appears in the whole course of the universe. By the immutability of the Messias, here we must understand that which is moral, not that which is natural. There be some who object, Christ was tempted in vain, if he was naturally unchangeable.

Only three kinds of being (6:4)

§. 4. In order to know how far the mutations of things can reach, we must examine how many species of things there be, which as to substance or essence are distinct one from another; and if we diligently inquire thereinto, we shall find only three, as before was said, viz. God, Christ, and the creatures, and that these three in respect of essence, are really distinct one from another, is already proved; but there can be no reason alleged to prove, that there is any fourth kind of being distinct from the other three; yea, a fourth kind of being seems wholly superfluous: and because all the phenomena in the whole universe may be sufficiently resolved into these three before-mentioned, as into their proper and original causes, there is no necessity to acknowledge any other, according to this rule: (which if rightly understood, it is most true and certain) beings are not to be multiplied without necessity; for seeing the three beforementioned remove all the specifical differences in substance, which possibly can be conceived in our minds; and so by these alone is that vast and infinite possibility of things filled up: how then can there be room or place found for a fourth, fifth, sixth, or seventh being?

And that it is performed by these three is already before demonstrated; to wit, that whatsoever can be in any wise called a being, the same is either wholly unchangeable, and such is God the supreme being, or is wholly changeable, viz. To good, or evil, and such is the creature or lowest being, or that which is partly unchangeable, viz. In respect of evil, or partly changeable, to wit, in respect of good; by which is understood Christ, the son of God; that middle being between God and the creatures; into what classis or rank therefore shall we bring a certain fourth, fifth, sixth, or seventh being, &c. Which is neither wholly changeable, nor wholly unchangeable; nor partly changeable, nor partly unchangeable: besides, he that supposes a certain fourth being, essentially or substantially distinct from the three before-mentioned, overthrows that most excellent order we find in the universality of things, to wit, that there is not only one medium between God and the creatures, but two, three, four, five, six, or as many as can be supposed between first and latter.

Moreover, it is very consentaneous to sound reason, and so also to the order of things, that as God is but one, neither hath he two, three, or more distinct substances in him; and Christ but one Christ, neither hath in him more distinct substances, inasmuch as he is the heavenly man, and very first Adam; so likewise the creature, or whole creation, is but one only substance or essence in specie, although it comprehends many individuals placed in their subordinate species, and indeed in manner, but not in substance or essence distinct one from another. And so that which Paul speaks concerning man, may in like manner be understood of all creatures, (who in their original state were a certain species of man so called for their excellencies, as hereafter shall be shown;) to wit, that God made all nations, or armies of creatures, out of one blood: and certainly here the reason of both is the same; for as God made all nations out of one blood, to the end they might love each other, and stand in a mutual sympathy, and help each other; so hath he implanted a certain universal sympathy and mutual love in creatures, as being all members of one body, and (as I may so say) brethren, having one common father, to wit, God in Christ, or the word made flesh; and so also one mother, viz. That substance or essence alone, out of which they proceeded, and whereof they are real parts and members; and albeit sin hath in a wonderful manner impaired this love and sympathy, yet it hath not destroyed it.

THE JUSTICE THAT RESTORES

Transmigration as divine punishment (6:7)

§. 7. Now we see how gloriously the justice of God appears in this transmutation of things out of one species into another; and that there is a certain justice which operates not only in men and angels, but in all creatures, is most certain; and he that doth not observe the same may be said to be utterly blind: for this justice appears as well in the ascension of creatures, as in their descension; that is, when they are changed into the better, and when into the worse; when into the better, this justice distributes to them the reward and fruit of their good deeds; when into the worse, the same punishes them with due punishments, according to the nature and degree of the transgression. And the same justice hath given a law to all creatures, and written the same on their natures; and every creature whatsoever, that transgresses this law, is punished for it: but that creature that observes and keeps it, hath this reward, viz, to become better. So under the law which God gave to the jews, if a beast killed a man, that beast was to be slain; and the life of man is said to be required at the hand of every beast, gen. 9. 5. And if anyone had to do with a beast, not only the man, but the beast, was to be slain; so not only the woman and her husband did receive sentence and punishment from God after their transgression, but the serpent also, which was the brutish part in man, which he took from the earth.

God hath also put the same instinct of justice in man, towards beasts and trees of the field; for whosoever he be that is a good and just man, the same loves his beasts that serve him, and taketh care of them that they have their food and rest, and what else is wanting to them; and this he doth not do only for his own profit, but out of a principle of true justice; for should he be so cruel to them as to require their labor, and yet deny them their necessary food, then certainly he transgresses that law which God hath written on his heart; and if he kills any of them, only to fulfil his own pleasure, he acts unjustly, and the same measure will again be measured unto him; so likewise a man that hath a certain fruitful tree in his orchard, that prospers well, he dungs and cleanses the same, that it may wax better and better; but if it be barren, and incumbers the ground, then he hews it down with an ax, and burns it with fire. And so here is a certain justice in all these, as in all the transmutation of things from one species into another, whether it be by ascending from the ignobler or baser unto the nobler, or by descending into the contrary, there may be found the same justice: for example: is it not just and equitable, if a man on earth lives a pure and holy life, like unto the heavenly angels, that he should be exalted to an angelical dignity after death, and be like unto them, over whom also the angels rejoice? But if a man here on earth lives so wickedly and perversely, that he is more like a devil raised from hell than any other creature, if he dies in such a state without repentance, shall not the same justice tumble him down to hell? And shall not such deservedly become like devils, even as those who led an angelical life are made equal with the angels?

But if a man hath neither lived an angelical nor diabolical, but a brutish, or at least-wise an animal or sensual life on earth; so that his spirit is more like the spirit of a beast than any other thing: shall not the same justice most justly cause, that as he is become a brute, as to his spirit; whilst he hath left the dominion of his more excellent part, to that brutish part and spirit within him, that he also (at least, as to his external form, in bodily figure) should be changed into that species of beasts, to whom he was inwardly most like, in qualities and conditions of mind? And seeing this brutal spirit is now become superior and predominant in him, and holds the other captive, is it not very probable, when such a man dies, that the very same brutish spirit shall still have dominion in him, and carry the human soul with it whithersoever it pleases, and compel it to be subservient unto it? And when the said brutish spirit returns again into some body, and hath now dominion over that body, so that its plastic faculty hath the liberty of forming a body, after its own idea and inclination, (which before, in the humane body, it had not;) it necessarily follows, that the body, which this vital spirit forms, will be brutal, and not humane; for the brutal spirit cannot produce and form any other figure: because its plastic faculty is governed of its imagination, which it doth most strongly imagine to its self, or conceive its own proper image; which therefore the external body is necessarily forced to assume.

Devils' torment is temporary (6:8)

§. 8. Herein the justice of God marvelously appears, whilst he assigns to every kind and degree of transgression its due and proper punishment; neither doth he sentence every sin and transgression to hell-fire, and the punishment due unto devils; for Christ hath taught the contrary, in that parable, where he shows the third degree only is doomed to infernal punishment, (viz.) If one say to his brother: thou fool!

What can be here objected against the justice of God? If it be said it doth too much lessen and disparage the dignity and nobility of humane nature, to suppose the same with respect to body and soul, convertible into the nature of a brute. To this i answer, according to the common maxim, corruptio optimi fit pessima, the best things by corruption become the worst: for seeing man by his voluntary transgression hath so exceedingly polluted and brought down his own nature (which was so noble) into a far worse state and condition, that the same could wax as vile and base in spirit as the most unclean beast or animal; so that he is become as subject to earthly concupiscences and desires, as any beast; yea, is become worse than any beast: what injustice will this be, if God should also compel him to bear that image outwardly in his body, into the which he hath inwardly transformed himself? Or, which thinkest thou is the worst degeneration, to bear the image of a beast in spirit, or in body?

Certainly, every one will say, to be like a beast in spirit is far the greatest degeneration; and there is not one, who is indued with true nobility of mind, who will not confess, that, to be like a beast inwardly, is worse than to be like the same outwardly; for to be one with him in spirit, is far worse than to be one with him in external form and figure of body: but if any one shall say this punishment is too little for such a man, who hath lived all his days a brutish life, if after death he shall only return to the state or condition of some beast; let such know, that the most just creator and maker of all things is wiser than he, and knows best what punishment is due unto every particular sin; who hath also so most justly and wisely disposed all things, that no man that lives carnally, and after the manner of beasts, can enter into the kingdom of heaven; and so also the doctrine of Christ expressly informs us, that all sins are not to be punished with the pains of hell: and that where the treasure is, there is the heart also, and the spirit of man: also if a man is joined or united with any things, that then he becomes unum quid, or one with the same; and that he that cleaves to the lord is one with him in spirit; and he that cleaves to a harlot is one flesh with her. Why then doth not he that cleaves to a beast, by the same reason, become one with a beast?

And so in all other cases: for to whom any one yields himself in obedience, the same is his master, so far as he obeys him; as the scripture saith. Moreover also it is said, with what measure soever ye mete, the same shall be meted unto you: as if it should have said, all kinds and degrees of sin, have their proper punishments, and all these punishments tend to the creatures advantage; so that grace prevails over judgment, and judgment is turned into victory to the salvation and restoration of the creature: for seeing the grace of God is extended over all his works, why should we think God a more severe and rigid master to his creatures than indeed he is? Seeing this doth wonderfully obscure and darken the glory of the divine attributes; neither doth it beget a love towards God, and an admiration of his goodness and justice in the hearts of men, as it ought to be; but the plain contrary.

Universal Restoration (6:10)

§. 10. And moreover also, why did he drown the old world with water, and hath purposed to destroy this with fire? Such as was that of Sodom: but that he would show, that for divers kinds of sin, divers sorts of punishment are to be inflicted: and that the old world was indeed wicked, but that which is to be destroyed with fire is worse, which for that reason will have the greater judgment.

But the different nature of these transgressions, for which those different punishments are prepared, seem to consist in this; that the sins of the old world were more brutish and carnal, as the word of God doth seem to point out, when he saith, my spirit shall not always strive with man; because he is become flesh; that is, he is become perfectly brutish or bestial, by obeying the desires of the flesh: so that unless this generation had been cut off, all mankind (except Noah and his family) in the succeeding generation, would have become bestial, which evil God would prevent, by drowning them with the waters, that by this punishment they might be reduced from the brutish nature to the nature of men: but the sins of this world, which like Sodom is to be destroyed with fire, seem their own nature, to be more like the sins of devils, than anything else, (viz.) By reason of craft, deceit, malice, hostility, and cruelty; and therefore their proper punishment is fire, which also is the original principle of those noble spirits so greatly degenerated; and so they ought deservedly by the same to be restored and regenerated: for what is fire, but a certain kind of imperfect aethereal substance shut up in combustible bodies? As we observe the same still to mount upwards, and by reason of its notable thinness immediately to vanish: from which aethereal substance, as well angels as men, have their original, quoad spiritus, or, as to their spirits; as the brutal nature hath its original from water. But as all the punishments, God inflicts on his creatures, have some proportion with their sins; so all these punishments (the worst not excepted) do tend to their good and restoration, and so are medicinal, that by them these diseased creatures may be cured and restored to a better condition than before they enjoyed.

Source: Anne Finch Conway, The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy (1692), adapted.

_______________________

DAMARIS CUDWORTH MASHAM:

BALANCING NATURAL RELIGION WITH REVELATION

Damaris Masham (1658–1708) was born Damaris Cudworth, daughter of the Cambridge Platonist philosopher Ralph Cudworth. She was educated through her father's library rather than any formal schooling. In her early twenties she struck up a close friendship with John Locke, then twice her age. The two exchanged affectionate letters and verses under the pseudonyms Philander and Philoclea, though the relationship settled into a lifelong intellectual partnership rather than romance. In 1685 she married Sir Francis Masham and moved to his estate at Oates in Essex, and in 1691 Locke, in declining health, took up a standing invitation to live there, remaining a member of the household until his death thirteen years later. Masham published two works of her own, both anonymously. A Discourse Concerning the Love of God (1696) is a defense of Locke's empiricism against the mystical philosophy of Nicolas Malebranche and John Norris. The dispute ended her earlier friendship with Norris, who had once dedicated a book to her. Occasional Thoughts (1705) is a treatise on practical Christian morality. She also corresponded with Leibniz on questions of metaphysics and religion. She died at Oates in 1708.

The following selections are from Occasional Thoughts. The aim of the work is to show that natural reason, on its own, can establish the existence of God and the broad outlines of morality. However, she argues, reason cannot reliably move people to actually live by them, which requires revelation. She also warns against teachers who visibly subordinate Scripture to their own philosophical theories, thereby creating doubt that corrodes the ordinary believer's faith. In the opening section on the "Criterion of Revelation", Masham sets her governing rule: reason must always judge our assent, even regarding revelation; for, reason's task is precisely to determine whether something really is God's word. Nothing genuinely revealed can contradict reason, she argues, since that would make reason useless and destroy the credibility of revelation itself. In the section on "Natural Theology" she shows what unaided reason can establish on its own. Considering ourselves in a pure state of nature, we have the capacity to infer remote truths from immediate experience. This lets us reason from the order of the universe and our own enjoyment of existence, to an invisible first cause who is wise, powerful, and good. Moving to the issue of moral obligation, she argues that moral relations are the revealed will of God. That is, there is an unchanging nature of things that generate unchanging relations between them. When we understand what conforms to those relations, we are in fact perceiving God's will. In the section on "Sin as Rational Self-Contradiction", she argues that knowingly opposing God's will isn't only ingratitude, but a rational absurdity. For, our very existence depends on the same unified, unchanging will we would be defying. In "Freedom of Action and the Duty to Discern God's Will" she explains why disobedience is even possible. Freedom, she says, is the highest ability a creature can have, and it carries with it a responsibility to actively study the nature of things to discover and obey what God intends.

She next examines the limitations of human reason. In the section "Two Senses of Virtue: Custom versus Reason" she distinguishes between the common view of virtue as mere social conformity, versus true virtue as conformity to reason's unchanging dictates. In "Impediment of Uncertain Reward" she argues that even a person who grasps the law of reason may still rationally break it. This occurs if there is guaranteed afterlife where we will be judged. In the section on the need for revelation, she concludes that only the gospel gives us certain knowledge of an afterlife with real rewards and punishments. Without these, most people lack sufficient motive to follow reason at all. In the section on Locke's book The Reasonableness of Christianity, she argues that Locke has already fully demonstrated this insufficiency of unaided reason. In the section "Answering the Objection from Revelation's Lateness" she considers a natural objection: why would a wise God delay revelation for so many ages? Her reply is that judging God's timing at all presumes a grasp of his infinite designs no finite mind possesses. In the section "Covenant of Grace" she explains Christ's deeper purpose. Since the law demands a perfect righteousness that no one can achieve, Christ established a covenant in which sincere faith is credited as righteousness. This frees believers from the costly, fear-driven rituals found in pagan and Jewish religion. Finally, she addresses the issue of how Scripture gets misread. In the section on "Two Failures in Reading Scripture" she identifies two opposite errors: trusting religious teachers uncritically, and, just as dangerously, adopting a favored philosophical opinion first and bending Scripture to fit it afterward. In the section "How Teachers' Doubts Spread to the Multitude", she considers the effects of religious teachers who openly subordinate Scripture to their own theories. In such cases, ordinary believers reasonably conclude that even learned defenders of Christianity are not fully convinced of scripture's authority. This in turn spreads skepticism and encourages the wider public to treat Scripture's authority as optional.

CRITERION OF REVELATION AS CONFORMITY TO EVIDENTIAL REASON

It is as undeniable as the difference between men's being in, and out of their wits, that reason ought to be to rational creatures the guide of their belief: that is to say, that their assent to anything, ought to be governed by that proof of its truth, whereof reason is the judge; be it either argument, or authority, for in both cases reason must determine our assent according to the validity of the ground it finds it built on: by reason being here understood that faculty in us which discovers, by the intervention of intermediate ideas, what connection those in the proposition have one with another: whether certain; probable; or none at all; according whereunto, we ought to regulate our assent. If we do not so, we degrade ourselves from being rational creatures; and deprive ourselves of the only guide God has given us for our conduct in our actions and opinions.

Authority yet is not hereby so subjected to reason, as that a proposition which we see not the truth of, may not nevertheless be rationally assented to by us.

For though reason cannot from the evidence of the thing it self-induce our assent to any proposition, where we cannot perceive the connection of the ideas therein contained; yet if it appears that such a proposition was truly revealed by God, nothing can be more rational than to believe it: since we know that God can neither deceive, nor be deceived: that there are truths above our conception, and that God may (if he so pleases) communicate these to us by supernatural revelation.

The part of reason then, in regard of such a proposition as this, is, only to examine whether it be indeed a divine revelation: which should reason not attest to the truth of; it is then evidently irrational to give, or require assent to it as being so.

And as plainly irrational must it be to give, or require assent to anything as a divine revelation, which is evidently contrary to reason; no less being herein implied than that God has made us so as to see clearly that to be a truth, which is yet a falsehood; the which, were it so, would make the testimony of our reason useless to us; and thereby destroy also the credit of all revelation; for no stronger proof can be had of the truth of any revelation than the evidence of our reason that it is a revelation. . . .

NATURAL THEOLOGY AS KNOWING GOD FROM HIS WORKS

To see what light we receive from nature to direct our actions, and how far we are naturally able to obey that light; men must be considered purely as in the state of nature, viz. As having no extrinsic law to direct them, but endued only with a faculty of comparing their distant ideas by intermediate ones, and thence of deducing, or inferring one thing from another; whereby our knowledge immediately received from sense, or reflection, is enlarged to a view of truths remote, or future, in an application of which faculty of the mind to a consideration of our own existence and nature, together with the beauty and order of the universe, so far as it falls under our view, we may come to the knowledge of a first cause; and that this must be an intelligent being, wise and powerful, beyond what we are able to conceive. And as we delight in ourselves, and receive pleasure from the objects which surround us, sufficient to endear to us the possession and enjoyment of life, we cannot from thence but infer, that this wise and powerful being is also most good, since he has made us out of nothing to give us a being wherein we find such happiness, as makes us very unwilling to part therewith.

And thus, by a consideration of the attributes of God, visible in the works of the creation, we come to a knowledge of his existence, who is an invisible being: for since power, wisdom and goodness, which we manifestly discern in the production and conservation of ourselves, and the universe, could not subsist independently on some substance for them to inhere in, we are assured that there is a substance where unto they do belong, or of which they are the attributes.

Which attributes of God would not be discoverable by us, did we not discern a difference in things; as between power and weakness, benevolence and no benevolence, or its contrary; and betwixt directing means to an end, and acting at hap-hazard without any design, or choice: a knowledge, which, by whatever steps conveyed into the mind, is no other than a seeing things to be what they are, and that they cannot but be what they are.

MORAL OBLIGATION AS GOD'S WILL SEEN IN THE NATURE OF THINGS

Moral Relations as the Revealed Will of God

From which diversity and immutability in the nature of things, there necessarily arises a diversity of respects and relations between them, as unchangeable as the things themselves: wherein the will of the creator in reference hereunto is revealed to every intelligent agent, so far as he is made capable of discerning these relations, dependencies and consequences; and whatsoever with respect to his own actions, such a being finds resulting from any of these as most conformable to the design of his creator in making him such a part as he is of the whole, he cannot but consider as the will of God, thereby dictated to him; since otherwise, God would act contradictiously to his wisdom in making him what he is.

We being then endued, as we are, with a capacity of perceiving and distinguishing these differences of things; and also with a liberty of acting, or not, suitably and agreeably hereunto; whence we can according to the preference of our own minds, act either in conformity to, or disconformity with, the will of the creator (manifested in his works no less than the will of any humane architect is in his) it follows, that to act answerably to the nature of such beings as we are, requires that we attentively examine, and consider the several natures of things, so far as they have any relation to our own actions.

Which attentive consideration of the works of God objected to our view, implies an exercise thereupon of that faculty in us by which we deduce, or infer, one thing from another: whence (as has been said) our knowledge immediately derived to us from sensation, or reflection, is enlarged by the perception of remote, or distant truths. The more obviously eminent advantages accruing to us from which faculty of reason, plainly make known the superiority of its nature; and that its suggestions, ought to be hearkened to by us preferably to those of sense; where these (as it too often happens) do not concur. For did we know nothing by inference and deduction, both our knowledge and enjoyment would be very short of what they now are; many considerable pleasures depending almost entirely upon reason; and there being none of the greatest enjoyments of sense which would not lose their best relish, separated from those concomitant satisfactions which accompany them only as we are rational creatures. Neither is it our greatest happiness alone which is manifestly provided for in our being endued with this faculty; but our much greater safety, and preservation likewise; since these require a capacity in us of foreseeing distant events, and directing means to an end, oftentimes through a long train of actions; which is what we can only do by that in us, whereby the relations, dependencies and consequences of things are discoverable to us.

But as reason is that which either in kind or degree, differences men from brutes; and that there are few, if any, who would lose this distinction, it is by common consent acknowledged that reason is in respect of all others, a preferable endowment. And if beasts, only inferior to men in the advantages of this faculty, appear hereby intended to be subjected to men, it cannot be less evident that that part in men which they have in common with beasts, was likewise designed by their maker to be subjected to their reason also. From all which, it undeniably follows that we do not act answerably to the will, or pleasure of God, in making us such creatures as we are, if we either neglect the search of those measures of our actions prescribed to us by the discernable natures of things; or, if seeing these, we yet conform not our selves thereunto.

Sin as Rational Self-Contradiction

Now for any creature knowingly to oppose the will of its creator, is not only disingenuity in regard of what is owing from it to its sovereign benefactor, and folly in respect of that dependence which it has on him for its being, as it is commonly represented to us to be; but is also in the nature of things (simply considered) so repugnant to right reason, that were such a creature consistent with itself herein, and could act pursuantly to that will, it would operate to its own destruction; since its existence evidently depends upon that of its maker; whose will, as revealed to us, being but a different consideration of his attributes, the knowledge whereof is all the knowledge we have of God, cannot be so much as conceived by us separable from the being of God; unless the God, which we conceive, be a fiction of our own imagination, and not the creator of all things; who is an invisible being only knowable to us in, and by, the exemplifications of his attributes: the infinite perfection, and the inseparable correspondence, and harmony of which (discernable in the frame and government of the universe) plainly tells us, that the divine will cannot be (like ours) successive determinations without dependance, or connection one upon another; much less inconsistent, contradictory, and mutable; but one steady, uniform, unchangeable result of infinite wisdom and benevolence, extending to, and including all his works. So that sin, or disobedience to our maker is manifestly the greatest nonsense, folly and contradiction conceivable, with regard purely to the immutable perfection of the divine nature; and to the natural constitution of things, independently upon any positive command of God to us, or his irresistible power over us.

Freedom of Action and the Duty to Discern God's Will

But as without a capacity in the creature to act contrary to the will of the creator there could be no defect, or self-excellency in any created being; contrariety to the will of God is therefore permitted in the universe as a necessary result of creaturely imperfection, under the greatest endowment that a created being is capable of having, viz. That of freedom or liberty of action: and as the constitution of such creature, as this, implies that what is best in reference to the design of the creator, and of its own happiness, should not be always necessarily present to the mind as best; such a creature may oppose the will of his maker with various degrees of guilt in so doing; or (possibly) with none at all; for no agent can offend farther than he willfully abuses the freedom he has to act.

But God having made men so as that they find in themselves, very often, a liberty of acting according to the preference of their own minds, it is incumbent upon them to study the will of their maker; in an application of the faculty of reason which he has given them, to the consideration of the different respects, consequences, and dependencies of things, so as to discern from thence, the just measures of their actions in every circumstance and relation they stand placed in; which measures are nothing else but the dictates resulting from those views which such a consideration of things as this gives us, of what is consonant, or not so, to the design of the creator in every particular, wherein we are concerned to act. And these manifestations of his will, thus discoverable to us, ought to be regarded by us, as his commands. . . .

LIMITS OF REASON AND NEED FOR REVELATION

Two Senses of Virtue: Custom versus Reason

Religion has, I think, been rightly defined to be the knowledge how to please God, and thus taken, does necessarily include virtue, that is to say, moral rectitude; but as men have usually applied these terms virtue and religion, they stand for things very different and distinct, one from another. For by a virtuous man, in all countries of the world, or less societies of men, is commonly meant, by those who so call anyone, such a man as steadily adheres to that rule of his actions which is established for a rule in his country tribe, or society, be that what it will. Hence it has been that virtue has in different times and places changed face; and sometimes so far, as that what has been esteemed virtuous in one age, and in one country, has been looked upon as quite the contrary in others: though in all times and places, wherein men have not degenerated into a downright brutish, or altogether animal life (as some whole nations have done) but have set any rules, or measures to their actions, the dictates of right reason have more, or less, taken place with them, so far as the manifest advantages, or rather necessity thereof to the subsistence or convenience of society, has directed men. And so much as custom, or the injunctions of some lawgiver enforced these dictates of reason, or nature, so far and no further, did obedience thereunto denominate men virtuous; without any distinction made in reference to these prescriptions, as being precepts of the eternal law of right, or as obligatory any other ways than as being part of the law, or fashion of that country, or society, wherein these rules had prevailed or were established. A firm and steady adherence to which, whether conformable, or not, to the law of reason, being alike that whichever intitled men to be esteemed virtuous among those who professed to live by the same rule. . . .

Impediment of Uncertain Reward

But there is still, beyond this, a farther impediment to men's obeying the law of nature, by virtue of the mere light of nature; which is, that they cannot, in all circumstances, without revelation, make always a just estimate in reference to their happiness. For, though it is demonstrable that the law of reason is the law of God, yet the want of an explicit knowledge of the penalty incurred by the breach of that law, makes it not to be evident to all men that the incurring of this penalty shall (in all cases) make the preference of breaking this law, an ill bargain: which it may, sometimes not be to many, in regard of the discernable natural consequences of such a transgression.

For though observance of the law of reason is, in the constitution of natural causes, visibly to those who consider it (generally speaking) the means of our greatest happiness, even in this present world, yet if there be no future life (which that there is, is made certain to us, only by the revelation thereof in the gospel) to answer in for transgression of this law; the breach of it may, though not naturally, yet accidentally, in some cases, conduce to men's greater happiness; and, very often, notwithstanding that to have obeyed the law of reason they may discern would have been better for them than to have followed their appetites, had they been early so accustomed, yet now that they have contracted different habits, which are like a right hand, or eye to them, the difficulty of a new course of life may appear too great for the attempt of it to be advisable; since the consideration of the shortness and uncertainty of life may make men apt to say to themselves on such occasions,

who would lose the present hour, / for one that is not in his power? / Or not be happy now he may, / but for a future blessing stay: / who know not he shall live a day?

Need for Revelation

The revelation of an eternal life after this, with an express declaration of everlasting rewards and punishments annexed to our obedience, or disobedience, to the law of nature (though such a future state may be reasonably inferred from all things happening alike to the good, and to the bad in this world, and from men's natural desire of immortality) is yet but a necessary enforcement of the law of nature to the far greatest part of mankind, who stand in need of this knowledge, and are uncapable of an inference so repugnant to what their senses daily tell them in the case; and wherein the truth asserted has scarcely ever procured an unwavering assent from the most rational of the heathen philosophers themselves. Now the unquestionable certainty of a future state, wherein men shall receive everlasting rewards, and punishments, we alone owe the knowledge of to Jesus Christ, who only has brought life and immortality to light. The willingest to believe the souls immortality were before our saviors coming, at best, doubtful concerning it; and the generality of mankind, were yet far less persuaded of it. . . .

NECESSITY OF REVELATION, DEFENDED AND FULFILLED

Locke's "Reasonableness of Christianity" as Authority

The little which has been said, do, methinks, sufficiently evince the need of revelation both to teach and enforce natural religion: but the defectiveness of the light of nature to this end, is a verity of so great use to be established, that the consideration thereof should not be left upon such short reflections as these; was not this truth at large made out in a late treatise intitled, The Reasonableness of Christianity as Delivered in the Scriptures.

A work which the unhappy mistakes and disputes among us concerning the Christian religion, makes useful to all men; and which has been peculiarly so to many, as the only book wherein they have found the insufficiency of natural light to natural religion, has been fully shewed, although that to reconcile men to, or establish them in the belief of divine revelation, nothing was more requisite to make this appear, in an age wherein the prevalency of deism has been so much and so justly complained of.

Answering the Objection from Revelation's Lateness

But against the insufficiency of natural light to the ends of natural religion, the world having been so many ages without it, is, by some, thought an objection: for, if supernatural light had been so needful as is pretended to be, how could it comport, say they, with the wisdom of God not to have given it to men sooner and more universally?

To judge of all the ends and designs of the divine wisdom in the creation or government of the world, is to suppose that we have a comprehension of God's works, adequate or commensurate thereunto; which is not only to conceive of his wisdom as not being infinite, but even to circumscribe it within very narrow bounds. If the wisdom of God, (like his other attributes) does infinitely surpass our reach, his views must, for that reason, be necessarily oftentimes, as much beyond our short sight. For us then, when we see not the reason why any thing is, to take upon us to say that such a thing does, or does not comport with the wisdom of God, must needs be the highest folly that can be, since it implies a presumption, that we see all in respect of such a subject that God sees: and the objection here made turns only upon the unaccountableness of the divine wisdom herein to our understandings. For God's dealing thus with men, can by no means be said by us to imply any contradiction to his wisdom. Whilst we having an assurance highly rational (from those numberless worlds which surround us) that we are but a small part of the intellectual creation of our maker; and being certain that our abode here bears but a very inconsiderable proportion of time to millions of ages, and is as nothing to eternity, cannot tell but that to know much more than we do, in this state, of the entire scheme of providence with respect to the whole extent of intelligent beings, may be necessary to our seeing the beauty of anyone part of the design of our creator.

And it is the most suitable to the all-comprehensive wisdom of God for us to conceive, that without having this knowledge, we may be far less able to judge of the divine economy, in reference to his dealings with us here, than he who should see but one scene of a drama, would thereby be capacitated to judge of the plot or design of the whole. In objecting therefore against the need of revelation to support natural religion, because that we understand not why, if revelation was necessary to this end, the world had it no sooner: men are guilty of so great an absurdity as to argue from a matter only unknown to them against the reality of that evidently is: which is always irrational to do; but is especially so, when, if we cannot answer what is objected, we yet see plainly that that objection may be very answerable, and accountable for, even to our conceptions; were but our views a little more enlarged, and such as, perhaps, they shall be hereafter.

But in urging this consideration as sufficient to silence any objection to the needfulness of revelation from its lateness and want of universality; I suppose not that the divine, economy is herein actually incomprehensible by men; or at least, may not be accounted for, if not demonstratively aright, yet suitably to the divine attributes: and a due reflection upon the entire design of Christianity, so far as it is revealed to us, will, it is likely, conduct us best to a sight hereof. But our present business is not this inquiry, but to see what those advantages are which we receive by the revelation of Jesus Christ, the design of whole coming into the world appears to have been, to enforce the rule of rectitude, by setting it in a clearer light, with the manifest attestation of divine authority, and promulging it as the law of God, by declaration of eternal rewards and punishments, annexed to the observance or breach thereof.

Covenant of Grace

Yet to deliver clearer and more excellent precepts of morality; to attest to the divinity hereof by miracles; or to bring immortality to light, were not (as the means of enforcing natural religion) the whole business for which Christ took our nature upon him. It was a decree as immutable as the divine nature, that no unrighteous thing should have everlasting life: wherefore all, both jews and gentiles having broken the law, and being thereby condemned (since the law necessarily required perfect righteousness, and could admit of no abatement thereof) Christ came to establish betwixt God and man, a covenant of grace in order to men's obtaining eternal life, which they could not obtain by the works of the law. The which covenant of grace was, that to as many as believe in his son, taking him for their king, and submitting to his law, God would grant remission of their sins; and that this their faith should be imputed to them for righteousness; that is, accepted of by him, in lieu of perfect obedience, in all such who sincerely endeavored to live up to the precepts of Christ, their lord.

Men have ever been solicitous, to reconcile pardon of sin to the purity of God's nature, which has exposed them (as we have seen) to divers delusions, and to wearisome and costly superstitions; even sometimes to the giving the fruit of their bodies to atone for the sins of their souls. All the forms of pagan religion have abounded with institutions of this nature; and that of the Jews consisted very much of tiresome and unpleasant performances; which being types and shadows of him that was to come, were practiced to the same purpose. All which things we are freed from by the gospel; Christ having offered up himself once for all, through whom forgiveness of sin is preached to as many as believe in him, truly repenting of their past sins, and walking in newness of life, conformably to the law of him their master; but and if, through humane weakness or imbecility, we do sin, he is our advocate with the father, who for the sake of him his beloved son, will justify, or accept as righteous, those who truly believe in him, whence we are justified by God's free grace or favor, and not by the works of the law, against which all have transgressed, and failed of a perfect obedience. . . .

And thus the Christian religion, we find, is every way admirably adapted by the divine wisdom, to the end of enforcing the eternal law of reason or nature; which evidently needed this enforcement. From whence it is manifest, that whoso directly or indirectly teaches men to look upon Christianity as separable from morality, does the most that is possible misrepresent it; and therein (as effectually as they can do so) undermine both natural and revealed religion; the latter of which dispenses not with any breach of the former; and exempts us only from the burthen of such outward performances as have no efficacy to the making men better, but often do make them very much worse . . .

HOW SPECULATIVE REASON CORRUPTS THE AUTHORITY OF SCRIPTURE

Two Failures in Reading Scripture

Two Failures in Reading ScriptureWhat then should those who would cure, or prevent all mistakes prejudicial to the right understanding the Christian religion so carefully do, as to persuade and engage people diligently and with unprejudiced minds to study the scriptures; and not (as is usual) to embrace opinions concerning religion first, and then consult the scriptures only to fortify from thence their preconceived sentiments? For doing thus they do in effect, but rely blindly upon the teachings of men, and such men too (as God knows have themselves for the most part) as blindly followed others; whilst here and there some few (as having more refined wits, and disdaining such shackles as the generality like to wear, yet not loving the truth in the simplicity thereof) have sought to improve and adorn it by their philosophical conceits, and notions; a thing no less dangerous than the former.

For to such as are better pleased with curious speculations, than plain and obvious verities, it is very apt to happen that a favorite hypothesis, or opinion, shall run quite away with their reason and judgment: which when it does, the scriptures are sure to be interpreted with conformity to that as if it were an eternal, and unquestionable principle of truth. And thus too often is it seen that the sacred doctrines of divine revelation are submitted to be tried by philosophical fancies, as a criterion of their truth; which is truly a more direct disservice to Christianity than the above-mentioned implicit faith, since this evidently exposes even the divine authority of the Christian religion to be questioned.

How Teachers' Doubt Spreads to the Multitude

For when any, especially if such whose profession it is to be teachers of this religion, shall either argue against the plain sense of what is delivered in the scriptures, merely because it is not reconcilable to their preconceived sentiments: or to those of their admired masters of reason; or else shall insist upon some of their own or these men's theorems as necessary to be believed in confirmation of any thing taught by our savior, or his apostles; what can the natural effect of this be, but to make such as have not the leisure, or inclination to examine the truth of this revelation, skeptical in regard thereof; by persuading them that those themselves who are rational men amongst the very teachers of the Christian religion, are not very clearly and fully convinced of its divine authority; since if they were, they would certainly submit their opinions to be tried by the scriptures, and not warp the scriptures to a compliance with their opinions; or think the doctrines contained in them needed any other confirmation to support them.

And wherefore must it be thought that such men, as these, are not convinced of the divine revelation of the Christian religion, but from hence, that they (who will be presumed to have examined this matter the best of any men) do find indeed some flaw or just cause of doubt in the evidence thereof? From whence it is that they prefer their natural reason as a surer teacher than that revelation; however on some occasions they speak highly of it. And as men of this philosophical genius have usually more virtue than those who hoodwinked follow their leaders; or than such who look upon virtue as no part of religion; there will, on this account, as also for the reputation of their uncommon science, be probably a distinguishing esteem had of such: whence the apparent want of deference in these men to the scriptures (liable to be looked upon as some degree of skepticism) is of dangerous example; which is obviously manifest in that direct tendency this has to satisfy those in their infidelity, who cannot, or will not, find leisure to examine for themselves the truths of religion.

But there is also a farther ill influence which apparent want of deference to scripture authority in those who pretend to believe (and, much more, to teach the gospel) has: and that is to the countenancing too much that multitude who preferring the Christian religion, do in their practical that which these men do in their speculative opinions, viz. Make the dictates of the gospel their rule so far only, as they are vouched for and authorized by their reason, infected, as it is, by custom, passion, or worldly interest; which is done by very many who would be offended to have their belief of the scriptures questioned. But however they profess to own them, none who act thus can be rationally thought to be sincerely persuaded of their divine authority, although it is possible that many such men may have no entire disbelief thereof neither; it being barely not assenting, which is the natural effect of ignorance in those who have good sense enough to see that it is irrational, to be confidently assured of what they have not sufficient reason to be so assured of. . . .

Source: Damaris Cudworth Masham, Occasional Thoughts in Reference to a Vertuous or Christian Life (1705), adapted.

_______________________

CATHARINE TROTTER COCKBURN

IMMATERIALITY NOT REQUIRED FOR IMMORTALITY

Catharine Trotter Cockburn (1679–1749) was born in London and self-taught, having had little access to formal education. She showed early literary talent, and by seventeen had a tragedy, Agnes de Castro, staged at Drury Lane, making her one of England's first successful women playwrights alongside Aphra Behn. In her twenties she converted to Catholicism before later returning to the Church of England, and in 1708 married the clergyman Patrick Cockburn, with whom she raised several children in straitened financial circumstances in Aberdeen and then Northumberland. In 1702 she anonymously published A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding. When Locke discovered the identity of his defender, he sent her a gift of books in gratitude. She went on to write on ethics and moral philosophy, and later defended Samuel Clarke's positions in his famous exchange with Leibniz. She published comparatively little in her lifetime relative to what she wrote. Much of her philosophical work only reached a wide audience after her death, when Thomas Birch collected and published her writings in 1751.

The selections below are from Cockurn's Defence and follow two themes. The first involves the danger of misgrounding moral and religious truths. She argues here that it is both ineffective and dangerous to prove the soul's immortality through abstract speculations. Most people lack the time or capacity for such complex arguments. If they are told that immortality depends strictly on immateriality, any failure to grasp the abstract proof can lead them to reject an afterlife entirely. Those who wish to defend truth should base it on clear and simple principles that fit common understanding. Supporting a truth with weak foundations undermines the entire argument, giving an advantage to skeptics who want to corrupt moral principles. Every concept stands best on its proper foundation, and the reasons behind moral truths are straightforward enough for anyone to understand. The second theme his her own theory that moral immortality is independent of immaterial substance. She argues that the belief in a future state among ancient philosophers and Eastern societies shows that expecting an afterlife does not require a belief in an immaterial soul. Many anticipated immortality while viewing the soul as a refined form of matter. Furthermore, if we accept that the soul is physical in nature, this does not adversely affect the primary purpose of religion, namely, the expectation of future rewards and punishments. This moral certainty rests simply on our awareness that we are free, rational agents, and also on our logical certainty that an omnipotent God exists. Because earthly life does not distribute justice evenly, reason indicates that this world is a temporary testing ground, and that fair rewards and punishments are reserved for a future life. These moral arguments remain completely valid whether the soul is immaterial or a functional system of matter.

DANGER OF MISGROUNDING MORAL AND RELIGIOUS TRUTHS

But could the immateriality of the soul be proved to be as certain, as it is highly probable, it can never be of good consequence, and may be dangerous, to make that the main proof of its immortality; for this is an argument of no use to the generality of mankind, who want [i.e., lack] either leisure, or capacity, for such nice speculations; and if they are convinced on other grounds, that the soul is immortal, it is no great matter, whether they think it immaterial, or no. But if they are persuaded, that it cannot be immortal, if it is not immaterial, it is easy to see of how ill consequence that must be, if the proofs of the soul's immateriality should not happen to convince them; as it often falls out by the different cast of men's heads, that the same arguments, that are very strong and persuasive to one man, have no force at all with another, especially in abstract reflections. Those, therefore, who are zealous for truth, should endeavor to establish it upon the plainest, and clearest principles, and such as are most adapted to common apprehensions.

This is not the only instance, in which I have observed, that truth does not suffer less from those, who would maintain it upon false or uncertain grounds, than from those, who openly oppose it. I have known several, who have been carefully enough instructed in their duty, who yet for want of being taught at first, or applying themselves to consider the true grounds of it, have been easily argued out of their good notions, though some of them persons of no mean capacity; for if the foundation fail, the best superstructure will fall, though strong and immoveable, when established upon its proper grounds. And this does not only happen, when the foundation is in itself weak or uncertain, but when truths are taught upon principles, which, though true, and solid in themselves, are not the ground or reason of those truths; which some have done out of a good design of rendering the truths they teach the more sacred. But everything stands firmest on its own foundation: and I believe, if it were rightly considered, it would appear, that the reasons of all moral truths are plain and clear, and within the reach of the lowest apprehensions. These things, which I have only hinted at, are of great consequence to be thoroughly considered by all, who have the instruction of others under their care, that they may not think they sufficiently acquit themselves of their duty by inculcating good maxims, when their negligence, or mistaken zeal in teaching the grounds of them, may at least give too great advantage to those, who make it their business to corrupt the principles, as well as the practice of their companions, which are but too many in this libertine age. . . .

MORAL IMMORTALITY INDEPENDENT OF IMMATERIAL SUBSTANCE

Reports of Materialist Belief in a Future State

But besides the uncertainty and danger of this argument, which I have before taken notice of, the uselessness of it, to the generality of mankind, sufficiently shows, that it cannot be the foundation of the belief of a future state. That it is not so to the Eastern Pagans at this day, we have the evidence of a judicious author, both from the information of the missionaries, who have been longest among them, and his own conversation with them, who tell us, that they believe the immortality of the soul, but have no notion of its immateriality; and that they only suppose it of a matter subtle enough to escape being seen or handled. And that many of the old philosophers, who expected a future state, had no thoughts of the soul's being immaterial, anyone must observe, who has read them with attention. And I believe, if well examined, it will appear, that those among them, who had a notion of the soul's being immaterial, did not believe its immortality upon that foundation, but only sought an explication, how the soul by its own nature might be capable of that immortality; which they found great reason to hope for, on other grounds much more firm and persuasive.

Rational Belief in Future Rewards and Punishments is Sufficient Proof of Immortality

But what is yet more considerable, were this proof of the soul's immortality as certain and as universally received, as any self-evident proposition, it would not at all serve to the chief end of our assurance of the soul's immortality, viz. The expectation of rewards and punishments in a future state according to our doings in this life; without which it is no matter, whether we think the soul immortal or no. And this we could never have by the most attentive consideration, and the clearest knowledge of what kind of substance the soul is. It must be established on far different grounds, such as the confederation of ourselves as rational and free creatures, of which we have an intuitive, infallible perceptions and of an omnipotent Being, from whom we are, and on whom we depend, of which we have a demonstrative knowledge within every one's understanding to whom it is proposed. And if the consequences drawn from thein are not sufficient to assure men of a future state of rewards and punishments, as the clearest proofs of the soul's immortality can signify nothing without them, so neither can they add any force to them, and therefore are of no use to the great ends of morality and religion.

For suppose to convince an intelligent heathen, who thought the soul material, and doubted of a future state of rewards and punishments, arguments were used to prove the soul in its own nature undissolvable, and that therefore it must remain after death; he night then reasonably enquire in what state it remains, how he may be sure, that it is in a state of rewards and punishments, and that it does not return to the universal soul, of which it may be an effluence; or inform the next parcel of matter it finds fitted for it, as some philosophers have thought. This, it is plain, must be still in doubt to him, notwithstanding those proofs of the soul's immortality; and arguments of another nature must be used to satisfy him in this point, whatever may be most proper to work on his understanding. Suppose those I have before hinted at; That 'tis reasonable to think that the wife and just Author of our being, having made us capable of happiness and misery, and given us faculties of discerning and choosing good or evil, designed we should be accountable for our actions, and happy or miserable, according as they are conformable, or not, to that law, which he has established in our very natures, that his will might be certainly known to us; and since it is visibly not so, in the ordinary course of his providence, but all things happen alike to the righteous and the wicked, in this world, it is most consonant to reason to think this is only a state of probation, and that the dispensation of rewards and punishments is reserved for a future life; there being no other way to reconcile the partial distribution of things here to that order which we know is agreeable to the divine will, by the conformity it has to our reason, which is a ray of his own wisdom.

We will suppose the heathen convinced by these arguments, or others to the same purpose; that he owns it is highly reasonable to conclude there must be a future state of rewards and punishments; but he does not so well digest the soul's being in material; he has no notion of a substance without any extension. Suppose then the Remarker should tell him, as he does Mr. Locke, if the soul is not immaterial, there can be no certain proof that it is immortal. And I desire him to take this dilemma for the heathen's answer: Either the arguments, by which I have been convinced, that there will be punishments and rewards in a future state, are proofs of it, or they are not; if not, then though the foul should be immortal, I have no assurance that it will be in a state of rewards or punishments; and if they are proofs of a future state, then a future state is equally certain, though the soul be not immaterial, since that does not make it less consonant to the justice and wisdom of God, nor lets within his power. I believe the Remarker will find he has no way to solve this dilemma, but must either give up the certainty of rewards and punishments, or the necessity of thinking the soul is immaterial, to prove a future state; and I defy him to establish the belief of rewards and punishments in a future state on any arguments, that will not be equally conclusive, whether the foul is immaterial or not.

This then is evident, that Mr. Locke's supposition, that God may have given (for anything we know) to some systems of matter a power to perceive, and think; does not at all weaken any proof of the soul's immortality, that can be of use to the great ends of religion, for which alone we are concerned to know, that the soul is immortal. And perhaps the insignificancy, as to those ends, of our knowing: what kind of substance the soul is, may be the reason we are left so much in the dark about it. Our wise Maker has proportioned our faculties only to our necessities, and has made his will known to us by a light of nature clear enough to render any one inexcusable, who does not follow it; though the full assurance of an eternal retribution is only given us by "Jesus Christ, who has brought life, and immortality, to light, through the Gospel" [2 Timothy 1:10], which I have already shewn, that Mr. Locke's principles give us a sure foundation for, both of natural and revealed religion.

Source: A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay of Human Understanding (1702), adapted.

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

1. According to Cavendish in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, why is speculative reasoning superior to scientific technology and experimentation, and why can sense perception not serve as the foundation of knowledge?

2. According to Cavendish in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, why does she assert that all parts of nature have a natural knowledge of God and worship Him, and why is this belief universal despite differences in particular religions?

3. According to Cavendish in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, why is a natural philosopher incapable of being an atheist, and how does she defend her materialist panpsychism by attributing sense and reason even to minerals?

4. According to Cavendish in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, why does she reject the Pythagorean doctrine of reincarnation, and how does her view of multiple material souls explain what happens to human vital and rational capacities after death?

5. According to Conway in The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, what are the primary attributes of God, and why does she propose replacing the trinitarian terminology of "three distinct Persons" with God's essential Idea and Will?

6. According to Conway in The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, why is Christ necessary as a cosmic medium between an unchangeable God and changeable creatures, and why are there strictly only three essentially distinct kinds of being?

7. According to Conway in The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, how does divine justice operate through the transmigration of brutish human spirits into animal bodies, and why are all divine punishments, including fire, ultimately temporary and medicinal?

8. According to Masham in Occasional Thoughts, what is the role of evidential reason in judging divine revelation, and why is it impossible for a true revelation to contradict natural reason?

9. According to Masham in Occasional Thoughts, how does natural theology deduce the existence and moral attributes of God from the order of creation, and why is sin defined as a rational self-contradiction?

10. According to Masham in Occasional Thoughts, why is unaided natural reason insufficient to guarantee moral behavior without the revelation of an afterlife, and how does Christ's covenant of grace free believers from burdensome superstitious rituals?

11. According to Masham in Occasional Thoughts, what two opposite errors do people commit when reading Scripture, and how does the speculative skepticism of religious teachers corrupt the faith of ordinary believers?

12. According to Cockburn in A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay, why is it dangerous and ineffective to make the immateriality of the soul the primary proof of its immortality when instructing the general public?

13. According to Cockburn in A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay, how do historical and contemporary examples of materialist belief in an afterlife demonstrate that expecting future rewards and punishments is independent of the soul's immateriality?

14. According to Cockburn in A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay, how does she construct her dilemma against the Remarker to prove that rational assurance of future divine retribution remains fully valid whether the soul is material or immaterial?

15. According to Cavendish in Observations upon Experimental Philosophy, why does she argue that human beings have no supreme or absolute power over natural causes and effects?

16. According to Conway in The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy, how does she explain the difference between the sins of the old world destroyed by water and the sins of the world to be destroyed by fire?

17. According to Masham in Occasional Thoughts, how does she answer the objection that a wise God would not have delayed divine revelation for so many ages?

18. According to Masham in Occasional Thoughts, how does she distinguish between the common definition of virtue as mere social conformity and virtue as adherence to right reason?

19. According to Cockburn in A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay, why does she hold that supporting a moral truth on false or uncertain foundations does as much damage as openly opposing it?

20. According to Cockburn in A Defence of Mr. Locke's Essay, why does she suggest our wise Maker may have left us in the dark regarding what specific kind of substance the soul is?

21. Short Essay Options: Please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

(a) Critics argue that Cavendish's materialist panpsychism degrades God by eliminating any distinct spiritual realm and attributing rational worship to inanimate objects like stones. How might Cavendish respond?

(b) Critics argue that Conway's doctrine of universal restoration and temporary punishment undermines the moral gravity of sin and contradicts orthodox Christian teachings on eternal damnation. How might Conway respond?

(c) Critics argue that Masham's insistence that reason must judge the validity of revelation effectively subjects divine authority to human error and leads straight into deism. How might Masham respond?

(d) Critics argue that Cockburn's willingness to grant that the soul might be material surrenders a fundamental pillar of Christian theology to physicalist materialism. How might Cockburn respond?

(e) Critics argue that Cavendish's rejection of experimental science in favor of speculative reason is an outdated prejudice that ignores the empirical successes of technological instruments like the microscope. How might Cavendish respond?

(f) Critics argue that Conway's concept of Christ as a middle being between God and creation reintroduces Arianism and destroys the divine equality of the Son with the Father. How might Conway respond?

(g) Critics argue that Masham's defense of revelation based on the "uncertainty of reward" reduces Christian morality to a mercenary calculation of self-interest based on future consequences. How might Masham respond?

(h) Critics argue that Cockburn's claim that common people cannot understand abstract proofs of immateriality is an overly condescending view of human rational capacity. How might Cockburn respond?

(i) Compare how Cavendish, Conway, Masham, and Cockburn navigated the gendered institutional barriers of early modern philosophy to establish their distinct philosophical voices.

(j) Compare how early modern women metaphysicians responded to the rise of mechanical materialism, contrasting Cavendish's materialist panpsychism with Masham and Cockburn's Lockean empiricism.