AQUINAS, DANTE, MOORE

From Classics in Political Philosophy, by James Fieser

© 2008, updated 1/1/2026, CC BY-NC-ND 4.0

 

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CONTENTS

• Thomas Aquinas: `Natural Law (from Summa Theologica and On the Governance of Rulers)

• Dante Alighieri: World Government (from On Monarchy)

• Thomas More: Utopia (from Utopia)

 

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THOMAS AQUINAS: NATURAL LAW

Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274) was born in what is now central Italy, and spent his life as a priest and scholar in the Roman Catholic Church. His most famous work is the voluminous Summa Theologica, which contains an influential account of natural law. In brief, God embeds various values within our natural instincts, which we discover through reason; these provide the substance of both our morals and laws. Part of Aquinas's motivation is to explain why natural law is universal, yet at the same time laws of particular countries can dramatically vary. For Aquinas, there are four kinds of law. Eternal law is God's unchanging laws of the universe. Natural law is a subset of eternal law, which God implants in human instincts and we discover through reflection. These include general rules, such as "don't harm others." Human law is an effort by humans to take the general principles of natural law and deduce specific applications from them, such as "don't write bad checks." Finally, divine law, as contained in the Bible, is a revealed portion of the eternal law that reinforces some principles of natural and human law, and adds special religious ones.

          Concerning natural law, Aquinas argues that there is one highest principle from which all others are derived: "Good is to be done and evil is to be avoided." We determine what is "good" for us by looking at our human inclinations, and he lists six relevant ones: self-preservation, sexual intercourse, educating our offspring, rationality, knowledge of God, and living in society. From these we infer six primary principles of natural law: (1) preserve human life, (2) procreate, (3) educate your children, (4) shun ignorance, (5) worship God, and (6) be sociable and do not harm others. Each of these primary principles encompasses more specific or secondary principles. For example, the primary principle "do not harm others" implies the secondary principles "don't steal" and "don't kill." These, in turn, imply even more specific or tertiary principles, such as "don't write bad checks." As the principles become more specific, they leave the domain of natural law and enter that of human law. When considering whether natural law is the same in all people, Aquinas argues that the primary principles are common to everyone, such as "do not harm others." However, more particular tertiary derivations of human law are not necessarily common to all societies. He argues that human laws carry the force of natural law if they are derived correctly; however, "if in any point it diverges from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law."

          Aquinas next considers whether people were initially designed in the state of innocence (i.e., the Garden of Eden) to rule over others, and he argues that there is indeed a natural inequality among people. However, while there is a natural master-subject relation, there is no master-slave relation. In selections from another work titled On the Governance of Rulers, Aquinas explains the nature and responsibility of kings. People naturally need a ruler to be guided to their proper end, since we were not naturally designed to survive alone. The King's main three obligations are to establish the good life for his subjects, preserve that good life, and improve upon it. In a final selection from Summa Theologica, Aquinas articulates three necessary criteria for any war to be morally just. First, it must be declared by the proper authority; private individuals cannot declare war or summon people to fight. Second, there must be a just cause, such as to address some fault or make amends for some wrong done by a rival country. Third, it must proceed from rightful intention, particularly the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil.

FOUR KINDS OF LAW (from Summa Theologica)

Whether there is an Eternal Law (ST 1a2ae.91.1)

A law is nothing else but a dictate of practical reason originating from the ruler who governs a perfect community. Now it is evident, granted that the world is ruled by Divine Providence, … that the whole community of the universe is governed by Divine Reason. For this reason the very Idea of the government of things in God the Ruler of the universe, has the nature of a law. Since the Divine Reason's conception of things is not subject to time but is eternal, according to Proverbs 8:23, therefore it is that this kind of law must be called eternal.

Whether there is in us a Natural Law (ST 1a2ae.91.2)

Law, being a rule and measure, can be in a person in two ways: in one way, as in him that rules and measures; in another way, as in that which is ruled and measured, since a thing is ruled and measured, in so far as it partakes of the rule or measure. For this reason, since all things subject to Divine providence are ruled and measured by the eternal law, as was stated above. It is evident that all things partake somewhat of the eternal law, in so far as, namely, from its being imprinted on them, they derive their respective inclinations to their proper acts and ends. Now among all others, the rational creature is subject to Divine providence in the most excellent way, in so far as it partakes of a share of providence, by being provident both for itself and for others. For this reason it has a share of the Eternal Reason, whereby it has a natural inclination to its proper act and end. This participation of the eternal law in the rational creature is called the natural law. Hence the Psalmist after saying (Palms 4:6): "Offer up the sacrifice of justice," as though someone asked what the works of justice are, adds: "Many say, Who showeth us good things?" in answer to which question he says: "The light of Thy countenance, O Lord, is signed upon us": thus implying that the light of natural reason, whereby we discern what is good and what is evil, which is the function of the natural law, is nothing else than an imprint on us of the Divine light. It is therefore evident that the natural law is nothing else than the rational creature's participation in the eternal law.

Whether there is Human Law (ST 1a2ae.91.3)

A law is a dictate of the practical reason. Now it is to be observed that the same procedure takes place in the practical and in the speculative reason. For each proceeds from principles to conclusions, as stated above. In the speculative reason, from naturally known indemonstrable principles, we draw the conclusions of the various sciences, the knowledge of which is not imparted to us by nature, but acquired by the efforts of reason. So too it is from the precepts of the natural law, as from general and indemonstrable principles, that the human reason needs to proceed to the more particular determination of certain matters. These particular determinations, devised by human reason, are called human laws, provided the other essential conditions of law be observed . . . . For this reason Cicero says in his Rhetoric that "justice has its source in nature; from this certain things came into custom by reason of their utility; afterwards these things which originated from nature and were approved by custom, were sanctioned by fear and reverence for the law."

Whether there was any Need for a Divine Law (ST 1a2ae.91.4)

Besides the natural and the human law it was necessary for the directing of human conduct to have a Divine law. This is so for four reasons. First, because it is by law that man is directed how to perform his proper acts in view of his last end. Indeed if man were ordained to no other end than that which is proportionate to his natural faculty, there would be no need for man to have any further direction of the part of his reason, besides the natural law and human law which is derived from it. But since man is ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is disproportionate to man's natural faculty … therefore it was necessary that, besides the natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by a law given by God. Secondly, because, on account of the uncertainty of human judgment, especially on contingent and particular matters, different people form different judgments on human acts. From this different and contrary [human] laws also result. In order, therefore, that man may know without any doubt what he ought to do and what he ought to avoid, it was necessary for man to be directed in his proper acts by a law given by God, for it is certain that such a law cannot err.

          Thirdly, because man can make laws in those matters of which he is competent to judge. But man is not competent to judge of internal movements, that are hidden, but only of external acts which appear: and yet for the perfection of virtue it is necessary for man to conduct himself aright in both kinds of acts. Consequently human law could not sufficiently curb and direct internal acts; and it was necessary for this purpose that a Divine law should also come about. Fourthly, because, as Augustine says, human law cannot punish or forbid all evil deeds. Since while aiming at doing away with all evils, it would do away with many good things, and would hinder the advance of the common good, which is necessary for human intercourse. In order, therefore, that no evil might remain unforbidden and unpunished, it was necessary for the Divine law to supervene, whereby all sins are forbidden.

          These four causes are touched upon in Psalms. 118:8, where it is said: "The law of the Lord is unspotted," i.e. allowing no foulness of sin; "converting souls," because it directs not only external, but also internal acts; "the testimony of the Lord is faithful," because of the certainty of what is true and right; "giving wisdom to little ones," by directing man to an end supernatural and Divine.

NATURAL AND HUMAN LAW

Whether the Natural Law contains Several Precepts, or Only One (ST 1a2ae.94.2)

As stated above (91.3), the precepts of the natural law are to the practical reason, what the first principles of demonstrations are to the speculative reason; because both are self-evident principles. Now a thing is said to be self-evident in two ways: first, in itself; secondly, in relation to us. Any proposition is said to be self-evident in itself, if its predicate is contained in the notion of the subject. Although, to one who does not know the definition of the subject, it happens that such a proposition is not self-evident. For instance, this proposition, "Man is a rational being," is, in its very nature, self-evident, since who says "man," says "a rational being": and yet to one who knows not what a man is, this proposition is not self-evident. Hence it is that, as Boethius says (De Hebdom.), certain axioms or propositions are universally self-evident to all; and such are those propositions whose terms are known to all, as, "Every whole is greater than its part," and, "Things equal to one and the same are equal to each other." But some propositions are self-evident only to the wise, who understand the meaning of the terms of such propositions: thus to one who understands that an angel is not a body, it is self-evident that an angel is not circumscriptively in a place: but this is not evident to the unlearned, for they cannot grasp it.

          Now a certain order is to be found in those things that are apprehended universally. For that which, before anything else, falls under apprehension, is "being," the notion of which is included in all things whatsoever a man apprehends. Thus, the first indemonstrable principle is that "the same thing cannot be affirmed and denied at the same time," which is based on the notion of "being" and "not-being": and on this principle all others are based, as is stated in [Aristotle's] Metaphysics 4.9. Now as "being" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension simply, so "good" is the first thing that falls under the apprehension of the practical reason, which is directed to action: since every agent acts for an end under the aspect of good. Consequently the first principle of practical reason is one founded on the notion of good, viz. that "good is that which all things seek after." Hence this is the first precept of law, that "good is to be done and pursued, and evil is to be avoided." All other precepts of the natural law are based upon this: so that whatever the practical reason naturally apprehends as man's good (or evil) belongs to the precepts of the natural law as something to be done or avoided.

          Since, however, good has the nature of an end, and evil, the nature of a contrary, hence it is that all those things to which man has a natural inclination, are naturally apprehended by reason as being good. Consequently these are objects of pursuit, and their contraries are evil, and objects of avoidance. Thus, according to the order of natural inclinations is the order of the precepts of the natural law. First of all, there is in man an inclination to good in accordance with the nature which he has in common with all substances, to the extent that every substance seeks the preservation of its own being, according to its nature. By reason of this inclination, whatever is a means of preserving human life, and of warding off its obstacles, belongs to the natural law. Secondly, there is in man an inclination to things that pertain to him more specially, according to that nature which he has in common with other animals. In virtue of this inclination, those things are said to belong to the natural law, "which nature has taught to all animals," such as sexual intercourse, education of offspring and so forth. Thirdly, there is in man an inclination to good, according to the nature of his reason, which nature is proper to him. Thus man has a natural inclination to know the truth about God, and to live in society. In this respect, whatever pertains to this inclination belongs to the natural law; for instance, to shun ignorance, to avoid offending those among whom one has to live, and other such things regarding the above inclination.

Whether the Natural Law is the Same in All Men (ST 1a2ae.94.4)

To the natural law belongs those things to which a man is inclined naturally. Among these it is proper to man to be inclined to act according to reason. Now the process of reason is from the common to the proper, as stated in [Aristotle's] Physics 1. The speculative reason, however, is differently situated in this matter, from the practical reason. For, since the speculative reason is busied chiefly with the necessary things, which cannot be otherwise than they are, its proper conclusions, like the universal principles, contain the truth without fail. The practical reason, on the other hand, is busied with contingent matters, about which human actions are concerned. Consequently, although there is necessity in the general principles, the more we descend to matters of detail, the more frequently we encounter defects. Accordingly, in speculative matters truth is the same in all men, both as to principles and as to conclusions. However, the truth is not known to all as regards the conclusions, but only as regards the principles which are called common notions. But in matters of action, truth or practical rightness is not the same for all, as to matters of detail, but only as to the general principles: and where there is the same rightness in matters of detail, it is not equally known to all.

          It is therefore evident that, as regards the general principles whether of speculative or of practical reason, truth or rightness is the same for all, and is equally known by all. As to the proper conclusions of the speculative reason, the truth is the same for all, but is not equally known to all. Thus it is true for all that the three angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, although it is not known to all. But as to the proper conclusions of the practical reason, neither is the truth or rightness the same for all, nor, where it is the same, is it equally known by all. Thus it is right and true for all to act according to reason. From this principle it follows as a proper conclusion, that goods entrusted to another should be restored to their owner. Now this is true for the majority of cases. But it may happen in a particular case that it would be injurious, and therefore unreasonable, to restore goods held in trust; for instance, if they are claimed for the purpose of fighting against one's country. This principle will be found to fail the more, according as we descend further into detail. This is so, for example, if one were to say that goods held in trust should be restored with such and such a guarantee, or in such and such a way. For, the greater the number of conditions added, the greater the number of ways in which the principle may fail, so that it be not right to restore or not to restore.

          Consequently we must say that the natural law, as to general principles, is the same for all, both as to rightness and as to knowledge. But as to certain matters of detail, which are conclusions, as it were, of those general principles, it is the same for all in the majority of cases, both as to rightness and as to knowledge. Yet in some few cases it may fail, both as to rightness, by reason of certain obstacles. This is just as natures subject to generation and corruption fail in some few cases on account of some obstacle. As to knowledge, some people's reason is perverted by passion, evil habit, or an evil disposition of nature. Thus formerly, theft, although it is expressly contrary to the natural law, was not considered wrong among the Germans, as Julius Caesar relates.

Whether every Human Law is Derived from the Natural Law (ST 1a2ae.95.2)

As Augustine says (On Free Choice 1.5) "that which is not just seems to be no law at all." Thus the force of a law depends on the extent of its justice. Now in human affairs a thing is said to be just, from being right, according to the rule of reason. But the first rule of reason is the law of nature, as is clear from what has been stated above (91.2). Consequently every human law has just so much of the nature of law, as it is derived from the law of nature. But if in any point it deflects from the law of nature, it is no longer a law but a perversion of law.

          But it must be noted that something may be derived from the natural law in two ways: first, as a conclusion from premises, secondly, by way of determination of certain generalities. The first way is like to that by which, in sciences, demonstrated conclusions are drawn from the principles. The second way is likened to that whereby, in the arts, general forms are particularized as to details: thus the craftsman needs to determine the general form of a house to some particular shape. Some things are therefore derived from the general principles of the natural law, by way of conclusions. For example, that "one must not kill" may be derived as a conclusion from the principle that "one should do harm to no man." But some are derived from them by way of determination. For example, the law of nature has it that the evil-doer should be punished; but that he be punished in this or that way, is a determination of the law of nature.

          Accordingly, both types of derivation are found in the human law. But those things which are derived in the first way, are contained in human law not as originating from them exclusively, but have some force from the natural law also. But those things which are derived in the second way, have no other force than that of human law . . . . The general principles of the natural law cannot be applied to all men in the same way on account of the great variety of human affairs. Hence arises the diversity of positive laws among various people.

NATURAL SERVITUDE (from Summa Theologica)

Human Inequality in the State of Innocence (ST 1a.96.3)

We must admit that in the primitive state there would have been some inequality, at least as regards sex, because generation depends upon diversity of sex: and likewise as regards age. For some would have been born of others; nor would sexual union have been sterile. Further, as regards the soul, there would have been inequality as to righteousness and knowledge. For man worked not of necessity, but of his own free-will, by virtue of which man can apply himself, more or less, to action, desire, or knowledge. Hence some would have made a greater advance in virtue and knowledge than others. There might also have been bodily disparity. For the human body was not entirely exempt from the laws of nature, so as not to receive from external sources more or less advantage and help. For, indeed it was dependent on food with which it would sustain life. So we may say that, according to the climate, or the movement of the stars, some would have been born more robust in body than others, and also greater, and more beautiful, and all ways better disposed. However, in those who were thus surpassed, there would have been no defect or fault either in soul or body.

Man Mastering over Man in the State of Innocence (ST 1a.96.4)

Mastership has two meanings. First, as opposed to slavery, in which sense a master means one to whom another is subject as a slave. In another sense mastership is referred in a general sense to any kind of subject. In this sense even he who has the office of governing and directing free men, can be called a master. In the state of innocence man could have been a master of men, not in the former but in the latter sense. This distinction is founded on the reason that a slave differs from a free man in that the latter has the disposal of himself, as is stated in the beginning of [Aristotle's] Metaphysics, whereas a slave is ordered to another. So that one man is master of another as his slave when he refers the one whose master he is, to his own--namely the master's use. Since every man's proper good is desirable to himself, and consequently it is a grievous matter to anyone to yield to another what ought to be one's own, therefore such dominion implies of necessity a pain inflicted on the subject. Consequently in the state of innocence such a mastership could not have existed between man and man. But a man is the master of a free subject, by directing him either towards his proper welfare, or to the common good. Such a kind of mastership would have existed in the state of innocence between man and man, for two reasons.

          First, because man is naturally a social being, and so in the state of innocence he would have led a social life. Now a social life cannot exist among a number of people unless under the presidency of one to look after the common good; for many, as such, seek many things, whereas one attends only to one. Accordingly, the Philosopher [Aristotle] says, in the beginning of the Politics, that wherever many things are directed to one, we will always find one at the head directing them.

          Secondly, if one man surpassed another in knowledge and virtue, this would not have been appropriate unless these gifts contributed to the benefit of others. According to 1 Peter 4:10, "Each one should use whatever gift he has received to serve others." Accordingly, Augustine says (The City of God, 19.14): "Just men command not by the love of domineering, but by the service of counsel." And (The City of God, 19.15): "The natural order of things requires this; and thus did God make man."

THE NATURE AND DUTIES OF A KING (from On the Governance of Rulers)

What is Meant by the Name, King

1. Our plan must begin with an explanation of what is to be understood by the word "king." In all pursuits which are directed toward some end and in which it is possible to proceed in more than one way, there is need of some controlling force by which one may arrive by a straight course at the appointed goal. A ship, driven in various directions by the impulse of varying winds, would never reach her destination were she not guided to the port by the diligence of the helmsman. But for a man there is an end toward which his whole life and action are directed. For he acts by virtue of the intellect, whose property is to act purposefully. Further, it happens that men proceed through various ways toward the proper destination of mankind; this is revealed in the diversity of human interests and actions. Man, therefore, needs something to guide him toward his goal. There dwells naturally within every man the light of reason, by which he in his actions is directed toward his proposed end. If it suited man to live singly, as many animals do, he would need no one else to guide him to his end. Every man would be his own king, under God—the supreme king; by the light of reason, divinely given, he would direct himself in all his acts. But it is the nature of man to be a social and political animal, living in a multitude,—more so than other animals, as natural necessity makes clear. For other animals nature has prepared food, coverings of hair, and means of defense—such as teeth, horns, and claws; or, at least, they have speed for flight. Man was created with none of these things prepared for him by nature. In place of them all reason was given him by which he might provide them for himself with the work of his hands. But to obtain such things one man is not sufficient. For one man alone could not live an adequate life. It is, therefore, natural to man to live in the society of many.

          Furthermore, in other animals there exists a natural instinct with regard to all things which are beneficial or harmful to them. For example, the sheep naturally considers the wolf his enemy. Animals also by natural instinct know that some herbs are necessary to their lives and that others are medicinal. But only in a community does man have natural knowledge of those things which are necessary to his life, as if having power through reason to obtain from general principles the knowledge of the simple things which are necessary to human life. It is not possible, however, for one man by his own reason to accomplish all of this. It is, therefore, necessary for men to live in multitudes, so that one may be helped by another and different ones may be occupied in discovering different things, through reason. Thus one is engaged in medicine, another in this pursuit, another in that. This system is made very clear in the fact that it is a characteristic of man to use speech, by means of which he is able to set completely forth his conceptions to his fellows. Other animals express their passions to each other in various ways, as dogs indicate their anger by barking. But man is more disposed to communication than any other gregarious animal, such as the crane, the ant, or the bee. Regarding this matter Solomon says (Eccl. iv. 9), "Two are better than one, because they have the reward of mutual society." . . .

          If an unjust government should be established by one man who in governing seeks his own benefit, and not that of the multitude committed to him, such a ruler is called a tyrant, a name derived from might, because he coerces with force, instead of ruling with justice. Thus among the ancients some powerful persons were called tyrants. When an unjust government is founded, not by one, but by a few, it is called an oligarchy, which is the rule of a few who, for the sake of riches, oppress the people; it differs from a tyranny only in number. If the evil government is conducted by the many, it is called a democracy, which is the rule of the common people who through force of numbers overwhelm the wealthy. The whole people here are as one tyrant. Just governments should be distinguished in the same manner. If just government is controlled by a multitude it is called by the general name of polity, as when a multitude of warriors rule within a state or province. If it is conducted by a few who are virtuous, it is called an aristocracy—which is the best dominion, or the government of the best, who are thus called optimates. If the just power belongs to one alone, he is properly called king. Accordingly, the Lord says (Ezek. 37.24), Daniel my servant will be king over them; and they all will have one shepherd. Thus it is clear that from the nature of a king he is one who is set above, and that he should be a shepherd seeking the common good of the multitude and not his own.

          Since it is appropriate for man to live in a multitude because he is not sufficient by himself with regard to the necessities of life, the society of the multitude ought to be as much more perfect than life in isolation as it is in itself more sufficient in the necessities of life. There is indeed a certain sufficiency for life in the family of one household, as much, that is, as is needed for natural acts of nutrition, reproduction of offspring, and other similar purposes. There is a sufficiency in one village, so far as the things belonging to one craft go. But in a city, which is a perfect community, there is everything that is required for all the necessities of life; and still more sufficient is a province, when there is need for mutual assistance in fighting against common enemies. Therefore, the one who rules a perfect community, that is, a city or a province, is called by the title of king. The one who rules a house is called not king but paterfamilias; but he has a certain likeness to a king; so kings are sometimes called fathers of their people.

          It appears, then, from what has been said, that a king is one who rules the multitude of a city or province, and rules it for the public good. Accordingly, Solomon says (Eccl. v. 8), The king reigns over all the land subject to him.

That a Kingdom Ought to be Governed Primarily with a View to Creating Happiness

15. Since the end of the life which we live well at present is heavenly happiness, it pertains to the duty of the king to make the life of the multitude good, in accordance with what is suitable for that heavenly happiness. He must command those things which lead to heavenly happiness and forbid their opposites, as far as possible. The way to true happiness and the obstructions on the way are revealed in the divine law, the teaching of which is the duty of priests. . . . The king, having learned the divine law, ought to study especially how the multitude subject to him may live well. This study has three parts: first, how a king may institute a good life among the subject multitude; secondly, how he may preserve what has been instituted; thirdly, how he may advance what he has preserved to a better condition.

          For the good life of an individual two things are needed. One thing, which is fundamental, is action according to virtue (for virtue is that by which one lives well). The other, which is secondary and instrumental, is a sufficiency of material goods, the use of which is necessary to virtuous action. The unity of an individual man is produced by nature. The unity of a multitude, which is called peace, must be obtained through the efforts of the ruler. Therefore, to establish good life for a multitude three things are required: first, that the multitude should be brought into the unity of peace. Secondly, that the multitude, having been united by the bond of peace, should be directed to good action. For as a man can do nothing well unless the unity of his parts be first established, so a multitude of men, lacking the unity of peace and fighting itself, is prevented from acting well. Thirdly, that through the care of the ruler there should be provided a sufficient supply of the necessities for good living. When, therefore, good life is established in a multitude by the services of the king, he should next work for the conservation of that life.

          There are three things which prevent the public good from enduring. One of them comes from nature. For the good of the multitude ought to be established not for one time but for all time. But since men are mortal they cannot live forever. Nor while they live are they always equally vigorous, because human life is subject to variations and men are not equipped to perform the same duties throughout their lives. Another hindrance to the maintenance of the public good comes from within and depends upon the perversity of wills, which are either too weak to achieve those things which common welfare requires, or are hostile to the peace of the multitude and, despising justice, disturb the tranquility of others. The third impediment to the preservation of the state arises from without, when peace is upset by the encroachments of enemies which sometimes altogether destroy a kingdom or a city. A three-fold responsibility, therefore, rests upon the king. First, for the succession of men in the various offices, since by divine law in things corruptible they cannot always remain the same, he must see that others are born to take the places left vacant. Thus the integrity of the whole and the good of the subject multitude are preserved by the care of the king. Secondly, by his laws and commands he must keep his subjects from wickedness and lead them into works of virtue, taking his example from God, who has given laws to men and returns rewards to those who keep the laws, and punishments to those who transgress. Thirdly, it rests with the king to keep the multitude subject to him safe from enemies. For it would avail them nothing to escape the inner perils if they are not also defended from those without.

          Finally, for the good government of a multitude there remains a third thing which pertains to the duty of the king. It is that he take care for their advancement. This he does when in each of the matters mentioned above he corrects whatever is wrong, supplies whatever is lacking, and strives to perfect whatever can be improved. Accordingly, the Apostle warns the faithful always to covet earnestly the better gifts.

          These then are the things which pertain to the duty of a king. Each should be considered carefully and in detail.

JUST WAR (from Summa Theologica)

Whether it is Always Sinful to Wage War (ST 2a2ae.40.1)

In order for a war to be just, three things are necessary. First, the authority of the sovereign by whose command the war is to be waged. For it is not the business of a private individual to declare war, because he can seek for redress of his rights from the tribunal of his superior. Further, it is not the business of a private individual to summon together the people, which has to be done in wartime. As the care of the public good is committed to those who are in authority, it is their business to watch over the public good of the city, kingdom or province subject to them. Just as it is lawful for them to have recourse to the sword in defending that public good against internal disturbances, when they punish evil-doers, according to the words of the Apostle: "He does not bear the sword for nothing. He is God's servant, an agent of wrath to bring punishment on the wrongdoer" (Romans 13:4). So too, it is their business to have recourse to the sword of war in defending the public good against external enemies. Hence it is said to those who are in authority: "Rescue the poor: and deliver the needy out of the hand of the sinner" (Psalms, 81:4). For this reason Augustine says: "The natural order conducive to peace among mortals demands that the power to declare and counsel war should be in the hands of those who hold the supreme authority."

          Secondly, a just cause is required, namely that those who are attacked, should be attacked because they deserve it on account of some fault. For this reason Augustine says "A just war is customarily to be described as one that avenges wrongs, when a nation or state has to be punished, for refusing to make amends for the wrongs inflicted by its subjects, or to restore what it has seized unjustly."

          Thirdly, it is necessary that those making war should have a rightful intention, so that they intend the advancement of good, or the avoidance of evil. Hence Augustine says "True religion looks upon as peaceful those wars that are waged not for motives of aggrandizement, or cruelty, but with the object of securing peace, of punishing evil-doers, and of uplifting the good." For it may happen that the war is declared by the legitimate authority, and for a just cause, and yet be rendered unlawful through a wicked intention. Hence Augustine says (Contra Faustum, 22.74): "The passion for inflicting harm, the cruel thirst for vengeance, non-peaceful and relentless spirit, the fever of revolt, the lust of power, and such like things, all these are rightly condemned in war."

Source: Summa Theologica, tr. Laurence Shapcote. On the Governance of Rulers (De Regimine Principum), Bk. I, chs. 1, 15, tr. Francis Coker.

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DANTE ALIGHIERI: WORLD GOVERNMENT

Italian poet Dante Alighieri (1265-1321) was one of the great literary figures of the late Middle Ages, and is best remembered for his epic poem The Divine Comedy (1320). He studied philosophy for several years in his youth and became familiar with Aristotle's writings. He was politically active later in life and, caught between ruling factions, was exiled from his hometown of Florence. With his country in turmoil, he looked to German king Henry VII to unify the continent and return the Holy Roman Empire to its former glory. Within this context, he wrote On Monarchy (1312) in which he argues three points: (1) there should be a single monarch who rules the entire world, (2) the Roman empire justly had that claim, and (3) the authority of kings comes directly from God, and kings are not subservient to the church. The selections below address the first and third of these issues. Regarding a world monarch, Dante presents around a dozen arguments for this position, many of which draw heavily from Aristotle's metaphysical theories, the underlying theme of which is that the more unified a thing is, the better. For example, a world monarch is like the prime mover who orchestrates the motion of all celestial objects. Other arguments, though, draw on more natural intuitions, such as that a single ruler can best resolve conflicts between factions, or get things done more efficiently. His final argument reflects his inner conviction about the special status of the Roman Empire: the greatest peace on earth took place during Augustus's rule, and it was during this time that God decided to become human through Jesus. Regarding the third issue, Dante argues that earthly kings receive their authority directly through God, and not from the Pope and the Church as was commonly held. Human nature has two ends: earthly paradise and heavenly paradise, and God specifically assigned earthly kings to help us achieve this first end, and the church the second.

ARGUMENTS FOR A WORLD MONARCH (from On Monarchy)

Three Questions concerning Temporal Monarchy

1. . . . An understanding of temporal monarchy is very profitable but also very obscure. Yet it has been left unexplored by everyone because it is no immediate source of worldly gain. It is thus my purpose to draw it out from its hiding-places, so that I may exert my labor for the benefit of the world, but also so that I may be the first to win the prize of so great an achievement for my own glory. The work indeed is difficult, and I am attempting what is beyond my strength. I do not trust in my own powers, but, rather, in the light of that bountiful giver, "Who gives to all men generously, and does not reprimand."

          2. First, we must see what it is that is called "temporal monarchy", in its idea, so to speak, and according to its purpose. Temporal monarchy, or as people call it "the Empire," is the government of one prince above all men in time, or in those things and over those things which are measured by time. Three great questions are asked concerning it. First, there is the question, is it necessary for the welfare of the world? Secondly, did the Roman people rightfully take to itself the office of monarchy? And thirdly, does the authority of monarchy come from God directly, or only from some other minister or intermediary of God?

A Monarch Needed for Society to Achieve its End

5. . . . The first question is whether temporal monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world. That it is necessary, I think, can be shown by the strongest and most evident arguments, for nothing either from reason or of authority opposes me. Let us first take the authority of Aristotle in his Politics. There, on his respected authority, it is said that where a number of things are arranged to attain an end, it is necessary for one of them to regulate or govern the others, and the others to submit. It is not only the authority of his famous name which makes this worthy of belief, but also reason, by citing examples.

          If we take the case of a single man, we will see the same rule evident in him. All his powers are ordered to gain happiness, but his understanding is what regulates and governs all the others, otherwise he would never attain happiness. Again, take a single household: its end is to shape the members to live well; but there must be one to regulate and rule it, who is called the father of the family, or, it may be, one who holds his office. As Aristotle says: "Every house is ruled by the oldest." As Homer says, it is his duty to make rules and laws for the rest. Hence the proverbial curse: "May you have an equal at home." Take a single village: its end is the mutual assistance of people and goods, but one in it must be the ruler of the rest, either set over them by another, or with their consent, the head man among them. If it is not so, not only do its inhabitants fail of this mutual assistance, but the whole neighborhood is sometimes completely ruined by the ambition of many, who each of them wish to rule. If, again, we take a single city: its end is to secure a good and sufficient life for the citizens. But one man must be ruler in good forms of the state (as well is in imperfect forms). If it is otherwise, not only is the end of civil life lost, but the city too ceases to be what it was. Lastly, if we take any one kingdom, of which the end is the same as that of a city, only with greater security for its tranquility, there must be one king to rule and govern. If this is not so, not only do his subjects miss their end, but the kingdom itself falls to destruction, according to that word of the infallible truth: "Every kingdom that is divided against itself will fall to desolation." If this holds true in these cases, and in each individual thing which is ordered to one certain end, then what we have established is true.

          Now it is plain that the whole human race is ordered to gain some end, as has been before shown. There must, therefore, be one to guide and govern, and the proper title for this office is monarch or Emperor. So it is plain that monarchy or the Empire is necessary for the welfare of the world. . . .

A Monarch Reflects the Image of God as Oneness

8. All is well and at its best which exists according to the will of the first agent, who is God. This is self-evident, except to those who deny that divine goodness achieves absolute perfection.

          It is the intention of God that all created things should represent the likeness of God, so far as their proper nature will admit. Therefore it was said: "Let us make man in our image, after our likeness." Although it could not be said that the lower part of creation was made in the image of God, yet all things may be said to be after his likeness, for what is the whole universe but the "footprint of the divine goodness." Therefore, the human race is well, and in fact at its best state when, so far as can be, it is made like God. But the human race is most made like God when it is most as one; for the true principle of oneness is in him alone. Accordingly it is written: "Hear, O Israel, the Lord your God is one God." But the human race is most one when it is united wholly in one body, and it is evident that this cannot be, except when it is subject to one prince. Therefore in this domination mankind is most made like God, and, consequently, such a domination is in accord with the divine intention, and it is indeed well and best for man when this is so, as we showed at the beginning of this chapter.

A Monarch Parallels the Prime Mover

9. Again, things are well and at their best with every son when he follows the footsteps of a perfect father, as far as he can by his proper nature. Mankind is the son of heaven, which is most perfect in all of its works; for it is "man and the sun which produce man," according to Aristotle's second book on Physics. The human race, therefore, is at its best when it imitates the movements of heaven, as far as human nature allows. Since the whole heaven is regulated with one motion, that is, that of the prime mover, and by one mover, who is God, in all its parts, movements, and movers (and human reason readily grasps this from science). Therefore, if our argument is correct, the human race is at its best state when (both in its movements, and in regard to those who move it) it is regulated by a single Prince, as by the single movement of heaven, and by one law, as by the single motion. Therefore it is necessary for the welfare of the world for there to be a monarchy, or single Princedom, which men call the Empire. Boethius suggested this when he said: "Oh happy race of men, if your hearts are ruled by the love which rules the heaven."

A Monarch Needed to resolve Controversies

10. Wherever there is controversy, there ought to be judgment. Otherwise there would be imperfection without its proper remedy, which is impossible since God and Nature, in necessary things, do not fail in their provisions. But it is clear that there may be controversy between any two princes, where the one is not subject to the other, either from the fault of themselves, or even of their subjects. Therefore, between them there should be means of judgment. Since, when one is not subject to the other, he cannot be judged by the other (for there is no rule of equals over equals), there must be a third prince of wider jurisdiction, within the circle of whose laws both may come. Either he will or he will not be a monarch. If he is, we have what we sought. If not, then this one again will have an equal, who is not subject to his jurisdiction, and then again we have need of a third. So, we must either go on to infinity, which is impossible, or we must come to that judge who is first and highest; by whose judgment all controversies will be either directly or indirectly decided; and he will be monarch or Emperor. Monarchy is therefore necessary to the world, and Aristotle saw this when [quoting Homer]: "The world is not intended to be disposed in evil order; 'in a multitude of rulers there is evil, therefore let there be one prince.'"

A Monarch Allows the Most Freedom

12. Again, the human race is ordered best when it is most free. . . . It is therefore evident that this liberty, or this principle of all our liberty, is the greatest gift bestowed by God on mankind. By it alone we gain happiness as men; by it alone we gain happiness elsewhere as gods. But if this is so, who will say that humankind is not in its best state, when it can most use this principle. But he who lives under a monarchy is most free. Therefore, let it be understood that he is free who exists not for another's sake but for his own, as Aristotle said in his Metaphysics. For everything which exists for the sake of some other thing, is necessitated by that other thing, as a road has to run to its intended end. Only if a monarch rules will people exist for themselves, and not at the pleasure of others. For only then are the perverted forms of government set right—while democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies, will drive mankind into slavery (as is obvious to any who is familiar with them all). Public power is in the hands of kings and aristocracies, which they call the rule of the best, and champions of popular liberty. Because the monarch loves his subjects much, as we have seen, he wishes all men to be good, which cannot be the case in perverted forms of government. Thus, Aristotle says in his Politics: "In the bad state the good man is a bad citizen, but in a good state the two coincide." Good states in this way aim at liberty, so that in them men may live for themselves. The citizens exist not for the good of magistrates, nor the nation for the good of its king. But the magistrate exists for the good of the citizens, and the king for the good of his nation. For just as the laws are made to suit the state, and not the state to suit the laws, so too those who live under the laws are not ordered for the legislator, but he for them. Aristotle also holds this in what he has left us on the present subject. Hence, too, it is clear that, although the king or the magistrate rule over the other citizens regarding the means of government, yet regarding the end of government they are the servants of the citizens, and especially the monarch, who, without doubt, must be held the servant of all. Thus it is clear that the monarch is bound by the end appointed to himself in making his laws. Therefore mankind is best off under a monarchy, and it follows that monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world.

A Monarch is more Just and less Tempted by Desires

13. Further, he who can be best prepared to rule can best prepare others. . . . Hence it may be gathered that he who wishes to prepare others needs to be prepared for his work in the best way. But the monarch is the only one who can be prepared in the best possible way to govern. This is proved as follows: Each thing is the more easily and perfectly qualified for any habit, or actual work, the less there is in it of what is contrary to such a disposition. Therefore, they who have never even heard of philosophy, arrive at a habit of truth in philosophy more easily and completely than those who have listened to it at odd times, and are filled with false opinions. For this reason Galen well says: "Such as these require double time to acquire knowledge." A monarch then has nothing to tempt appetite, or, at least, less than any other man, as we have shown before; whereas other princes have much; and appetite is the only corrupter of righteousness, and the only impediment to justice. A monarch therefore is wholly, or at least more than any other [regional] prince, disposed to govern well: for in him there may be judgment and justice more strongly than in any other. But these two things are the pre-eminent attributes of a maker of law, and of an executor of law, as that most holy king David testified when he asked of God the things which were appropriate to the king, and the king's son, saying: "Give the king your judgment, O God, and your righteousness to the king's son."

          We were right then when we assumed that only the monarch can be best prepared to rule. Therefore, only the monarch can in the best way prepare other men. It follows, then, that monarchy is necessary for the best ordering of the world.

A Monarch does Things more Efficiently

14. . . . All that is superfluous is displeasing to God and Nature, and all that is displeasing to God and Nature is bad, as is evident. It therefore follows not only that it is better that a thing should be done by one than by many agents, if it is possible to produce the effect by one. Further, to produce the effect by one is good, and to produce it by many is simply bad. . . .

          But it must be carefully observed that when we say that mankind may be ruled by one supreme prince, we do not mean that the most trivial judgments for each particular town are to proceed immediately from him. For municipal laws sometimes fail, and need guidance, as Aristotle shows in the fifth book of his Ethics, when he praises fairness. For nations and kingdoms and states have, each of them, certain peculiarities which must be regulated by different laws. For law is the rule which directs life. Thus, the Scythians need one rule, for they live beyond the seventh climate, and suffer from almost unbearable cold, from the great difference between their days and nights. But the Garamantes need a different law, for their country is equinoctial, and they cannot wear many clothes, from the excessive heat of the air, because the day is as long as the darkness of the night. But our meaning is that it is in those matters which are common to all men, that men should be ruled by one monarch, and be governed by a rule common to them all, with a view to their peace. The individual princes must receive this rule of life or law from him. . . . It is not only possible for one man to act as we have described; it is necessary that it should proceed from one man only to avoid confusion in our first principles. Moses himself wrote in his law that he had acted this way. He took the elders of the tribes of the children of Israel, and left to them the lesser judgments, reserving to himself those that were more important, and wider in their scope. The elders then carried these wider ones to their tribes, according as they were applicable to each separate tribe.

          Therefore, it is better for the human race to be ruled by one than by many, and thus there should be a monarch, who is a single prince. If it is better, it is more acceptable to God, since God always wills what is best. Of these two ways of government, since the one is not only the better, but the best of all, it follows not only that this one is more acceptable to God as between one and many, but that it is the most acceptable. Therefore, it is best for the human race to be governed by one man; and monarchy is necessary for the welfare of the world.

A Monarch Harmonize the Wills of Everyone

15. . . . It is plain that whatever is good, is good for this reason: that it consists in unity. Because harmony is a good thing in so far as it is harmony, it is evident that it consists in a certain unity, as its proper root, the nature of which will appear if we discover the real nature of harmony. Harmony is the uniform motion of many wills. Hence it appears that a unity of wills, by which is meant their uniform motion, is the root of harmony—indeed, it is harmony itself. We say that many clumps of earth are harmonious because that they all gravitate together towards the center, and that many flames are harmonious because they all ascend together towards the circumference. If they did this of their own free will, we say that many men are in harmony because they are all moved together. There is one quality formally in the clumps of earth, which is gravity, and one in the flame of fire, which is lightness. Similarly, regarding willing, there is one thing that is formally in everyone's wills. For the force of willing is a certain power; but the quality of good which it captures is its form. This form, like others, being one, is multiplied in itself, according to the multiplication of the matters which receive it, as the soul, and numbers, and other forms which belong to what is compound.

          To explain our assumption as we proposed, let us argue in this way. All harmony depends on unity which is in wills. The human race, when it is at its best, is a kind of harmony—for as one man at his best is a kind of harmony (and as the same is true of the family, the city, and the kingdom), so is it of the whole human race. Therefore the human race at its best depends on the unity which is in will. But this cannot be unless there is one will to be the single mistress and regulating influence of all the rest. For the wills of men, because of the temptations of youth, require one to direct them, as Aristotle shows in the tenth book of his Ethics. This cannot be unless there is one prince over all, whose will shall be the mistress and regulating influence of all the others. But if all these conclusions are true, as they are, it is necessary for the highest welfare of the human race that there should be a monarch in the world. Thus, monarchy is necessary for the good of the world.

Monarchy is Confirmed by Augustus's Peace of Rome

16. To all these reasons alleged above, a memorable experience adds its confirmation. I mean that period in human history which the Son of God waited for, when he was about to become human for the salvation of everyone, at the moment when he willed (or ordered at his will). If we reflect on the arrangement of the human race and the order of its times, from the fall of our first parents (which was the turning point at which all our going astray began), we will find that the world was never at peace everywhere except under the divine Augustus, who was sole ruler, and under whom a perfect monarchy existed. It is the testimony of all writers of history that the human race was happy in the tranquility of universal peace. This is the testimony of famous poets. This, too, the author of the story of the "meekness and gentleness of Christ" has thought proper to say. Last of all, Paul has called that most blessed circumstance "the fullness of the times." For then, indeed, time was full, and all the things of time, since no function belonging to our happiness lacked its minister. But if we don't see it with our own eyes, we may read in books how the world has progressed since that "seamless robe" has been torn apart by the claws of ambition. Oh, race of mankind! What storms must toss you, what losses must you endure, what shipwrecks must batter you, as long as you, a beast of many heads, strive after opposing things. You are sick in your faculties of understanding, and you are sick in your affections. Unanswerable reasons fail to heal your higher understanding. The very sight of experience does not convince your lower understanding. Not even the sweetness of divine persuasion charms your affections, when it breathes into you through the music of the Holy Ghost: "Observe how good and how pleasant a thing it is to dwell together in unity."

MONARCH'S AUTHORITY INDEPENDENT OF CHURCH AUTHORITY

Against the Sun-Moon Argument for Church Authority

1. At the beginning of this work I proposed to examine three questions, according as the subject matter would permit me. Concerning the two first questions, I think our inquiry has been sufficiently accomplished in the preceding books. It remains to examine the third question. Perhaps it may arouse a certain amount of indignation against me, for the truth of it cannot appear without embarrassing certain men. . . . The present question, then, concerning which we have to inquire, is between two great luminaries, the Roman Pontiff and the Roman Prince: and the question is, does the authority of the Roman Monarch (who, as we have proved in the second book, is the monarch of the world) depend immediately on God, or on some minister or vicar of God; by whom I understand the successor of Peter [i.e., the Pope], who truly has the keys of the kingdom of heaven? . . .

          4. Those men to whom all our subsequent reasoning is addressed, when they assert that the authority of the Empire depends on the authority of the Church, as the inferior workman depends on the architect, are moved to take this view by many arguments, some of which they draw from Holy Scripture, and some also from the acts of the Supreme Pontiff and of the Emperor himself. Further, they strive to have some proof from reason.

          For in the first place they say that God, according to the book of Genesis, made two great lights, the greater light to rule the day, and the lesser light to rule the night. This they understand to be an allegory, insofar as the lights are the two powers, the spiritual and the temporal. Then they maintain that as the moon, which is the lesser light, only has light so far as she receives it from the sun, so the temporal power only has authority as it receives authority from the spiritual power.

          To refute these and similar arguments, we must remember the words of [Aristotle] the Philosopher in his book on Sophistry, "the overthrow of an argument is the pointing out of the mistake." . . . Having noted these things, to make it clearer how we destroy this and the further fallacies of our adversaries, we must remark that there are two ways in which error may arise concerning the mystical sense, either by seeking it where it is not, or by accepting it in a sense other than its real sense.

          Concerning the first of these ways, Augustine says, in his work Of the City of God that we must not think that all things, of which we are told, have a special meaning. For it is on account of that which means something, that that also which means nothing is woven into a story. It is only with the ploughshare that we turn up the earth; but the other parts of the plough are also necessary.

          Concerning the second way in which error touching the interpretation of mysteries may arise, Augustine, in his book "On Christian Doctrine," speaking of those who wish to find in Scripture something other than he who wrote the Scripture meant, says, that such "are misled in the same way as a man who leaves the straight path, and then arrives at the end of the path by a long circuit." . . .

          Having thus first noted these things, I will proceed, as I said above, to destroy the argument of those who say that the two great lights are representative of the two great powers on earth. For on this type rests the whole strength of their argument. It can be shown in two ways that this interpretation cannot be upheld. First, seeing that these two kinds of power are, in a sense, accidents of men, God would thus appear to have used a perverted order, by producing the accidents, before the essence to which they belong existed; and it is ridiculous to say this of God. For the two great lights were created on the fourth day, while man was not created till the sixth day, as is evident in the text of Scripture.

          Secondly, seeing that these two kinds of rule are to guide men to certain ends, as we will see, it follows that if man had remained in the state of innocence in which God created him, he would not have needed such means of guidance. These kinds of rule, then, are remedies against the weakness of sin. Since, then, man was not a sinner on the fourth day, for he did not then even exist, it would have been useless to make remedies for his sin, and this would be contrary to the goodness of God.

          Therefore I say that the temporal power does not receive its being from the spiritual power, nor its power which is its authority, nor its working considered in itself. . . .

No Possible Source of Church Authority over the King

14. Again, if the Church had power to give authority to the Roman Prince, she would have it either from God, or from herself, or from some Emperor, or from the universal consent of mankind, or at least from the majority of mankind. There is no other channel by which this power could flow down to the Church. But she does not have it from any of these sources, therefore she does not have it at all.

          It is clear that she has it from none of these sources. For if she had received it from God, she would have received it either by the divine or by the natural law: because what is received from nature is received from God (though the converse of this is not true). But this power is not received by the natural law; for nature lays down no law, except for the effects of nature, for God cannot fail in power, where he brings anything into being without the aid of secondary agents. Since therefore the Church is not an effect of nature, but of God who said: "Upon this rock I will build my Church," and elsewhere: "I have finished the work which you gave me to do," it is clear that nature did not give the Church this law.

          Nor was this power bestowed by the divine law. For the whole of the divine law is contained in the bosom of the Old or the New Testament, and I cannot find therein that any thought or care for worldly matters was commanded, either to the early or to the latter priesthood. . . .

          So it is quite plain that the Church did not receive this power from herself; for nothing can give what it has not. . . . But it is sufficiently clear from what we have previously made evident that the Church has not received this power from any Emperor.

          Further, who can doubt that she did not have it from the consent of all, or even of the greater part of mankind? This is particularly so since, not only all the inhabitants of Asia and Africa, but even the greater number of Europeans, hold the thought in abhorrence. It is mere weariness to adduce proofs in matters which are so plain. . . .

Separate Domains of Temporal and Spiritual Powers

16. It has been proved in the preceding chapter that the authority of the Empire does not have its cause in the authority of the Supreme Pontiff. For we have shown that this argument led to absurd results. Yet it has not been entirely shown that the authority of the Empire depends directly upon God, except as a result from our argument. For it is a consequence that, if the authority comes not from the vicar of God, it must come from God himself. Therefore, for the complete determination of the question proposed, we must prove directly that the emperor or monarch of the world stands in an immediate relation to the King of the universe, who is God.

          To better understand this, it must be recognized that man alone, of all created things, holds a position midway between mortal things and immortal things; and, therefore, philosophers rightly compare him to a dividing line between two hemispheres. For man consists of two essential parts, namely, the soul and the body. If he is considered in relation to his body only, he is mortal; but if he is considered in relation to his soul only, he is immortal. . . . Two ends, therefore, have been laid down by the ineffable providence of God for man to aim at. One is the happiness of this life, which consists in the exercise of his natural powers, and which is prefigured in the earthly Paradise. The other is the happiness of the life eternal, which consists in the fruition of the sight of God's countenance, and to which man by his own natural powers cannot rise, if he is not aided by the divine light. This happiness is understood by the heavenly Paradise.

          But to these different kinds of happiness, like different conclusions, we must come by different paths. For the first we may arrive at by the lessons of philosophy, if only we will follow them, by acting in accordance with the moral and intellectual virtues. But at the second we can only arrive by spiritual lessons, transcending human reason, so that we follow them in accordance with the theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity. The truth of the first of these conclusions and of these means is made clear by human reason, which by the philosophers has been all laid open to us. The other conclusions and means are made clear by the Holy Spirit, who by the mouth of the Prophets and holy writers, and by Jesus Christ, the co-eternal Son of God, and his disciples, has revealed to us supernatural truth of which we have great need. Nevertheless human passion would cast them all behind its back, if it were not that men, going astray like the beasts that perish, were restrained in their course by bit and bridle, like horses and mules.

          Therefore, man had need of two guides for his life, as he had a twofold end in life. One is the Supreme Pontiff, to lead mankind to eternal life according to the things revealed to us. The other is the Emperor, to guide mankind to happiness in this world, in accordance with the teaching of philosophy. None, or only a few could arrive at this harbor of happiness (and even they with great difficulty) unless the waves and flatteries of human desires were set at rest, and the human race were free to live in peace and quiet. This therefore is the mark at which he who is to care for the world, and whom we call the Roman Prince, must most chiefly aim at. I mean, that in this little plot of earth belonging to mortal men, life may pass in freedom and with peace. The order of this world follows the order of the heavens, as they run their course, to the end that the learning which brings liberty and peace may be duly applied by this guardian of the world in proper time and place. Thus, it is necessary that this power should be dispensed by God who is ever present to behold the whole order of the heavens. It is God alone who has preordained this, that by it in His providence he might bind all things together, each in their own order.

Source: Dante Alighieri, On Monarchy (1312), 1, 3. Tr. F.J. Church.

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THOMAS MORE: UTOPIA

 

Thomas More (1478–1535) was an English lawyer and statesman, and at the height of his career was Lord Chancellor under Henry VIII of England, one of the highest governmental positions, which involved advising the King. He alienated himself from Henry by refusing to sign a document that would make the King the supreme head of the Church of England. For this he was found guilty of high treason and decapitated. In 1516, 13 years before taking his position as Lord Chancellor, More published Utopia in Latin, the first English translation appearing only after his death. The work reflects a humanistic period of his life when he was in association with satirical social critics like Erasmus. During this time More also published a translation of four pieces by the Roman satirist Lucian, which reflect his appreciation of satire as a literary device. Those four works are (1) "The Tyrannicide", a dialogue in which two would‑be assassins mock the vanity, paranoia, and self‑importance of tyrants. (2) "The Lover of Lies", a comic conversation where a group of men compete to tell the most ridiculous supernatural stories, exposing human gullibility through escalating absurdity. (3) "Menippus", a philosophical travel tale in which Menippus descends to the underworld to learn the truth about life, only to find that the dead are just as foolish as the living, but more polite, and (4) "The Rooster", a dialog in which a talking rooster lectures a bewildered man about philosophy (e.g., “You humans think yourselves wise, yet you spend your days chasing what you do not need and fearing what you cannot avoid. A rooster could teach you better”).

          More wrote Utopia as a similar satire, modeled after the many accounts of voyages to new worlds that were published in his day. The full title of the work is "On the Best State of a Commonwealth and on the New Island of Utopia". The term "utopia," invented by More, means "no place" in Greek, and his aim was to criticize various problems within European society and test the limits of humanist political reform. The work is in two books, and the selections below are from the second, in which he conveys a fictitious account of an unusually happy and well-organized society on the island. The story is conveyed by a traveler named Raphael, who visited it somewhere in the New World. The account begins with a description of the island's geography, which, surrounded by a treacherous sea, protects it from outside invasion. Inhabitants live in a communal setting, have no currency, and share all goods and services with others as needed. Everyone rotates in and out of agricultural work every two years. They use their time efficiently, and have only six-hour work days, with the remainder of their time spent on learning and leisure activities. The tough chores are done by slaves who are either criminals or volunteers from poorer surrounding countries. They have free public hospitals, practice euthanasia, allow consensual divorce, minimize the death penalty, have few written laws, and show religious toleration (except for atheists).

GEOGRAPHY AND GOVERNMENT

Layout of the Island

The island of Utopia is 200 miles across in the middle and over a great part of it, but grows narrower at both ends. The figure of it is not unlike a crescent. Eleven miles breadth of sea washes its horns and forms a large bay, encompassed by a shore about 500 miles in length, and well sheltered from storms. There is no great current in the bay. The whole coast is as it were a continued harbor, affording the whole island every advantage of mutual contact. Yet the entrance into the bay, because of rocks and shoals, is very dangerous.

          In the middle is a rock which appears above water, on whose top is a tower inhabited by a garrison. The other rocks lie under water, and are very dangerous. The channel is known only by the natives, and a stranger entering the bay without one of their captains would be in immediate danger of shipwreck. They themselves could not pass it in safety, without certain marks on the coast to direct their way. If these were a little altered, any fleet coming against them, however large, would certainly be lost. Similarly, on the other side of the island are many harbors. The coast is so fortified by nature as well as contrivance, that a small force could hold back the descent of a large army.

          Reports say (and marks of its credibility remain) that this island was originally a part of the continent. Utopus, the conqueror of it, and whose name it now bears (having previously been called Abraxa), brought the government and civility of the primitive inhabitants to their present highly improved state. Having easily subdued them, he formed the design of separating them from the continent and encompassing them with the sea. To this end, he ordered a deep channel to be dug 15 miles long. So the natives might not think he treated them like slaves, he not only required them to labor at the work, but his own soldiers as well. From the number of hands employed, it was finished quickly, exceeding every man's expectation. His neighbors, who at first laughed at the foolishness of the undertaking, when they saw it accomplished, were struck with admiration and terror.

          There are 54 cities on the island, all of them large and well built. Their laws, manners, and customs, are the same, and they resemble each other as nearly as the ground they stand on will allow. The nearest to each other are at least 24 miles apart, and the most remote, not more than a day's journey on foot. Every city sends three of her wisest senators once a year to Amaurot (the capital of the island, and situated in the center), to consult on their common interests. The jurisdiction of every city extends at least 20 miles, and farther where they lie wider apart. No one desires to enlarge her boundary, for the people consider themselves only as good managers of their lands, not as owners.

          They have built farm houses over the whole country, which are well designed and furnished with every necessity. Inhabitants for them are sent in rotation from the cities. No family in the country has fewer than forty men and women in it, besides two slaves. A master and mistress preside over every family, and over thirty families a magistrate. Every year twenty of the family return to town after having been two years in the country. In their place another twenty are sent to learn the country business of those who have been there only one year, and must, in their turn, teach the next comers. Thus, those who live on the farms are never uninformed of agriculture, and commit no fatal errors, such as causing a scarcity of corn.

          But, notwithstanding these yearly changes, to prevent any from being compelled against their desires to follow that hard course of life too long, many of them take such pleasure in it, that they ask permission to continue therein many years. These husbandmen till the ground, breed cattle, hew wood, and send it to the towns by land or water, as is most convenient. They breed countless chickens in a very interesting manner. They are not hatched by hens, but a vast number of eggs are hatched together by means of a constant artificial warmth; and no sooner do the young break through the shell, than they consider their feeder as their parent and follow man as other chickens do the hen. . . .

Magistrates

Thirty families choose yearly a magistrate, who was in ancient times called the syphogrant, but now the philarch. Over every ten syphogrants, with these their families each, is another magistrate, formerly called tranibor, now protophi larch. The syphogrants, 200 in number, choose the prince from a list of four, named by the people of the four divisions of the city, taking an oath beforehand that they will choose him whom they think most suitable for the office. They vote privately, so that it is not known for whom each gives his vote. The prince is for life, so that he will not enslave his people if he suspects a scheme against him.

          The tranibors are newly chosen every year, yet generally continued, while all their other magistrates are annual. They meet every third day (oftener if necessary), and consult with the prince concerning the general interests of the state, or private disagreements among the people, though the latter seldom happen. Two syphogrants are always called into the council-chamber, and are changed daily. It is a fundamental rule of the constitution that nothing relative to the public can be concluded, until the matter has been debated three days in the council. It is death for any to meet and hold consultation concerning the state, except at their council, or in the general assembly of the people.

          This has been so provided, that the prince and the tranibors may not conspire to change the government and enslave the people. Therefore, when anything of great importance arises, the syphogrants are made acquainted with it, who, when they have communicated it to the families belonging to their divisions, and have considered it themselves, make a report to the senate. On important occasions, the matter is referred to the council of the whole island.

          One rule observed in their council is to never debate a subject on the day on which it is proposed. It is always assigned to the next meeting. For, they fear that rashness and the heat of argument might lead them to support their first opinions, rather than consult the public good, and thereby put their country at risk rather than endanger their own reputations. To prevent this, they make their motions carefully, not impulsively.

Work and Leisure

Agriculture is so universally understood among them that neither man nor woman is ignorant of it. They are instructed in it from their childhood, partly at school and partly by practice. They are frequently led into the fields near the town, where they not only see others at work, but become exercised in it themselves. Besides agriculture, so common to them, every man has some specific trade, such as the manufacture of wool or flax, masonry, smith's or carpenter's work. No other trade is in higher regard among them. Throughout the island they wear one sort of clothes, without any other distinction than what is necessary for different sexes, and the married and unmarried. The fashion never changes, is simple and pleasing, and is suited to the climate, for summer as well as winter.

          Every family makes clothes for itself, and women as well as men all learn one of the above-mentioned trades. The women generally engage in the wool and flax trade, leaving the more vigorous trades to the men. One trade is generally followed by father and son, their preferences often agreeing. But if any man's talent points another way, he is adopted into a family professing the trade he prefers, and effort is made by his father and by the magistrate that his master be a proper person. If, when one has learned a certain trade, he desires to acquire another, that is also allowed and is managed as before. When he has learned both, he follows that which he prefers, unless the public has more need for one than the other.

          The chief and almost only business of the syphogrants is to make sure that no man lives idly, but that everyone follows his trade diligently. Yet they do not exhaust themselves with continuous labor from morning to night, as if they were beasts of burden. This would indeed be grueling slavery, as it is everywhere the common course of life among all workers except the Utopians. But, dividing the day and night into twenty-four hours, they appoint six for work, three before and three after the midday meal. They then have supper, and at eight o'clock (counting from noon), they go to bed and sleep eight hours. The rest of their time is left to their own discretion. Yet they are not to waste the time in luxury and idleness, but must employ it in some proper exercise, according to their various preferences, which is generally reading.

          They have public lectures every morning before daybreak. None are obliged to attend, except those who are appointed to literary professions. Yet many women as well as men go to hear lectures of one sort or another, according to their interests. If others, not formed for contemplation, prefer employing themselves at that time in their trades, as many of them do, they are not hindered, but are praised as subjects desirous of serving their country.

          After supper, they spend an hour in some diversion, in summer in the garden, and in winter in their halls, entertaining each other with music or discourse. They have no idea of dice, or of any foolish and mischievous game. They have, however, two games not unlike our chess. The one is a battle of numbers, in which number consumes number. The other resembles a battle between the virtues and vices, in which the discord among the vices themselves and their union against virtue is pleasantly represented; there is also the particular opposition between certain virtues and vices, and the methods in which vice openly assaults, or secretly undermines virtue, and virtue resists.

Efficiency of the Utopians

Since only six hours are devoted to labor, the time appointed to it must be carefully examined, otherwise, as you can imagine, a scarcity of the necessities of life might result. But this time is quite far from being insufficient for supplying them with necessities and conveniences. More time is unnecessary, as may be seen by considering how large a proportion of all other nations is totally idle. In the first place, women generally do little, and they are half of mankind; and if a few women are diligent, their husbands are idle. Then consider the great number of idle priests, and what are called religious persons. Add to these the rich, those chiefly who have landed property, called noblemen and gentlemen, with their families of idle people, kept for show rather than use. Then add those strong and vigorous beggars who go about pretending disease as an excuse for begging. On the whole, you will find that the number of those by whose labor mankind is supplied is much smaller than you imagine.

          Next, consider how few of those who work are employed in labors of real use. For we, who measure all things by money, give rise to many trades which are useless and superfluous, and which serve only to support festivity and luxury. If the laboring part of mankind were employed only on the necessities of life, these would be so plentiful that their price would fall, and the tradesman could not be maintained. But suppose that everyone who labors in useless avocations were more profitably employed, and all they who waste away their lives in idleness and sloth (each of whom consumes as much as two of the laborious) were compelled to labor. You may immediately see that little time would accomplish everything that is necessary, profitable, or agreeable to mankind, especially while pleasure is kept within proper bounds. . . .

          Thus, from the number among them who are neither idle nor to be uselessly employed, you may estimate how much may be done in their few hours of labor. But besides this, we need to remember that useful skills are managed with less labor among them than elsewhere. In regular societies, the building and repair of houses employs many people. The reason is that a financially careless heir often allows the house his father built to fall into decay, and his successor is at great cost to repair what might have been kept up at a small expense. It also often happens that the house which one person built at a great expense, is neglected by another who thinks he has better taste in architecture, and, letting it go to ruin, builds another at a greater expense. But among the Utopians everything is so regulated that they seldom require new building ground. They not only repair their houses with great speed, but show much skill in preventing their decay, and their buildings are preserved very long with little labor. Thus, too, their builders are often without employment, except in hewing timber and squaring stone, in case of needing to construct a building in a sudden emergency. Abundance of all things exists among them. Indeed, it frequently happens that for lack of other work, many of them are sent out to repair the highways. But when no public call requires their attendance, the hours of labor are shortened. The magistrates never impose unnecessary labor on the people. For, the chief end of the constitution is to regulate labor by the public needs, and to allow all as much time as possible for mental improvement, in which they judge the happiness of life to consist.

          As for their clothes, observe how little labor is spent on them. While at work, they wear loose dresses of leather and skins, which will last seven years. When they appear in public, they put on an upper garment which hides the other. These garments are all one color, the natural one of the wool. They need less woolen cloth than is used anywhere else, and what they use is much less costly. Of linen cloth they use more, but it is made with less labor; and they value cloth only from the whiteness of the linen or cleanness of the wool, without much regard to the fineness of the thread. While in other places, four or five upper garments of woolen cloth, of different colors, and as many silken vests, are hardly sufficient. While the more refined sort of person thinks that ten garments are too few, here every man is content with one, which often lasts him two years. Nor is there any temptation to desire more, for no man would be the warmer, nor improve their appearance with them.

DOMESTIC ISSUES

Family Life

It is now time to explain to you the mutual association of these people, their commerce and regulations.

          As their cities are composed of families, so their families are made up of those who are nearly related to each other. Their women, as they grow up, are married into other families. But the males, children and grandchildren, still live in the same house, in great obedience to the common parent; unless age has weakened his mind, and then the next in age supplies his place. But due care is taken that no city becomes too populous, or be depopulated. No city may contain over 6000 families besides those of the surrounding country. No family may have less than ten, or more than sixteen, persons in it; without any limitation for the children under age. This rule is easily observed by removing some of the children of a more fruitful couple to a less abundant family. . . .

          The oldest man of every family, as already said, presides in it. Wives obey their husbands, and children their parents, junior always serving senior. Every city is divided into four equal parts, and in the middle of each is a marketplace. What is manufactured by the various families and brought there, is carried to houses appointed for that purpose. In these, all things of one kind are laid together, and every father goes there and takes whatever he or his family needs, without paying for it, or leaving any exchange. There is no reason for denying anyone, since they have such abundance of all things. There is also no danger of anyone asking for more than he needs; for, being sure they will always be supplied, they have no incentive of the kind.

          It is the fear of deficiency which makes any animal greedy or ravenous. Besides this fear, there is a pride in man which makes him regard it a glory to excel his fellow-creature in splendor and excess. The laws of Utopia leave no room for these feelings.

          Near these markets are others for every kind of provision. Here are herbs, fruits, bread, fish, fowl, and cattle. Outside of their towns there are designated places near running streams for killing their animals, which is done by their slaves. They do not allow their citizens to kill their cattle, since they think that this would greatly impair human feelings of pity and kindness, which are among the best of the affections that we are born with. Nor do they allow anything foul or unclean to be brought into their towns, to prevent the air from being infected with ill smells which might harm their health.

          In every street are large gathering halls, lying at equal distances from each other, and distinguished by particular names. The syphogrants live in them, with their thirty respective family dwellings surrounding them, fifteen on one side of it, and as many on the other. Here they meet and hold their meals. The steward of each goes to the market at a designated hour, and takes home provisions according to the number belonging to his hall.

          They take the greatest care of their sick, who are lodged and provided for in public hospitals. They have four of these to every town, built without the walls, and so spacious, that they are like little towns. By this means, had they ever so many sick, they could lodge them conveniently, and so far apart, that no apprehension of infection could arise from those laboring under contagious disorders. The hospitals are provided with everything necessary for the ease and restoration of the sick. The patients are looked after with such tenderness and care, and are so constantly attended by their skilful physicians, so that none are sent there against their preferences. Thus, there is scarcely one person in a whole town who, if taken ill, would prefer to stay home rather than go there.

          When the steward of the hospitals has taken for the sick whatever the physician prescribes, the best things left in the market are distributed to the halls in proportion to their numbers. The first served are the prince, then the chief priest, the tranibors, ambassadors, and strangers if any are among them. The latter indeed seldom happens, but they have well furnished houses designated particularly for the reception of strangers when they come.

          At the hours of dinner and supper, the whole syphogranty is assembled by trumpet and they meet and eat together, except only those who are in the hospitals or lie sick at home. Yet after the halls are supplied, no one is prevented from carrying home provision from the marketplace, for they know that no one does this except for some good reason. For, though anyone who pleases may eat at home, no one does it from inclination, since it is absurd to prepare a bad dinner at home when a much more plentiful one is ready for him so near his residence.

          The unpleasant and dirty tasks in these halls are performed by their slaves. But cutting their meat and arranging their tables is done by the women, every family taking it by rotation. They sit at three or more tables according to their number, the men toward the wall, the women on the outside. Thus, if any of the women suddenly become ill (which is not uncommon when they are pregnant), she may, without disturbing the rest, rise and go to the nursery, where there are nurses with the unweaned infants, clean water, cradles, and a fire. . . .

          So you see, there are no idle people among them, nor any pretences for excusing any individual from labor. They have no taverns, bars, or brothels, nor any other means of corruption, of gathering in corners, or forming parties. All live in full view, and all are obliged to do their duty and properly devote time to their leisure. It is certain that, a nation thus regulated, must enjoy great abundance of all things, which being equally distributed, no one can need or be forced to beg. . . .

Slaves, Euthanasia

They make no slaves of prisoners of war, except of those who are taken in battle; nor of the sons of their own slaves, or of those of other countries. Their slaves are only those who are condemned to that state for some crime. Or, which is more common, they are those who their merchants find condemned to death in countries where they trade, whom they often ransom at low rates, and sometimes obtain for free. They are employed in perpetual labor, and are always chained. Their natives are treated much more severely than others, being considered as more immoral than the rest; and, since the advantages of so excellent an education were insufficient, they are judged worthy of harder usage.

          Another kind of slave is the poor of neighboring countries, who voluntarily offer to serve them. The Utopians treat them better and use them in every respect as well as their own countrymen, except that they impose more labor upon them, which is no hardship to those who have been accustomed to it. If any of them desire to return to their own country (which indeed seldom happens) they neither force them to stay nor send them away empty-handed.

          I have already related to you with what care they look after their sick, so that nothing is left undone which may contribute either to their health or ease. As for those who are afflicted with incurable disorders, they use all possible means of cherishing them, and making their lives as comfortable as possible. They visit them often, and take great pains to make their time pass easily. But if any have torturing, lingering pain, without hope of recovery or ease, the priests and magistrates visit and encourage them [to voluntarily end their lives]. They are unable to proceed with the business of life, have become a burden to themselves and all around them, and have in reality outlived themselves. Thus, they should no longer cling to a deep-rooted disease, but choose instead to die since they would only live in great misery. Being persuaded, if they thus relieve themselves from torture, or allow others to do it, they will be happy after death. Since they forfeit none of the pleasures, but only the troubles of life by this, they think they not only act reasonably, but consistently with religion. For they follow the advice of their priests, the expounders of God's will.

          Those who are influenced by these reasons either starve themselves or take laudanum. But no one is compelled to end his life in this way, and if they cannot be persuaded to it, the former care and attendance on them is continued. Though they respect a voluntary death when chosen on such authority to be very honorable, on the contrary, if anyone commits suicide without the concurrence of the priests and senate, they do not honor the body with a decent funeral, but throw it into a ditch.

Marriage, Divorce, Adultery

Their women are not allowed to marry before eighteen, and their men not before twenty-two. If any of them is guilty of unlawful intercourse before marriage, they are severely punished, and they are not allowed to marry unless they can obtain a special authorization from the prince. Such disorderly conduct also brings a severe reprimand on the master and mistress of the family in which it happened, since it is concluded that they have been negligent in their duty. Their reason for punishing this so severely is because they think, were they not strictly restrained from all roaming appetites, very few would engage in a condition in which they risk the peace of their whole lives by being tied to one person, and are obliged to endure all the inconveniences with which that state is accompanied.

          In choosing their spouses, they adopt a plan which appears to us very extravagant, yet is constantly observed among them and considered very wise. Before marriage, a somber matron presents the bride (whether she is a virgin or widow) naked, to the bridegroom. After that, some somber man presents the bridegroom naked to the bride. We laughed at this, and condemned it as very indecent. They, on the other hand, wondered at the foolishness of mankind in all other countries; who, if they buy but an inferior horse, examine him all over and take off his trappings. Yet a wife, on whom depends the happiness of the remainder of life, they take upon trust, regarding only her face, and leaving the rest of her body covered, where contagious and loathsome disorders may be concealed. All men are not so wise as to choose a woman only for her good qualities, and even the wise consider the body as adding more than a little to the mind. It is certain that clothes may conceal some deformity which may alienate a man from his wife when it is too late to part with her. If such a thing is discovered after marriage, he has no remedy but patience. They therefore think it is reasonable that good care should be taken to guard against such harmful deception.

          There was greater reason for this regulation among them, because they are the only people of those parts who do not allow polygamy or [nonconsensual] divorce, except in cases of adultery or insufferable perverseness. In these cases, the senate dissolves the marriage, and grants the injured permission to marry again. But the guilty are made infamous and never allowed the privilege of a second marriage. No one is allowed to put away his wife against her inclination, on account of any misfortune which may have happened to her person. They consider it the height of cruelty and treachery to abandon either of the married pair when they most need the tenderness of their partner. This is especially so in the case of old age, which brings many diseases with it, and is itself a disease. But it often happens that, when a married pair do not agree, they separate by mutual consent and find others with whom they hope to live more happily. Yet this is not done without permission from the senate, which never allows a divorce without a strict inquiry, by the senators and their wives, into the grounds on which it is desired. Even when they are satisfied as to the reasons of it, the matter proceeds slowly, for they are persuaded that a too prompt permission of new marriages would greatly impair the kind communication of the married.

          They severely punish those who defile the marriage bed. If both of the offenders are married, they are divorced and the injured may intermarry [i.e., marry the other injured spouse], or marry whom else they please. But the adulterer and adulteress are condemned to slavery. But if the injured spouse cannot conquer the love of the offender, they may still live together, the partner following to the labor to which the slave is condemned. Sometimes the repentance of the condemned, and the unaltered kindness of the injured, have prevailed with the prince to take off the sentence. But those who relapse after they are once pardoned are punished with death.

ISSUES OF JUSTICE

Punishment

Their law does not determine the punishment of other crimes, it being left to the senate to fix it according to the circumstances of the case. Husbands are allowed to correct their wives, and parents their children, unless the offence is so great that public punishment is thought necessary for the sake of example. Slavery is generally the punishment, even for the greatest crimes. For it is no less terrible to the criminals than death, and they deem the preservation of them in servitude to be more for the interest of the state than killing them. Their labor is more beneficial to the public than their death could be, and the sight of their misery is a more lasting terror to others, than that of their death.

          If their slaves will not bear their yoke nor submit to the labor prescribed them, but rebel, they are treated as wild animals that are incapable of being kept in order by a prison or chains, and they are finally put to death. But those who bear their punishment patiently, and appear to be more troubled by their crimes than their sufferings, are not without hope that in the end either the prince by his prerogative or the people by their intercession will restore them to liberty, or at least greatly lessen their slavery.

          He who tempts a woman to adultery is no less severely punished than he who commits the crime. They deem a deliberate intention to commit a crime equal to the actual perpetration of it, since its not taking effect does not diminish the guilt of him who failed in his attempt.

Handicaps, Physical Appearance

They take great pleasure in fools. It is considered mean-spirited and unbecoming to treat them improperly, and they think it is not wrong for people to divert themselves with their foolishness, and that it is an advantage to the fools. For if men were so morose and severe as not to be at all amused with their ridiculous behavior and foolish sayings (which is all they can do to recommend themselves to others), it could not be expected that they would be so well provided for nor so tenderly used as otherwise.

          Should any man criticize another for being misshapen, or imperfect in any part of his body, it would be thought no reflection on the person so treated, but scandalous in him who had faulted another with what he could not prevent.

          It is thought a mark of a lazy and squalid attitude, not to preserve natural beauty with care. But it is wicked among them to wear makeup. They all see that no beauty recommends a wife to her husband so strongly as her integrity and obedience. Few only are attracted by beauty, but the other excellences charm the whole world.

Laws

If a man aspires ambitiously to any office, he loses it for certain. They live in loving association with each other, the magistrates never behaving either disrespectfully or cruelly to the people. They prefer rather to be called fathers, and by really being such, well merit the designation. The people pay them all marks of honor, the more freely because none are demanded from them. The prince himself has no distinction either of garments or a crown. A sheaf of corn only is carried before him, and a wax-light before the high-priest.

          They have few laws, and their constitution is such that they require not many. They greatly condemn other countries, whose laws, with the commentaries on them, swell so many volumes. They consider it unreasonable to oblige men to obey a body of laws so large and intricate, as not to be read and understood by every subject.

          They have no lawyers among them, since they consider them to be a class whose profession it is to disguise matters, and to twist the laws. Therefore, they think it much better that every man should plead his own cause, and trust it to the judge, as elsewhere the client trusts it to his counselor. By this plan they avoid many delays, and find out the truth with more certainty. For, after the parties have opened the merits of the cause without the contrivances of lawyers, the judge examines the matter and supports the simplicity of those well-meaning persons, whom otherwise the scheming would run down. Thus, they avoid those evils which appear so notable in those countries which labor under a vast load of laws.

          Every one of them is skilled in their law. It is a very short study, and the plainest meaning of which words are capable is always the sense of it. They argue in this way. All laws are disseminated so that every man may know his duty. Therefore, the plainest construction of words is what ought to be put upon them. A more refined exposition could not easily be understood, and would only make the laws useless to the greater part of mankind, especially to those who most need the guidance of them. It is the same thing whether you make no law at all, or couch it in terms of which, without a sharp mind and much study, men cannot find out the true meaning. For the generality of mankind are so dull and so busied in their jobs, that they have neither the leisure nor capacity required for such an inquiry. . . .

          The Utopians call those who ask magistrates from them "neighbors"; but those to whom they have provided more particular services "friends". While all other nations are perpetually making and breaking leagues, they never enter into alliance with any state. They think leagues useless, and believe, that if the common ties of humanity do not knit men together, the faith of promises will have little effect. They are the more confirmed in this by what they see of the nations around them, who are no strict observers of leagues and treaties.

War

They detest war as brutal, which, to the disgrace of human nature, is practiced more by man than by any animal. In opposition to the opinion of almost every other country, they think nothing is more inglorious than the glory gained by war. They involve themselves daily in military exercises and discipline, in which their women are also trained so that in cases of need they may not be completely useless. Nevertheless, they do not engage rashly in war, but only to defend themselves or their friends from aggression, or to assist the oppressed in shaking off the yoke of tyranny. They help their friends in offensive as well as defensive wars, but never without having been consulted before the breach was made, being satisfied as to the grounds, and finding every effort of accommodation unsuccessful.

          They think war is just when a nation encroaches on the territory of its neighbor by public authority and takes away property; or when merchants are oppressed in a strange country, under pretence of unjust laws, or by the distortion of good ones. The latter they consider the juster cause, because injury is done under the appearance of law. . . .

Religious Tolerance

Various religions abound in different parts of the island, and even in every town. Some worship the sun, others the moon, or one of the planets. Others again worship men who have been famous for virtue or glory, not only as ordinary deities, but as the Supreme God. Yet the greater and wiser part adore one eternal, invisible, infinite, incomprehensible Deity. . . . By degrees they abandon their various superstitions and unite in the religion which is best and most respected. . . . Utopus understood that, before his coming among them, the inhabitants had been engaged in serious quarrels concerning religion. Through this they were so divided among themselves, that, with every party fighting by itself, he found it easy to conquer them. This done, he made a law that every man might be of what religion he pleased, and might try to draw others to his persuasion by argument, friendship, and modest behavior, without bitterness against those of other opinions. But those using any other force than that of persuasion, or using contempt or violence, were to be condemned to banishment or slavery.

          This law was made by Utopus, not only to preserve the public peace, which he saw suffered much by daily contentions and irreconcilable sects, but because he thought the interest of religion itself required it. He judged it wrong to lay down anything rashly. He also seemed to doubt whether those different forms of religion might not all proceed from God, who might inspire men in a different manner, and be pleased with the variety. He therefore thought it indecent and foolish for any man to threaten and terrify another, to make him believe what did not strike him as true. Supposing only one religion to be true and the rest false, he imagined that the innate force of truth would at last break forth and shine with splendor, if supported only by the strength of reasoning, and attended to by a teachable and unprejudiced mind. On the other hand, if such debates were carried on with violence and disturbance, the best and holiest religion might be choked with superstition, as corn is with thorns and briars, since the most wicked people are always the most stubborn.

          He therefore left men free to believe as they saw appropriate, making only a strict and severe law against those who should so far degenerate from the dignity of human nature, as to suppose that our souls died with our bodies, or that the world was governed by chance without a wise directing providence. For they all formerly believed that there is a state of rewards and punishments after this life. They now consider those who think otherwise as unsuitable to be accounted men, degrading so noble a being as the soul of man, and ranking it with the animals. They look upon such men as totally unsuitable for human society, or to be citizens of a well-ordered commonwealth. With such principles, as often as they dare, they will despise all their laws and customs. For, there is no doubt that one who fears nothing but the law, and believes there is nothing after death, will not hesitate to violate all the laws of his country by fraud or force, when by so doing he can satisfy his appetites. . . .

CONCLUSION

When Raphael [the narrator of the above account] had thus finished his discourse, many things occurred to me about the manners and laws of these people which seemed very absurd, such as their art of war, their notions of religion, etc. But principally, what seemed the foundation of the rest, was their living in common without the use of money. Through this, all nobility, splendor, and majesty would be destroyed, which according to common opinion are the true ornaments of a nation. . . . Though it must be confessed that he [i.e., Raphael] is a very learned man, and one who has acquired great knowledge of the world, I cannot agree with everything he has said. Yet, I freely confess, there are many things in the commonwealth of Utopia that I wish, but have no hope of seeing, were adopted among us.

Source: Thomas More, Utopia (1518), 2, tr. Arthur Cayley.

STUDY QUESTIONS

Please answer all of the following questions.

[Aquinas]

1. According to Aquinas in the section on "four kinds of law," describe those four kinds of law and state his four reasons for why there is divine law.

2. According to Aquinas in the section on "whether the natural law contains several precepts, or only one", describe the six main natural inclinations and their corresponding moral precepts of natural law.

3. According to Aquinas in the section on "whether the natural law is the same in all men," what are the three levels of principles of natural law regarding their rightness and our knowledge of them?

4. According to Aquinas in the section on "whether every human law is derived from the natural law," what are the two kinds of deduction from natural law?

5. According to Aquinas in the section on "man mastering over man in the state of innocence," what are the two reasons for why there is a master-subject relation?

6. According to Aquinas in the section "what is meant by the name king," what are the three forms of unjust governments, and the three forms of just governments?

7. According to Aquinas in the section titled "That a kingdom ought to be governed primarily with a view to creating happiness," what are the three things that hinder the continuance of the public good, and the three responsibilities of the king towards that end?

8. According to Aquinas in the section on "just war", describe the three requirements for just war.

[Dante]

9. What are the examples that Dante gives where a single authority figure is needed for something to achieve its end?

10. Summarize five of Dante's arguments in support of a single ruler of the world

11. Give one of Dante's two criticisms of the sun-moon argument.

12. According to Dante, what are the four possible sources of church authority over the king?

13. According to Dante in the section on separate domains of temporal and spiritual powers, what are the two parts, two ends, two paths, and two guides of human nature?

[More]

14. According to More, what is the political structure of the Utopian families and magistrates?

15. According to More, how are the Utopians more efficient than other societies?

16. According to More, how do the Utopians deal with slaves, and terminally ill people?

17. According to More, how do the Utopians deal with premarital sex, adultery and divorce?

18. According to More, how do the Utopians deal with punishment, and creation of laws?

19. According to More, how do the Utopians deal with war?

20. According to More, what is the Utopians' view of religious toleration and their reasons for it?

21. Short essay: please select one of the following and answer it in a minimum of 100 words.

          [Aquinas]

          a. Consider the six natural inclinations that Aquinas lists, and the six corresponding principles of natural law that they imply. Are there other natural inclinations that he should have listed, and are there other ways of devising natural laws from the six that he did list?

          b. In the section titled "Whether every human law is derived from the natural law" Aquinas discusses the problem raised by philosophers like Cicero that standards of justice vary greatly from one society to another. Does Aquinas adequately address this problem?

          c. In the section on natural servitude, Aquinas considers an issue that was also discussed by Augustine. For Augustine, there was no servitude in the state of innocence and people conducted themselves freely as their own masters. Discuss Aquinas's position on this and whether his view is more correct than Augustine's.

          d. Examine Aquinas's discussion of unjust governments and his critique of democracies. Are his worries about democracies justified?

          e. In the section on just war, Aquinas argues that right motive for declaring wars include doing good and avoiding evil. Is this a practical or impractical guideline? Explain.

[Dante]

          f. Augustine argued that when a large empire forces smaller countries to join them, this leads to social and civil unrest, as was the case with the Roman Empire. Dante sees it differently. How might Dante respond to Augustine?

          g. One Dante's arguments for a world government is efficiency: things can be done better with a single over-arching government than with many disunified governments. Criticize this argument.

          h. What are some of the disadvantages to world government which Dante might not have considered?

          i. Dante is advocating something like church-state separation by holding that the states do not get their authority from the church. Nevertheless, states still receive their authority from God. Discuss the implications of Dante's view of the state's authority, and whether it might lead to a theocracy.

          j. Dante envisioned a world government that was modeled after the Roman Empire under Caesar Augustus. In modern times, what would be a more realistic model for a world government, and how would that differ from Dante's conception?

          [More]

          k. Plato argued that the manufacture of luxury goods is a vital part of a country's economy. More, though, describes the manufacture of luxuries as an inefficient waste of time and suggests that a simpler life is better. Who is right and why?

          l. Describe the Utopian institution of slavery, and discuss whether it is an improvement over other types of slavery, which More seems to think it is.

          m. More suggests that marriage, although a social necessity, can be very oppressive. Describe the problems and discuss whether the Utopians' solutions are viable.

          n. The Utopians have only a few laws and those they do have are plainly worded so that everyone can understand them. Thus, they have no need for lawyers. Give their reasons for this and discuss whether their approach would work.

          o. While Utopians practice religious toleration, they do not permit atheism, and the denial of life after death and divine providence. What are their reasons for this and what, if anything, is wrong with this position?

          p. More briefly describes a game that the Utopians play called "virtues and vices." Develop More's game as either a card game or board game. Select a few virtues and their corresponding vices as examples (e.g., courage-cowardice; temperance-intemperance; good temper-ill temper; wittiness-buffoonery; generosity-stinginess; self respect-arrogance).